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PREFACE
This volume is the third in a three volume series of reports submitted to the National Science Foundation for a project
entitled "University of Rhode Island, University of Maine Study
of Social and Cultural Aspects of Fisheries Management Under
Extended Jurisdiction"

(N.S.F. Grant Number AER77-060l8).

This project was funded through the RANN Directorate of N.S.F.
(Research Applied to National Needs), and was designed to provide data on social, cultural, and economic aspects of the
New England fishinq scene which would be of value to those
in industry and government concerned with managing the marine
fisheries of the northeastern part of the United States,
particularly those concerned with management under PL 94-265,
the Fisheries Conservation and Management Act of 1976.

It is

important to note that PL 94-265 calls for the management of
U.S. fisheries not only for biological ends, but with economic
and social factors in mind as well.

The Congress clearly

recognized that the management of marine fisheries affects
both the fish resources and the economy and culture of coastal communities.

The data in each of the three academic areas

most directly involved in fisheries management are very uneven.
There isagreat deal of information about the biological aspects of U.S. fisheries; less on the economic sphere; and
virtually no social and cultural information on fishermen and
fishing communities in New England.

This current project

was initiated with a view toward correcting that imbalance.
All told, there were 13 people who worked on the project:
five from the University of Rhode Island and eight from the
University of Maine.

The entire University of Rhode Island

crew were anthropologists.

Five of the University of Maine

group were anthropologists; two others were economists; and
one was a graduate student in oceanography.

Preceding page brank
ix

This

p~oject

had five objectives which were stated in

the original proposal as follows:

(a) to provide baseline

data on the fishing communities and fisheries of New England,
(b) to provide information on key values and social institutions,

(c) to collect and analyze data on innovation in the

New England fishing industry,

(d) to provide a model which

other social scientists could use to apply social science
information to problems of fisheries management, and (f) to
integrate social, economic, and biological information in
ways that provide a coordinated picture of fishing behavior.
Volume I of this report contains the information on the baseline data.

This information is published in two parts.

The

port study information on the area between Eastport, Maine
and the New Hampshire/Massachusetts boundary has been published (1980) by the University of Maine Sea Grant Office in a
volume entitled
1978.

~

Fishing Ports of Maine and

~Hampshire:

Port study data on Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and

Connecticut are contained in a volume entitled The Small
Fishing Ports of Southern

~

England, published (1980) by

the University of Rhode Island Sea Grant Office.

Information

on values and social institutions, innovation, and specific
fisheries management plans (objectives b, c, and d) is contained in Volume II of the Final Report.
In this third volume, we are using an adaptive model to
provlde a new and integrated view of fishing behavior.

This

accomplishes the fifth objective of the project.
Accomplishing the first four objectives did not require
an unusual approach.

The port studies contain factual infor-

mation; the 22 articles that comprise Volume II required
conceptual tools and methodologies comnonly used in anthropology and economics.

This third volume required a unique

approach--one that has never been attempted before in exactly
the same way.

Our object was to synthesize social, economic,

and biological information, because it is increasingly recognized that those interested in managing the fisheries have

x

been getting piecemeal information from a variety of specialists in different disciplines which does not give any consistent, complete picture of fishing behavior.

Understanding

the need for a view of fishing behavior which takes into
account biological, social, and economic factors is one thing;
producing such a model is quite another.

The basic problem

is that integration of data from all of these diverse fields
necessitates an integrative device--a model.

Unfortunately,

we discovered no existing model which would allow us to
account for the phenomena we discovered in the fishing industry.

Thus, in order to provide an integrated view of

fishing behavior, we first had to develop such an integrative
model.

Much of the time one of the authors (Wilson) spent

on this project has been devoted to this task alone.

Frankly,

it has been a very difficult but rewarding experience.

The

result, we believe, is a different view of fishing and fishing behavior.

The model developed has allowed us to bring

into focus some aspects of the behavior of fishermen which
has previously gone completely unnoticed.

It also allows

us to explain diverse aspects of behavior ranging from innovation and secrecy to overexploitation of fish stocks, reference

grOUp behavior and the formation of institutions

among fishermen.
No model in the social sciences (or another academic
field for that matter) is completely without antecedents.
This model is no

exception.

In essence, we have taken con-

cepts concerning adaptation, strategic interaction and exchange from anthropology and sociology, combined them with
concepts developed by a few economists, and produced a new
model of the behavior of the firm.

In the past three years,

we have read so many articles and books in these diverse
fields that it is no longer clear even to us where the germs
of many of our ideas originated.

However, our debt to Fred-

erick Barth, John Bennett, and George Homans is very obvious

xi

and needs to be formally recognized.

The same is true for

economists Kenneth Boulding, Oliver Williamson, Kelvin Lancaster, and John Common.
The model presented in this book is essentially adaptive
or evolutionary,and as such is very different from the static
textbook model of the firm.

We were interested in using this

model to explain fishing behavior, but we believe it can be
applied to firms in a large number of industries in the industrialized western world.

This model, we would like to

stress, is neither an economic model nor an anthropological
model.

It is a general social science model of the behavior

of firms in modern industrial settings.
This model relies heavily on certain concepts such as
"institution," "exchange," "rules," "transaction," and
"cluster."

These terms have been used in so many different

ways that some standardization of meanings was necessary to
avoid confusion.

Accordingly, we have followed John R. Com-

mon's usage consistently throughout the book; we did so because he defined them clearly and because he developed his
terminology with anmalysis of the firm in mind.
This volume was written so that it could be understood
independent of the other volumes.

Nevertheless, it does con-

tain a summary of many of the ideas developed in the course
of this project.

Most of the volume is devoted to the devel-

opment of concepts and their application.

We draw very

heavily on data presented in the port study volumes and in
Volume II to exemplify certain points and to test hypotheses
suggested by our adaptive model.

Very little new data is

presented in this volume, save for Part III, which does contain data which has not been presented elsewhere in the final
report.

In fact, many of the articles in Volume II were

written with the requirements of this third volume in mind.
Part I of this volume reviews the social, economic, and
some of the biological literature applicable to fisheries

xii

problems and demonstrates the need for a new integrative model.
Part II presents the model itself.

In Part III, the model

is used to explain aspects of fishing behavior in New England.
In this section, certain hypotheses suggested by the adaptive model are tested, using data from various fisheries.
In Part IV, we apply some of the insights provided by our
model to aspects of fisheries management.
James Wilson wrote all of Part II

(a critical section

concerning the model) and did all of the editing on it.
also

~.vrote

the first draft of Part IV.

James Acheson wrote

and edited the preface, Part I, and Part III.
a final draft of Part IV.

He

He also wrote

The authors edited the drafts

produced by each other but made no attempt to jointly write
each section.

Wilson and Acheson have been working together

for almost a decade on one or another fishing project and
are fully cognizant of the fact that they have such different
writing styles, work habits, and methods of approaching problems that any attempt to sit in the same room to write a
single section or page could only end in disaster.

They have,

however, been working together long enough to learn enough
of each other's ~t8ciplines to make effective communication
possible.
The authors are indebted to Jane Brooks, Rosemary Shorey,
Donna Rog, and Faye Whelock who typed the great bulk of the
manuscript and to Steve Bicknell, Judith Cooper, and Claude
Westfall who drew the figures.

Justine Shea did a very fine

job cleaning up the final detailS

of the manuscript, includ-

ing typing the preface, Part IV, and the bibliography.

Very

special thanks are due Hugh Briggs, who worked long and
frustrating hours to rescue Part II from the bowels of a
troll-like word processor, and to Ann Acheson who worked
even longer hours editing and proofreading the entire volume
through its multiple drafts.
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PARI' I

THIDRETICAL BACKGROJND

i

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

In the intellectual history of the West, the concepts
of "progress" and "growth" have played a prominent role.

Man

has been the measure, and what gave man greater control, more
leisure, higher income, more energy, or a higher standard of
living was automatically good and desirable.

Very little

attention has been paid to the side effects of our headlong
attempts to industrialize, modernize, and grow.

It is only

in the last few decades that it has become widely understood
that the unparallelled economic development experienced by
the United States has been purchased by running through a
whole continent of resources in less than 200 years, and that
the price of technical progress has been severe damage to the
environment.

In the environmental sphere, the list of unfor-

tunate tradeoffs is a long one.

Massive increases in the

production of electricity have been purchased at the expense
of radioactive pollution; increases in ease of transportation
are exchanged for air pollution; production of synthetics
results in chemical pollution; increased food production has
led to DDT damage to a large number of animals and plants.
Reluctantly, we are coming to the conclusion that man is not
separate from nature, but a part of an incredibly complicated
natural system which he can disturb only at his peril.

Sadly,

with a sense of national malaise, we have begun to come to the
conclusion that our assets are not unlimited, that rapid economic growth can only be purchased at a very high cost, and
that we have got to begin to conserve our national resources.
Our attitudes and experiences with marine fishery resources
have parallelled our experience with other natural resources.
In the late 1950's and early 1960's it was thought that the
resources of the oceans were large enough to provide a general
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solution to starvation in the world.

There was a spate of

interest in farming the sea, and predictions that increases
in fishing efforts in the offshore, mid ocean regions
result

in massive increases in catches.

would

Of course, attempts

to greatly increase fishing pressure typically brought increases in catches for a few

yea~s,

and then stock failure.

In many cases, the decrease in fish catches were as spectacular as they were precipitous.

The anchovy production off

the coast of Chile fell from 12.3 million tons in 1970 to
approximately 3 million tons in 1973, a decline of over 75
percent in a three year period (Idyll 1973:29).

The Georges

Bank haddock catch, once the mainstay of the New England
fishery, declined from 120 million pounds in 1965 to a mere
11.7 million pounds in 1972 (Alexander 1973:192).
is a long one.

The list

In the United States, for example, similar

declines have been seen in the past few years in bluefin
tuna, northern shrimp, the southern shrimp (penaeus species),
Pacific sardine, northern lobster, dungeness crab, cod,
herring, Pacific halibut, Atlantic halibut, surf clams, and
numerous other species.
In the case of certain andromadous
species, for example, Atlantic salmon the problem is easily
traced to dams and the pollution of major rivers.

In other

cases, natural environmental factors playa major role.

The

collapse of the northern shrimp industry, which occurred
between 1973 and 1975, was due in large part, experts agree,
to a cyclical increase in water temperature in the Gulf of
Maine.

But a major problem in most cases has ostensibly been

overfishing.
------_.---.

That is,. the dangerous declines of most species

have been caused by excessive predation by man__· .
.

- . . . . . . _. - __ ·e._ . . . . _ ,". ___ __ ... ______ . ___
.~

•____

~_

..

_T_,.~._"··

By the mid 1960's it became increasingly clear that the
marine fisheries of the United States would have to be managed,
and that only the Federal Government could do the job properly,
given the range of fish stocks and the international implications of fisheries management (Hutton 1973:62-67) .

.,

..)

The passage of PL 94-265, the Fishery Conservation and
Management Act of 1976, marks a milestone in the annals of
fisheries management.

The law extends

u.s.

jurisdiction

over fisheries to 200 miles and provides a set of mechanisms
and guidelines for conservation and management of marine
fisheries.

Under this law, the coastal areas of the United

States are divided up into eight regions.

The fisheries of

each region are managed by one of eight Regional Councils,
composed of Federal and state officials and members of the
industry.
of

u.s.

Most important, the law calls for the management

fisheries for Optimum Sustainable Yield (PL 94-265:

Sec. 301).

This means, in essence, that the U.S. fisheries

are to be managed not only for biological ends but also with
economic and social factors in mind.

The authors of the bill

recognized that management of marine fisheries affects both
the fish resources and the economy and people of coastal
communities.

Simply managing to protect fish stocks alone

would inevitably cause a good deal of disruption to the fishing industry and inevitably result

in political opposition.

Moreover, implicit in the OSY concept is the recognition that
marine fisheries management involves some very difficult
tradeoffs between fish resources, catch, income, and goals of
coastal people.
In fisheries management circles, the dependence on Optimum Sustainable yield as a management tool was met' with mixed
f~elings.

Many people in state and Federal agencies charged

with managing marine resources recognize that management plans
must take into account data from both biological and social
sciences and that these data must be integrated in some way.
They are fully aware that the history of fisheries management
is studded with cases where biologists have suggested regulations which have stirred up massive political opposition,
instances in which legislators proposed plans which would not
solve the problem of overexploitation, and other cases
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where

social scientists put forth plans which turned out to be
patently illegal.

They were very optimistic about the OSY

concept, because it promised to bring together social, economic, historical, and biological data in a way that it
could be used

to effectively conserve the fish while mini-

mizing social

disruption and political opposition.

others

experienced with fisheries management were very skeptical
about the OSY concept.

They pointed out that there was no

precise agreement on the definition of the concept of Optimum Sustainable Yield, and no real agreement on what social,
biological, economic, and legal data are needed or how it
should be integrated.

In 1976, one officer of the National

Marine Fisheries Service phrased the problem in the following way:

"We have just passed a bill to manage all the

fisheries in the United States with a certain concept in
mind, and no one even knows how to define that concept."
In the years since the passage of the bill, the fears of
the skeptics have so far proven justified.

There has been

very little additional work published on Optimum Sustainable
Yield since 1976, and certainly nothing of a degree of specificity that would aid a Regional Council in formulating management plans.

The eight Regional Councils have reacted to the

absence of information on OSY in somewhat different ways.
Most have simply ignored the OSY concept, which is supposed
to guide management efforts, and have framed fisheries management plans with two factors in mind:
Yield, and 2) political pressure.

1) Maximum Sustainable

That is, they have set

quotas and other regulations which would result in coming as
close to achieving Maximum Sustainable Yield figures for a
given species as they dared, given the political pressure from
the fishing industry.

They are aware that this technique

achieves OSY, if at all, only by accident (Sissenwine
41-42).

1978:

Both fishermen and biologists have been unhappy with

the results.

The fishermen have resented being regulated for
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a variety of reasons

(Acheson 1980c;

1980f); the biolo-

gists tend to insist that fish stocks are still being overexploited and that future catches are being sacrificed for
political expediency.
The general unhappiness with the results of fisheries
management efforts is perhaps inevitable since the procedure
being used by the Regional Councils has three very serious
flaws.
Reliance on Maximum Sustainable Yield, a biological
concept, orients management toward maintaining the largest
biomass possible.

Unfortunately, a large biomass of fish,

or even large catches of fish, does not automatically translate into large incomes for fishermen or increased amounts of
fish for consumers, since some fish are worth a great deal in
the market and others are relatively worthless.

In addition,

the emphasis on MSY orients managers to thinking solely in
terms of cutting back fishing effort by whatever means.

It

does not focus attention on the social and economic effect
of various management options.

This can lead to some odd

priorities and unworkable suggestions.

For example, Maximum

Sustainable Yield can most easily be achieved by a complete
moratorium on fishing and this solution has been seriously
proposed by lab-bound biologists working in the MSY analytical frame.

It is, clearly, a solution which would be unac-

ceptable to fisherman, producers or consumers, who would have
no fish at all to catch, process and eat.
The procedure used by the Regional Councils almost completely ignores social, cultural, economic, and historical
data in formulating management plans except insofar as such
concerns are embodied in political opposition on the part of
fishermen.
The procedure used by the Councils is not based on any
clear understanding of what is being sacrificed or gained as
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•

Ma~~g~

any particular management option is put into effect.

ment, as it is currently being practiced in the New England
"""------~

------------- -

------

Regional Council, is essentially a contest between biologists
who want
--.--.-.

...

to protect the stocks and fishermen who want high
--,,"-'~-

-~----

.-.

,"

..,--

current incomes.

The tradeoffs needed

~<?__ gpJ::Clin

an

opt~il"ll_y.!-:I!_

have receeded into the background.
----~.---- .....

---. - -- .----,--".-~-...~~ ..... -.--.... - - ."
"

.

-~-.,

The Regional Councils have had little choice but to
ignore the concept of Optimum Sustainable Yield in the formulation of fisheries management plans.

They cannot be expected

to apply a concept that no one can specify concretely.

The

failure to adequately define Optimum Sustainable Yield has
left fisheries management in a limbo for the time being.

The

fact that such a key concept has received so little attention
points to an intellectual failure of the first order of magnitude on the part of academics interested in resource management.

It is clearly a concept that deserves a great deal of

attention on an increasingly crowded planet where the need to
manage all resources becomes more obvious with every passing
year.
Certainly one of the prime objectives of fisheries
management is to maintain catches, and thus a knowledge of
the dynamics of fish stocks is critical for effective management.

But the major problems with fish stocks are ostensibly

caused by human beings.

Thus, the object of management is to

control the predation by people exploiting those stocks.

If the

essential problem, then, is caused by our treatment of nature,
then the search for solutions must include an examination of
human desires, needs and motives.

Focusing on the fish alone

will not get at the genesis of the problem -- namely, the
behavior of people in the fishing industry and the economic
and social institutions in which they participate.

Unfortu-

nately, there is very little information on the behavior of
those in the fishing industry and the way their social and
economic institutions are systematically connected to fisher-
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ies resources.
In the absence of definite information on the culture
and social structure of fishing communities, fisheries managers ,and economists have simply assumed that fishermen were
interested in nothing but selfish gain at the expense of the
fish resources.

In this respect, they appear to be following

Garrett Hardin who assumes that those using common property
resources are locked into a system in which it is only logical that they increase exploitation without limit, and that
they are callous enough to escalate their abuse to the point
where those resources are stripped bare (Hardin 1968:1244).
Bonnie McKay expresses this attitude nicely when she says:
"The analytical model used by fisheries economists assumes
__

•• ______

• ____

that all

••

-

_.

",f~sh~rmen

• ...

"

_.

-

,"0

" _ " '. . .' .

_.".

,

_

•• _

behave as anarchic villains i.n a 'tragedy

~,_1::f.1.e_ c()mmons' which,_l_ea~~___ ,~Il~~~~c:t.l::>_~Y,,_!O rE?~.~u£~_~_9:~J2.!e._~i..~~

an?,economic waste (e.g. Christy and Scott, 1965; Crutchfield
and Pontecorvo, 1969)"
~~cl_1::~Clt

,whic~hCl:~:t:

the.:r.~

(McKay 1978:398).

In short,

~.is

Cl.re no social and economic mechanisms

Al'!.9:t:§CisJng, in~~~tme,l1.t, technical advance and fis)}.::-

ing pressure, short of stock failure (Crutchfield 1964).

________

.". ___

~._.

__

"~

_ _ • • _ . ___ . e• •

'_;

••

~.-

••

0

._,

••

'.

_.

•

---.

It

also assumes that predation by humans has been the primary
factor in causing the demise of several fish stocks.

More

specifically, it has been axiomatic among population dynamicists studying fish that recruitment into the fishery (number
of harvestable-sized fish)

was determined by the number of

eggs laid by adult fish whose numbers, in turn, were influenced by the amount of fishing effort.

Thus, excessive fish-

ing effort on the breeding stock lowers the number of eggs
in the water and ultimately catches (Royce 1972:196-97).
This picture of fishermen and fishing behavior is clearly
flawed.
First, great fluctuations have been observed in fish
stocks and landings, but there is increasing uncertainty
about man's role in causing them.
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This is a radical depar-

ture from conventional wisdom regarding fish populations.
In the past several years, data have been collected challenging the assumptions about the relationships between fishing
effort and recruitment.

For example, stocks of haddock and

cod were overfished in the mid 1960's to the point where
fisheries biologists were speculating that the breeding
stock was so small that these species might never rejevenate
and that their biological niche would be taken over by other
types of groundfish (for example, hake).

In the past several

years (1977-1979) survey data from the Gulf of Maine have
shown that there are two very large year classes of haddock
and cod, now almost of harvestable size, which came out of a
very small adult stock.

This indicates that a small adult

stock may produce a large number of progeny if factors such
as water temperature and food supply favor high survival
rates.

If this is true, then predation by man may not be

the most important factor affecting future abundance of harvestable fish in all circumstances.

Similar observations

have been made in other fisheries.
Second, there is substantial evidence that all ocean
areas are not common property resources, and that fishing
communities do have certain informal institutional means to
regulate their exploitation of fish populations.

' - - - - - - - - - " --_ .. _-.

In the

literature, there are instances when fishermen have normati ve systems

exC?1:1:!~_~n<i __ .£lE:!wcomers

from the fishery; in other

instances they have expropriated ----------._------_.informal ownership
rights
- _.
.. - . .
to ocean territories; and in other cases, :f.:b~herme.n c::ontrol _
"

-- --- - _.----~.c~~!:l~ .t()

----.

---.~

---

<::oncentrations of fish b¥secrecy and control over

information, which established short-term property rights
(Acheson 1972,1975a, 1980a ; Andersen 1972i Stiles 1973;
Brox 1964; Catarinusi 1973; Forman 1967).

Sometimes all

three mechanisms are found in the same fishery.

In some

cases, there is little question that these reduce fishing
effort (Acheson 1975ai Acheson and Acheson 1980).

In this

current project, a great deal of additional information has
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been gathered on such institutions in various parts of New
England.

(These institutions, and their effect on fishing

effort, will be described in detail in Section III, Chapter
4 of this volume).
Third, some fishermen are very clearly concerned with
the resource on which their livelihood depends (Acheson 1975b;
1980f).

In parts of New England, at least, a very high per-

centage are in favor of certain government regulations on
fishing, even though there is rarely consensus on exactly
what regulations should be imposed on any given sector of
the industry (Acheson 1975bi 1980f).
Fourth, in industrialized societies it takes a good deal
of capital to establish a viable fishing business at the
threshold level; and once one has entered the business, there
are real limits on the amount of capital that can profitably
be invested.

In all cases, fishing succe_ss depends largely

on the skill and knowledge of the captain and_crew.
may be the most difficult asset to obtain.

This

KI}owledge, skills

~~_~__ ~x12~r~~~c~_clearly

limit the species one can fish for and
the effectiveness of fishing effort. The notion that anyone

can enter any fishery and expand their exploitive effort on
any stock is not true (Acheson 1980b).
While there has been very little information on fishermen and their behavior, it is clear that they are motivated
by a great deal more than a simple desire to take everincreasing amounts of fish.

Certainly, modern commercial

fishermen are competitive, and unquestionably they fish for
money, not sport.

But the assumptions of economists and bio-

logists about the behavior of these people are overdrawn.
The question remains:
men?

What are the aims and goals of fisher-

What social, cultural, and economic factors guide their

behavior?

More importantly, how can a picture of the behavior

of fishermen be integrated with existing biological and economic information to generate a conceptual frame to pinpoint
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Optimum Sustainable Yield for any given fishery?
There are two very serious problems in attempting to
pinpoint Optimum Sustainable Yield.
First, the data in the academic fields necessary to
refine the concept of Optimum Sustainable Yield are very
uneven.

A great deal of effort has been expended to obtain

information on the fish stocks; there is far less on the
economics of fishing; and almost no social, cultural or
historical data on fishermen or the communities in which
they live.

In this regard, it should be pointed out that

the state and Federal agencies responsible for marine fisheries management are staffed almost exclusively by biologists.
The research these agencies finance, not surprisingly, is
almost exclusively biological in nature.

In addition, social

scientists have shown very little interest in marine resource
management.

Most social scientists apparently believe that

resource management problems await some sort of technical
solutions, and thus are properly in the realm of the natural
scientist.
Second, and far more important, there is no agreement on
what social, biological or economic data are needed or how it
should be integrated to begin to approach Optimum Sustainable
Yield estimates.
The problem is not confined to fisheries alone.

There

is no model anywhere which can be used to integrate information from all these academic fields.

Thus, the problem of

defining OSY cannot be attacked by borrowing an integrative
model from some other field and applying it to fisheries.
This means that if some means of attaining Optimum Sustainable
Yield is to be achieved, a new integrative model must be developed.

In this volume we will attempt to present such an

integrative model and apply it to data on New England fisheries to develop a new theory of fishing.
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Chapter 2 of this section will be devoted to an examination of the literature on previous attempts to integrate data
from biology, economics and anthropology.

Special attention

will be focused on cultural ecology and the theory of adaptation, since we believe work in this field contains the seeds
of a kind of evolutionary model which can be used to integrate
data from the biological and social sciences.

In Part II of

this volume will be focused on developing this kind of model.
In Part III, specific hypotheses stemming from the adaptive
model will be discussed, using data concerning New England
fisheries.

As we will see, this model focuses attention on

certain aspects of the behavior of fishermen which have not
been adequately described before, and allows us to account
for a good deal of that behavior.

In the last part of this

volume, we develop a new theory of fishing behavior based
on the adaptive model.
While no attempt will be made in this volume to define
Optimum Sustainable Yield for any given fishery, the volume
does contain a model allowing us to integrate social, economic and biological information in ways producing a new and
more accurate picture of fishing behavior.

This, we believe,

is a first, and perhaps the most important step in defining
Optimum Sustainable Yield.
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CHAPTER 2
INTEGRATION OF SOCIAL, ECONOMIC AND BIOLOGICAL DATA:
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES

While there is no adequate model to integrate data from
economics, anthropology, and biology, there have been numerous attempts to link two of these three fields (for example,
biology and economics, anthropology and biology).

Some of

these attempts are blind leads for our purposes; others are
not.

For these reasons, it is useful to discuss some of the

major attempts to integrate these three fields.
A.

Bio-economic Models
Some of the most useful recent work with application to

fisheries management has been done by economists working with
what are called "bio-economic models."

Most of the work done

in this field is based on Schaefer curves -- a set of biological concepts linking recruitment into the fishery, or size
of the total stock of fish to fishing effort (Clark 1976:30;
Gulland 1969:84-93; Royce 1972:325; Schaefer 1954:34-36).
Economists using these or closely related models are essentially trying to identify that level of fishing effort giving
some sort of Optimum Economic Yield.

This goal is usually

phrased in terms of the marginal concepts.

As Bell (1972:156)

phrases it "The optimum management strategy for any fishery
is to permit effort to expand to the point where the marginal
cost of the resources (capital and labor) needed to produce
a pound of fish is equal to the price consumers are willing
to pay for that last pound of fish produced."
Some of the best work in this field has been done by Lee
Andersen (1977:31) who uses a series of curves to explain the
relationship between fishing effort, total cost and revenue
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and marginal revenue

(Figure~).
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It has been assumed by several researchers that bioeconomic models, such as the ones proposed by Anderson, could
somehow be modified or expanded into an Optimum Sustainable
Yield concept.

We do not believe this is so.

First, as has

previously been mentioned, the situation in the cod and haddock industries calls into question the ability to link any
given level of fishing effort to recruitment.

If this is

true, then it is impossible to specify exactly what Maximum
Economic Yield for any fishery will be.
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Moreover, we see no realistic way to expand such models
to include social variables.

Such models, after all, contain

nothing about perception, social structure, values, and all
the other factors influencing
people.

opinions and reactions of

One has to stretch one's imagination to even con-

ceive of a possible link.
One possible way that social and cultural factors could
possibly be linked with such bio-economic models is through
the concept of fishing effort.

That is, social variables

influence fishing effort, which in turn affects catches,
stock sizes and recruitment.

The problem is that a very

large number of factors
influence
fishing effort, including
_".-.
-.

--_ ... _---_ .. _.... _.-

..

-,.~

...•

.

-,

skill, responsiveness to innovations, commitment to the

- - _ •. ---------.-

,.

.-

" ' - . '

~-

-

"--

_F.

•

industry, ethnic group membership, ability to switch fishing
gears, and others (Acheson and Acheson 1980).
factors are very difficult to quantify.

Moreover, such

Other sets of tech-

nical and natural factors influence the catches of any given
type of fishing gear.

In the lobster fishery, for example,

catches of traps are influenced by at least 15 factors ranging from the season of the year and length of the trap, to
the type of heads in use and the depth of water (Acheson
1980d).

Thus, in the lobster fishery, fishing effort can

only be measured if one knows the number of traps in use as
well as the effectiveness with which they are being used.
Given our present state of knowledge, it is impossible to
quantify all of these various factors for every fishery,
much less adequately describe the role they play in affecting
fishing effort.

Even if one could pinpoint the socio-

economic factors influencing effort, it would be impossible
to specify a given stock size and recruitment level that
would be associated with any level of effort.

Theoretically,

however, the concept of fishing effort might be used as a
link between biological and socio-cultural spheres.

At pre-

sent, however, it must remain only a possibility until more
information is obtained on the fishing industry and the effect
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of behavior of fishermen on the stocks.
Bio-economic models in fisheries management are really
being used by economists to answer essentially economic
questions about rates of utilization of fish resources.
Their aim is to answer certain questions concerning resource
allocation -- not questions about the fish populations per
see

Certain biologists have attempted to link biology and

economics in still another way -- namely by using the economics of resource allocation as a framework for viewing ecological processes.

In this case, it is biologists who are

borrowing economic tools in an attempt to calculate such
things as optimal foraging strategies of predator populations
to maximize energy intake or reproduction, or the use of cost
benefit analysis to understand the relationship between population growth and the quality and quantity of food resources
open to them (Shoener 1971, Cody 1974, Emlin 1968).

Such

attempts to use economic theory in ecology have been critisized by economist Kenneth Boulding, who asks, "What if anything in the biosphere corresponds with the concept of the
price system, and especially to an equilibrium price system
in economics?"

(Boulding 1972:366).

Certain ecologists believe that such studies will someday be of use to resource management.

For example, Rapport

and Turner state that "the existence of common ecologicaleconomic models suggest that it is possible to unify methodologies, concepts and theories which have independently
developed in the two fields.

The prospect should be of in-

terest to strategic planners and managers of our resources"
(1977:373).

However, such authors leave no doubt that while

it may be possible to unify economic and biological theory
in this way for purposes of resource management, little has
actually been done to date.

Whether applying micro-economic

theory to animal ecology could ever be of use to fisheries
managers remains doubtful, since it promises to increase

16

knowledge only of animal populations -- not human populations
(i.e. fishermen)

and their relationships to their natural

environment.
B.

Socio-Economic Models
Despite the fact that anthropology and economics are

social sciences, there have been very few models developed
to integrate these two fields.

Economists have used models

which they call socio-economic models, and some of these have
been applied to fisheries problems.

However, most of these

models are completely economic in content.

Periodically a

variable such as age, education, or family size will be fitted into the equation.

But the aim of such models is to

predict such things as changes in income levels or the
economic impact of changes in policy.

There is very little

about perceptions, social structure, aspirations, institutional factors or any other factors motivating or constraining human behavior.

Such economic models certainly have

their uses when applied to certain issues
management.

of fisheries

One of the authors of this volume has used such

models to predice the effect of an increase in the legal
lobster measure.

We have been able to calculate the changes

in total pounds of lobster caught and revenues to fishermen
for every 1/16 inch increase in the measure (Acheson and
Reidman 198Gb).

But this is an economic model exclusively.

There is nothing in it which tells us anything about the
behavior of fishermen or the communities they live in, and
literally no way to get such information into the model.
Anthropologists, working essentially without the aid of
economists, have attempted to develop a set of concepts to
integrate data from anthropology and economics to understand
the social and economic systems of tribal and peasant societies.

These anthropologists have taken their clue from Max

Weber, who distinguished between "formal rationality," and
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"substantive rationality."

"Formal rationality" was used

by Weber in referring to abstract universal rules aimed at
obtaining maximum output at minimum cost.

"Substantive

rationality" refers to efficient procedures as defined by
the people of a given culture operating with a particular
set of socially-acceptable goals and constraints.
The result has been a long and bitter debate in anthropology between the so-called "formalists," who maintain
essentially that economic concepts and models can be used
to interpret data on the economies of non-Western societies
(Goodfellow 1939; Cook 1966; Burling 1962; LeClair 1962;
Firth 1972) as opposed to the _"substantivists," who insist
that the opposite is true and that anthropologists will have
to develop another set of concepts to properly interpret the
economic systems of such cultures (Polyanyi, Arensberg and
Pearson 1957; Polyanyi 1944, 1947, 1959; Kaplan 1968; Dalton
1968, 1969, 1971).

After some 20 years, the debate has

petered out, but no consensus has yet been reached.
There has been no attempt on the part of economists to
build bridges between their own discipline and anthropology.
In great part, the reason no integrative models have
been developed sterns from the fact that economics and anthropology have traditionally been operating with two different
paradigms.

As Dusenberry (1960:233) phrased the difference:

"economics is all about how people make choices.

Sociology

(and anthropology)

is all about why they don't have any

choices to make."

Indeed, economics has tended to emphasize
------~-~.-~------.----.-.------.~----"-~.--

the

fact.~hat

.-

people make maximizing
decisions and has tended
-'
_-_.,.-

'-. . . .

-

...

....

to play down the institutional frame within which those decisions take place.

In economics, the problem of defining goals,

aims and motives of people of various cultures has been subsumbed under the concept of utility.

Anthropologists and

sociologists, by way of contras'E-,--nave tended to emphasize
only the institutional aspect of behavior, and have at times
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presented people as mere robots programmed by their culture
to behave in certain rigid, inflexible ways.

They have

placed great emphasis on describing cultural differences and
variations in motivation and goals.
This distinction between economics and anthropology is
no longer accurate.

In anthropology, especially, there is

widespread recognition that people do have a good deal more
latitude for individual decision making than had been hypothesized previously, and that a great deal of intracultural
variation exists (Pelto 1975).

In several fields on the

cutting edge of social anthropology, much attention is currently being focused on the kinds of choices that people
make and the constraints influencing strategies and goals in
various cultures.

In economic anthropology and studies of

innovation, emphasis is on the choices made regarding production, consumption, new technology, and so on (for example,
Burling 1962; Barth 1967; Salisbury 1962; Ortiz 1973; Plattner 1969; Schneider 1974; Dewalt 1975; Prattis 1973; Acheson 1972; Greenwood 1976; Wharton 1971).

Anthropologists

interested in network analysis, exchange theory, and strate~-----.---,-

gic interaction all emphasize the choices people make to
manipulate their social relationships to achieve certain
ends (Barth 1959; Bailey 1969; Boissevain and Mitchell n.d.;
Blau 1964; Homans 1961; Heath 1976; Mayer 1966; Thibault and
Kelley 1959 provide examples of studies of this kind).

This

new emphasis on decision strategies, games and goals, and so
on makes it very difficult to distinguish clearly between
anthropology and economics.

The fact that anthropologists

are focusing on what people will do and will accept under
varying circumstances, in the words of Norman and Dorothea
Whitten, "places the anthropologist at the heart of economic
theorizing, one of the crucial questions of which deals with
the problem of 'maximizing'"

(1972:259).

The area of over-

lap between the fields is further increased by the fact that
some anthropologists see economic theory as a model for all
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social exchange (for example, Heath 1976) .
While bridges are clearly being constructed between
anthropology and economics, there are some enormous differences between the two fields yet.
(1) Most important, economics tends to deal with formal
models, emphasizing rational behavior under conditions that
are characterized as ideal.

Anthropologists are completely

oriented toward an inductive approach to explain actual behavior of people "on the ground."

The fact that economists

are interested in how people ought to maximize their ends,
while anthropologists are interested in whether people are
maximizing something and what they are doing creates an
enormous chasm between the practitioners of the two disciplines when it comes to what they study and the data they
collect.
(2)

Economics is a policy-making science: anthropolo-

gists, on the whole, have been very reluctant to work with
policy makers.
(3)

The ceteris paribus reasoning of economic theory

tends to place a strong emphasis on the relatively short
period of time during which all other things might be supposed to remain unchanged.

Furthermore, the difficulties

of formally specifying rational behavior under conditions
of uncertainty have further limited the time horizon of
economic theory -- especially those parts which have pre tentions of practicality.

Anthropology, by way of contrast,

has tended to emphasize a broader range of behavior and far
longer periods of time.

Despite these differences, new

theoretical connections between the two fields are very much
in evidence.
The fact that economics and much of current anthropology
focus on decision making within institutional parameters is
of little help, in and of itself, in integrating social,
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economic, and biological information in any way that will be
useful for purposes of fisheries management.

There is, how-

ever, a whole body of theory, which is closely related to
this shared decision model, which, we believe will aid in
integrating information from these intellectual disciplines
namely, the theory of adaptation.

c.

Social and Biological Models
There is a massive amount of information on the relation-

ships between biological systems on the one hand and cultural
systems on the other.

A relatively small amount of work has

been done by sociologists, geographers and psychologists.

A

few biologists -- most notably Eugene Odum -- have attempted
to use biologists' concepts such as energy flow in analyzing
the relationships between man and nature (Odum 1971).

But

much of the work in this area has been done by anthropologists.
In fact, the relationship between man and his environment has
been one of the major foci of interests in American anthropology in the past thirty years.

The major contribution of

these anthropologists deserve attention, since some of the
concepts they have developed are of particular use for our
purpose.
In recent years, much of the most interesting work in
this area is being done by anthropologists who describe themselves as cultural ecologists.

The cultural ecologists,

following the lead of Julian Steward, essentially view man
as a part of nature, not separate from the natural world or
above it.

Man, from this point of view, is an animal, and

like all animal populations, human populations are part of
eco-systems.

Like other animals, human beings depend on

other living organisms and non-living substances for their
very survival, and in turn, affect other parts of the ecosystem.

Humans do not interact directly with their environ-

ment, but articulate with it through their culture.
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Culture

from this point of view is a kind of "equipment" in the
struggle for survival (Rappaport 1973:245).

It is, of

course, a very effective kind of equipment since it has
provided man with a far greater capacity to exploit a
variety of niches than other animal species enjoy.
The cultural ecologists have very diverse interests and
have explored a wide range of topics.
the effects

Some have focused on

residence rules or group membership have for

allocation of available resources (Meggitt 1965; Leeds 1965;
Isaac 1980).

Other studies have inquired into the effect of

warfare on resource utilization (Sweet 1965; vayda 1961).
There are projects which have explored the effects of religious concepts and rites on population (for example, birth
and deatn rates, health) (e.g. Benedict 1973; Harris 1965;
Nag 1962; Newman 1970; Marshall and Polgar 1976).

Others

have studied the way man regulates the environment and the
resources at his disposal (Acheson 1975a; Rappaport 1967).
The underlying question behind all of these studies is
whether social behavior enhances or reduces the survival of
the people involved, and whether this behavior enhances or
degrades the physical environment.

In much of this body of

literature, there is an emphasis on the social and cultural
factors operating to keep man in balance with his natural
environment.

Rappaport, for example, argues that Tsembaga

rituals and warfare operate to maintain an equilibrium between
human populations and their resource base.

In his words, this

pattern of activity helps to maintain "an undegraded
ment,"

environ-

. adjusts man-land rations, distributes local sur-

pluses of pigs throughout the regional population, and assures
people of high quality protein when they are most in need of
it (1967:28-29).
In a whole series of studies Marvin Harris uses what he
calls "functional explanations"

(1960) to argue that cultures

contain built-in controls regulating the use of natural re-
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sources.

In one recent article, he argues that the strong

preference for eating meat seen in most cultures is a strategy to ensure survival, because such norms allow people to
cope in times of stress and warfare when the body's need for
protein rises sharply (Harris 1979:32).

In another article

he argues that the Indian Government's program to slaughter
sacred cattle is unwise, since the cattle provide goods
necessary for a peasant economy (i.e. dung and hides) .
In still another study, Lee argues that Bushmen women
keep the birth rate down by spacing their children three to
five years apart.

A small population is desirable since it

allows the Bushmen to live at a level of efficiency to permit adequate living and a good deal of leisure.
These studies are very different in many respects, but
there is a common theme running through them -- namely the
balance between man and the resource base in tribal and peasant societies.

The emphasis is not on growth or change,

but rather on cultural and institutional feedback mechanisms
operating to keep these societies in equilibrium with the
flora and fauna on which the human population depends.

In

essence, the cultural ecologists are interested in how the
use of natural resources by humans influences and is influenced by the value systems and socio-economic organizations of
different cultures.
One might assume that a body of literature concerning
social factors maintaining resource control would be of immediate practical value to those interested in understanding
overexploitation of natural resources in our own society.
The cultural ecologists, after all, are describing situations
in which people do not compete to over-exploit fish or other
resources.

One might assume that such a body of literature

would contain insights into the fundamental nature of our
own resource utilization problems, and perhaps a set of
analytical tools that might be borrowed to analyze policy
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options in this area.

The knowledge that there are societies

in the world which have built-in mechanisms restraining the
use of natural resources is very useful.

It underlines, as

nothing else could, the fact that our own escalating misuse
of the natural environment is not "natural" or "inevitable,"
but rather the product of a set of specific cultural circumstances which are far from universal.
The conceptual apparatus used is another matter entirely.
There are three sets of problems which make cultural ecology
and its intellectual apparatus inapplicable to fisheries
problems.

First, the conceptual tools used were developed

to understand aspects of small, stable tribal and peasant
societies.

The findings of such studies can be applied to

modern industrial societies and the resource problems they
face only with great difficulty.
Second, the explanations used by most cultural ecologists
are clearly functionalist in nature.

That is, the social and

ecological systems are seen as a set of interconnected parts;
and any single unit of the system is explained in terms of
its use or function for other units of the system.

The func-

tion of the norms prohibiting the killing of sacred cattle
in India is to ensure the supply of dung, hides, and so on
needed for peasant agriculture.

The function of ritual among

the Tsembaga, to use Rappaport's example, is to maintain a
balance between the human popUlation, pig population, and
flora.

As Jarvie has pointed out, such "explanations" ex-

plain nothing.

A second flaw is that they attempt to explain

an institution or other social patterns in terms of its accidental aftereffects (Jarvie 1968:199f).

To continue our

examples, the Tsembaga rituals may result in keeping the pig
populations in the future from denuding the countryside,
which could occur if their population grew unchecked.

But

that clearly is not the reason that the people themselves
hold such rituals in the present.
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In fact, there are only

the barest hints that the Tsernbaga themselves are even
aware of the ecological aftereffects of their pig feasts.
In a similar vein, it has been argued that infanticide
among hunter-gatherer groups prevents such groups from increasing in population to the point where they outrun their
resource base.

This may be one of the manifest functions,

but this is scarcely an adequate explanation for the behavior involved.

A woman who kills her baby has something far

more immediate in mind that a potential problem with the manland ratio which might occur fifty years in the future.
Third, the cultural ecologists are oriented toward explaining total societies

in statis.

The emphasis is on

"second order abstractions and statistical tendencies"

(Ben-

nett 1976:223), describing whole systems of norms and institutions and their relationships to aspects of the environment
at a particular point in time.

When those interested in cul-

tural ecology do become interested in change, their emphasis
is apt to be on describing long-term evolutionary stages in
taxonomic terms.

In this literature, there is little empha-

sis on the processes which occurred over the long-term to
produce gradual transformations of individual societies.
Rather, we are presented with a series of snapshots of different types of societies at several different points in
time, each with its characteristic technologies, institutions,
value systems, and so on.

In this literature, there is the

clear understanding that some societies have participated in
the entire sweep of cultural development and have gone througq
several different stages, but there is no indication of how
those changes have occurred, for example, how some huntinggathering societies have become agriculturalists (Cohen 1971:
6-15) .
Fourth, and most important, there is no indication in
the literature on cultural ecology of the mechanisms connecting social and environmental variables.
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The cultural ecolo-

gists have described a series of social systems which are
in balance with their environment, but they give very little
indication of the various mechanisms in the systems they are
describing which maintain their balance.

One example is

afforded by Lee who argues that Bushman population is maintained at a low level by the desire of women to space their
children to avoid undue work (Lee 1972a, 1972b, 1972c).
we do not know is the mechanisms these women use.
form of birth control used?
figure into the picture?

What

Is some

Does infanticide or abortion

Are they avoiding sex for years on

end or is it traditional to obtain sexual satisfaction without intercourse?

Is there some glandular factor which pre-

vents ovulation for years after the birth of a child?

Lee

provides us with no answers to these questions, and since he
does not really tell us what these Bushpersons are doing, he
leaves us with the certain knowledge that his description of
the system is incomplete, and the uneasy feeling that the
factors controlling Bushman populations are vastly different
than those he describes.

We know that the resources of the

Khalahari are scarce, and that the human population is correspondingly low.

The mechanism maintaining that balance is

incompletely described at best.

Recent work has shown that

the mechanism producing this birth spacing is probably physiological in nature; fertility rates among Bushmen women are
apparently related

to diet and its associated effect on body

fat and hormonal levels (Kolata 1974:932-33).
Anthropologists such as Lee give some hints about the
feedback mechanisms controlling the ecosystems with which
they are concerned; other authors, like Harris, do not even
give that.

To return to our two examples, Harris argues

that most cultures have strong norms concerning preferences
for animal protein, since high quality protein has great
survival value, especially in times of stress or warfare.
Somehow this explains the widespread preference for meat.
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Yet he gives no indication what the causal linkages are.
Is it possible that there are physiological factors behind
the strong preference for meat?

Have the people of these

cultures noted consciously that people who ate meat were
healthier?

There is no clue in Harris' work.

Harris may be

correct in assuming that there is "wisdom" in traditional
culture.

But all too often he writes as if the balance

between man and nature were invented and maintained by
"mother nature" or some other equally benevolent force working outside the conscious direction of man.

He has been

seriously criticized, by Bennett among others, for substituting "just so stores for scientific explanation."
From our perspective, there is a still more serious
flaw.

In the entire literature on cultural ecology, we have

no picture of the kinds of decisions and choices made by
actual people operating with different assets and constraints.
In short, the cultural ecologists completely jump over the
entire subject matter of economics.

In the
process,
they
--.-.-

.....

~--.--

~

...

are very vague on the switching rules used by the people of
a

cul~llre

to respond to changes in their environment or to

produce changes.
There can be little doubt that the cultural ecologists
have made a significant contribution to understanding the
relationship between man and his environment, but they have
not developed a set of concepts that can automatically be
applied to questions concerning management policy for marine
fisheries in the United states.

One problem sterns from the

fact that the cultural ecologists have focused on small,
isolated societies in balance with nature and fisheries
managers must deal with a complex heterogenous industry which
is sometimes out of balance with the marine resource base.
The most serious problem is that the cultural ecologists
ignore the mechanisms by which human beings and their societies affect the environment and the kinds of decisions people
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make in response to that environment.
The whole object of fisheries management, after all, is
to affect the decisions of fishermen concerning target species,
level of effort, and so on.

That is virtually impossible to

do unless one understands the kinds of decisions being made
regarding the marine environment and the factors influencing
those decisions.

Thus, the utility of "cultural ecology"

for practical resource management is strictly limited.
In very recent years, those interested in the relationship between social systems and environmental systems have
approached the topic through what has become known as the
theory of adaptation.

The theory of adaptation is an out-

growth of cultural ecology, and the debt these anthropologists have to Julian Steward and the cultural ecologists is
very evident.

Nevertheless, there are certain critical dif-

ferences which need to be discussed in detail -- particularly
since a focus on adaptation, unlike the older cultural ecological approach, holds forth great promise in applications
to problems of resource management.

This is not to indicate

that those interested in adaptation have developed a set of
intellectual tools which can be applied directly to resource
problems in the U.S., but the potentiality is clearly there.
D.

Adaptation
"Adaptation" has multifarious definitions.

Biologists

use the term to talk about the changes in the gene pool of
an organism which produce evolutionary developments over the
course of generations.

Traditionally, anthropologists --

especially the cultural ecologists -- have talked about
adaptation in terms of the long-term changes in the stages
of development of a civilization which occurred as humans
unconsciously altered established patterns to fit into environmental niches and avoided strategies which were maladaptive.
Cohen, for example, talks of hunting-gathering, horticulture,

28

pastoralism, agriculture, and industrialism as major forms
of adaptive strategies (Cohen 1971:7-10).

The emphasis here

is on describing societies at a particular stage of development, and the ways their social structure fits with the
physical environment.

The focus is not on the processes

and mechanisms producing those adaptive alterations in the
society as a whole.
Very recently, several eminent anthropologists, most
notably

John_~ennett,

have suggested that studies of adapt a-

tion be shifted to the individual level.

In this sense,

adaptation refers to the behavior of an individual "during
its life by which it attempts to cope with its environment"
(Bennett 1976a:848).

It is the result of a series of choices

or strategies as the individual tries over the course of time
to gain his ends and solve immediate problems.

As Bennett

phrases it, "in adaptation,the organism plays a game with
the environment, endeavoring to learn, manipulate, or change
the rules in order to realize goals, satisfy needs, or maintain a degree of freedom of choice and action"
848) .

(Bennett 1976a:

In the last analysis, adaptive behavior is niche-

seeking behavior.

In adaptation, human beings are seen as

using the social, economic, and physical environment in ways
which maximize chances for physical survival, while maintaining valued institutions and those goals and things which give
life its meaning.
In this body of literature, the environment is perceived
as including not only climate, natural resources, and the
demands of the economic system, but also social groupings and
the normative system as a whole.

It is, in short, anything

which the individual has to take into account in making decisions to solve problems.

Unlike the cultural ecologists, who

tend to think of the environment and human behavior

as a

fixed system in stasis, the newer studies of adaptation accept
the natural environment, technology and economic systems as
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givens and then go on to study the way people maneuver to
attain their ends.

Sometimes these maneuvers take place in

ways which leave the social and physical environment intact;
at times the environment is changed in the process.
The problem-solving decisions of individuals certainly
have long-term consequences.

Bennett, for example, distin-

guishes between "adaptive strategies" and" adapti ve processes."
Adaptive strategies are the patterns formed by the many separate adjustments that people devise in order to obtain and use
resources and to solve the immediate problems confronting
them; adaptive processes are the changes introduced over
relatively long periods of time by the repeated use of such
short-run strategies.

In short, it is the decisions indivi-

duals make in the short run which, if repeated by enough
people, will produce long-run changes in the social system.
Thus, it is the decisions of individuals which produce longterm processes and ultimately evolutionary changes.

By

implication, it is the decisions of individuals which are the
key to understanding not only the present, but also long-term
future trends in which whole social structures are altered
in ways which make them more amenable to the demands of the
environment.
For these reasons, it is the adaptive strategies stemming from the decisions of individuals which are the focus
of attention in this body of literature -- not the long-term
processes or results.
Several aspects of Bennett's short-run adaptive strategies should be noted.

First, individuals are well aware of

the kinds of the maneuvers in which they and other people are
engaged.

As Bennett points out, every language has a large

number of words to describe such strategies:

"coping, changing,

rectifying, correcting, curing, ameliorating, modifying, manipulating, bringing-up-to-standard, swindling, deceiving"
are English words referring to ways of altering circumstances.
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Another set of terms refers to the psychological outcomes
for the individual following the use of strategies:

"satis-

fying, gratifying, disappointing, making happy, fulfilling,
and many others"

(Bennett 1976b:272).

As a rule, the people

of a given culture have few words to describe the very longterm evolutionary changes, and may not even be aware of them.
Bennett's work on adaptation focuses primarily on those
kinds of decisions and goals which relate to the environment,
technology, production, and other matters influencing the
ability to survive physically.

People, of course, make

decisions and maneuver in many other aspects of life -- for
example, kinship, politics.

However, for Bennett and his

followers, these goals and values are of concern only if they
impinge on the choice of occupation or the ability to make a
living.
Bennett stresses that in solving problems individuals
take into account two sets of factors:

(a) the means one

can employ to attain one's ends in the most efficient manner
(i.e. optimization, maximization), and (b) moral precepts and
duties towards other people.

These two sets of factors in-

fluencing decisions correspond to what Bailey calls "pragmatic
rules" and "normative rules"

(Bailey 1969:4-5).

In every

society, there is a good deal of maneuvering room which individuals can use, but any study of adaptation must take into
account not only the choices and maneuvers employed to solve
problems, but the constraints the normative structure places
on their use.
For our purposes, the theory of adaptation as conceived
by Bennett and others holds enormous promise in two critical
areas.
First, it is very clear from Bennett's most recent work
that the adaptive behavior model is, in his mind, one that
will produce a great deal of useful information to "policy
makers"

(Bennett 1976b:3, 26-28, 15, 148, 291).
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He believes

that- people of any culture always have a range of choices
regarding the way they use the natural environment in their
attempt to find a secure niche.

Some of these choices are

more environmentally productive or more destructive than
others.

Some are clearly preferable to users of natural

resources.

A knowledge of the adaptive responses would pre-

sumably give policy makers some insight into ways to avoid
triggering destructive decisions concerning the environment.
It would also presumably give them a way to avoid policies
which would threaten the adaptive niches the users of resources
have achieved.

In this regard, it should be noted that a good

deal of the opposition to fisheries management comes from fishermen who are afraid that regulation will lower their incomes,
make it more difficult to earn the same income, or remove them
from the business altogether.

Presumably, a knowledge of the

range of choices open to fishermen and an understanding of the
things fishermen must do if they are going to survive economically would allow the selection of policy options that would
conserve resources and minimize political opposition.
Second, work like Bennet's holds the promise of providing
a general model which can be used to integrate social sciences
and the biological sciences.

Certainly, a full-fledged inte-

grative model has not developed from such studies of adaptive
behavior, but the promise is apparent.
The biological connection is obvious.

Studies of adap-

tation, after all, involve the ways that people make decisions
regarding natural resources to make a living.

The maneuvers

and choices they make regarding those resources have implications for the way the society evolves in the long run.
The connections with psychology and linguistics are also
apparent.

Adaptive systems are characterized by flexibility,

as people modify their behavior to meet new demands.

On one

level, an adaptive system might be thought of as a set of
switching rules which define the options open to an individual
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in a given culture and the choices open to him under a given
set of circumstances.

On another level, adaptation is depen-

dent on the ability to learn new skills and responses.

In

both cases, the adaptation involves the ability to understand,
judge, and respond to new situations.

This underlines the

fact that adaptive behavior is ultimately traceable to the
cognitive processes of individuals involved.

Since the cog-

nitive maps defining choices and strategies are embedded in
language, there is an obvious connection with socio-linguistics
as well.
Adaptation, as Bennett conceives it, is also closely connected to some of the most exciting fields of social anthropology and sociology.

As was previously pointed out, in the

past decade or so anthropologists and sociologists have begun
to develop a general model of social life, which emphasizes
the fact that the key to social relationships of all kinds is
exchange.

In the closely related fields of exchange theory,

strategic interaction, network analysis, and symbolic interaction, a great deal of attention has been paid to the kinds
of decisions and choices people make vis-~ -vis these transactions.

Of course, a study of adaptive strategies focuses

on the way people enter into transactions and exchanges to
attain their goals and solve problems.
For our purposes, it is important to note that the
theory of adaptation provides important linkages with economics.

One connection can be seen in the fact that adaptive

strategies involve optimizing choices and decisions -- the
subject matter of economics.

Not too surprisingly, anthro-

pologists interested in adaptation have borrowed whole sets
of elementary tools from economics (i.e. opportunity costs,
marginal concepts, cost benefit analysis) to analyze choice
responses (for example, Bennett 1969:311-312).

The debt of

these anthropologists to economics is very obvious.
In economics certain parallel developments are taking

33

place.

While the term "adaptation" is somewhat foreign to

the language of economics, there are many aspects of the
theory which implicitely focus on adaptation.

One example

is the basic price change-response, and similar types of
comparative-static analysis so cornmon to economics.

Although

the main corpus of economic theory, does not make the transition fr?m adaptive to evolutionary

theory~

there

are_~ertain

recent trends which at least point in this direction.

We

might cite in this regard the growth of human capital theory
_t~ecker

1962), which stresses the importance of a trained and
,"~-

_e9ucated work force for economic

.

deve~o_I2ment;

the insurance

parable (Arrow 1971; Knight 1965); organization (hierarchy)
theory

lCyer!_c:l~_~___ ~~!"_~~

1963; Williamson 1975; Arrow 1974;

Hurwicz 1973: March and Simon 1958; Olson 1968; Simon 1972;
Solo 1967; Alchian 1950: Boulding 1950; Nelson and Winter
1973); the rebirth of interest in the elemental transaction
itself (Williamson 1975; Ackerloff 1970: Coase 1937; Demsetz
1968; Marschak 1968; Shubik 1973) and the explicit attempts
by Boulding and others to develop an evolutionary economics.
All of these interests of economists center on the problem
of how a firm or individual transforms or consciously adapts
itself to its environment.

Of course, this is exactly the

focus of anthropologists such as Bennett.
In all of economics, Schumpeter's work shows the most
conscious concern with an adaptational model.

In arguing

against the restricted vision of the economic theory of his
time, Schumpeter proposed a broader view of economic behavior
in his famous chapter on the process of "Creative Destruction"
which he saw as an "evolutionary process"

(Schumpeter 1969:

41) .
"In other words, the problem that is usually
being visualized is how capitalism administers existing structures, whereas the relevant problem is how
it creates and destroys them.
As long as this is
not recognized, the investigator does a meaningless
job. As soon as it is recognized, his outlook on
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capitalist practice and its social results change
considerably.
The first thing to go is the traditional conception of the modus operandi of competition.
Economists are at long last emerging from the
stage in which price competition was all they saw.
As soon as quality competition and sales effort
are admitted into the sacred precincts of theory,
the price variable is ousted from its dominant
position. However, i t is still competition within
a rigid pattern of invariant conditions, methods
of production and forms of industrial organization
in particular that monopolizes attention.
But in
capitalistic reality as distinguished from its text
book picture, it is not that kind of_~oJ:!l..2etitj:gn
which counts, but the competition frO~A __I1~W,_com
modi ty, the new, t,eGhnQlogy " the new-s·o1,!.J;:ceof
s'uppiy, the new type of organizatIon (the largest
unit of control for instance) -- competition which
commands a decisive cost or quality advantage which
strikes not at the margins of profits and the outputs of the existing firms, but at their foundations and their very lives.
In the case of retail trade, the competition
that matters arises not from additional shops of
the same type, but from the department store, the
chain store, the mail order house, and the supermarket which are bound to destroy those pyramids
sooner or later.
Now a theoretical construction
which neglects this essential element of the case
neglects all that is most typically capitalist
about it; even if correct in logic as well as in
fact, it is like Hamlet without the Danish prince."
(Schumpeter 1969:43-45)
In our view, Schumpeter's proposition is consistent with
the broader notions of adaptation of anthropologists such as
Bennett.

We believe the work of Schumpeter and Bennett con-

tains the seeds of a model which could be formalized in the
interests of integrating social and economic data of use to
fisheries managers.
To date, the anthropologists and economists interested
in adaptive behavior have not attempted such an integration.
In fact, they seem unaware of each other's efforts.
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Despite the promised potential of adaptive studies,
very few such studies have been done.

While some of those

studies begin to pull together social, economic, and biological data in discussing the kinds of decisions and strategies people in different cultures employ which have an effect
on the physical environment, .the types of models and intellectual tools used are relatively unsophisticated.

Moreover,

the policy implications are scarcely explored at all.

One

of the best studies of adaptation is Bennett's Northern
Plainsmen, which explores the adaptive strategies used by
the people of four different cultures living in one small
area of Saskatchewan not far from the U.S. border:
ers,

farmers, Indians, and Hutterites.

the ranch-

Bennett does a re-

markable and convincing job explaining how these four different sets of people, faced with the same environment

but

.

different kinds of values and social organization, make different sets of decisions to attain some very different goals,
and survive in ways that give their lives meaning.

There is

very little quantitative data in the study, and almost no
analysis of the variation in decision-making by people within
each of these four cultural groupings.

This is not to suggest

that Bennett is unaware that individual Indians, ranchers, or
whoever make different choices depending on the situation in
which they find themselves, but the emphasis of the book is
on outlining generalized patterns of responses characteristic
of each of the four ethnic groups involved.

Bennett does a

particularly good job in describing the ways that hard economic factors and ideational factors both influence the selection of means to achieve valued ends.
However, the economic concepts used are relatively unsophisticated.

The key concept used through Northern Plains-

men to analyze economic decisions is that of opportunity costs.
Moreover, the role of social and cultural variables in influencing decisions and adaptive strategies are described qualita-
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tively.

Throughout the book, one gets statementn such

as the following concerning opportunity costs and the way
decisions are modified by values:
IIHutterite investment opportunity costs are
of course low: by their own rules the Bretheren
cannot sell their colonies and they realize relatively high rates of return.
But we must again
qualify the results by pointing out that many
farmers and ranchers, aware of the inferior position of their enterprises, prefer to accept lower
rates of return of their labor and capital investments because they like the life. The con~ept of
opportunity costs must, therefore, always be
qualified by cultural preferences."
(Bennett
1976b:312)
As a result, there is a strong tendency for ranchers and
Hutterites to remain in their respective occupations, while
a far larger number of farmers and/or their children tend to
leave farming.
While Bennett's analysis is superficial from some points
of view, he was one of the first anthropologists to recognize
the value of opportunity costs in analyzing decisions.

Re-

cently, anthropologists have begun to publish more studies
using the concept of opportunity costs (for example, Barlett
1980:140-142), as well as a good many other concepts from
economics to analyze decision making, including concepts
from financial analysis (for example, Acheson 1980h:252-255) ;
statistical analysis (Chibnik 1980:87ff; Dewalt 1980:300-308);
and decision trees (Gladwin 1980:62-65).
It is critical to note that the kind of analysis done by
Bennett for the four ethnic groups in Saskatchewan

will not

work in understanding the decisions made by fishermen.

A

far more sophisticated analysis is called for if we are to
understand the choices various kinds of fishermen make in
their attempts to remain economically viable and reach valued
goals.
A great deal of difficulty stems from the fact that
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fishermen and fisheries operate in a highly fluid environment
where rapid, radical change is the rule rather than the exception.

It is not only that fishermen make major changes

in fishing techniques, crew size, and so on to take advantage of predictable changes of availability of fish stocks,
markets, and other such

factors.

They must also take into

account the fact that there are drastic changes in prices,
species, locations of fish schools, and other variables from
one year to the next.

In addition, fishermen are constantly

adding new gear, changing boats, searching out new marketing
outlets, or innovating in other ways.

They have also demon-

strated that they are perfectly capable of innovating their
way around regulations designed to limit fishing effort
(Smith 1977).

Recently, large numbers of fishermen are

joining together in groups and associations in an effort to
affect the regulatory process and the legal parameters under
which they will operate under PL 94-265.
ing cooperatives in unprecedented numbers.

They are also formThere are, in

short, a very wide variety of coping strategies fishermen are
using concurrently in an effort to solve problems and remain
economically viable.

If one wants to assess what fishermen

will do in response to management regulations of various
kinds, and more to the point, which regulations will threaten
the viability of fishing firms of various kinds, one must
know a good deal about the possible strategies open to owners
and captains operating under various conditions.

It is

exactly this kind of information that an adaptive model should
provide.

Bennett points the way toward this kind of analysis.

But neither he nor his colleagues have done much in the way
of providing a methodology that can be used in analyzing
specific, complex, rapidly changing adaptive strategies such
as the ones occurring in the fishing industry.
The theory of adaptation, if it is going to be of use in
understanding adaptive choices in complex modern industries
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has to be modified and Gxtended.

Bennett in anthropology and

Schumpeter in economics roughed a general framework, but a
good deal more model building needs to be done.

In the next

section, we attempt to develop a set of specific concepts
concerning adaptation, integrating concepts from both anthropology and economics.

In the third section, this model will

be applied to the fishing industry in New England.

We hope

that it will result in a more accurate picture of what fishermen are doing in their attempts to attain their goals.
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PARI' II

THE ADAPTATIONAL MODEL

ifl

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

The following theory grew out of a desire to reconcile
the conflicting models of microeconomic behavior used by
anthropologists and by economists, especially those models
concerning the exploitation of wild resources. The desire
took us much further afield than we expected. The result is
a fairly general theory (rather than one applicable to the
exploitation of wild resources only), capable of taking into
account the broad adaptive paradigm of anthropology and the
'competitive' paradigm of economics. It is basically a formal theory, much closer in methodology to the approach of
economics than of anthropology, but in substance it is a
mix, to a certain extent a synthesis of the views of the two
disciplines.
The relationship of this broad theory we propose to
trends in economic theory today is this: over the last ten
or so years there has grown up an extensive literature on
information, transaction costs, organizations and institutions, non-market exchanges, and a variety of other matters
which, in a sense, are extending the boundaries of economic
analysis. These are subjects which have long interested
anthropologists, and the trend has led some enthusiatic
economists to perceive a kind of 'intellectual imperialism'.
From our perspective this new literature is not necessarily
widely at variance with the behaviorial notions of
competition embedded in neoclassical economic theory, but it
does seem to strain that model and open the door for an
alternative concept of the competitive process which is more
consistent with its concerns and findings. The theory
proposed here is the result of our search to find that kind
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Preceding-page blank

of consistent framework. We do not look upon it as a form
of intellectual imperialism simply because the most basic
ideas about competition embedded within it are more common
to anthropologists than economists.
In their broadest outlines, anthropological and economic theory do not present mutually exclusive views of the
world--successful competition may in fact be nothing more
than successful adaptation to the environment (if one includes competitors in the environment). From the practical
point of view, however, there are great methodological and
substantive differences between the application of the
'adaptive' paradigm of anthropologists and the 'competitive'
paradigm of economists. These differences appear to have
developed in response to different sets of questions about
behavior. It would be possible to elaborate the extensive
differences in the two paradigms' interpretations of similar
behavioral phenomena. However, this is not really necessary
here, for the point of departure for this theory is rather
easy to describe.
Economists have always cast their 'competitive' paradigm in terms of the decision making process of the individual economic entity. In the pervasi ve_~~oc=l~E>_~.~cal par adigm, the particular form of the competitive decision making
problem is stated in terms of a profit maximizing solution
to the simultaneous determination of price and quantity of
output of a product; the product is assumed as given. Competitive success or efficiency (the two are virtually synonomous) arises from the proper solution of this problem. The
firm is assumed to exist in a world of well defined, homogeneous products and corresponding industries and markets.
Full or almost complete knowledge is usually assumed as is
the mobility of resources, and so on. The question of what
the firm is to produce is not accorded formal treatment.
The theory presented here takes a different view of the
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competitive decision making problem. Rather than the neoclassical price/quantity problem, the firm is viewed as if
its competitive problem is Xl.bs..t .t,Q P.tQ.Qy~~ Q.t .Q,Q.
In
Schumpeter's words, " ••• in capitalist reality as distinguished from its text book picture, it is not that kind of
competition [i.e., neoclassical price/quantity decision or-iented competition] which counts, but the competition from a
new commodity, the new technology, the new source of supply,
the new type of organization ••• --competition which commands
a decisive co~t or quality advantage which strikes not at
the margins of profits and the outputs of the existing
firms, but at their foundations and their very lives"
By rephrasing the basic competitive question in
(1969:44) •
this way, the view of competition as the result of decision
making is preserved in conformance with the most general
view of economics; however, the substance of the decision
making problem is transformed into one which is much closer
to the general view of adaptive behavior held by anthropologists. Nevertheless, as one might expect this alternate
formulation of the basic decision problem of the firm eventually leads to a very different view of the competitive process and the welfare or normative implications of that process. Right now this paper cannot pretend to be anything
more than an outline of that process and, to a certain' exI
tent, those welfare implications.
This rephrasing also almost automatically thrusts one
into a world which is not easily delineated by the usual assumptions of economics. Most fundamentally, the question of
what to produce or do immediately implies a world in which
the range of commodities and services cannot be captured by
a simple aggregation into "n" given products or services.
Rather the question of what to produce, if it is to be taken
as a non-trivial question, implies that the competitive
process depends upon the actual and potential existence of
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an almost continuous variation in products. Capturing this
kind of competitive environment and process in a theoretical
framework requires the ability to conceptualize the basis
for variations of competitive importance for existing products and services, and, more importantly, for an infinite
number of non-existent products and services which mayor
may not be the object of competitive, adaptive behavior.
A world of this sort also implies an environment in
which information and knowledge are scarce resources simply
because the environment itself, when viewed this way, is
infinitely more complex. than in the traditional view of
economics. Incomplete knowledge in turn implies uncertainty, the importance of individual, group and collective
learning behavior and, for the system as a whole, indeterminancy. Time also appears important since the rate of
adaptation or the timing of what to produce or do in a
changing, complex environment is very important to any
firm's or individual's competitive posture.
In summary, by changing one's basic view of the competitive problem one is also forced to change one's theoretical description of the world, that is, the strategic assumptions with which one chooses to simplify the real world.
In the presentation which follows, a formal theoretical
world is created, one which it is hoped is appropriate to
the question of competition through decisions about what to
produce and do. The formal approach is cast into three basic parts. The first presents a mathematically deterministic
theory of the economy in the short period. The point of
this short period model is to define the instantaneous relationships between firms (where the word firm is used as a
kind of short hand to indicate any economic decision making
entity), the objectives of firms, and some fundamental assumptions about the environment of the market and production. The short period model is not a decision making or a

45

behavioral model--all decision making, all action takes
place in the long period. Rather, it is ~~~~__~orepre,sent
the changing relative competi ti ve E25.i_~tion of f irms (~.i.§-g~j.§ each other and the environment) as a result of earlier
(long period) d~~isions by those firms.
The mathematical form chosen for the short period model
is a system of differential equations in which there is one
equation for each firm in the economy. Within each equation
there is a product or factor market int~ractive term for
each other firm.
Mathematically the system yields equilibriums, but conceptually it is treated as if it were simply
a~~pot view of a system in perpetual disequilibrium.
The reason for this treatment of the short period is
elaborated in the third part which deals with the nature of
decision making by the firm. Before getting to this part,
however, the ---second---_..section of the model delineates the
-_.-.
assumptions about -demand,
knowledge
and
information,
the
-nature of transactions and institutions, and a variety of
other important factors which define the long period environment. The attempt in this section of the paper is to
define a heterogeneous, complex and changing environment in
a manner which provides a logical foundation for the analysis of long period behavior.
Building on this foundation, the next section of the
paper begins to explore the nature of decision making by the
firm.
The long period model is what has been called a pattern or process type model. It does not yield long run
equilibriums or equilibrium paths. Instead, it is rather
modest in its assumptions of its own knowledge of the economic environment and is more or less content to identify
patterns of beh~vior which, on the basis of its definition
of the environment, might be thought to be reasonable representations of the nature of economic activity.
The methodology of this approach presents a strong

_'___
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contrast to recent work in economics addressing similar
questions (e.g., Spence (1975), Lancaster (1971,1975,1979),
Dixit and Stigler (1977). This work tends to deal with the
problem of complexity by carefully specifying (as if the
modeler were fully knowledgable of the environment), and
usually in a mathematically tractable form, what are thought
to be reasonable forms of complexity (for example, the distribution of consumer preferences, own and cross product
elasticities, and so on). These forms are then logically
investigated with respect to their implications for efficiency and equity, with some interesting conclusions. In
effect, this method is a kind of logical/mathematical case
study approach. The great advantage it offers is the logical rigor and specificity of conclusions which it allows.
However, the methodological requirement of exact specification of the environment appears to attribute to the theorist
a form of omniscience somewhat contrary to the investigation
of imperfect knowledge. More important, the approach tends
to direct attention towards possible outcomes (given the
specification chosen by the theorist) rather than towards
questions about the behavioral processes people actually
engage in when they are faced with co~exity
and imperfect
¥
~
knowledge.
For these reasons the theoretical means for dealing
with uncertainty and complexity relies heavily upon subtheories of iD~tjtytigD~ and kDg~l~gS~. Summarized briefly,
the theory of institutions proposes that in the presence of
complexity and uncertainty, exchange and competitive interactions are subject to strong, collectively degenerative
tendencies towards opportunistic behavior. We argue that
the recognition of this potential collective loss, coupled
with repetitive interactions under roughly similar circumstances leads to the evolution of behavioral rules or institutions. The purpose of institutions is to reduce or
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suppress opportunistic behavior and thereby minimize the
uncertainty about future outcomes of exchange and competitive interactions. In effect, these behavioral rules tend to
substitute for very costly or unattainable information about
future states of the environment, and, very importantly,
tend to create regularity in an otherwise very complex,
changing and unpredictable environment. This regularity is
information.
Our theory of knowledge proposes that in a complex,
changing environment, competitively valuable knowledge is
not only scarce but also very particularistic, causing competitive strategies to become essentially learning strategies. In other words, adaptive competition is seen as the
acquisition of particularistic, advantage-conferring bodies
of knowledge. Combined, the two sub-theories propose that
the costs of acquiring knowledge are conserved (1) through
institutions which lower the collective costs of exchapge
related information, and (2) through the choice of competitive strategies which, because of the particularistic attributes of knowledge, allow firms to limit their pursuits to
relatively narrow niches. In such niches it is possible to
attain relative competitive advantage with only limited expenditures on the aquisition of knowledge. These two subtheories are then used to analyze the decision making (product choice) behavior of the firm and to arrive at collective or aggregate patterns of behavior which should be expected in the long period.
The last part of the theory extrapolates from the 'general' theory of the first three parts into an alternative
explanation or view of the process of exploitation of wild
resources. The relationship of this theory to the problems
of the exploitation of wild resources may seem somewhat obscure at first. But to the author the relationship is a
fairly clear result of having watched and worked with fish-
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ermen for a number of years. Their competitive problem-seen most clearly in a multiple species fishery--and the one
described by the theory is DQt a question of choosing a
prof it maximiz ing level of output, but r ather a qu~_sti0!l. of
what to try to catch. This, for the fisherman, is equivalent to the question of what to produce. This decision must
be made in the face of relatively imperfect knowledge of a
highly variable resource, a rapidly changing market, and a
'host of actual and potential competitors, all of whom interact with and affect the success of the fisherman. The fisherman's problem is only secondarily one of cost minimization
given a set of prices. It is much more a question of how
much and what can be caught given relatively constant costs
of operation. Quantity is not a choice variable for the
firm but, once the decision about what to fish for is made,
is instead almost the sole indicator of the competitive appropriateness of the firm's decisions. In sum, the relationship of the formal theory laid out in the first three
sections of the paper to the theory of the exploitation of
wild resources in the natu~e of the competitive decision
problem laid out in the theory and actually faced by fishermen.
b_~Qtg_9D_bt!LjQ~tjQD§

Part II of this volume contains few references to the
ideas of others who have worked on similar problems and
ideas. This is not meant to imply a (mistaken) sense of
strict originality. Earlier drafts of the theory did contain many references and ponderous comparisons between a
point in the text and that made by a given author. It
became apparent that these references were not very useful
and were almost always tangential to the argument being
presented. On the other hand, the works of these authors
were the source of ideas even if those ideas were stated in
a context inappropriate to that of our theory. The problem
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was resolved by eliminating the unuseful textual comparisons
and simply citing at the end of the text those writings
which have bearing on the points discussed.
There are nevertheless several authors whose work has
been particularly stimulating and influential: John R.
Commons, Oliver Williamson, and Fredrik Barth and George
..
Homans for their ideas on transactions and institutions:
Herbert Simon (and his colleagues) for the ~9~ion of bounded
rationality; Kenneth Boulding for his cross disciplinary
perspective;" K_~lvin Lancaster for characteristics theory
and, of course, Schumpeter for his sense of dynamic competition.
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CHAPTER 2
THE SHORT PERIOD

A.

lDt~Q9y~tlQD

In the course of this presentation a model of the economy will be developed which treats the firm as an organism
which consciously adapts to and even molds--in a very constrained way--its environment. In this section of the
paper, however, a snap shot view of the economy is developed. Specifically, firms are viewed as they exist over a
very short period of time, a period of such short duration
that they are only capable of marginally altering their
level of output/sales. Prices, product characteristics,
production technology and unit costs of production are all
assumed constant and outside each firm's realm of control.
This very short period view of the economy is modeled as a
deterministic systen of differential equations. Mathematically it is a system which, given sufficient time, will
move to an equilibrium state. In spite of this mathematical
characterization of the short period, we wish to treat it as
a systen which 'dissolves' long before equilibrium is ever
reached. Specifically, we vievl the very process of moving
toward equilibrium as eliciting responses from the firms
within the system. These responses (decisions) destroy the
old equilibrium-producing parameters of the system by
creating new parameters which cause the system to tend
towards a new equilibrium. For example, we would expect
changes in the rate of sales of any firm to produce adaptive
responses from that firm or other firms in the form of decisions affecting price, product type, technology of production, and so on--decisions whose very purpose is to alter
the set of likely outcomes if the world is left as it is.
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As a result of these decisions the system then tends toward
a new equilibrium, but this tendency in turn is destroyed by
yet another decision purposely designed to thwart the set of
outco~es represented by that potential equilibrium situation. In short, the short period is a very brief period of
disequilibrium that lasts only as long as the interval betvleen decisions.
B.

Qgj~~1j~~§

gi

1D~

rjLID
Throughout the paper we will assume that the firm's
short period objectives are, first, survival and, second, an
increased rate of growth. Since survival for the firm means
nothing more than the avoidance of a zero size and the rate
of growth is nothing more than the rate of change in size,
both objectives may be subsumed by reference to the direction and speed of change in the firm's size, or the relative
rate of change in the firm's size. But what is meant by
size? A variety of measures are available--assets, employment, sales, and so on. At this point in the paper we
choose to adopt what may seem to be a very simple minded
measure of size--the value of sales. Although it may be
objected that much better measures are available, it should
be noted that when the firm is constrained to the extent
assumed here--no changes in prices, technology, costs or
product characteristics--the value of sales is an appropriate measure of firm size, for when the firm can only
change its rate of sales and that change is deemed to have
no effect on prices or costs, then there is little else but
the rate of sales which the firm may use as an indication of
its success. Consequently, let us simply note at this point
that we consider the firm attempting to maximize its
relative rate of growth:
(liN) (dN/dt)
where N denotes net revenue and we take t to represent continuous time. In a sense we are using net revenue, N, which
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is really a time dependent or flow concept, as an indicator
of changes in a stock measure, assets for example, of the
size of the firm. Throughout this section we assume away
inventory problems and equate output and sales. This assumption is not necessary for what follows but it does considerably simplify exposition of the model.

c.

QD tD~ Q9j~~tiY~~ Qi ~Dg fiIID
If we were to conduct a cross-sectional survey of a
market economy we would note that some firms were faring
well and others not so well. We would want, of course, to
attribute this differential success to differing characteristics of the firms we observe. Some have learned to cope
well, others have not. By coping well we mean simply that
they have learned at some time how to minimize the effect of
the constraints they face in the attainment of their objectives relative to other firms. Neoclassical economics
teaches that, all other things equal, the primary constraint
the firm faces is in the area of production. Cost minimizing efficiency is the key to succcess. The logic of this
proposition is inescapable once it is assumed that the firm
is a small operator in a stable, large, homogeneous product
market. Under these circumstances the firm does not have to
worry about the definition (or change in definition) of its
product and the relationship between sales and revenue (or
price) occasioned by the way it defines its product. If
these assumptions of the neoclassical model are removed then
it follows that the firm ~lill have additional problems to
solve. The choice of an appropriate product and the reSUlting revenue effects are those problems. In short, our
cross-sectional survey may lead us to suspect that the differential success of firms is attributable to their ability
to cope with production efficiency, choice of product and
pricing problems. We may not be led to disagree with the
neoclassical notion that all other things being equal, cost
~QD~tI9iDt§
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minimizing efficiency is what counts. Rather, the notion
emerges that the inequality of the other things may frequently be the determinant of the firm's success or failure.
Consequently, we begin to sketch out here a view of how
these other things are likely to affect the individual
firm's behavior and the collective process of market competition.
C.I

ID~ rjDgn~jgl ~9n§tXgjDt

Our survey of the economy would quickly turn up the
fact that all firms are faced with what we call a financial
constraint--the resources at their disposal are not infinite. In the short period we would note that the firm's
primary flow of resources orginates from the sale of its
product. Provided the process of purchasing inputs, producing, selling and receiving of revenue take place instantaneously this flow of resources would prove to be sufficient
for the maintenance of production over time. Since this
process does not take place instantaneously and/or because
the rate,of production may be increasing at a rate exceeding
revenue inflow, we note that firms tend to rely on other
resource bases, primarily short term credit. The firm's
access to short term'credit, however, is constrained by the
costs the firm incurs through borrowing and the lender's
(and firm's) desire to secure the value of the borrowed
resources against unforeseen and unfavorable developments.
From the firm's and lender's point of view this generally
dictates a reasonable limit determined by the cost of the
borrowing necessary to compensate for the actual lag in the
receipt of revenue. As a consequence we note that in the
short period the rate of inflow of resources to the firm
from both cash flow and borrowing will work out to be
approximately proportional to the value of output/sales.
Consequently, for the moment we choose to relate the
financial constraint of the firm to its basic indicator of
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success or failure, the rate of change in its size or sales.
We note that in general the function is a simple proportional relationship, i.e.
gN.1 = a.N·
dt

1

(2.1)

1

or dividing through by N, we find that the financial
constraint of the firm is a constant when taken in terms of
the relative rate of sales of the firm, i.e.
;.IN. = a.1
l _::J1
dt
(2.2)
1
In short, we assume for the moment that the short period
financial constraint facing the firm is such that the
absolute level of resources flowing into the firm in the
short period is proportional to the value of sales of the
firm and that it remains constant over time. The first part
of this proposition is trivial: the second part is not
trivial, obvious or true. It will be modified below when we
discuss the effects of the firm's and its competitors'
actions in the market.
-

N.

C.2

lD~ rLQgy~~iQD ~QDE~~giD~

The process of production obviously requires the
expenditure or outflow of resources. Some of these expenditures arise from the purchase of inputs (materials and
services including financial) from other firms in the economy and from others for 'internal' resources such as labor
skills, managerial talent and the imputed cost of the firm's
borrowing from itself.
In those circumstances in which a firm is observed to
have a constant rate of output and constant unit costs
with respect to the flow of its output over time we would
note that the expenditure of resources for internally
provided inputs would be proportional to its output; hence,
we could \-/r i te
ijN.

dt 1

= b·11. N·1

(2.3)
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or

1 dN. = b ..
N.
1

-d

e

(2 .4)

11

where b 11
.. reflects the rate of 'internal' resources expenditure. But for total unit costs to remain constant over
time we would have to observe that the flow of expenditures
for inputs purchased from other firms also remained constant, i.e.
gN. = b .. N., for all j, or

dt 1

IJ

1

(2.5)

.l --1
dN. = b .. , for all j
1J
N. dt
(2.6)
1
where b .. denotes the rate at which units of output of firm
IJ
It should be emphasized that
j are purchased by firm i.
this definition of constant costs is not the same as is
normally used in economics. All that is meant here is that
for a given rate of flow of output, unit costs do not change
over time. Usually the term constant costs refers to identical unit costs for differing rates of output. In the
notation used above the usual definition for constant costs
would be indicated by
b. ·/N. = b. ·*/N.
(2.7)
IJ
1
IJ
1
for t of some given duration, where N is output for the
period for which the rate b ij is defined and where b ij * and
Ni * correspond to another rate of output. If the right hand
side of the equation was greater (less) than the left the
equation would indicate the existence of the traditionally
defined increasing (decreasing) costs.
Further examination of the reasons why unit costs might
not remain constant with changes in the rate of output might
turn up the fact that some of the firm's expenditures were
fixed without regard to the rate of output. Furthermore, the
method of production used by the firm may be conducive,
because of plant size, etc. to a certain rate of output so
that variations from that rate would produce unfavorable
changes in unit costs. For a given rate of output we can
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note the effect of fixed costs as:
-SUM(j=1 to n}b 1)
.. * -b 1)
.. N.1 -SUl-l{j=1 to n)b 1)
.. N.1
(2.8)

where b ij * here denotes the rate of expenditures on fixed
costs--those unrelated to incremental changes in the rate of
output.
In the case of an optimal rate of output dictated in
the short period by plant design or some other factor, we
would note (if it were possible to hold all else equal) that
as the rate of output is increased from a rate below to a
rate above the optimum, the change in unit costs would
decline and then rise, with the change in direction occuring
at the optimum rate (i.e., a u-shaped cost curve). This is
impossible to show with our notation without creating a
cumbersome series of differences between the cost equations
for each rate of output so we will let the matter stand with
this verbal description.
These definitions are equilibrium definitions, but this
is not likely to be a state the firm will witness. It will
be remembered that our concept of the short period is one in
which the system is moving towards a continually shifting
equilibrium. Consequently, the interpretation we put on the
firm's experience is this: during the course of the dynamic
adjustment towards equilibrium the rates of flow given by
the parameters of its equation will change from the values
(or tendencies) consistent with the old equilibrium towards
those consistent with the new. For example, during the
period the firm may begin to experience difficulty obtaining
supplies at the rate necessary to sustain its current rate
of production. That is, as the economy moves towards a new
(unlikely to be attained) equilibrium the firm finds that
its old rates of output and intermediate product purchases
are not consistent with the rates of output occasioned by
the adjustment in sales towards the new equilibrium level.
We look upon these dynamic adjustments in the rates of
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flow of variables such as sales, purchases, and so on as the
indicators which cause the firm to make decisions. In the
case of this example, the firm may respond by bidding a
higher price in order to assure an adequate flow of inputs;
it may sign another contract with another firm; it may alter
its method of production, its rate of output, and so on. The
methodological point is that it is changes in the rates of
flow experienced by the firm which cause it to act.
This formulation of the production constraint facing
the firm in the short period is, of course, virtually identical (in equilibrium) to the basic Leontief type production
model if fixed and variable costs are lumped together and
only the observed rate of output considered. When the
equations for all firms are written together we can interpret each b ij as either purchases by firm i from firm j or
sales by j to i--in short all the off-diagonal elements conform to those in the intermediate product matrix of a Leontief system. The diagonal elements, b ii , differ (in a nonsubstantive way) from those in a Leontief system in that
they include internal purchases of financial and labor services (primary inputs) as well as intermediate products.
Finally, our system relates firms to one another whereas the
Leontief system is generally used to relate aggregations of
firms, or industry to industry.
C.3

Xb~ ~gL~~~ ~9D§~LgjD~

Our survey would also reveal that the success or failure of the various firms depends to a large extent upon
their relationship to the (broadly defined) marketplace. We
should note that the firm's sales rate is constrained by (1)
the limited size or extent of demand for the particular
product it is producing and (2) by the relative success or
failure of other firms competing for that same demand with
the same or similar products, that is, by the nature of the
firm's interaction with other firms in the marketplace.
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In order to define the effect of the firm's and its
competitors' sales on itself, it is first necessary to give
a rough picture of what we will call the consumer environment. This is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 4. We
consider the consumer environment to be such that potential
purchases of the firm's product arise as a flow over time.
The rate of this flow is given by consumer product preferences, budgets, and the relationship of the characteristics
(including price) of the firm's product to other products in
the market.
Implicit in the notion of the consumer environment is a
concept of consumer behavior which is based either on satisficing with regard to utility objectives or on an inability
to optimize consumption choices because of ambiguous, incomplete or biased information. This point of view will be
elaborated in Chapter 4. For the moment it should be enough
to note that in the case of satisficing we may think of a
world in which consumers are searchers, whose search process
------ - .. ----- ----------is costly, and who are consequently of.t_~n_.willing to tradeoff search costs for a possibly less than
optimal consumption purchase. The probability of such trade-offs being
made would appear to increase as consumers approach indifference between the firm's product and any other. Hence if
the firm could actually 'move down its demand curve' it
would most likely encounter a declining rate of sales which
could only be offset if larger selling costs were incurred
in order to reduce the search costs of consumers. These
costs can be thought of as drains on the firm's resources
either in the form of actual expenditures or in a declining
frequency of sales. We choose to look upon them in terms of
their effect on the firm's rate of sales.
A similar process would occur if consumers received ambiguous, incomplete or biased information about the products
offered to them in the marketplace and/or if the quantity of
information available to them was potentially so great that
,--.-'-_.-
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the costs of analyzing (or even the ability to analyze) that
data prevented optimization of their buying patterns. Here
again, the probability of less than optimal buying decisions
would be likely to increase as consumers became more and
more indifferent between one or another product because of
the more accurate and costly information required to make a
marginal decision and the declining benefits relative to a
correct non-marginal decision. In this case also each additional sale by the firm can only be made if accompanied by
a compensating decline in the frequency of sales. (Changes
in selling costs, prices and/or product type could maintain
or increase the frequency of sales, but in this model these
are only long period options.) In short, once consumer
preferences and relative product characteristics are given
as they are for the short period by definition we view the
conditions governing individual transactions as the primary
determinant of the frequency of sales.
Another way of looking at this is that as the firm itself makes sales it finds that it has reduced the potential
rate of flow of purchases accordingly. That is, relative to
a zero rate of sales the firm finds that the potential frequency of sales is dirninshed. To use an analogy with the
physical world, say we were slowly sending a stream of marbles at a constant rate past a little boy who was trying to
grab as many as he could by rapidly and randomly poking his
hand into the stream. At any instant in time the boy's
chances of getting a marble would depend upon how many he
had already pulled out of that part of the flow of the
stream accessible to his hand. The more he had already
pulled out of that part of the stream the lower would be his
remaining chances at that moment.
The larger the firm is relative to the flow of potential purchases the greater will be the relative impact upon
itself of a change in its own rate of sales, just as our
little boy's chances of getting more marbles would become
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less the greater the number he had already pulled out of the
stream. We can represent this notion mathematically as:
1 dN.1 = -c 11
.. N.1
N.1 dt
(2.9)
which we interpret as meaning that the relative reduction in
the firm's unconstrained rate of potential revenue inflow is
a function of the rate of sales of the firm itself. It is
this effect of the firm upon itself (as well as the effect
of other firm's sales, discussed below) which causes the
gross revenue of the firm to vary with the rate of sales of
product. Consequently, considering only the effects of the
firm's own actions we can take
1 dN.1 = a.1 - c 11
.. N.1
N.1 dt
(2.10)
to be the relation determining the relative rate of inflow
of gross revenue resulting from the firm's sale of a product
of given characteristics. That is, the potential rate of
revenue inflow, ai' associated with a zero rate of sales is
reduced as the actual rate of sales, N i , is increased.
Sales by other firms Will also reduce the rate of inflow of revenue to the firm. Hence, in a similar vein we
might write
1 dN.1 =
N.1 dt

(2.11)

where we note that the relative effect on firm i depends
upon the size of the other firms (N.) as well as the
,
J
relative rate at which they are removing revenues which
might have been removed by the firm itself.
This notion may be elaborated further by illustrating
some special cases which are usually distinguished by economists. Take, for example, the special case which arises
when the products in question are perfectly homogeneous,
i.e., one for one substitutes.
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In this case, a sale by firm j will tend to reduce the
potential frequency of sales by firm i to exactly the same
extent as would have been the case if firm i itself had made
the sale. Therefore, we can note that
(2.12)
c.1J·/c 11
.. =1
will hold for the special case of bgIDg9~D~gYB_~~ggy~tB.
For products which are less than perfect substitutes
for one another the inhibitory effect on firm i of a sale by
firm j will be less than in the homogeneous product case.
That is,
a < c.1J·/c 11
.. < 1
(2.13)
As the products tend towards close ~YDBtjtY1~~ this ratio
will tend towards one and as the products tend to be less
and less substitutable the ratio will tend towards zero.
In a similar manner we can distinguish the case where
the products are complements of one another. By complements
we mean here when products tend to be used in a joint consumption process (e.g., gasoline and tires), andlor when the
consumer is faced with joint search and information costs.
In this case greater output and sales by firm j will have a
favorable impact on the rate of sales of firm i. This
allows us to write,
(2.14)
c.1J·/c 11
.. < a
as the condition for ~g~l~ID~D!9LY products.
It should be emphasized that equilibrium conditions are
implicit in the definitions we have applied to the effect of
the size and rates of flow of sales of the firm and other
firms on the firm's own market. We do not visualize the
firm as actually experiencing equilibrium conditions.
Rather what it will notice is the movement away from one and
toward another equilibrium or equilibrium trajectory. This
will show up as changes in the rates given by the parameters
of the firm's equation and, it is expected, will provoke a
response from the firm itself or from other firms. For
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example, a retail store would probably notice a decline in
its rate of sales if a similar store were to move in across
the street. We would expect the firm to respond (with a
sale, change of product, or whatever) in an attempt to
thwart the new equilibrium 'tendency represented by the
change in its rate of sales. Exactly how it might respond
depends upon its circumstances--a question we will not
broach until we get to the long period model.
In sum, in the short period we view the firm as faced
with a limited market. Its sales and those of its competitors tend to exhaust the market in a way that affects the
rate of change in the frequency of each others sales.
Changes in the frequency of sales due to equilibrium tendencies of the system are considered to be one of the firm's
prime indicators of short period success or failure. Its
response (in the form of decisions about price, product
type, etc.) to this and similar indicators causes a new
short period to be initiated.
D.

.s.JJIDJ!l.9.r~

The short period model of the firm views the operations
of the firm in terms of a set of variables affecting the
relative flow of net revenues of the firm (l/N i ) (dNi/dt) •
These variables are:
(1) The unconstrained inflow of revenues--unconstrained in the sense of there being no limits to the
market. The rate of this flow - a i - is viewed as being
proportional to sales of the firm.
(2) The rate of outflow of resources associated with
expenditures for production. These outflows are viewed as
arising (a) from 'internal' expenditures - b ii - also proportional to sales and (b) from expenditures for intermediate inputs purchased from other firms - b • And
ij
(3) . outflows, perhaps more accurately described as
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leakages of resources associated with a reduction in the
frequency of sales in a limited narket brought about by
sales by the firm itself - c ii Ni - and sales by other
firms - c .. N .•
1J
J
A simple adding up of these inflows and outflows yields
the rate of change in the net resource position of the firm.
If the firm were faced with only one other firm in the economy we could write out all the relevant variables affecting
its net relative resource flows as:
(l/NI ) (drll/dt)

=

a l -b ll -b 12 -cllNl -c 12 N2

(2.15)
A similar equation may be written for firm two as well as
for any firm in any economy with any number of firms.
When the equations for all the firms are written one
below the other the model is easily summarized as a system
of simultaneous equation~. This might more readily be
written in matrix notation as
(2.16)
x = A - B - eN
Since a ,system of this sort gives the factor and product
market relations for firms selling heterogeneous products it
may be fair to think of it as a general equilibrium approach
to a monopolistically or imperfectly competitive economy.
It should be emphasized that the arguments on the right
hand side of the firm's equation are implicit functions of
the competitive environment in which the firm finds itself-the terms under which it purchases inputs, the costs of negotiating contracts, the reliability of supply, the existence
of consumer sUbstitutes for its product, its own and other
firms' advertising, consumer preferences, and so on.
E. hD
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In the explanation of the operation of the firm in the
short period offered above, the inflows and outflows the
firm experienced were interpreted as flows of generalized
resources. This view implies the ability to measure all
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flows with a common measure, obviously money value, and
hence, th~t the net flow of th~ res~urces of the firm,
dN/dt, is in a sense the bottom line of the firm's balance
sheet.
However, firms are rarely in the position of being able
to accurately measure the value of the flow of resources in
the short period. The process of accurately accounting
these resource flows is itself so costly that a system that
records changes in the value of rates of flows would be prohibitive if done on a continuous basis. An adequate approximation for the purposes of the firm, especially in the
short period when prices are fixed, is the actual enumerable
flows of resources themselves, i.e. X units of sales, y
units of output, z units of input from firm j, etc. In
short, an inventory system which lends itself to very easy
and inexpensive '(relative to costs and revenues) measurement, is one which provides the firm with adequate (but not
perfect) measures of its performance in the short period.
Following this approach we may reinterpret the variables we have used to describe the firm as:
(1) dtVdt, the net rate of change in product
inventory.
(2) f(a), the rate of inventory outflow of product
unconstrained by limited market size factors.
(3) k(c), the marginal change in the rate of inventory
outflow attributable to limitations of market size.
Then f(a) and k(c) taken together yield a schedule
relating the rate of change in the outflow of product to
total accumulated outflow N. And,
(4) g(b) the rate of creation of product due to
production.
It should be noted that a system of this sort is very
simple indeed. Two of the primary variables of the system,
dN/dt and g(b), are directly measurable by the firm. The
remaining variable k(c) which gives the slope of the sched-
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ule relating the frequency of sales as a function of accumulated sales is then derivable by a simple subtraction. The
firm may either compare k(c) for two successive inventory
periods and/or it may compare k(c) and g(b) in the same
period. Either or both calculations provide the firm with a
quick and inexpensive reading of market conditions and its
efforts relative to those conditions. We can look upon such
simple indicators as one of the means by which the firm perceives and learns about its position, and the tendencies of
its position, in the broader long period environment.
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CHAPTER 3
Sm-IE "EXCERCISES" WITH THE SHORT PERIOD MODEL
A.

.In.t.r~gy~.tj.Qn

Under the very constrained conditions outlined above,
that is, when firms are restricted to changes in their level
of output/sales and are not allowed to consciously mold
their evolutionary characteristics to actual or perceived
changes in their environment, competitive success or failure
is merely a reflection of decisions made prior to the beginning of the short period.
It may be useful to think of the time related aspect of
competition somewhat as follows: We think of a 'game'
played in succesive rounds in which each player, or the management of the firm, is asked to 'fix' the evolutionary
characteristics--prices, costs, product characteristics, and
so on, everything but level of output--of the firm. Each
player is constrained by the results of previous rounds of
play in terms of the size and resources of the firm, and
accumulated knowledge of consumer demand, relevant technology and input markets--in short, the historical development
of the firm. Players are then brought together and firms
pitted all against each other. Each round of play is analagous to the short-term competition analyzed here. It takes
place over a short period of time during which the 'players'
observe the unfolding of the interacting consequences of
their previous decisions in terms of changes in the rate of
sales of each firm.
At any time any player may call a halt to the process,
end the short period and (under constraints discussed later)
alter the characteristics of his firm in order also to alter
the likely outcome of the game. The process is essentially
one in which long period decision making creates continuous
short period disequilibrium around continuously changing
points of potential equilibrium.
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The convenient and probably essential mental crutch of
'holding all other things equal' is not the model's preferred way of looking at the world. Consequently, if one
were to hold rigorously to the spirit of the model it would
be virtually impossible to simply and easily demonstrate the
'pure' effects of this or that kind of action by any actor
within the systen. In order to achieve the kind of pedagogical simplicity which is frequently so useful, we depart
from our preferred method of treating the short period in
this section of the paper. Our departure is very simple and
straightforward: We allow the short period to be played out
to equilibrium and, for purposes of simplicity, we require
that the period be defined in terms of a single ,decision.
Thus each short period is initiated when one firm makes a
decision (i.e., changes its relationship to other firms in
the economy). This decision causes the parameters of the
system to be altered and the system to tend towards a new
equilibrium. Neither the firm in question nor other firms
are "allowed" to make any other decisions during the movement to equilibrium nor are any other aspects of the environment assumed to change except in passive response to the
firm's decision. By carefully and narrowly specifying the
nature of the decision and the environment we can compare
the old and the new equilibria and isolate the effect of
that single decision. This kind of approach allows us to
draw some highly conditional conclusions about long period
processes in this kind of environment.
In addition, in this section of the paper we also
abandon the implicit formulation of the constraints facing
the firm in favor of a more explicit formulation which
allows the use of simple graphics. We assume here:
(1) that there are only two firms in the economy, and
(2) that all the inputs necessary for the firm's operation are purchased internally (i.e. all the off-diagonal
elements of the b matrix are assumed equal to zero). Hence,
the equation describing the flows within the firm can be
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written as:
(l/Nl(dNl/dt) =a l - b ll - cllN l -c 12
(3.1)
These simplifying assumptions produce an easy to use
linear graphical representation of the resource flows within
the firm and reduce the problem of interactions with other
firms to the manageable case of only one other firm. Formally we are left with the analysis of duopoly and what might
be called duopoly with differentiated products.
The comparative static analysis achieved by modifying
the short period model in this way allows one to begin a
preliminary analysis of the adaptive phenomenon of long
period competition. Some of the results of this anaysis are
very suggestive; however, they do lack a convincing, consistent theoretical rationale. That is, the decisions analyzed
in this way are decisions made without reference to the
highly important factors constraining and directing them.
The kinds of questions surrounding these matters can only be
approached after we have laid out our long period model.
(See Boulding [1950] for a similar formal geometric
approach. Pielou [1969] is a convenient source for a similar model of biological competition with long term dynamics
appropriate to biological, but probably not eCOtiomic, competition.)
B.
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the simple two firm case under these restrictive
conditions the model can represented as:
(l/N l ) (dNl/dt) = a l - b ll -cIINl -c 12 N2
(3.2)
~n

(3.3)
Consider now the conditions which would result when the
relative rate of growth in sales of firm one comes to a
halt; that is, when a l -b ll -cllNl - c 12 N2 = 0
(3.4)

It can be readily seen that the size of firm one at a zero
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rate of growth of sales depends upon the size of the other
firm (i.e. the firm cannot be viewed in isolation). Graphically this may be represented by the locus of points lying
on a straight line in the first quadrant (ruling out negative firm size) of a graph with NI and N2 on the vertical and
horizontal axes respectively. (See Figure 2.) The slope of
the locus is c l2 /c ll and the intercepts are

(al-bll/cII) for N2 = 0 and
(al-bll/cI2) for NI = O.
In other words, the maximum possible size of firm one (when
N2 = 0) is seen as strictly a function of its own market and
technological characteristics (aI' b 11 and c ll ). As the
constraints of production, b ll , and limited market size,
c ll ' become greater relative to its unrestricted growth
rate, aI' the maximum possible size of the firm declines.
Likewise, its minimum possible size (N I = 0) is the result
of the inhibitory effects of the other firm, c 12 ' and its
own costs of production out-weighing its unconstrained
growth, a l •
If we were to consider the equilibrium tendencies of the
firm we would find that for any point lying below the line,
i. e. ,
(3 .5)

the combined relative sizes of the two firms is such that
firm one will tend to grow taking the size of firm two as
given (e.g., point A in Figure 2). The arrow extending froQ
point A and running parallel to the NI axis shows the
direction of growth of firm one. All points above the line,
NI > «al-b l ) - Cl2N2)/cII
(3.6)

such as point B in Figure 2, indicate that for a given size
of firm two firm one will tend to diminish in size.
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Similarly for firm two its equilibrium size possibilities are given by the locus of points described by
a 2 -b 22 -c 2I NI - c 22 N2 = 0
(3.7)

where the slope of the line is c 21 /c 22 and its intercepts
are (a 2 - b 22 )/c 22 and (a 2 - b 22 )/c 21 on the N2 and NI axes
respectively. For all combinations of firm sizes lying
above this line firm two will tend to exhibit negative
growth rates and for all combinations lying below the line
firm two will tend to show positive growth rates.
FIGURE 2

Sh::>rt RlID Locus of Equilibr'iun Sizes for Finn One, Seen as a Function of

Size of

Finn Tw:>

O~------------------------------~--~~~N2
Arrows from ron-€l:]UiliJ:n::ium POints A am B srow direction of craI'l:je in
size of f.irm one for a given size of firm t\\t).
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The simultaneous solution of both these equations
reveals no unique properties without knowledge of the values
of the various coefficients. However, in general there are
four possible solutions as illustrated in Figure 3{a), (b),
(c) and (d).
The conditions for stable equilibrium with both firms
at a positive size are
{a 2 -b 22 )/c 21 > (a l -bll)/c ll
(3.8)

and
(3.9)

This corresponds with the graphical situation depicted in
Figure 3{a) where the slope of the equilibrium locus for N2
exceeds and intersects that of Nl • Stable equilibrium
occurs at point E. The economic interpretation to be put on
these conditions is very straightforward: For a stable
equilibrium to exist the constraints on the growth of firm
one given a zero size for firm two have to be strong enough
to prevent firm one from 'filling' the market. The same has
to be true for firm two.
Figures 3(b), 3(c), and 3(d) represent three circumstances of non-stable equilibrium in which complete dominance by one of the two firms is the result. The factors
which determine the stability of competition, especially
those which can be shown to be of importance in the formation of monopoly or the excercise of market power, are always
of interest. Consequently, we now examine the question for
two general cases: (I) competition with homogeneous products, and (2) competition with non-homogeneous products.
The simultaneous solution of both these equations
reveals no unique properties without knowledge of the values
of the various coefficients. However, in general there are
four possible solutions as illustrated in Figure 3{a), (b),
(c) and (d).
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FIGURE 3

Possible OUtcanes of Two Finn Canpetition

A.

B.

Stability with both firms
at a positive size

Only one firm survives
(depending on phase path)

..------------------~--~N2

~------------a-----"--~N2
c. Only firm one survives

D. Indeterminant· homogeneous
products with constant
and identical costs
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C.

~~ID~~tj~j~D_lb~~Y9D_tb~_~~1~_~t_~_~~ID~9~D~~Y~_2~~gy~~

In Chapter 2 we noted that homogeneous product markets
give rise to a situation where c 11
..

= c 1J
..

and c J1
..

= c.j.
1

Referring to the equilibrium conditions stated in equations
(3.8 and 3.9) and to the definition of a homogeneous product
(equation 2.12) it follows that
(3.10)
therefore, setting (3.10) equal to c, and substituting into
the equations which define a stable equilibrium at a positive size for each firm (equations [3.8) and [3.9]) we derive, for the first firm
(3.ll)
and for the second firm
(a l - bll}/c > (a 2 - b 22 )/c

(3.12)

Multiplying both equations by c for the first firm we get
a 2 -b 22 > a l -b ll
(3.13)
and, for the second firm
a l -b ll > a 2 -b 22

(3.14)

It is clear that no uniquely defined equilibrium is possible
because equations (3.13) and (3.14) cannot be simultaneously
fulfilled. One firm or the other, depending on the balance
of its revenue and production constraints, will survive.
These results conform perfectly with the well known proposition that competition among sellers of homogeneous products
under conditions of constant costs will be unstable.
Nevertheless a question arises with regard to the interpretation of the probability of this outcome in the real
world. At the crux of the question is the assumption of
constant costs. If we were to presume that in the real
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world costs might change with respect to the size of the
firm or its volume of output, then it would be important to
know also the relationship of the size of the market to the
size of the firm. It would seem that if size of market is
defined so that a market tends to be small then the likelihood of a firm experiencing (long period) decreasing or
constant costs at a level of output sufficient to exhaust
the market would be rather high. On the other hand, a
liberal definition of size of market (one that implicitly
arrived at a larger size) might lead one to conclude that
the likelihood of competitive exclusion would be small.
It would appear then that one's view of what is meant
by 'homogeneous commodity' would strongly color one's view
of what economy was like. A strict definition would lead
one to see large parts of the economy as consisting of more
or less trivial monopolies. Schumpeter has written:
nLiterally ••• anyone is a monopolist who sells anything that
is not in every respect, wrapping and location and service
included, exactly like what other people sell ••• "(1969). A
more relaxed or liberal view of the definition of homogeneous products and markets would lead one to aggregate
transactions of many similar but not identical commodities
into a single market. The firms in these markets would be
characterized, by and large, by an inability to achieve a
size sufficient to drive other firms to extinction. This
latter view is implicit among most neoclassical economists,
and the former is the view of those economists who tend to
decribe the economy in terms of monopolistic or imperfect
competition. Ultimately this question is of importance
because of its ramifications for the conduct and performance
of the market. That is, competitive exclusion is important
because it gives rise to small numbers bargaining situations
which affect the efficiency and equity of the market
process. This, of course, deserves greater discussion but
can only be done in the context of our long period model.
Another question raised by the interpretation of these
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stability conditions concerns the relationship of costs and
size. In a homogeneous product market characterized by
instability, it would appear that the surviving firm not
only needs to achieve lower costs than the other firm; it
also needs to do this at a scale sufficient to exhaust tne
market. The other side of this same coin, of course, is
that a firm could continue to survive in competition against
another firm if it were able to achieve relatively lower
costs but at a scale insufficient to exhaust the market.
Over time, however, such a firm would be faced with the
continuous threat that the other firm might be able to
achieve relatively lower costs at a scale sufficient to
exhaust the market. Consequently, it would seem reasonable
to conclude that there is a continuous requirement placed
upon the firm which wishes to survive~ and this requirement
is to achieve relative efficiency at as large a size as is
consistent with the market. In short, under these circumstances the firm's preference for growth, which we have only
assumed to this point, may be grounded ultimately in its
need to survive. It suggests that in non-homogeneous but
highly substitutable product markets the long period competitive process may also drive the firm to adopt a growth for
survival strategy.
Still another problem raised here is the competitive
meaningfulness of homogeneous products and constant costs in
a world where firms are free to alter their product characteristics. On the one hand, it would be reasonable to exect
that any trend towards competitive exclusion, based entirely
on the homogeneity of products, would give rise to a counter
tendency towards product differentiation. But the very
possibility of differentiation also carries with it the
equally possible convergence of product characteristics.
Consequently, the possibility of product convergence induced
by a new technology, marketing method, or what have you,
would always seem to place the firm, even one with a highly
differentiated product, in a potential situation of compet76

itive exclusion. Consequently, it would appear that the
firm--even one in a differentiated product market-interested in its own survivial should always prefer
efficiency at as large a size as is consistent with the size
of the market to the same level of efficiency at a smaller
size. But efficiency in this context is not simply cost
minimizing efficiency. It is also, and more importantly,
adaptive efficiency which places the firm in a position
where it can avoid, or administer, the ~~yp g~ g~g~~ of
competitive exclusion.
D.
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The success or failure of firms competing with one
another through the sale of non-homogeneous products depends
upon more than relative efficiency in production. The point
of this section of the paper is to use the graphics of section Chapter 3 B and a comparative static analysis to illustrate how the firm's relationship to its product market and
that of other firm's products could affect its success or
failure. The analysis is limited to the two firm case merely to keep things simple. We reserve to a later point in
the paper the behavioral analysis of how firms undertake to
change their relationship to the broader market. For the
moment we merely assume a change in order to illustrate the
importance of the firm's relationship to the marketplace.
A particular initial situation is depicted in Figure 4.
We have two firms selling two different, but substitutable,
goods to consumers. Each good gives rise to different firm
charateristics (i.e., the parameters ai' b ii , and cij). The
two firms will experience differences in their inflow of resources (revenue), ai' costs of production, bij, and reductions in revenue flows due to limited product market size,
c ii ' and the inhibitory effect of their competition, Cij,
all simply because they are producing different products.
Implicit in the situation depicted in the diagram is the assumption that the initial values of the firms' parameters
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FIGURE 4

Finn 1 and 2 in Equililiriun

FIGURE 5

The Effect of a Reduction in the Costs of Production (bU) for Firm 1
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were such that the firms reached a stable equilibrium with
both at a positive size.
Toe comparative static graphical technique which we
will use to analyze the effect of decisions on this initial
equilibrium is very straightforward: The values of the parameters of the firm's equation are determined to a large degree by decisions made by the firm and its competitors. As
decisions are made the equilibrium locus of the firm
changes. Depending on the kind of decision made this shows
up as an easily illustrated shift or rotation of the firm's
equilibrium locus. (If the change occurs in the 'interaction' coefficients in the simplified model used here these
are c l2 and C21 the locus of both firms shifts or rotates).

D.I
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We now want to see what would happen if one of the
firm's parameters was arbitrarily changed. In the first instance, to go over some ground already covered, consider a
case in which firm one's costs of production were lowered
through, say, a technological improvement in its production
process, that is, in effect, a reduction in the rate of expenditures for inputs, bll. Referring to the intercept
values for firm one's equation we note that graphically this
change will cause both intercepts of firm one's equilibrium
locus to move outward--the result is a parallel shift of the
locus as depicted in Figure 5. This shift produces a new
equilibrium at E' which corresponds with (1) an increase in
the size of firm one, (2) a decline in firm two's size, but
(3) the decline in the size of firm two is more than offset by the increase in size of firm one.
D.2 i~~QY&1 b11~~91j~D§
Consider now a case in which firm one decided to alter
the characteristics of its product. For simplicity we will
assume this can be done without simultaneously altering cost
(b ll ) or unconstrained revenue flows (a I ). The effect of
product differentiation will be observed in changes in the
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market parameters of both firms.
(1) By changing its product firm one finds the size of its product market is altered
and therefore c ll changes. (2) The rate of substitution of
its product for firm two's will change and this will be reflected in the value of c l2 and c 21 • We will assume all
relevant market effects on firm two are captured by the substitution effects reflected in the value of c 21 • Then, if
we are interested only in the direction of change, we have
two possible changes (positive or negative) for two variables, c
and c 12 • Firm one moves into either a larger or
II
smaller product market and the substitutability of its
product for firm two's either increases or decreases. In
addition to changes in firm one's parameters caused by a
change in firm one's product, the market interaction between
firm one and two changes. This shows up in terms of the
substitutability of the two products which affects the value
of c 21 in firm two's equation. Here we have assumed that
substitutability is 'symetrical'; that is, an increase in
the substitutability of firm one's product for firm two's
also represents an increased substitutability of firm two's
product for firm one's. Thus the interaction terms, c 21 and
c 12 ' will always move in the same direction will have the
same value and can be treated as one.
In Figure 6 the two possible directions of change in
firm one's market size, c ll ' are shown across the top, and
the two possible directions of change in product substitut~bility are shown on the left.
Figures 6 (a), (b), (c) and
(d) show the four possible results of product differentiation.
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FIGURE 6
The Effect of CJ::an;es
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Examination of the graphs leads to the following observations: Firm one is benefited most by product differentiation which tends to move it into a larger market with
less product substitutability--i.e., some form of market
discovery (6d). However it also seems to receive clear benefits by moving into a larger market with a product more
like that of the firm already there--i.e., some form of
imitation (6b). In both cases in which the firm moves to
relatively smaller markets the results are detrimental, with
the exception that in (6c) firm one seems to have achieved a
more stable market position by moving to a less substitutable product in a' smaller market. This last case is something of a paradox since it suggests that the goals of survival and an increased rate of growth are not always compatible. But as our early discussion has indicated, the possibility of another firm's products converging on that of the
firm in question would seem to indicate that this kind of
withdrawal from the pressure~ for competitive growth offers
no long term guarantee of survival.
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CHAPTER 4
THE LONG PERIOD

A.

.ID.t.r.Qg.Y~.tj..QD

The representation of the firm in the short period in
the previous sections left unstated the reasons why and the
conditions under which firms make decisions. No mention
whatsoever was made with regard to the conditions circumscribing the scope of alternatives open to the firm. In
effect we have yet to layout a theory of how firms compete--decide what to produce--in the long period. In this
section of the paper we discuss the external environment in
which firms find themselves. The purpose of this discussion
is to define how that environment constrains the decision
making behavior and the opportunities of the firm. In terms
of the short period model, what is being done here in defining the rules by which the firm can alter those coefficients
of its equation which describe its interaction with other
firms. In other words, decision making here is viewed as
the means by which the firm alters its relationship with its
external environment and ultimately competes.
Decision making is retained as the essence of the competitive process (as in neoclassical economics) but is described here in terms of decisions the firm makes with regard to its interaction with other firms in its environment,
primarily via its choice of product, rather than in terms of
a "given" market (i.e., some aggregate of all other firms
selling homogeneous products). The secondary questions the
firm is seen as facing are not merely the classical questions about price and quantity, but questions about the terms
with which it interacts with its environment. The terms of
its interaction are taken to include price and quantity, to
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whom and how it choses to sell, and from whom and how it
choses to buy.
Bound up in these competitive questions faced by the
firm are essentially two major theoretical problems: The
first requires a simple way of describing a complex environment. From the theoretical point of view this question demands a means for conceptualizing a world in which the characteristics of products are almost infinitely variable.
Relative to neoclassical economics it means the abandonment
of a theoretical construct which visualizes the product environment in terms of groups of products which, for analytical purposes, can be lumped together into categories whose
components can be assumed to be homogeneous. Instead the
view propounded here emphasizes the heterogeneity and possibility of continuous change of products. In a sense, this
view proceeds from the observation that products are almost
always differentiated if it is at all possible, that there
must be strong economic reasons for this and that economic
theory ought to have a means for describing hO\1 the decision
to chose a product type is directed and constrained. The
theoretical device chosen to conceptualize this kind of
material environment is a highly modified version of characteristics or attributes theory of product demand--a theory
most thoroughly articulated by K. Lancaster (1971, 1979).
The second major problem has to do ~lith the constraints
on the firm's ability to perceive its environment. Put
differently, in a complex environment information is scarce
and costly. Therefore, the determinants of the relative
cost of particular information for each individual firm will
strongly affect the nature and effectiveness of the firm's
ability to compete. It is this information constraint which
is our second major theoretical problem. To approach this
problem we develop first a 'taxonomy of knowledge' based on
characteristics theory in order to have a vehicle for describing the particularistic nature of knowledge, and sec-
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ond, a theory of institutions as information channels or
surrogates in order to provide a basis for describing the
extent and content of information networks (i.e., the dispersion of collective knowledge).
The major reasons for altering and elaborating the
characteristics or attributes theory of demand may be briefly summarized: Our use of this theory is in a form which is
very different from that espoused by Lancaster. It is fair
to state that Lancaster (1971) went to great pains to show
that this form of demand theory was thoroughly consistent
with neoclassical theory. This required, among other
things, assuming perfect knowledge and a world of a limited
number of characteristics in order to make the theory
compatible with the long run deterministic world view of the
neoclassical doctrine. In effect, in his early work Lancaster purged the theory of its ability to deal with complexity and heterogeneity--the very attributes that make it
interesting and important. His later work (1979) takes advantage of these attributes, but because of the methodological approach of carefully specifying the environment, it
tends to retain its deterministic character.
Our interest here is not to build a view of the world
which is deterministic~ rather we wish to emphasize the
evolutionary character of the long run economic processes.
In short we are interested in the process of learning and
adaptation in a complex, changing and heterogeneous environment. Consequently, we depart from Lancaster by assuming
information to be costly and the economic environment to be
heterogeneous, complex, changing, and, especially, unspecified with regard to particulars.
Characteristics theory is important because it provides
a convenient way to reference this kind of world. That is,
using characteristics theory one can provide a reasonable
concept for dealing with 'closely related' products, a nonexistent product, or a million non-existent products. In
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this sense it is highly amenable to the treatment of a product environment which is heteiogeneous and complex. Because
it can describe, or at least conceptualize non-existent
products it provides a way to describe change in the product
envionment. It is not limited as is conventional demand
theory to a finite number of u~changing products. Since an
outstanding characteristic of modern capitalism is the continuous proliferation and change of products this is an important attribute of characteristics theory. It allows one
to conceptualize a heterogeneous demand environment and
thereby avoid obfuscating aggregatio~s. For example, the
fashion industry, to take an extreme case, is an instance
where conventional demand theory provides almost no guide to
understanding the competitive structure and performance of
the industry. In fact, since it probably would wind up attributing all change to 'shifts in consumer preferences' it
probably would do more to mislead than to inform one about
the relevant behavior in that industry. To a lesser extent
the same is true even in the fishing industry which comes
perilously close to the textbook example of a perfectly competitive homogeneous product market at first glance. Characteristics theory, as we hope to pOint out, can lead to
useful conceptualizations of individual and market behavior
in these instances.
t-Te also use character istics theory as a basis for delineating what we call a 'theory of economic knowledge.' In
the kind of world which we wish to describe, differentiated
knowledge becomes either a very strong constraint on the set
of feasible opportunities open to the firm or, viewed from
another perspective, a source of c?mpetitive advantage.
Economic theory, lately, has been concerned with the acquisition of knowledge but mostly as a variant of the
generalized investment problem. Only recently has attention
been addressed to the broader question of how information
and knowledge affect the processes of competition. As a

.
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result there is a very weak theoretical basis for offering
some intuitively obvious conclusions about economic phenomena. For example, to take an extreme case, we have no
theoretical basis for answering the question: Why don't
fishermen consider the production of jet aircraft in their
set of feasible alternatives? The answer is intuitively
obvious--they don't know how to produce jet aircraft and to
learn would take too much time and be too costly--but is not
available to us through theory. Although this example may
seem trivial in a sense, perhaps because of its extreme
conditions, it cannot be denied that the particular forms of
knowledge available to the firm strongly circumscribe the
set of feasible alternatives before it. The resident knowledge of a firm not only describes what is feasible at the
moment, but also the set of knowledge which can be economically acquired. In short, what the firm has learned and is
capable of learning are important economic questions. They
determine the firm's relationship to its environment and its
ability to alter that relationship, in effect, to compete.
In the sections which follow we use characteristics
theory as a basis for describing the constraints of knowledge faced by the firm. The approach is rather simple. We
assume that for each product the firm currently produces and
has produced in the recent past there is a correlated body
of financial, market, organizational and technological
knowledge necessary for the production and sale of that
commodity. To the extent that the firm's product history
differs from that of other firms its resident knowledge and,
hence, the costs and returns to the acquisition of
particular forms of knowledge, will also differ. In other
word£, the multi-dimensional characteristics space which we
use to describe products can also be used to describe the
particular forms of knowledge which are correlated with the
financing, production and sale of those products.
When
combined with a "learning approach" this taxonomy of know-
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ledge provides the analytical basis for describing the set
of feasible alternatives before the firm and how that set
differs from the feasible set of other firms. It also provides the basis for a dynamic analysis of the process of
competition very different from that of standard theory.
When the notion of the "competitive decision" is altered--away from the "price/quantity" question and towards
the "what to produce" question--the non-technological, competitive interactions between firms become much more significant explanators of individual and collective economic behavior than the market interactions--usually labeled pecuniary externalities--of standard theory. When the firm is
able to alter the characteristics of what it can produce,
the somewhat artificial passivity irr.plied by the whole notion of pecuniary externalities is replaced by (the possibility of) active adaptive behavior in which--using
neoclassical language--pecuniary externalities provoke
changes in the production function, namely, alterations in
product characteristics. In other words, the logical distinction between pecuniary and technological externalities
upon which so much of the normative content of neoclassical
theory is based breaks down when adaptive, product altering
behavior occurs as part of the competitive process. This
tends to raise some difficult welfare questions about which
we attempt only a very tentative articulation.
Common's (l923) legalistic theory of transactions and
(exchange related} institutions is used here because of its
appropriateness to a non-deterministic, very imperfect
world. Its specific purpose in this theory is to provide a
basis for describing the interaction of the firm with its
environment under conditions of uncertainty. Characteristics
theory provides a convenient basis for describing a complex
world which is appropriate to the consideration of uncertainty, but in a sense it provides a view almost without a
sense of time. But uncertainty cannot be divorced from the
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passage of time. Common's theory on the other hand, not only provides a clear sense of time but also the basis for an
institutional interpretation of collective and individual
behavior under conditions of uncertainty, especially as it
is affected by the flow of collectively generated information.
The purpose of using Common's theory for the long
period model is to elaborate further the conditions and
constraints which are likely to govern the firm's ability to
alter the nature of its interactions with its environment-i.e., the parameters of its short period equation. The
basic behavioral proposition for which Common's theory of
transactions and institutions is used may be summarized as
follows: when transactions are characterized by poor and/or
asymetrical distributions of information about the current
or future environment, institutions arise whose purpose
(which is not by any means always fulfilled) is to mitigate
the inefficiencies and inequities which could potentially
arise under these circumstances. Mitigation takes place
through the regularization of behavior upon which relatively
firm expectations can be founded. In effect, institutions
tend to replace relatively uncertain expectations about the
material environment with more certain expectations about
human behavior.
Unlike more modern treatments of decision making under
uncertainty, the approach suggested by Common's work does
not lead one to the "risk equivalent" solution. Rather,
there is the notion that uncertainty gives rise to negotiations, deals and, after repeated collective encounters with
similar situations of uncertainty, the evolution of a set of
working rules or institutions--from the very informal such
as reputation to the fully legal such as commercial codes-whose purpose is to mediate generically similar transactional problems.
Institutions as such are seen as growing out of and
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being thoroughly dependent upon the existence of information
networks. They are different from information networks to
the extent that they provide an interpretation of the world,
on the one hand, and a set of rules or expectations of behavior on the other. Both of these functional aspects of
institutions can only arise within an information network as
a result of repeated interactions under similar circumstances.
Broadly speaking, we divide institutions into three categories
according to the circumstances governing the interaction:
(1) heirarchical institutions governing exchange in a nonmarket environment, (2) market exchange related institutions, and (3) institutions governing competitive interactions.
LQD9 2~~iQg bBB~IDEtiQDB
Our intent in the long period model is to create a
theory of economic behavior which can explain economic
processes and institutions in a complex, changing environment. The kind of environment which we have in mind can be
characterized somewhat as follows:
(1) Heterogeneity: we view the world as one in which
products, preferences, markets and so on are variable at any
point in time and subject to continuous variation over time.
This does not mean that we think of, for example, product
space as being completely filled with a set of totally
unique products. What it does mean is that we view the
product environment as one which is highly variable even
though patterns or distributions of products may be readily
evident. Put differently, we assume heterogeneity because
we feel that this variability in the environment is the
basis for a large part of the economic behavior which we
term competition, i.e. competition through choice or definition of product rather than through efficiency in the production of a given, non-variable product. Consequently, we
do not want to hide this variability by assuming, for exB.
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ample, roughly similar products to be members of some
aggregate category which is analyticaly treated as if all
its constitutent elements were identical.
(2) Complexity: Almost as a corollary to the existence
of heterogeneity is complexity. Complexity in a social
system is very important because it imposes immense information requirements upon the actors within the system. Since
a state of perfect knowledge is never possible and even
relatively thorough knowledge of a limited part of the
system is very costly, one must view the behavior of individuals and firms in the light of the accomodations they make
to contend with their, and other persons, imperfect knowledge. Put differently, 'bounded rationality' is implied by
,complexity.
(3) Information and knowledge: In this kind of
environment information and knowledge are very important
resources; likewise learning behavior and the social
structures or institutions which facilitate the flow of
information become very important factors in the conservation of resources devoted to the acquisition of information
and knowledge. Consequently, we will tend to treat information gathering and learning activity as the driving competitive forces in the system according them a role somewhat
parallel to that of capital accumulation in the usual economic model.
(4) Time and change: It is hard to think of a static
complex world. Without change, complexity disappears as
learning accumulates. with change, complexity is maintained
and the more rapid the change the more complex is the environment. Consequently, if one is to pretend to investigate
behavior in a complex world the rate of change, the
timeliness of how things vary in that world is especially
important to learning and competitive strategies and costs.
Therefore time is treated in terms of its continuous,
irreversible passage.
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(S) Resource mobility: Part of the complexity we see
in the world is associated with the fixity of purpose or
non-fungibility of resources, both human and physical. In
the case of human resources mobility is seen primarily as a
time consuming alteration of the embodied knowledge of the
person or firm. In other words, shifting functions in society is seen as a learning problem which is likely to be
strongly constrained by the costs and time necessary to acquire new knowledge (new for the person or firm involved).
In the case of physical resources, the fixity of their
function is seen as more permanent and much more strongly
constrained by costs and time in terms of alterations of
that function. These attributes of resources, of course,
become in and of themselves sources of complexity in the
system because they strongly affect the rate at which
adaptive behavior and strategies can proceed.
Our assumptions about human behavior in this kind of
environment are much less easily summarized. We share the
general view of economics that there is a very strong, probably dominating, element of self-interest in economic behavior. On the other hand, in a complex environment in which
interactions among individuals are continuous,individual and
collective interest often shade into one another. Uncertainty, especially that arising from interactions among
individuals, cannot easily be reduced or eliminated without
recourse to collective rule making and enforcement. In
effect, in this kind of uncertain world we view unbridled
self-interest as probably unlikely simply because it is not
likely to be serviceable. This point of view or assumption
about human behavior does raise, however, the difficult
question of how self-interest is constrained. To answer
this question we have to go the long way around by first
offering up a theory of transactions and institutions in a
complex, information poor environment. As mentioned this
theory depends heavily upon characteristics theory and upon
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our reading of Common's theory of institutions.

C.

IL~D~g~~j9D~ ~DQ ~bgIg~~~Ij§~j~~ Ib~9LY

The crux of Lancaster's version of characteristics
theory may be easily stated in terms of its application to
consumer demand. Consumers are considered to demand, not
goods and services P~L ~~, but the characteristics which are
embodied in goods and services. For example, the demand for
gourment French dinners may be thought of as arising from
consumers' prior demand for nourishment, taste, food texture, status, entertainment and variety of other characteristics which may be embodied in a gourmet French dinner.
The demand for housing may be thought of as arising from a
prior demand for shelter, convenience, warmth, safety and
particular kind of architecture, quiet and many other
characteritics which might be associated with housing.
In a world viewed in this manner the consumer
(including here the firm as a consumer of intermediate
goods) is faced, first, with the need to allocate his budget
among those characteristics he demands (much as the consumer
in standard theory must allocate his budget among the goods
and services he demands), second, with the problem of identifying the characteristics embodied in the array of goods
available to him in the market place, and, finally, with the
problem of translating his characteristics derived preferences into a set of goods and services which embody the desired characteristics in the desired proportions.
It is assumed that there is a flow of information to
the consumer which informs him of the kinds, quality and
extent of characteristics as they are embodied in the goods
and services available in the market. Lancaster (1971)
assumes that this flow is universal in the sense that it is
available to all consumers and contains all of the information they require. In his later work, Lancaster (1979)
tends to secify carefully the nature of characteristics
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preferences (e.g., evenly distributed in characteristics
space), the state of consumer information (e.g., half the
population fully informed, half fully ignorant) and throughout treats references as exogenous. We depart from Lancastcr's methodological approach by assuming there is no ~
ELjQLj basis for specifying the particulars of a complex
environment (e.g., the distribution of preferences, etc.).
We also depart from Lancaster's version of characteristics
theory with regard to the information burden such an environment places upon economic actors--both consumers and
sellers. To be specific, we assume ~~~D are imperfectly
informed about a very complex product and product value
environment and about changes in that environment over time.
We also assume preferences are subject to an information
problem in that they are constrained by what the consumer
perceives as feasible in the product environment. But this
perception can only be defined in terms of information about
that environment. In other words, we take preferences to be
endogenous. There are several reasons why these assumptions
are made.
First, in a world in which there are many characteristics which may be and, in fact, are embodied in products, and
each and every product in the economy is so characterized,
the situation arises in which the consumer may not be able
to attribute an unambiguous price to each characteristic.
Consequently, the consumer's initial problem of allocating
his budget among characteristics is not subject to a unique
solution because of his inability to assign precise prices
to the various characteristics available in goods and services. Additionally, since all consumers are faced with the
same problem, that is, the inability to uniquely divorce
characteristics from products, competitive bidding is not
likely to establish a uniform price for any given characteristic. Needless to say, an impaired bidding process also
denies sellers access to unambiguous knowledge of the prices
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or the relative value of characteristics.
Second, it typically will be the case that the flow of
information to the consumer about the characteristics embodied in products will be a biased and/or incomplete flow.
Advertising, the opinions and experiences of other consumers
and the consumer's own reading of what characteristics are
embodied in products are not likely to provide complete and
objective knowledge of the product environment. Consequently, the consumer's decision making process is complicated by
making the identification of the quality or quantity of
characteristics in products highly uncertain. The seller is
faced with a similar problem when he attempts to assess the
comparability of his and other products. Additionally, the
seller's world is complicated because ultimately the comparability he is interested in is not some sort of objective
comparability but the subjective comparability which arises
in consumers' minds. Given the information problem faced by
consumers and the uniqueness of each of their circumstances,
this subjective comparability would be very hard to determine objectively.
Third, products and characteristics are not ageless.
They change over time; they deteriorate; and their relative
position in the product environment changes as new products
are introduced to that environment. In effect, the 'physical' and value characteristics of products are a function
of time and thereby require that the assessment of characteristics at the time of the transaction include an often
very difficult prediction of the change in the product's
relative characteristics over time.
Finally, the very process of entering ~nto an exchange
or merely shopping may generate information which alters the
product preference structure of the consumer or seller. In
other words, search and analysis take time, generate new
information and expose both buyer and seller to aspects of
the environment they may not have known previously. In and
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of itselE this process may be sufficient to reshape preferences, which in extreme circumstances might lead to continuous indecision or uncertainty simply because preferences
are being altered continuously. In less extreme circumstances this implies simply that preferences are influenced
by the product environment and the processes shaping that
environment.
The extent to which these problems of a complex economic environment affect the conduct of the transaction
depends by and large upon the circumstances of the individuals and the products involved in the exchange.
It is
most probably the case that relatively standardized products
exchanged by individuals on a repetitive basis will give
rise to a not overly complex information problem. In other
words, in spite of the overall complexity of the environment, circumstances can arise in which exchanges can be conducted under conditions which do not demand a large investment in the acquisition of knowledge for each exchange. On
the other hand the confluence of individual circumstances
and product characteristics may be such that the information
required of parties to each exchange can be rather extensive
and expensive to acquire--for example, unique products,
works of art, research projects, or whatever. Consequently,
in the kind of complex environment with which we are dealing, the nature of the transaction, that is the way in which
it is conducted and its outcome, is most probably best analyzed in terms of an information problem whose parameters
are defined by the circumstances of the individual parties
and potential parties to the exchange, the characteristics
of the product involved in the exchange, and the particulars
of the market context of the exchange.
gD In!gLIDE1ign F~gQl~ID
When the transaction is viewed as an information
problem, several variables stand out as important. On one
D.
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level of analysis, there is a set of variables determined
primarily by the environment external to both parties to the
transaction. These variables relate to the alternatives
available to each party in the form of other potential
transactions of the same or similar goods and services and
the alternative historical values placed upon those goods
and services by other (third) parties in the market. These
variables appear to determine mostly the limiting range of
valuations placed upon the exchange during the transactional
proceedings, that is, reservation prices. By and large we
take these variables to be, first, the frequency with which
other exchanges of the same or similar goods and services
have taken place recently and, second, the comparability of
circumstances including the characteristics of the products
in those other exchanges and in the current or proposed
exchange.
On the second level of analysiS are those variables
which affect the L§lg~jy~ ~~§~§ of acquiring information for
each party to the transaction. Factors such as the following are likely to be most pertinent here:
(I) The absolute value of the potential gains from
trading, defined as the difference between the reservation
prices of the buyer and seller, and
(2) the relative costs and benefits to buyer and seller
with regard to:
(a) the terms of exchange applicable to the
proposed transaction and to
(b) other previous.transactions of this and
comparable products;
(c) likely changes in the market conditions (e.g.,
inventories, technological changes) surrounding
this and comparable transactions,
(d) the value other potential sellers and/or
buyers have recently attached to exchanges of
this and comparable products, and
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(e) the particular circumstances of the other
trader.
~s these factors vary according to the circumstances of
each individual transaction, one would expect the particular
outcome (i.e., division of the gains from trading) of each
transaction to vary. Additionally, one would expect that
the repetitive occurence of generically similar asy~metries
in the cost of information between buyer and seller would
give rise to institutions which might a~eliorate the inefficiencies and inequities that would otherwise result. Less
opti~istically, one might venture that societies incapable
of generating such ameliorating institutions are likely to
conform to the archtypical Marxian view of exploitive market
processes.
The first of these two sets of information variables
(frequency of exchange and comparability) relates essentially to information sources which are collectively generated by all participants in the market. The second set
(those determining relative costs and benefits) tends to be
more a function of the particular circumstances of the individual traders. In the section which follows we explore
the effect of the market determined/or exogenous information
costs and benefits on the nature of the transaction with an.
eye towards those factors which may affect the performance
of the market.
D.1

~~~D~D9g ~~D~~~~gg lD!g~ID~~jgD

If we consider frequency of exchange alone, we find it
to be of interest primarily because the information state
surrounding each transaction is very much a function of such
frequency. Two reasons can be advanced for believing this
to be the case:
(1) Repetitive exchanges lead to learning about the
exact characteristics enbodied in the good or service and
thereby reduce the costs of acquiring information appropri-
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ate to each particular transaction.
(2) A large number of recent exchanges by QtD~L parties
of the same or comparable products generate a greater degree
of certainty about the characteristics embodied in and the
valuation placed upon or accorded the product by potential
parties to similar exchanges--i.e. the costs to each party
of learning its reservation price and ~stablishing comparability is lowered the greater the frequency of comparable
exchanges.
For example, consider an extreme situation in which
exchanges by other parties are strictly comparable because
of homogeneous products and homogeneous circumstances of the
parties themselves (income, preferences, etc.), there are
many buyers and sellers, and the frequency of sales is very
high. Under these circumstances the cost to both parties of
obtaining information about the characteristics involved in
the product and the valuations placed upon those characteristics by others will be minimal. That is, the costs of
searching out parties to comparable exchanges will be low as
will be the costs of verified (unambiguous) information
about prices in those exchanges. There is likely to be a
close agreement among the parties about the exact nature of
the embodied characteristics and the reservation prices of
each are likely to be identical or close to converging (because of an actual or potential many party bidding process).
It is likely, in fact, that the only divergence in reservation prices that will arise will be attributable to the need
to hold (inventory) offers and bids given that the frequency
of exchanges does not produce instantaneous transactions
(Demsetz 1968). Since all potential parties will be in this
same situation one will find that these conditions will give
rise to a 'market price'; that is, one in which all the
relevant information about the exchange is provided by other
comparable exchanges. No reliance on non-exchange related
information (e.g., costs of production, etc.) is pertinent

99

to the ~~LID~ of the ey-change (although it may determine
wllether one or the other party is willing to undertake the
exchange). Likewise under these circumstances no preference
for trading with one or anoth~r party will arise on anyone's
part.
As these conditions are relaxed so that the frequency
of strictly comparable exchanges declines, the cost of information to the individual about the characteristics enbedded in the product will rise as will the cost of learning
reservation prices. In effect, as the density of information in the environment declines, the searching out of information about the results of other parties' recent exchanges is likely to be less productive. As the frequency
of exchanges of comparable products falls two things happen:
first, there is a corresponding rise in the uncertainty
~lhich becomes attached to information about valuations, in
particular reservation prices and product characteristics;
and second, there is also a corresponding rise in the amount
of substitute information which must be acquired by the individual in order to maintain the same level of certainty.
In other words, because the individual enters the negotiation with implicit predictions of other individuals'
behavior bound up in his expectation of his and the other
party's reservation price, we essentially take the view that
the market is a kind of statistical machine which polls current and past participants on the valuations they place on
the product, ngtblng else held equal. It is extrapolations
from the results of these polls that lead to the expectations of other participants' behavior which become embedded
in the statenent of reservation price. Since information
ages in a world in which many other things are likely to be
changing, it is the frequency with which the market machine
generates information about individual valuations which is
of greatest importance in the statistical extrapolation. In
short, the market itself is a source or generator of inform-
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ation where the quantity of information and the certainty
which may be attached to that informatiori is a function of
the frequency of exchanges of comparable products.
In a world of less than strictly comparable products
(and preferences and circumstances of traders) the information problem becomes very complex. This complexity arises
from the ambiguity which is associated with information
about historical prices since in the absence of strict comp~rability of characteristics or combinations of characteristics prices no longer provide the information necessary for
a complete or unbiased index of relative value. Traders are
therefore forced to rely upon additional information about
the non-price characteristics of the product for the establishment of reservation prices. Unfortunately a large part
of this additional information about product characteristics
is not of the form which is conducive to easy measurement
the way money prices are. In and of itself, this increased
difficulty of measurement can be expected to lead to higher
information costs in the transaction, and, given that parties to the transaction weigh the costs and benefits of information acquisition, there will be as a result less information pertinent to the transaction actually present at
the time of execution.
Exactly how much information will be present when
products are not'comparable will be a function of the costs
and benefits of establishing comparability, or on the other
side of the same coin, of establishing the significance of
differences.
In this instance, one might look at information costs
as thoroughly comparable to costs of measurement ,(measurewent being a form of information). Por example, for two
items that are grossly dissimilar in terms of some given
characteristic, say weight, the costs of undertaking the
measurements necessary to determine those gross differences
are likely to be relatively low when compared with the costs
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necessary to determine ~inute differences in
t\,'O iter.ls of 21most e::actly the Gur:1e \";cight. l\s one approaches al~ost perfect compar~bility the costs associated
with being able to successfully Jiscriminute viII tend to
rise e::ponent ially. For pr oduct char 2cter isi tics 1 ess
easily subject to meu5urernent than weight, one would e~pect
correspondingly greater costs &ssociated with successful
discri~ination aDon~ characteristics.
In short, one would
expect the costs of c;iscriminating or establishing comparability between the circumstances of other exchanges and the
characteristics of other products to rise in a very rapid,
non-linear fashion as the exhanges and products themselves
become more and ~ore similar.
The benefits of successful discrimination, on the other
hand, \lould be e}:pected to be very large for c;ross differences in the characteristics of two ite~s but to decline to
vC!r~T snaIl level s for highly cor.lpar abl e i teT:1s--pr ov ided the
characteristics upon uhich the discrimination is based are
themselves associated with the utility of the decision
In other words, so long as we mean by comparability
the substitutability of the itc~s in their use, then an
gD~g~~g~~igl discrimination between two highly similar items
\'1il1 not carry a high opportunity cost; whereas the unsuccessful discrimination between two very aissi~ilar items
will carry a high opportunity cost. It is the avoidance of
these opportunity costs which constitutes part of the
benefits of obt2ining information about the co~parability of
t~o items. (The other part of the benefits arises as the
s~are of the gains from trading.)
oi

ne~surements
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FIGURE 7

Costs and Benefits of Dis::erninJ Prodoct Canparability

$

o

Total
Differentiat ion

A

Perfect
Comparability

B = Benefits of successful discrimination
C= Cost of information necessary to discrimate

Notes on the graph:
Canparability axis records 'true' comparability, or comparability after the transaction, of any pair of produ::::ts.
(2) Value axis records information costs-and utility benefits as perceived
or encountered before the transaction.
(3) A higher frequen::y of exch:u~e of either product lowers information
costs, shifts the cost curve dowl1\-!ard ani rErlu::::es the zone of un::ertainty likely to be tolerated by rational irrlividlE.lR.
(4) Benefits curve is stated in terms of the avoidan::e of the (utility)
opportunity oosts of a mistaken decision, an:'! consequently involves
the consuner '5 perception of e:xpected product claracteristics.

(1)
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lIenee, \Jhen the benef its and costs of the acqui si t ion
of information necessary to successfully discrimin~te between two (or more) items and/or services are graphed
against the relative comparability of the items requiring
discrimination (as in Figure 7) it becomes apparent that
there is a range of comparability over which the decision
maker is unlikely to find it worth his while to expend
greater resources for the purpose of distinguishing successfully between two items--i.e. the range to the right of the
intersection of the marginal costs and benefits curves.
That is, it would not be worth his while to allow his marginal information expenditures to exceed a level in excess
of ~A. This effective limit which rational individuals are
likely to place on their acquisition of information requires
that all transactions take place under conditions of
uncertainty.
F.
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This conclusion raises an interesting problem, namely
that the costs and benefits of acquiring exchange related
information are such that many exchanges would have to have
outcoces viewed as highly random. Not only that, but the
highly probable existence of asymmetries in the information
of the two parties to the exchange would also indicate the
strong possibility of a tendency towar~s self-interested and
collectively degenerative opportunistic behavior. This latter effect, esecially, would appear to be large enough to
increase the probability of errors, inefficiencies and inequities to the point where the efficacy of exchange would
be seriously eroded. This implication, however, appears to
be somewhat contrafactual since exchange does not appear to
be a fatally flawed or highly randomized form of behavior.
Consequently, one is led to the question of whether there
exists some mechanism for making exchange tolerably efficient and equitable in spite of the problems posed by uncer-
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tainty and/or whether there are social mechanisms which substitute for exchange when conditions surrounding the transaction contribute to excessive uncertainty.
A fundamental view of this paper is that the entities
vie term jD§.t.i.t.!J.tj.QD§ operate, on the one hand, to reduce the
costs of relevant exchange related information through the
substitution of information about expected hUman behavior
for unattainable or overly costly information about the
product environment, and on the other hand, to simply replace the process of exchange between independent entities
with organizations whose purpose is to supply a set of rules
about behavior in order to reduce the inequities and inefficiencies caused by uncertainty. The first of these we will
refer to as ~Z£DsD9~ L~ls.tg9 jD~.t.i.t.!J.t.i.QD§ and the second as
.fj.rID§ or .bj~.tgL£.bj~§. In a sense ",e are posing an hypothesis similar to that of Coase (1937) but suggest that transactions costs are reduced by rule making which can exist
with regard to the market as well as within hierarchies or
firms. Our hyothesis suggests a kind of functional substitutability between exchange related institutions and hierarchies. Support for this proposition is found primarily in
the legalistic theory of transactons formulated by J. R.
COI-:lmOns.
Common's very difficult book l.b~ L~gsl r.QYD9s.tj.Qn~ Qt
~s~j.tglj~ID (1923), lays out a complex legal/economic/historical theory of capitalist institutions; the power of his
theory ultimately resides in his analysis of the formal and
informal institutional constraints surrounding the individual transaction. In the view expressed by Commons the
transaction is not a simple exchange of goods or services
for money. Rather it is a complex socio-legal act which
gives rise to a set of rights and obligations--among the
parties to the exchange itself, among third parties who may
be contractually bound to one or the other first parties and
for the State or whatever collective organization has
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assumed police powers. These rights and obligations define
a set of conditional, behavioral rules for the parties to
the transaction which must be fulfilled during and after the
transaction. The specific content and duration of these
rights and obligations is a fUnction of the embodied characteristics of the product and the particular circumstances of
the parties to the exchange and the market.
Phen the transaction is viewed as the establishment of
a quasi- or fully legal contractual relationship between the
two parties, questions about the nature of the rights and
obligations of the parties arise more or less automatically.
One must define those rights and obligations, the limits to
those rights and obligations, the basis for defending rights
and enforcing obligations, and, further, what other rights
and obligations are likely to be created for other, third
parties; for example, the state may have assumed an obligation to enforce and defend rights, obligations may have been
incurred through private contract, employees may be bound by
the terms of their contract to perform in conformance with a
sales contract, etc. In especially complicated transactions
the web of rights and obligations and their definition as
they relate to all relevant parties can be exceedingly
extensive even if incomplete and, when viewed as an outlay
for the acquisition of information, exceedingly expensive.
11acualay (1963) cites the instance of the transfer of ownership of the Empire State Building which required millions of
dollars for the fees of lawyers and other experts. On the
other hand, in ~ ~ore simple transaction, for example the
purchase of a candy bar or cup of coffee, the actual outlay
of expenditures on information about rights and obligations
may be exceedingly small, although from the legal point of
view, thoroughly inadequate for the purposes of defining the
rights and obligations created by even this simple transaction. Nevertheless, whether the transaction actually
involves the outlay of large or small expenditures for the
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definition of rights and obligations, there remains an unequivocal similarity in that all transactions establish a
relationship over time between buyer and seller. This relationship defines the conditional behavioral requirements
placed upon each party, and, given those conditions, provides an expectation of behavior which, with enforcement of
rights and obligations, is more certain in its fulfillment
than an expectation regarding the physical performance of an
item of exchange, or more importantly, the performance of
the other party in the absence of enforced rights and obligations. Put differently, the certainty of one's expectation
regarding the results of an exchange can be enhanced considerably if the transaction is accompanied by a set of rights
and obligations which require, for example, the seller to
assure the expected performance of the item under some reasonable conditions for some reasonable period of time, where
what is reasonable is defined, by and large, by the characteristics of the product and the circumstances of the exchange. In effect, the expectations formed by these rights
and obligations refer to human, not product, behavior or
performance.
At first glance, this legalistic view of the transaction would appear to imply an additional informational
requirement for the transaction and the possiblity that
institutions might actually hinder exchange. But this is
not really what is happening. Rather, institutions create a
situation in which one form of (relatively) easily available
and highly generalized information (about the structure of
rights and obligations) can be substituted for other less
easily available, highly particularistic and unpredictable
information (about the future performance of product characteristics and the other party to the exchange). For
example, to take a very simple case, the purchaser of a
radio may effectively substitute the implied or formal
warranty regarding the performance of the radio after
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purchase for other, very extensive and costly information
~bout the engineering and other char&cteristics of the radio
itself. The warranty relates not so much to the radio whose
performance may be very hard to predict and impossible to
enforce but to the .Q~b,g.'yj,.QL of the seller v..'hich is relatively predictable because it is enforceable through custom or
law. In effect, the uncertainties of the physical world and
the strategic behavior these uncertainties would induce are
at least partially replaced by the establishment of an
implied or formal relationship between the two parties to
the transaction--a situation which is much less demanding of
information and much less uncertain.
Another way of looking at this same effect would be to
note that the existence of institutions reduces the overall
information requirement, thereby presumably reducing the
probability of error and inefficiency and increasing the
probability of exchange taking place, either in the market
or within a hierarchy. This reduction in the overall information requirement is accomplished by (formal and informal) prohibitions against opportunistic behavior based on
informational advantages, i.e., the equivalent of the socalled moral hazard insurance problem. A very important
economic effect of these prohibitions is, on the one hand,
to deny the full benefits of special or particularistic
knowledge to the holder of that knowledge through the
creation of a kind of social memory and, on the other, to
spread the benefits of that knowledge throughout the market
or organization. Put in still a different light, the behavioral rules embodied in institutions--especially the
prohibitions against opportunistic behavior--tend to create
highly beneficial networks of complementary information
sources vlhere the netuorks are composed of str ings of
transacting partners. To the extent that enforcement of
these prohibitions is effective, a • social memory' is
created and allocational efficiency is improved through the
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ability to more easily discriminate between correct and
incorrect statements about performance--all without the
costly need to distribute all knowledge to all possible
participants in all transactions. In short, institutions
create trust and provide tremendous savings in the cost of
acquiring and distributing knowledge about both the products
and participants in transactions.
All this is not to say that institutions create perfectly efficient and equitable alternatives to high frequency, homogeneous product markets. There is no reason to
believe that there is some invisible hand which automatically creates and modifies behavioral rules as circumstances
in the market are altered. There is, in fact, probably much
stronger reason to believe that institutions are slow to
adapt in the face of changing circumstances, since repeated
collective experience under the new circumstances is
required before the formation of a consensus, in the case of
informal rules, or a law, in the case of formal rules, is
possible. There is also little reason to believe that even
in the absence of change institutions are likely to arise
which will approximate an optimal set of rules (e.g.,
Arrow's intransitivity problem). Consequently, it is
reasonable to proceed on the assumption that institutions
facilitate exchange but at the same time may significantly
color the process of exchange in a way that impacts upon the
performance of the market.
Institutions simplify a complex, heterogeneous environment but at the same time they create a potentially distorted view of that environment. If this view of institutions
is correct it implies that a willingness to forego opportunistic and individually advantageous behavior improves the
allocative efficiency of exchange and, of course, lowers the
social enforcement costs associated with the maintenance of
markets in the face of great uncertainty. Whether such
individual willingness is encouraged or discouraged is most
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probably a function of the information networks established
by the market.
The other side of this is that the relative efficiency
of exchange related institutions will undoubtedly determine
the boundary between the market and hierarchies. To the
extent that the information networks established by exchange
related institutions are costly Yi~-g-yi~ the provision of
information, one would expect market mediated exchange to be
replaced by planned exchange within hierarchies.
Finally, we should note that an argument similar to
that advanced here for exchange related institutions can
also be made with respect to competitive interactions. In
the kind of environment we have assumed, competitive inteructions are the norm and take place under conditions of uncertainty about the environment and other cometitors behavior. In these kinds of situations institutions can be
expected to arise and function in a manner parallel to that
of exchange related institutions.
~gIDill§LY
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gQggt lD~~i1g~jgn~
In summary, in the absence of perfect information in
the trading (and for that matter the competitive production)
environment individual transactions are viewed as being subject to great uncertainty. This uncertainty, if not resolved, leads to potentially degenerative collective situations. In other words, an environment of imperfect information creates many opportunities for self-interested lying,
cheating, stealing, deceiving, misleading and all sorts of
other similar behavior. It is the expectation of the possibility of this behavior that leads to foregoing trading and
production opportunities to the potential harm of all
parties. We hyothesize that the perception of potential
collective benefit coupled with repeated encounters under
roughly similar conditions leads to the evolution of rules
or institutions governing or prohibiting collectively degenerative opportunistic behavior. Ue expect that these rules
F. 1

~L~gID§D1
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are determined by a consensus of traders or competitors and
are tailored to the very specific context of the trading or
competitive situation ~hey are meant to govern. The function of these rules is to remove or reduce the uncertainties
of potential opportunistic behavior by providing a basis for
the fairly certain conditionalized expectations' regarding
the outcome of individual trading and competitive interactions.

III

CHAPTER 5
THE FIRM IN THE LONG PERIOD

A. In.t.I.Q.9.Y~.t.i.QD

To this point we have outlined what we believe to be
the important factors determining the external environment
of the firm. We turn now to the question of the individual
firm's behavior in this kind of environment. Especially
important here'is the constraints on that behavior l and the
implications which flow from those constraints with regard
to the firm's choice of product and the effect of similar
behavior of all firms on the collective processes and performance of the market.
Throughout this section we assume, as in the short period model, that the objectives of the firm are, first, its
own survival as an economic entity and, second, growth.
More specifically, we suggest here that the firm will tend
to use a relativistic measure of its performance based upon
a comparison of its performance with that set of firms currently exercising product alternatives lying within or near
the range of the feasible set of alternatives open to the
firm itself. Athough it might be argued that the firm
should have a broader based measure,of performance it firm
behavior. would seem that there is little reason for the
firm to judge its own success or failure by that of firms
whose circumstances are not closely related to what the firm
itself conceives as feasible. Similar firms provide a basis
for meaningf~l comparison resting on the similarity of
financial, market, technological and other environmental
condi tions facing bo'th firms. It is also much less costly
1 An important omission in our outline concerns the
internal or organizational constraints upon the firm's
ability to process information.
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information for the firm.
The requirements of meaningfulness also suggest that a
primary object of attention of the firm will be the attributes of that same set of firms and the characteristics of
their products. Specifically the firm will focus its attention on:
(1) the relative success or failure of these other
firms and
(2) the relationship of other firms' performance to
(a) their product characteristics
(b) methods of production
(c) the relationship of the other firm's products to
all others in the market and
(d) the financial practices of the other firms.
The information resulting from this attention to other
firms will not only be useful for purposes of judging its
performance but will also be a primary source of data for
adaptive change by the firm. It will provide the firm with
a tolerably accurate approximation of:
(1) the strength of consumer. demand associated with
certain product characteristics, (c ll ),
(2) the extent of competition for particular areas of
consumer demand, (SUM c ll ) ,
(3) the existence of potential strong (and weak) areas
of demand (C ll + SUM c ij = min), and
(4) if the information is acquired continuously over
time, a strong feeling of the dynamic patterns of
product design change in the immediate area of its
feasible set of alternatives.
Further refinement of these data is open to the firm through
a variety of channels such as market surveys and so on.
The firms's response to its perception of its environment is crucial to its success or failure. Depending upon
the circumstances postulated one might develop an immense
variety of potential actions. Because of the informational
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constraints outlined, almost all, however, are reducible to
two general modes of response-~_~~ti~I!__ ~_~inl!_9v9t ..l9Jt!t By
imitation we merely mean an evolutionary change in product
design, production methods, marketing or financing which is
predicated on the belief that another firm has located a
favorably strong area of consumer demand, production or marketing method, etc. By innovation we refer to an evolutionary change in product design, etc., predicated on the belief
that there are unexploited areas of 'potential' consumer demand--i.e. that there are combinations of characteristics
for which there is strong potential demand but for which
there are no corresponding products on the market. In the
case of product innovation, as opposed to (patentable technological) invention, we further conclude that the process
of innovation is most likely to be carried out in a process
of relatively small changes. The reasoning for this conclusion is based on the costs of acquiring new market information and the difficulty of aSSigning property rights to
such knowledge. This will be elaborated after a necessary
prior discussion of the firm's behavior in the long period,
especially the constraints on its behavior.
B.

Ib~ ~j~ID

jD g

~9ID~l~~ ~D~j~9DID~D~

In the long period, the firm's decision about what to
make or do revolves around two environmentally determined
questions: (I) the expected frequency of demand associated
with its product alternatives and (2) their respective expected prices. We do not view the firm's choice process as
if it can be arrived at through the simultaneous determination of these two variables. Rather, each variable is
viewed as encompassing a host of subsidiary, but related,
problems as will be elaborated. First we outline the problems of determining the expected frequency of demand and
then turn to the question of expected price. Both are dealt
with in terms of the institutional theory of Chapter 4.
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The problem of choice of product can be approached from
one of two angles: we might consider the problem confronting a firm contemplating its initial entry into the market,
or we might consider the problem facing an established firm
considering the alteration of its product or the production
of another. For ease of illustration we have chosen to illustrate the problem of an established firm considering a
new product.
It should be emphasized from the outset that we choose
to define all the attributes of the firm (the parameters of
its short period equation) solely in terms of the product(s)
the firm offers in the marketplace. Depending on the characteristics of the firm's product--putting aside consideration of price for the moment--it will find that the competitive impact of other firms will be either greater or less
(C
ij ); that the constraint of its own particular product
market will be larger or smaller (C ii ); that its costs of
production (as defined by available techniques of production
and supply of inputs) will be higher or lower (b ij ), and
that its access to capital (either through retention of
surpluses or outside borrowing) will be easier or more difficult (a i ). Consequently, the firm's choice of 'product is
exceedingly important.
B.l Ib~ lD!g~m3~jgD B~gyj~~ID~D~§ !Q~ sD Q9~jmsl ~bgj~~ g!
i~Qgy~~

If the firm were to attempt to accomplish an optimal
choice of product in the kind of complex environment we have
outlined here without regard to the analytical and information costs of the decision it would be faced with a truly
formidable problem. The scope of the problem can be outlined as follows:
First the firm requires knowledge of the characteristics preferences of all consumers.
Second, it needs to know the characteristics embodied in all products of all other firms.
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Third, it needs to have a means for analyzing the
potential market interactive effects of all other firms
for all.the alternative products it could produce.
Fourth, it requires knowledge of the costs of
production for all product alternatives.
Fifth, it must know how each alternative product
will affect the conditions under which it could borrow
and/or the rate at which it might accumulate surpluses,
and,
Finally, it must know the learning costs it would
incur for each alternative product.
This partial list of requirements is further complicated by
the realization that each requirement for each alternative
cannot be determined independently. For example, the firm's
access to capital will be strongly influenced by the potential reactive behavior of other firms. And, of course, the
firm is faced with its own internal organizational problems
which make it difficult for it to perceive, analyze and
react to its environment as if it were a single neurophysical system.
We may illustrate a simplified version of the firm's
product choice problem by reference to a b~~~jB1j~ community
characteristics preference map. Figure 8 assumes a simplified world of only two characteristics which may be embodied
in a product in varying combinatorial quantities. We refer
to these characteristics as kl and k2 and for purposes of
illustration assume that we may measure these characteristics and arrange them along the axes of the diagram in a way
which conveys a meaning of greater or less. For a given
level of consumer expenditures and a given state of consumer
preferences, we could generate a map of consumer preferences. That is, we ask each consumer to create his 'ideal'
(but not necessarily optimal) basket of products given his
preferences, perception of the prices of characteristics,
products, information, analytical ability, and so on. Then
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we record on the map that combination of characteristics kl
and k2 which defines his and all other consumers' ideal
products. By ideal product we mean essentially ~he constrained preference statement the consumer makes given his
knowledge of technologically and socially feasible charac
teristics, relative characteristic prices, his budget, and
so on. The statement need not be limited to points corresponding to existing products simply because only full knowledge of the product environment on the part of consumers
would constrain their search so thoroughly. On the other
hand, one would expect a passing knowledge of the product
environment to constrain the statement of preferences within
a range which is reasonably feasible--technologically, socially and economically. In other words, we would expect
consumers' product preferences to reflect to a large extent
the existing configuration of products in the economy because the information constraints faced by consumers limit
their expectations about (technologically determined) feasibility and (socially determined) desirability to a product
set corresponding closely to the existing set. Hence, product preferences can be expected to be closely correlated
with existing products or product characteristics. It is in
this sense that we take preferences to be endogenous to the
system.
When this recording of preferences for all consumers is
carried out on the heuristic two characteristics diagram we
may view the result as a map showing varying densities of
'ideal product points' (Figure 8). We take this map as a
summary representation of the characteristics preferences of
consumers. Knowledge of this 'map' is the first requirement
of the firm's product choice decision.
We may also record on this map the existing products
offered by other firms. The cross marks on the map indicate
the combinations of characteristics kl and k2 which define
the other firms' products.
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FIGURE 8
A Heuristic PLeferen:::e f1ap with 'I\vo Cmracteristics
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preXit:Cts

The importance of the distribution or density of
consumer demand around each potential product point is,
perhaps, intuitively obvious. Nevertheless, it illustrates
one aspect of consumer demand--that consumers may not be
able to perfectly match their preferences with products
because of incomplete knowledge of the product environment-or, as viewed by the firm--that it is likely that few
consumers will have characteristics preferences exactly
matching any product offered by the firm. Nevertheless,
assume consumer's 'satificing' behavior will lead them to
gravitate to the product whose characteristics most resemble
the characteristics they desire. If consumers were
possessed of complete knowledge, the firm's product
'location' on the characteristic's map would yield an easily
determined number of sales (according to some 'least
distance' model). On the other hand, if consumers are less
than well informed and subject to the decision 'errors'
discussed in Chapter 4 above, then the firm must take into
account the effectiveness of the selling or marketing
procedure of the other proximate firms. Specifically, the
firm needs to weigh the ability of other firms' marketing
strategies to alter the informational environment and
thereby influence the purchasing decisions of consumers
relative to a perfect knowledge situation.
In short, the firm must state for each possible alternative the approximate limits of the specific product market
in the absence of competition and how those limits might
vary as a function of changes in the firm's costs of selling
or marketing effort (via inducement of change in the consumers decision) and similar activity by other firms. In the
terminology of the short period model, this is how the firm
is viewed as approximating the value of c ~~
..• When the firm
states the proximity of another firm's product and the effectiveness of that firm's marketing efforts it is, in
effect, approximating the value of the c .. parameter of the
1)
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short period model, or the other firm's inhibitory effect.
Once the firm has made these assessments with regard
all possible market alternatives, it must then turn to a
consideration of the likely costs of production and learning
and the implications for its access to finance associated
with each product alternative. Even greater complications
enter when the firm is confronted with the very real possibility that existing (or even other currently non-existent)
firms will alter their own product's characteristics or introduce new products in response to any action by the firm.
When all these factors are listed out it would appear
that the real world problem faced by the firm is not one
which is amenable to a nfull information n decision making
process simply because the consideration of all alternatives
poses an impossibly immense problem for the firm. In short,
the decision ability of the firm, like the consumer's, is
severely constrained by the availability of information.
This is a source of weakness and also competitive strength
for the firm.

c.

D~~~LIDjDsDt~ ~i tD~ ~jLID~~ r~s~j~l~ Al~~LDgtjy~~

It would appear, then, that when we consider the
decision making problem of the firm in this kind of complex
environment we must first consider the factors which limit
or define its set of feasible alternatives. In effect, we
must ask what it is that determines the character and extent
of the opportunities which might reasonably be considered by
the firm, or put a little differently, the factors which
limit the scope of the firm's new product search. On the
basis of the discussion to this point it is natural to turn
to the question of the kind and quality of information available to the firm. As we noted with the consumer, the
problem of the vastness of the economic environment is diminished for those commodities with which the consumer has
repeated contact, in other words, for commodities about
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which he is knowledgable. It is reasonable to expect that
the firm will also be able to best cope with those regions
of the economic environment with which it has the greatest
familiarity. In short, we want a convenient way to conceptualize the particularistic forms of resident knowledge and
other resources which determine the firm's set of feasible
opportunities.
In this matter, we can continue to rely on our characterization of the firm in terms of its financial, technological and market attributes. That is to say, the resident
knowledge of the firm is most likely to conform with the
subsets of operational knowledge required for the financing,
production and marketing of the firm's (current) product.
Consequently, we may begin by noting that the set of feasible adaptative alternatives available to the firm at any
point in time will be closely related to the current embodiment of knowledge within the firm, while the limits of the
feasible set may be considered to be determined by the costs
of acquiring new knowledge which, of course, is likely to be
relatively ill-defined for the firm.
C.l ~bs~~g~~~l§~l~§ S~~£~ s§ ~ ~~§l§ i~~ ~ ~~~QD~mY ~i
l}D.Q~.l~g.9~

In Chapter 4 we outlined a theory of the market environment in terms of characteristics or product space. One
purpose in doing so was to create a conceptual base by which
we might be able to systematically identify or describe the
forms and types (i.e., a taxonomy) of knowledge the firm
possessed of its environment. In terms of the market environment, for example, we assume that the firm would be possessed of particular forms of knowledge appropriate to the
area of that environment in which it has been selling its
product(s). Its experience is likely to have appraised it
of the nature of consumer preferences, the methods necessary
for selling to those preferences, and the methods and strategies of competitors in the area of the market adjacent to
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that in which it has been selling its product(s). Thus, the
realm of its resident knowledge with regard to the market
can be described in terms of the correlation of that knowledge with the characteristics which define its product(s).
For example, a dress manufacturer may be highly knowledgable
of the market for fashionable women's shoes. In short, the
firm's knowledge of the consumer environment is limited not
just to the marketing of its particular product, but to a
wide but still limited part of the demand environment associated with the characteristics of its products.
In a similar manner, the history of the firm will give
rise to particularistic bodies of technological and financial knowledge which will also be closely correlated with
the firm's product history and characteristics. These sets
of technological and financial knowledge mayor may not correspond (in terms or product space) to the set defined by
its marketing knowledge or to each other. In the case of
the dress manufacturer, for example, it is not likely that
the set of feasible alternatives defined by its marketing
knowledge (including women's shoes) would overlap the set of
feasible opportunities defined by its knowledge of production. Shoe and dress production appear to be rather far removed from one another even though the marketing requirements may be very closely related.
Consequently, in all spheres of its operation--marketing, technological and financial--we would D~t expect the
firm's knowledge to be confined simply to the point(s) in
characteristics space defined by its product(s). The firm
will have acquired relevant knowledge of the market, technical and financial parameters in adjacent areas of that
space. Undoubtedly, the exact boundaries of this knowledge
would be difficult to define but perhaps that is unnecessary; what is important for our purposes is that the resident financial, technical and market knowledge of the firm
is a limited set of particularistic knowledge whose boundar-
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ies, however ill-defined, are determined by the history of
the firm's interaction with its environment. We take this
body of resident knowledge as a major determinant of the set
of the firm's feasible alternatives.
c. 2 fl~ID L~s~DjD9 sDg ~bs~s~~~~l§~l~§ ~9s~~
The costs of acquiring knowledge beyond the boundaries
of the set determined by the firm's resident knowledge is
viewed as entailing an investment expediture. The cost of
this investment will determine to a certain extent the
boundaries of the firm's set of feasible alternatives in
product space. In particular, the schedule of likely investment/learning costs in each of the firm's spheres of operation--marketing, production, financing--is taken as a
function of the distance (in terms of characteristics space)
from the existing boundaries of each sphere of the firm's
knowledge to the location of the to-be-acquired knowledge.
On the basis of 9 p~l~~j speculation alone we would
venture to define the learning cost function in each sphere
of operation as conforming to a simple logistics growth or
learning curve. That is, for any direction in characteristics space from the current location of the boundaries of the
firm's resident knowledge, we postulate that the cost of acquisition of new knowledge will proceed at first at a slowly
rising rate, will then begin to grow rapidly, and finally
will slow down, asymptotically approaching some finite maximum. Put somewhat differently, we would expect learning
costs for the firm to be relatively low in the area immediately adjacent to its current location in product space
simply because its observation of its consumers and its interaction with competitors in this area is relatively intense (i.e., knowledge conveyed through experience). Thus
we assume the firm to be fairly well informed about the financial, technological and market parameters relevant to
p~oducts closely related to its own current product.
Beyond
a certain distance in product space, however, the firm will
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find that its resident knowledge in any given sphere of operation becomes increasingly irrelevant and that the costs
of learning begin to rise relatively rapidly. Beyond a certain point the firm is likely to find that its resident
knowledge has almost no bearing on product choice or possibilities. This area is represented by the asymptotic section
of the learning costs curve. In two dimensional characteristics space the entire learning cost schedule for any particular sphere of operation will take on a general shape
somewhat like an upside-down hat as illustrated in Figure 9.
FIGURE 9
Product Char:ge Learnl.Ilg Costs in Ch3.racteristics SJ.1ice
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This postulated view of the learning costs function in
characteristics space suggests two significant points of
view: (1) the feasible product alternatives of the firm tend
to be restricted
to ~IL area intQ~. immedJ~te vicinity of the
..
.... boundaries of .i..t.~_c.9.lJrrent res.ident .kno.wl.edge and "roduct ls),
but (2) if the proximate feasible set contains no alternatives preferable to the firm's existing product(s) (because
of consumer demand conditions or the existence of other
firms·' products), the firm may find that its resident knowledge confers no special competitive advantage. In this
latter kind of situation, the feasibility of choosing an alternative or new product will not be a function of the
firm's particularistic current knowledge, but of the resources at its disposal for the acquisition of unrelated
knowledge. In other words, beyond the boundaries defined by
the maximum learning costs, the firm might just as well consider all alternatives without regard to the costs of learning. l
Later we wil.!..!:1s.e this_~_C?~AQIL __.-9J_t.h.e--.ti~~.L!_~~~_!lJ:ng
process in character istics space, to descr it~e.f irst:.!..piche
~~_eking behavior in the design and marke.~!:Il~ .~.f_.products and
second, a learning theory
of
integrative
and conglomera'-te
-- •...
....
__ ... -- - .
.....
---.
firm behavior.
In addition to the current body of resident knowledge
of the firm, other aspects of its situation will also serve
to constrain the size and attributes of its set of feasible
alternatives. We assume that these other aspects of the
firm's situation constrain it primarily through their effect
on the costs, rate and direction (or biases) of learning of
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1 It will probably also be the case that the rate of
increase of learning costs along each characteristic axis
will vary from one characteristic to another. For example,
the costs of acquiring knowledge of the market with regard
to the characteristic, say, basic nutrition might be
considerably lower than the costs of acquiring market
knowledge related to the characteristic, say, convenience.
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the firm. Its size and consequent access to finances are,
for example, likely to close off a great many opportunities
for the small firm even if its financial, marketing and
production knowledge does not. ___
In .___
short,
·___·.______possible
. . .u_._._ ....".__......--expenditures for learning/investment are positively related to
_~-~~~ij-~~-'-~-f-- th
i rOm and, - the r ~ i~-~ ~~---i_~;--'~~'~'~~ r'-':-~-iz'~--~f .-
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the firm's feasible set is also a l?.Q'§.i,t.i.Y.e function of the
firm's
size. The limit of the firm's feasible set of al.,_.--. __ .. ternatives will also be determined by the ability or efficiency of the firm to undertake the learning process and the
costs associated with that learning. It will be the case
that for every new alternative facing the firm a certain
amount of learning needs to take place. Firms which, for
one reason or another, are able to learn rapidly and at
low cost will, of course, always have open to themselves
a larger array of alternative products, than will the
slow learning firm. When one is concerned with the process of conscious adaptation of a firm's rate of learning,
even as it takes place from a constrained base as viewed
here, would appear to be one of the more important actors in
the evolutionary success or failure of a firm. Not only is
learning important with regard to the opportunities open to
the firm at a point in time, but the accumulated exercise of
those opportunities over the past also defines for the firm
the character and size of the base from which feasible new
alternatives may be considered.
In summary, we view the firm's set of feasible or possible adaptive actions as a function of its resident knowledge and its costs of learning necessary to alter that body
of knowledge. From the point of view of the system as a
whole this view of the individual firm should convey a picture of firms, competing with one another--or avoiding or
sheltering from competition--on the basis of their unique
attributes of knowledge. In short, the competitive process
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is seen as one in which relative competitive advantage or
disadvantage is conferred through the possession and acquisition of particularistic unique sets of knowledge of the
technological, financial and marketing spheres of the environment. The competitively successful firm is one which is
able to acquire relative advantage through the effecient acquisition of particularistic knowledge of the economic environment. Viewed dynamically it is the process of economically acquiring and applying knowledge which is of greatest
interest in adaptive competition. In the section following
immediately we begin to explore this aspect of collective
microeconomics behavior in the context of the notions of
adaptive competition and efficiency outlined here.
D.

l'~_.Nj~.b..e

Successful competitive behavior is dependent upon the
conservation of resources devoted to the acquisition of
particularistic knowledge and the identification of exactly
what particularistic knowledge needs to be acquired. Both
of these aspects of the firm's behavior are strongly constrained by the attlbutes of the firm's base of resident
" firm the base of resident knowledge is
knowledge. For each
likely to be unique because of differences in its historical
experiences. Consequently, at any point in time the feasible opportunity set of each firm will be unique. It is
this uniqueness which denies many opportunities to many
firms, but at the same time and for the same reasons, confers upon each firm a special competitive position and set
of adaptive possibilities. Clearly the resuits of playing
out the competitive game in a changing, complex environment
will depend heavily upon the unique starting position or, to
borrow a term from biology, the Dj~.b..e of the firm.
The notion of the niche is one which is commonplace
among businessmen. It is also a notion which is peculiarly
suited to a persective which views the world as complex and
heterogeneous. It is, in short, a concept which is highly
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appropriate to the kind of theory we have been describing.
Consequently, we turn now to a definition of what is meant
by the niche in the context of our theory.
From the outset it should be made clear that we want to
define the niche and associated phenomena in such a way that
our nomenclature does not unintentionally camouflage some of
the very processes in which we are interested. In particular we want to avoid unintentional aggregation. Therefore,
we suggest that ~~che,----.,-be
defined, first, in a static sense,
.. .......
as corresponding with the 3~£.. __ .~i
~~~~X~YDj~j~§ Q~~D t~ tb~
-._..-- .
.. .. ... . .,'
!jLID ~D 1D~ DS3j3 ~t j!3 ~YXX~D1 X~3j9~Dt ~D~~l~gg~ sl~D~,
that is, without any learning taking place. In the more
meaningful dynamic sense, we define the firm's niche in
terms of the ~~~~X!YDj~j~~ ~~~D 1~ j! tbXQygb tb~ S~£yj3jt=
j~D ~t ~DQ~l~gg~ sD~Yt j13 ~Dyj~QD~D~.
This notion of a
niche is, in a sense, broadly behavioral, because it
includes as important not only the firm's 'starting place'
or current body of resident knowledge, but also those aspects of the firm such as hierarchial structure, financial
position, and potentially a host of other factors which will
affect the extent and efficiency of its acquisition of information about the environment and learning processes in
general. This dynamic view of the niche further reinforces
the notion of uniqueness. Even though it is not highly
likely that two firms' niches would be the same in terms of
their current resident knowledge (the static definition),
the likelihood is even less if the behavioral learning
aspects of adaptive ability are also taken into account (the
dynamic definition).
From a competitive point of view what is important
about the firm's niche is not so much the particular
knowledge and abilities which define it, but more its
relationship to the niches of other firms. In other words,
the competitive position of the firm, its probability of
success, is dependent not only upon its feasible opportuni-
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ties but also on the opportunities open to other firms on
the basis of their knowledge and ability to learn.
At any point in time the relative position of the
firm's niche is clearly important in terms of the inhibitory
effect (a revenue reducing effect) of other firms, in terms
of the positioning of the firms product relative to the density of demand, and in terms of its costs of production,
i.e., the parameters of its short period equation. For the
purposes of discussing long period competitive processes it
is convenient at this time to define a few terms which will
allow the discussion of relative niche positions, or starting points, to proceed more smoothly.
At a point in time the area or size of the firm's niche
can be defined in two ways: as a volume in characteristics
space or in terms of value. In terms of a volume in space
we may think of the niche as being bounded by the area in
space from which the firm is likely to make sales, but the
boundary so formed is not likely to be impermeable. That
is, the boundaries of the niche will not be such that on one
side of the 'line' are found consumers of one product and on
the other side are found consumers of another. Rather imperfect and costly information on the part of all actors in
the system will cause the boundaries of adjacent niches to
overlap. Referring back to the explanation of consumer
behavior in Chapter 4 we will find that, compared to a
situation of perfect information, many consumers will make
erroneous purchases. Towards the extreme outer boundaries
of the firm's niche we will find that the probability of a
consumer making an erroneous purchase approaches zero
because the differences between product characteristics are
large and easily discernible. Likewise there is an inner
boundary where the probability of a consumer making an
erroneous purchase approaches zero for the same reason.
(The area enclosed by this boundary may be non-existent when
the comparison is between two nearly identical products.)
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Between these two areas is the area of niche overlap. The
size of this overlapping area will be determined by consumer
behavior (cf. the discussion of uncertainty in the
transaction in Chapter 4) and by product 'spacing'.
The traditionally defined 'states of competition' may
be defined in terms of the degree or nature of niche overlap. The perfectly competitive firm is a special case
wherein consumer demand is assumed to exist at a single
point in product space; all the firms in the industry are
also 'located' at the same point and have completely
overlapping niches. For the purpose of individual firm
analysis there is no overlap between the niche of the perfectly competitive firm and the niche of firms outside the
industry, although when the industry as whole is considered
there may be some overlap which is captured as cross
elasticity of demand. Oligopolistic competition with homogeneous products is defined similarly, except that the numbers of the occupants of the same niche are assumed to be
rather few in number. A pure Marshallian monopoly is simply
the situation in which the amount of niche overlap is
assumed to be nil.
The case of monopolistic and/or imperfect competition
is one in which each firm occupies an identifiable niche but
experiences considerable niche overlap. Chamberlain's
(1956) group in turn is very similar to the cluster of firms
which would be expected to occur in product space as a result of the kind of imitative/innovative strategies
discussed in the model just above. Similarly, only the
numbers of firms involved separate monopolistic from
oligopolistic with differentiated products competition, at
least as far as niche overlap is concerned.
Multi-product and conglomerate firms, although not referred to as states of competition generally, are
interesting and rather common cases in which the identity of
the firm and the niche do not corresond on a one to one
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basis. Rather, the firm is a distinct collection of
differing niches. The idea of niche overlap is also useful
in describing product configuration of these kinds of firms.
The literature generally refers to horizontally and vertically integrated firms and to conglomerates. Horizontal
integration in our terminology refers to the situation in
which th,e products of the firm are clustered together on the
basis of their proximity in product characteristics space.
The integration in this case is not so much an internalization of the exchange function of the market but rather the
proliferation of similar products for the purpose of capitalizing on the firm's market related knowledge of proximate
locations in product space. One might think of this in
terms of overlapping niches corresponding to each of the
firm's products, where the combined product niches span a
large sector of product space. The static competitive
significance of this tye of firm strategy would not appear
to be a function of the extent of the product space spanned
by the firm's products, but as in the single product case, a
function of the relationship of the overlap with the product
niches of other firms. With regard to dynamic competitive
processes, however, the broad span of the firm in product
space would appear to create significant differences compared with the single product firm situation, especially
with regard to information flows in the market. This is a
point, however, which cannot be addressed until we first
make better sense of the forces shaing those information
flows.
Vertical integration like horizontal integration is
based on an extension of the firm's activities into new
product areas, on the basis of resident knowledge of the
firm, in this case, the knowledge related to the markets and
technology supplying the initial product of the firm or
perhaps even into the products for which the firm was
initially a supplier. The significant difference here, of
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course, is the absorption within the firm of transactions
which previously took place as market exchanges between independent entities. Here also the significance of this
behavior for dynamic competition would appear to relate to
its effect on the character and quantity of information
flows--to the firm and environment in general.
Conglomeration in its pure form is an interesting case
of multiproduct 'horizontal' firm growth in which the
products of the firm are for all practical purposes without
any niche overlap at all. Unlike vertical and horizontal
integration, conglomeration is not a multiproduct development of the firm based upon a particularistic advantage of
its product history and resulting resident knowledge.
However, like horizontal and vertical integration, conglomeration is the result which is likely to be expected from
firm growth under particular circumstances. As such they
are all examples of what we would call long period
processes: presently we will present models of these
processes.
An alternative measure of the size of the niche is in
terms of value. The importance of distinguishing between
niche size and value is clear when one realizes that it is
possible for a firm to occupy a relatively large niche and
at the same time find that the niche is completely overlapped by the boundaries of other firms' niches or that
there is a very low density of consumer demand in the area
of characteristics space encompassed by the niche. In
short, niche size and the value of a niche need not be at
all correlated with one another. The greater the niche
overlap the greater the inhibitory constraints of other
firms and the lower the rate of net revenue flow for the
firm.
When one considers the value aspect of the niche from
the point of long term strategies which the firm might
pursue, the question of the impact of niche overlap assumes
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interesting attributes. From the dynamic pOint of view the
attributes of the niche which are of importance for the firm
are those which determine its set of feasible alternatives.
Earlier we int~oduced the idea of the firm's movement in
characteristics or product space as a problem in learning.
Learning, of course, has costs as well as returns. Niche
overlap turns out to be an important determinant of the
returns the firm can expect to learning and, as we shall
see, the appropriate multiproduct strategy for the firm.
Consider for example a situation in which the firm
finds itself in a tightly packed cluster of niches. Although the costs of learning for the firm may be relatively
low, it will find that any proximate product location it
turns to is already occupied by another firm and consequently, it can expect the returns to learning associated
with that kind of product development (i.e. development
based upon its particularistic knowledge of the consumer
environment) to be relatively low. In short the flow of
consumer demand associated with the firm's niche, including
its overlap with the niches of other firms, provides a basis
for describing the size of the niche in value terms, as well
as in terms of its span in product space. It is the value
characteristics of the niche which are, of course, likely to
be dominant in the firm's choice of long period competitive
strategies.
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CHAPTER 6
DETERMINATION OF EXPECTED PRICE

A.

lDt~9~g~tj9D

At the beginning of each short period we consider the
firm always to be faced with the need to make a choice among
the product alternatives, including its current product,
contained ~lithin its feasible set. It is this decision
which constitutes the basis for long period competition and
defines the evolving nature of the firm's niche in the economic environment. In order to make this decision the firm's
information about its economic environment must be translated into its implications for the firm's objective--survival and growth. That is, its perception of the density of
consumer preferences by characteristics, technology, finances, the costs of learning, and so on, need to be translated
into a measure of the prospects offered by any potential
product or course of action for the growth and survival of
the firm.
In the context of adaptive change by the firm, the
meaning and measure of what is meant by 'growth' differs
radically from its meaning in a short-run situation. For
the short run we have taken net revenue to be an adequate
measure of firm growth. In the long run this is an inadequate measure, for in the long run the firm must make choices
among a variety of feasible alternatives and must be concerned with the current and future size of the set of its
feasible alternatives. There is no easy or unambiguous
measure of survival and growth in the long run. At any
point in time the firm must follow a strategy, not designed
to maximize growth along a known path, but designed to preserve for the firm the greatest flexibility for coping with
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an unknown or only partially knowable future.
As Chrysler has recently demonstrated size, 9~~ ~~, is
an inadequate measure of the probability of survival. What
is more important is the firm's Aposition in the market A -its set of feasible alternatives. In a complex dynamic
economic environment the primary requisite for firm adaptability is the ability to learn about and respond to changes
in that environment. The factors influencing the extent of
the firm'·s adaptive ability are undoubtedly complex. Two of
the most important are the hierarchical structure of the
firm (which we will not deal with here, in spite of its importance) and the resources at the firm's disposal. Hierarchical structure is important since the process of decision making and the rate of learning of the firm involve coordination and communication of a (potentially large) group
of people. There are, presumably, better and worse ways of
structuring hierarchies for these purposes. Available resources are important primarily because learning consumes
resources and the extent of costly learning which can be
undertaken is a major determinant of the· size of the set of
feasible adaptive alternatives. We will consider the quantity of resources available for investments in learning (and
complementary physical capital) to be something called surplus--primarily retained earnings and funds obtainable
through outside borrowing.
B. 1 D~~~~IDjDsD~§ 91 ~Y~9lY~
B. 1.1 ~9119~jD9
The firm's access to outside funds we will take to be
determined by the quantity of assets which the firm can
pledge as collateral for its borrowing. At any point in
time, then, we would expect the maximum borrowing by the
firm to be no greater than some value approximately equal to
the liquifiable assets of the firm. Also at any point in
time the amount of those potentially borrowable funds available for surplus will be no greater than the difference be-
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tween the maximum possible borrowing and the amount the firm
has already committed itself to for earlier learning/investment decisions.
R. 1.2 B~~BjD~g ]B~DjD9~
For the firm faced with the consideration of alternative possible products it will be no easy matter to corne to
a precise estimate of the retained earnings which might be
derivable from each alternative. Among the important factors which would have to known with regard to each alternative are price, frequency of sales, and costs. The difficulty of estimation arises primarily because these quantities are not necessarily independent of one another and because the data relevant to each alternative are quite likely
to be non-existent. The problem is likely to be sufficiently complex that the information and analytical costs to the
firm will be enough to foreclose any advantage in calculating or finding a maximum surplus alternative. In other
words, the choice problem of firms is viewed as so complex
that rationality requires reliance on far from complete information about and analysis of the firm's environment and
the use of relatively unsophisticated (in the analytical
sense) rule-of-thumb decision making techniques. This is
not meant to imply that the process of decision making is
considered simple minded; instead this attitude towards
decision making tends to emphasize not so much the importance of 'correct' or sophisticated decision making techniques, but rather the importance of learning about the
environment and having available relatively better information (relative to one's competitors) and being in a relatively more favorable location in characteristics space at
the time when fairly simple decision rules are applied.
What is complex and difficult are the long run strategies
for learning about and positioning oneself in the economic
environment.
In order to support this assertion about the nature of
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decision making in a complex environment we offer here, by
way of a kind of 'negative proof', the informational requirements of an optimizing approach to the determination
of surplus.
B. 1.2.1 lDi~~IDs~j~D E~gyj~~ID~Dt§ r~~ ~b~ F~~gj~tj~D ~i_
2Ij~~

For the firm considering the introduction of a new
product, different from that of any other firm's, the
question of an appropriate price is not only important but
also difficult to resolve especially if the problem is
approached with optimizing techniques in mind. The extent
of the analytical and information problem can be easily
illustrated by listing out those factors which would need to
be known in order to arrive at, say, the surplus or profit
maximizing price. Not only would this information need to
be known for a single product possibility but also for all
possibilities lying within the firm's feasible set.
(1) First, the firm must be able to assess the strength
of consumer demand in the area of characteristics
space appropriate to th~ contemplated product.
(2) It must also be able to predict the expected tradeoff between price and frequency of sales.
(3) It must know the effect on the frequency of sales
of its product, over a range of relevant prices, of
the presence of competing or substitutable
products.
(4) It must know how the information available to
consumers from other firms, non-proprietary sources
(e.g. other consumers, governments, etc.) and
itself will affect frequency of sales and how
this effect will vary with price.
(a) The firm must know how much and what kind of
information needs to be made available to consumers and in what form.
(b) It needs to know the costs of conveying this
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information and how such expenditures will
affect or interact with the frequency of sales
and price.
(5) It needs to know how other firms will react to its
initiative in terms of possible changes in price,
product or information policies.
(6)
It must be cognizant of macro-economic trends likely to affect disposable income, preferences and so
on.
(7) And finally, this must be done for each possible
product alternative.
Obviously the information requirements of this list
represent a very large potential cost to the firm. Just as
obviously, the requirements on the list can be drastically
reduced if the firm is content to undertake a less than
completely thorough analysis of its choice problem. The
consequences of the uncertainty which arises thereby may
represent a cost which is far less than the analytical and
information costs--to say nothing of the time--necessary to
resolve uncertainty. The burden of this uncertainty will be
reduced even further if there are available to the firm
institutions which provide substitutes for its 'analyticaly
preferred' information.
B. 2 D~1~LIDjD~D1~ 91 ~~~1~
The cost problem of the firm is completely similar to
that of price, only the list of information requirements
differs. Among the information requirements on the cost
side are:
(1) The firm must know what methods of production exist
for each alternative.
(2) It must know the costs of inputs (including capital
investments) •
(3) It must know whether supply and labor contracts can
be arranged.
(4) It must know the effect of its own purchases on
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input prices and reliability of supply.
(5) For each method of production it must know how unit
costs vary with the rate of output.
(6) It must be able to estimate its costs of learning a
new (or modified) method of production, ma~keting
and finance.
(7) It must be able to estimate the cost of
selling the product (advertising, distribution,
inventories, etc.).
(8) And finally, it must be prepared to undertake all
of the above for all the alternatives within its
feasible set.
Here also a 'global' analytical technique is not likely
to be feasible because the time and costs for acquiring
adequate information and analysis are likely to be so high.
The basic question is how the firm goes about conserving on
these costs, both those associated with explicit resource
expenditures and time.
jn g ~gIDpl~~ ~nyj.gDID~Dt
The discussion of transactions and institutions in
Chapter 4 above made the point that exchange related institutions tend to provide a set of rules which function as substitutes for expensive and perhaps unattainable information
about the economic environment. There was little or no discussion of the form or specific content of these institutions. At this point, the discussion of exchange institutions is continued with an eye towards the development of a
theory of how and why pricing rules are developed. The aim
is to point out that these rules are relatively general,
much more reliable, and less expensive than, say, an independent approximation of the traditional profit maximizing
approach of theory, and very useful to the firm trying to
estimate surplus and arrive at its choice of product.
In any possible and proposed transaction the bottom
C.

F.j~jD9 M~tbQg~

139

line position with regard to price of each party is called
the party's reservation price. So long as the seller's
reservation price is lower than the buyer's the transaction
is possible. For the proposed transaction to become a reality the two parties must agree on the terms of the sale including a final price lying between their two reservation
prices. What we are concerned with here are the rules and
circumstances which govern the process leading to a final
price. As before, we will deal with the transaction as an
infor~ation problem, but in this case the emphasis is on the
asymmetries in the nature and costs of information required
by the two parties.
What is important here is how variations in the circumstances of the market--which may be described in terms of the inhibitory parameters of the firm's
short period equation--are likely to affect each party's
relative information requirement and give rise to reasonably
predictable patterns, in the rules or (informal) institutions used to arrive at prices. The .discussion here is
specifically aimed at the pricing process, but the arguments
and conclusions apply almost in exactly the same way to the
terms other than price which can be expected to be attached
to the sale of any feasible product alternative.
The earlier discussion of transactions centered on the
importance to a single individual of the informational variables, comparability and frequency of exchange of other
products. Both are necessary to arrive at some notion-even one that is relatively uncertain--of reservation price.
And both are easily describable for both buyer and seller in
terms of the parameters of the firm's (the seller's) short
period equation. Comparability, of course, is a function of
how closely related other products are and is represented by
the ratio of the c ij and c ii coefficients in the firm's
short period equation. Frequency of sales of the firm's
product is captured in terms of its own inhibitory effect
upon itself with respect to time, cii/dt; and the frequency
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of sales of other firm's products is captured in the
relative value of its inhibitory effect with respect to
time, cij/dt. If it is assumed that the sales of all relevant firms are distributed evenly over time or in the same
seasonal cycle, then the relative frequency (relative to
each other firm) of a firm's sales is closely approximated
by
c ~~
.. x./(c.
·x. + c ~J
.. X.)
= c .. *
~
~~ ~
J
~~
a term which conveys a sense of the relative volume of sales
for each relevant competitor.
By arranging the positive values of these two variables--cij/c ii and cii*--in a simple table or map it is
possible to capture the range of potential product market
circumstances which a (single) product firm could face. [A
similar map could be produced for complementary product market circumstances by also mapping in the negative values of
cij/c ii , and a completely analagous map for factor markets
also could be produced using the b ij parameters of the
firm's equation.] This map for competitive product markets
is shown in Figure 10 and may be explained somewhat as
follows: Begin by thinking of the firm's relationship with
any other single firm (i.e., anyone of the jth firms) in
the economy. This relationship can be plotted as a single
pOint on the map simply by reading off the values of c ii *
equation. If the
and cij/c ii from the firm's short period
other firm is selling a product which is highly substitutable from the consumer's point of view (i.e. cij/c ii tending
toward a value of 1.0) the plotted point will lie somewhere
in the right hand portion of the map. To the extent that
the product is less substitutable the plotted point will lie
towards the left hand boundary of the map. The vertical
position of the plotted point depends on the ith firm's
inhibitory effect on its own market relative to that of the
jth or other firm, that is, the extent to which the firm
itself rather than the other firm is capable of exhausting
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its own proCuct market in a given period of time.
For
firms whose rate of sales is small relative to the rate of
creation of demand, c 11
.. , the plotted points (i.e., the
collection for all relevant jth firms) will tend to lie in
the upper part of the map provided that demand is filled by
all firms together. For firms with high valued c ii parameters (1.0) the plotted points will tend to lie towards the
bottom of the map. In the case of expanding markets where
saturation of demand has not taken place, firms with small
inhibitory effects upon their own market will tend to yield
plotted points towards the bottom of the map.
FIGURE 10
The Canpetitive Map of the Firm
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If points are plotted for other, irrelevant, firms in
the economy, the map will show a very strong concentration
of points in the upper left hand corner corresponding to
those other firms in the economy whose relative inhibitory
effect on the firms in question is practically nil (i.e.
Cii * approaches zero), firms whose products are, at best,
remote substitutes for the firm's.
If the world were neatly arranged so that it corresponded to the traditional analytical constructs of economics
the points plotted for the 'relevant' competitiors would
appear as tight clusters on the map. For example, corresponding to a perfectly competitive market structure one
would find in the upper right corner a particularly dense
and numerous cluster of pOints--perfectly substitutable
products and, for each other firm, an inhibitory effect
which approached zero. Clusters found towards the bottom
right corner would still correspond to an analytical world
of perfectly substitutable products, but each other firm
would tend to have a relatively strong inhibitory effect--in
sum, the analytical world of undifferentiated oligopoly.
Clusters lying to the left of the right hand boundary
correspond with the analytical world of differentiated
product competition--towards the top monopolistic and
imperfect competition, and towards the bottom differentiated
oligopoly. Finally, approaching the left hand boundary of
the map, one would find at the very bottom and exactly on
the boundary pure Marshallian monopoly. Higher up along and
near that boundary one would find an almost unknown
analytical world of highly differentiated products in which
one firm's competitive success or failure is not likely to
affect another's (the arts, crafts, personal services,
etc.). In summary, for any given firm whose competitive
circumstances corresponded to one of the traditional
analytical categories of economics one would find an
appropriate clustering of plotted points.
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The messy world we are trying to deal with here, of
course, would not produce such neat clusterings when a
firm's competitors were mapped. It is quite reasonable to
expect that a large firm, for example, might face simultaneously homogeneous product competition from other large
firms which have a strong inhibitory effect on it, and from
small firms with small inhibitory effects, as well as differentiated product competition from both large and small
firms all with widely varying inhibitory effects. Potentially, only the diversity of the product environment limits
the range and circumstances of competition a firm might
face. Its competitors are likey to be a heterogeneous
collection of firms whose attributes and potential actions
would be almost impossible to portray or predict precisely;
put differently, the cost of the information for an analytically accurate description of a firm's competitors is likely to be prohibitively high.
In terms of the conduct of the transaction, this complexity is important because it gives rise first, to exchange situations which are potentially very demanding of
information necessary for the establishment of reservation
prices (as pointed out it Chapter 4) and, second, to situations in which the relative cost of this information to the
two parties to the transaction is likely to be different.
If it is assumed that under most conditions these asymmetries in information costs would tend to be correlated with
the predominant (i.e., traditional analytical category)
market situation of the firm then one would expect these
regularities to lead to fairly regular pricing rules or
institutions for establishing reservation prices. It would
appear that the conditions necessary to produce this kind of
regularity are:
(1)
Clustering of competitors at a point on the firm's
competitive map similar to the other firm's maps
(i.e., relative homogeneity of competitor's circum-
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stances) •
(2) A relative lowering of the buyer's cost of information the more homogeneous the product associated
with the firm's cluster. And,
(3) A lowering of the relative cost of information to
the seller the fewer the number of firms in the
competitive cluster (i.e., towards the bottom of
the map).
These conditions would place the greatest asymmetry in costs
(favoring the seller) in the lower left corner of the map
(pure Marshallian monopoly) and the greatest equality in the
upper right corner (perfect competition). Between these
polar cases one would expect, under these conditions, gradual and regular changes in information cost asymmetries associated with establishing reservation prices.
For the moment we will assume that the tendency of
market institutions to provide simplified and somewhat
distorted information and, consequently, perceptions of the
environment, leads to a situation in which actors in the
system tend to behave ~§ ji the regularities represented by
the 'institutionalized' information flow accurately represent reality. Then if we were to approach the problem of
each transaction as if its outcome were independent of other
transactions (i.e., as if neither buyer or seller had yet
developed uniformly applied pricing rules of thumb and was
more or less attempting to act like a discriminating monopolist or monopsonist but perceived this regularity) and
allow both parties to rely upon information from their own
previous and other party's transaction we would be likely to
find that the circumstances of each party, especially his
"degree of presence" in the market, will determine his
.r.e.l~.tjy.e information costs.
By"degree of presence" we mean
simply the frequency and history of the trader's acquisition
of or search for relevant market information. For example,
the occasional participant or first time participant in a
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market will face higher marginal information costs than the
trader who has been continuously in the market. In effect,
information acquisition costs are closely analagous to
capital costs. Information costs have a high fixed cost
component and the value of the accumulated item tends to
depreciate over time--not as a function of use but simply
because the context which gives it value--the economic
environment--changes. In other words, one would expect
collective information costs to rise and the value of
acquired information to depreciate more rapidly during
periods of rapid structural change and inflation, for
example, than in more stable situations. Thus, in addition
to the competitive circumstances of the particular product
market, one would expect total and marginal information
costs and, consequently, the asymmetries of costs in the
transaction to rise or fall in response to the contextual
situation.
Looking only at static competition, those variables
which appear to be most important in the creation of asymmetrical information costs (i.e., that are most sensitive to
the differing circumstances of buyer and seller) are:
(1) Comparability of other products (Cij/cii)--the less
comparable they are the more costly information
will be and the more the seller's continuous presence in the market will allow him to distribute
these fixed information costs across a large number
of transactions. The greater the comparability of
other sales, the less costly information is to both
parties, but the less the relative cost of information to the buyer is correspondingly. If buyer
and seller are both continuously present in the
market, these asymmetries in information cost with
greater or less comparability should not occur.
(2) Frequency of sales of this and comparable products
--the lower the frequency of sales, the more costly
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is information about the terms, circumstances and
characteristics of other sales, and again the seller's continuous presence in the market reduces his
relative information cost per transaction. The
higher the frequency the lower the fixed information cost to both parties and the lower is the relative disadvantage of the buyer (unless, of course,
the buyer is also continuously in the market).
(3) Homogeneity or regularity of preferences and
attributes of buyer--that is, a firm selling to a
group of buyers whose circumstances and information
sources are relatively uniform and/or regularly
distributed will find its information costs regarding buyers' reservation prices lower than otherwise. With a decrease in the homogeneity of consumer attributes one would expect the total information cost to the firm to rise while that of consumers should not rise so rapidly since other
product prices, not the attributes of other consumers, is more relevant to the buyer.
(4) Homogeneity of attributes of other sellers of comparable products--the more other firms' circumstances (costs, inventories, etc.) are uniform or
regularly distributed the lower will be the costs
to the firm of learning buyers' likely reservation
prices. However, as the circumstances of other
firms become more dissimilar there is likely to be
a greater variance in buyers' likely reservation
prices and the cost of information to both seller
and buyer; and information cost per transaction
should begin to favor the seller because of the
fixed cost aspect of information.
But relative costs are not the only factors likely to
affect informational asymmetries. The benefits of information acquisition are of crucial importance, as pointed out
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in Chapter 4, because together with costs they will determine actual information acquisition--or uncertainty tolerance--by either of the two parties. If we view the process
of shopping or searching for market information as a series
of paired comparisons of potential exchange alternatives,
the variables which would appear to stand out as important
are:
(1) The proximity in characteristics space of either of
the two alternative products to 'ideal' preferences, or put somewhat differently, the comparability of product and preference characteristics. One
would expect that the closer the two products are in
characteristics space the lower would be the benefits of successfully discriminating between the two
and the lower would be the probability that rational
behavior would lead to the actual acquisition of the
information necessary to discriminate. One would
also expect that the benefits effect would be similar for buyers and sellers, but that the greater
presence of the seller in the market and consequently his lower information costs would lead to a
greater likelihood of the seller entering the transaction with more adequate information than the
buyer, unless of course, both were equally present
in the market or the buyer more so than the seller.
(2) The absolute value of the potential gains from
trading or put differently, the potential losses
from trading, place an upper limit on benefits and
the rational expenditure of resources for information acquisition. Again 'presence in the market'
would appear to determine the direction of informational asymmetries in the actual transaction. For
example, it would be reasonable to expect that sales
of high volume (from the seller's point of view),
cheap and differentiated products would be char act-

~48

erized by strong asymmetries favoring the seller.
It is simply not worthwhile for the buyer to carefully acquire all relevant information when the
benefits involved are ,so. paltry. For the seller
this is hardly the case.
(3) Finally, when potential bargaining costs exceed
potential gains, one would expect simple rules to
develop for the establishment of price. The more
comparable the products, the more these rules will
reflect reservation (market) prices; the less, the
more reliance will be placed on substitute information.
In short, the circumstances of the market and the characteristics of products tend-to give rise to fairly predictable patterns of informational asymmetries. It is reasonable to expect that the information networks in the market
will begin to codify and simplify data on the environment
according to these perceived regularities. But one would
expect that the categories, or instances, of these perceived
regularities would far exceed in number the traditional
competitive analytic categories of economics. In effect a
kind of conventional wisdom might be expected to grow up.
One would expect the growth of informal and perhaps formal
exchange institutions, related to collective experience,
which would tend to set standards regarding the terms and
conditions of generically similar transactions according to
the peculiar or particularistic attributes surrounding
broadly defined product areas.
In other words, most of the conditions affecting the
outcomes of transactions are determined primarily by circumstances external to the individual transaction. For any
particular product grouping the similarity of conditions
will tend to yield relatively similar outcomes which, over
time, will become fairly well known. In a like manner the
terms, or the set of rights and obligations, attached to

149

similar transactions will tend to approximate one another.
Finally, the formation of expectations centered around these
historical outcomes will tend to drive actual (current) outcomes into the mold of historical experience. This would
happen because the institutional codification and simplification of historical experience would tend to dep~ive the
market of information about unexpected or surprising results, i.e. those at variance with the expectations of the
conventional wisdom. It is, quite simply, this process of
converging expectations which produces for the firm relutively inexpensive and fairly accurate information about
price and other transactional terms for products in its
feasible set. In effect, what are called hunches or informed guesses are most probably extrapolations of these
perceived regularities to new but still roughly similar
conditions--product characteristics, location, and so on.
What is interesting about this process, if indeed it is
what is going on, is that it would appear to create very
strong forces limiting the perception of what is in fact
feasible. For example, if consumer's product preferences
(in this case formed from expectations regarding the performance or availability of characteristice) began to consolidate around the characteristics of the existing set of
products, one might very easily conceive of a situation in
which firms' fairly accurate perception of consumer preferences would lead them to believe that only small or perhaps
even no changes in product characteristics would pass the
test of the market. The often stated 'truth' of the sixties
and early seventies to the effect that Americans would never
buy small cars would appear, in retrospect, to be an example
of this kind of informational phenomenon in the market.
But as this example perhaps points up, a significant
alteration in the conditions of the market or the overall
economic environment, probably usually corning from outside
the system, can alter the substance of the surrogate inforrn-
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ation provided by exchange related institutions. Because of
the historical nature of this surrogate information, however, such alterations undoubtedly create a transitional
period during which new surrogate information has not been
codified, leading ~o a rise in the costs of exchange related
information, uncertainty, and most probably, informational
asymmetries.
Another very imortant aspect of this institutionally
generated information is that its suppression of outlying
possibilities, even though expectations may converge around
its representation of rea~ity, always leaves open the possibility that competitive advantage may be gained through
access to a more accurate depiction of reality. In other
words, the tendency of market institutions to simplify and
distort reality would tend to always create 'vacant niches'
ready for exploitation by some capitalist entrepreneur.
Both this tendency and that for external change would tend
to off-set the stabilizing effects of surrogate information
and converging expectations.
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CHAPTER 7
CHOICE OF PRODUCT

A.

lDtXggY~tjgD

To this point we have sketched out a view of long
period environmental conditions--the nature of demand, the
relationship of institutions to uncertainty, the flow of information, and so on--and factors contributing to the formation of expectations regarding price and other terms of
potential transactions. We turn now to the overall question
we have set out to answer: How does the firm go about
choosing what to produce or do given relatively confident
expectations about prices? Alternatively, in the context of
an informational problem we can rephrase the question in a
somewhat more operational manner as follows: How does the
firm come to form its expectations about the potential density of consumer demand associated with all the product
points in its feasible set? This rephrasing takes for
granted the firm's ability to identify a product conforming
with its own best interests (i.e., its ability to carry out
the traditional analytical choice problem of economic
theory, given a set of information) and shifts the center of
attention to the firm's problem of acquiring information.
It suggests that the flow of information to the firm may
limit or bias its perception of the size and extent of its
feasible set of opportunities and of the costs and benefits
associated with each alternative in that set. It also
suggests that competitive processes and outcomes may be
viewed as being determined primarily by the collective,
institutional mechanisms which give particular form to the
flow of information and distribution of knowledge in the
economy. It should not be surprising to the reader that our
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approach to answering this question will tend to rely heavily on the theory of institutional information networks
developed during our analysis of price expectations in the
previous section of the paper.
B. b§§.l.lID9.t.i..2D§

Our approach to the problem assumes:
(1) that actors in the system or market put primary
informational reliance upon the 'regularities' in the
environment as represented to them through the filtering
mechanism of institutions. But
(2) in spite of these regularities it is assumed that
technical change generated by new products, extra-market
institutions or international trade, and a continuing process of distribution of information tend to cause a continuous alteration in the characteristics structure of consumer
preferences. And
(3) firms are assumed to respond in a not entirely passive way (i.e., they may deliberately seek to reinforce orW
impede the flow of market information leading to changes in
preference structure). They do so through the modification
of old and creation of new products, or, described Simply,
through changes in the characteristics of their products.
(As advertisements for the naIl new n this or that demonstrate, it is sometimes hard to distinguish between modifications of old and creation of new products--'changes in
product characteristics' may be a simple and easy way to
avoid ~hat may be an unnecessary definitional problem.)
Finally, we want to emphasize the need to cast the
product c~oice problem in terms of a dynamic information
acquisition problem which is overlaid with the firm's inability to permanently withhold the fruits of its informational search from its competitors. In other words, the problem
is not a simple one of the costs of searching for and acquiring information; it is also a time dependent problem in
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which the economic value of knowledge is a function of the
duration of its relative scarcity. The duration of scarcity, in turn, depends upon the learning behavior of competitors.

c.

lmjtstjgD, lDD9Ysti9D gDg
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New knowledge of the demand environment is costly to
obtain and difficult to retain for exclusive use. In
effect, knowledge of the market has the attributes of a
common property resource. On the surface this would seem to
indicate that there is little or no incentive fo~ the development of new knowledge about the market. But this is not
the case if one takes into account the unique competitive
position of each firm, especially as that position affects
the firm's relative costs and the time required for acquiring any particular body of knowledge. What one finds is
that an environment of this sort places a premium on a
particular kind of innovation, namely an incremental change
in product characteristics emphasizing relatively low learning costs and early returns.
This proposition may be explained somewhat as follows:
in any common property resource where the characteristics or
location of the resource are subject to frequent and more or
less unpredictable change, an e~phemeral 'property' right of
a sort (i.e., an exclusive ability to exploit) accrue to the
person or firm which discovers any changed or newly perceived characteristics of the resource. This emphemeral
'right' lasts only so long as other persons or firms are
denied access to the relevant knowledge of the resource.
Once the existence of that knowledge is recognized by
others--which is usually soon after the discoverer begins
exploitation of the new knowledge--it is only a matter of
time and the learning costs faced by competitors before the
process of imitation takes place. In effect, the innovator
may count on only a short time during which he might exclus-
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ively exploit the value of his newly acquired knowledge. As
might be expected, these attributes of knowledge, combined
with the relative competitive position of each firm (especially with regard to the unique characteristics of its body
of resident knowledge) strongly influence the direction and
extent of the search for new knowledge.
In Chapter 5 we discussed the firm's internal constraints vis-a-vis its new product search. In the collective process of competition, however, the firm also is
constrained strongly by the current and potential activities
of other firms, especially their ability to undertake adaptive change which might increase their inhibitory effects.
Illustration of this process is most easily addressed from
the pOint of view of a firm considering a change in product
characteristics, and is most easily cast in terms of the
problem of potential imitation by competitors.
At first glance, factors governing the rate of imitation with no real property rights seem likely to be determined by the manner in which the body of knowledge which
constitutes the innovation is acquired and the relative
position of the firms in product space yj§-~-yj§ the costs
of learning for imitators. In general, there would appear
to be two polar or extreme imitative learning patterns: one
is when the new knowledge is conveyed simply through its use
(for example, search that results in the discovery of a good
fishing spot or area of consumer demand is knowledge conveyed completely through observation). The second is new
knowledge which only can be acquired through experience (for
example, how to make an internal combustion engine is not
easily conveyed through observation of an engine).
In the kind of 'knowledge' environment postulated here,
however, these two means by which imitators can acquire
knowledge tend to shade into one another, since the difference between the two forms of imitation are most clearly a
function of the relative positions of the resident knowledge
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of imitator and innovator. That is, the unique body of
resident knowledge of each firm tends to dictate its relative costs of learning (ignoring here the potential for large
differences in the relative efficiencies of the group learning process in each firm). For the imitating firm say, firm
B, whose resident knowledge closely approximates that of an
innovating firm ,A, the amount of learning required may be
so small that observation of the innovation may be all that
is required to understand it. For a firm C whose body of
resident knowledge is far removed from the innovating firm,
comprehension of the innovation may require the acquisition
of related knowledge in order to provide the context for
understanding comparable to that of firm B. In short, we
may look upon the costs of imitative learning as most closely approximated by distance in 'knowledge space', or, without the jargon, by the similarity in the competitive positions and histories of innovator and imitator.
This view of the imitative process suggests three
rather elementary aspects of long period competition:
(1) that imitators are likely to be found among firms most
similar to innovators; (2) that the costs of 'contextual'
information are likely to limit or constrain firms' search
for information to nearby locations; or put somewhat differently, that the information flows or networks are likely to
be denser the more similar the sets of resident knowledge;
and (3) that the rate of imitation is likely to be correlated with the proximity of competitors' resident knowledge-the more similarity the more rapid the imitation.

1'.h.e l'.i.w.iDg .Q.f l.wj..t.s.ti..QD
Given these aspects of imitative learning, a general
question about the external competitive constraints facing
the firm is whether they give rise to regular patterns of
behavior likely to alter or impact upon the firm's choice of
product. A relatively str~ight-forward graphical model,
D.
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emphasizing solely the innovating firm's problem of timeliness, provides an initial exploration of the problem.
Figure 11 is used for illustration. Costs and benefits of
product change are measured on the vertical axis and time on
the horizontal. For simplicity it is assumed that investment in and introduction of the new product occur simultaneously at time to.
FIGURE 11
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Let the period between to and tl be the short period during
which the innovator has g~ .f.§£.tg property rights due to the
lagged response of imitators. The duration of this response
is assumed to be determined by the proximity of other firms'
resident knowledge. Curve c-c is taken as the cost over
time of the investment in the acquisition of the innovator's
new knowledge. C-c rises at a rate equal to the going rate
of interest or opportunity returns plus the costs of production over time (assumed constant) from a level equal to
the initial cost of the firm's investment expenditure.
Curve O-R is taken as the gross returns associated with the
innovation. It is further assumed that the effects of
market saturation by the innovating firm do not begin before
imitation takes place.
As drawn, the curve O-R reflects the innovator's rapid
penetration of the market (to-t l ), a decline in his rate of
sales beginning at t l , and around t2 a settling down to a
rather constant rate of sales, followed by a decline which
might be attributable to shifts in consumer preferences, the
introduction of product change by a competitor or even the
firm itself or anyone of numerous factors which seem to
contribute to the declining stages of a particular product's
life cycle. Among other things, the curve assumes that
imitative product change has purely inhibitory effects on
the innovating firm, that is, that the proliferation of similar products does not alter the information environment of
consumers in such a way as to lower their search costs or
alter their preferences in a way that is favorable to the
innovator.
Whether the product change yields a positive net return
can be seen to depend crucially on (1) the initial cost of
the product change, (2) the rapidity of spread and
inhibitory effect of imitation, (3) the lifetime of the
product and, of course, (4) the density over time of
consumer demand. It can be expected that the firm will tend
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to orient its assessment of feasible alternatives, or its
preferences with regard to product change, in directions
which will tend to minimize the net inhibitory effect of
these four factors.
All other things equal, the firm would prefer:
(1) incremental changes closely related to its current
product--a lower value for OC in Figure 11
(2) changes which tend to capitalize on its areas of
relative advantage as conferred by its base of
resident knowledge in order to prolong the
imitation lag and minimize the probability of
overly close competition by a firm with similar
product change preferences (i.e., (1) above)-- a
slower rate of decline in OR after time tl
(3) relatively long product life--a longer period
between tl and t 2--and
(4) of course, a product conforming to a relatively
dense area of consumer demand--a proportionately
more rapid rise in OR than OC. (Ignoring the
opportunity cost of investment, there would tend to
be a proportionate, and favorable, rise in both OR
and CC.)
There is no reason to believe that all four preference
factors will consistently point the firm's search in the
same di~ection; rather it would appear, for reasons which we
hope become clear, that the competitive process itself is
likely to impose conflicting directional indicators.

E.

~~~gY~1 ~9s~~
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To illustrate that process still further we turn our
attention to the nature of imitative behavior in terms of
product space movements, or put differently, in terms of the
factors likely to affect the degree of product differentiation in the market.
If firm one chooses to imitate the product of firm two
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(and provided product differences are the only significant
ones between the firms) on the grounds that firm two's
product characteristics correspond to an area of stronger
consumer demand (c 22 < c ll ), it could expect two effects to
dominate its assessment of less or more completely imitative
product alternatives. First, if its perception of a dense
area of consumer demand arising from observation of the
strong, or anticipated strong, performance of firm two is
indeed correct, imitation will lead it into an area where
the limitations of the market for its product alone will
lessen (i.e., c II will fall). But, imitation will produce a
second effect, that is, increasing competition arising from
the greater proximity of firm two's product (i.e., c l2 will
rise). The first effect will tend to enhance the growth of
firm one; the second will tend to retard it. One would
expect the favorable effects to be relatively stronger in
the initial stages of imitation and the deleterious effects
to become relatively more dominant as imitation proceeded to
the ultimate of identical products. Firm two, of course,
will be affected by the imitation of firm one. Throughout
the process of imitation, assuming no response by firm two,
the inhibitory effect of firm one on firm two (C I2 ) will
grow, probably at an increasing rate. This will tend to
reduce the surplus of firm two as its sales decline.
One would expect that the two opposing effects of the
imitation process would combine to yield a product equilibrium of sorts before firm one evolved to a product identical to firm two's. In other words, to the extent that the
firm can anticipate these conflicting inhibitory effects,
the process of imitation would stop when the beneficial
effects of entering an area of greater consumer demand began
to be outweighed by the greater inhibitions of more proximate competition. In the language of our short period
model we would expect c 12 /c II to stop growing some time
before the stage of perfect product homogeneity was reached
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12 /c ll = 1). In effect, each firm will find its market
position to be a niche, perhaps' constantly changing as other
firms' products and consumer demand change, which will place
each firm apart from yet in close relation to other firms.
Viewed from a slightly different prospective one would
conclude that these same effects would combine to cause
homogeneous product markets to disintegrate into differentiated product markets if it is technologically or legally
possible. In effect, this process will tend to define the
firm's niche and reinforce the uniqueness of its position in
the environment.
(C

F.
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If we were to apply this view of the imitative process
with two firms to a multifirm situation, some interesting
results emerge concerning the competitive process. Earlier
we discussed the costs to the firm of simply perceiving the
state of its environment, the relationship of these costs to
its current body of resident knowledge, and the tendency to
rely upon surrogate information from collectively or institutionally filtered perceptions of regularity. All these
factors tend to constrain the scope of the firm's knowledge
of its environment and limit the direction and extent of its
search for new knowledge. The dependence upon surrogate
information especially tends to restrict the firm's sense of
what is feasible to the limited set of opportunities (or
variants of them) represented by other relevant firms. In
effect, costly information imposes a kind of conservatism on
the product choice process.
In this context, then, what can be expected of a multifirm process? Basically, one would expect a form of product
clustering to take place; that is, the relative commonality
of information available to all relevant firms would tend to
create similar, but not identical (given the uniqueness of
the niche), perceptions of economically feasible products.
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Furthermore, recalling the discussion of endogenous consumer
preferences, one would expect similar informational processes to give rise to a set of consumer product preferences
closely approximating the existing set of products. This
will tend to reinforce the firms' perceptions of what is
feasible, as well as reinforcing the tendency of products to
cluster into groups of differentiated, but similar, products.
In a competitive environment, we should expect that
multifirm processes will be based on the response to the
unique contextual circumstances surrounding each individual
competitive cluster. The current competitive position of
any firm in the cluster and the source of any perceived competitive advantage for that firm can only be described in
terms of the very context specific position it holds
relative to all other firms. Consequently, there is little
reason to expect to find generically similar long period
processes, beyond niche and cluster formation, common to all
clusters. What appears to be most pertinent to the analysis
of long period processes are those variables which define
the competitive situation of the cluster, especially the informational situation.
By the informational situations of the cluster we
refer, on the one hand, to the factors influencing the flow
of information within the cluster and on the other, to the
actual information itself--namely, information about the
product related spheres of knowledge of the market, technology and finances. The latter, of course, are particularistic to the cluster. The factors influencing the flow of
information, however, can be described most easily in terms
of the attributes of the cluster itself.
Our earlier discussions have brought out some of these
factors which are worth reviewing here or perhaps restating
as long period hypotheses:
(1) Cluster packing--the preference for incremental
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innovation has been described as a furiction of the
expected rapidity of imitation or, what is virtually the same thing, the similarities of the resident knowledge of the firm and that of its competitors. Following this line of thinking we can
think of tightly or loosely packed clusters according to the similarity of product histories, current
products and resident knowledge bases of the firms
in the cluster. Among tightly packed clusters, we
would expect a relatively strong preference for
fairly small changes, simply because firms in a
tightly packed cluster would have reason to expect
relatively easy and rapid imitation. The opposite
might be expected of loosely packed clusters.
(2) The reasons why clusters might be loosely or
tightly packed are:
(2a) Technological age--one would expect that knowledge of a new technology would create the
potential of a large number of economically
feasible products. In the early stages of the
technology one would expect relatively few
specific products, mostly those which would
readily substitute for existing products (with
a different technological base). But with the
demand shifts arising from broader recognition
of the feasibilities of the new technology and
the refinement of the technology itself, one
would expect the product possibilities inherent in the technology to become more fully
utilized. This utilization can be expected
both in terms of the range of products in
characteristics space (as a result of technological learning) and in terms of a finer
differentiation or variation in product types
(as a result of learning about the character-
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istics preferences of consumers when tied to
the technology). In effect, technological
aging can be expected to lead to tighter
clusters and rationally more conservative
attitudes toward changes.
(2b) An enlarged span of a cluster in product
spaces, even if the cluster is tightly packed,
will bring greater diversity to the firms in
the cluster. Basically, products combine
characteristics; characteristics are likely to
have differing technological, market or financial bases. In effect, clusters can overlap
much like niches. The result is the infusion
of new information in the clusters, a kind of
synergy, more favorable from an informational
point of view to some of the firms in the
cluster.
(3) The number of firms in the clusters relative to
the number of products also should affect the
information state of the cluster if the source
of performance information sought by other
firms is overall firms' performance. In this
case, the performance of multiproduct firms
conveys ambiguous information. However, if
individual product sales rates provide sufficient information, the ratio of firms to
products in a competitive cluster may be
irrelevant from the point of view of information flows about the consumer environDent. On
the other hand, if a single firm occupies a
large number of adjacent niches for technological, marketing or other reasons the total inhibitory effect of other firms may be significantly diminished, leading to a variation of
the monopoly problem (see Lancaster 1979).
164

CHAPTER 8
NOTES ON WELFARE IMPLICATIONS

The theory presented here stipulates conditions in the
economic environment and reaches tentative conclusions about
competitive processes which are significantly different from
those of the neoclassical theory of welfare. As might be
expected, this theory also implies significantly different
and, at this stage of the development of the theory, less
easily specified welfare conclusions. This section of the
paper attempts to sketch out the tentative welfare implications or questions about welfare problems raised in the
theory~

In general we consider welfare theory to be concerned
with the 'adequacy' of economic processes regarding the
fulfillment of the collective welfare. Central to the traditional welfare problem is the 'macroeconomic' trade-offs
which arise between efficiency and equity--the growth/distribution problem--on the one hand l and the proper means or
criteria for defining and resolving 'microeconomic' conflicts between private and collective interests--the externality problem--on the other. The analysis of these problems
in the neoclassical system is firmly grounded in the
-explicit propositions (1) that both social and private
efficiency can be equated with cost minimizing beh~vior given proper accounting of costs and (2) that it is possible to
identify or specify an exogenous aggregate welfare
function. The conclusions of our theory are compatible with
neither of these basic propositions.
Regarding the question of efficiency, this theory suggests that adaptive efficiency arising from the decision
about what to produce or do, although not the exclusive basis for efficiency, will tend to dominate the competitive
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process. (In an unchanging environment, however, it would
be reasonable on the basis of this theory to expect cost
minimizing efficiency to become dominant.) It is not immediately apparent that private adaptive efficiency corresponds
in all circumstances to what might be termed 'social efficiency' since any notion of social efficiency depends uon a
definition of aggregate welfare. Put somewhat differently,
the notion of adaptive competition introduces the problem of
variety into the social calculus (e.g. Lancaster 1979) and
suggests a three way trade-off among equity, efficiency (in
its traditional sense), and variety. Is variety in some
sense a 'good thing' in the way that more of any given
material 'good' is taken to be? What is the basis for
preferring ~ore variety to a greater quantity of a given set
of limited goods? Is the proliferation of variety in market
economics a response of the market to unique, niche-like,
attributes of consumers, or merely the result of playing
out competitive strategies, or perhaps the result of market
created differences in consumer situations and hence
preferences? This theory would find it rather difficult to
conceive of an aggregate welfare function, given its assumptions of endogenously or environmentally influenced
individual welfare functions and of scarce and costly
information. Basically the 'transactions' cost of specifying such a function make it extremely improbable, and the
endogeneity of preferences (which can be expected to change
over time) would confer upon it only ephemeral usefulness.
This is not to say that the idea of such a function
cannot be useful for certain analytical purposes. Rather,
the point is that the behavioral improbability of such a
function being employed by society suggests that the actual
decision mechanisms and criteria used are subject to significantly different constraints and, hence, are likely to be
much different than welfare theory envisions. We have tried
to pOint out that the firm is strongly constrained by in-
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formation costs. The welfare problem for society is one
which is much more massively constrained by thi~ same factor. We should expect the informational constraint as such
to exert a strong influence on the process and choice of
criteria with regard to social welfare questions.
Endogeneity of preferences, as assumed here, raises
particularly difficult welfare problems. We have not tried
to claim that tastes are fully endogenous, but simply that
their expression in terms of product preferences is strongly
influenced by the information available to consumers. This
does not amount to an assumption of full producers' sovereignty (in the sense used by some of the critical caricatures of Galbraith's writings); but rather, it simply tries
to point out that the strong informational influence of the
material and cultural environment limits the potential range
of consumer product preferences and, if firms are responsive
to their perception of these preferences, the range of outcomes that can be considered if society's choices are dependent on market processes. This is not necessarily a
question of the individual firm's ability to influence the
preferences of potential consumers of its products, but
rather it is a collective informational problem brought
about by the limited capacity of informational networks-specifically their tendency to homogenize preferences
through reliance upon surrogate and simplified rather than
direct information about the environment.
In effect, we see the information problem as affecting
a kind of collective reinforcement of current product types
or trends to the exclusion of alternatives which might be
open, or might have been open, to society had not the
conservatism of the informational problem been imposed upon
the product search and choice process. Given this, the
general problem of the adequacy of economic activity can be
solved either through what would appear to be a rather
hopeless global search for and assessment of alternatives
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not exercised, or through an assessment of the adequacy, or,
perhaps it would be appropriate to say, the efficiency of
the informational-institutional structure of the economy.
Put another way, we may ask: are there other collective
mechanisms or alterations of current mechanisms which are
likely to constrain or limit individual and social choice
processes less than the existing ones would? This latter
approach to the 'adequacy' problem would necessarily direct
one's research and policy approach towards the question of
institutional function and structure as well as actual
outcomes.
Endogeneity of preferences and adaptive efficiency
together raise difficult questions about the so-called
efficiency/equity trade-off. Perhaps the most fundamental
problem here revolves around the inability, with endogenous
preferences, to make unambiguous statements of social
preference between one or another outcome of economic
activity (product mix); in other words, taking an extreme
view, if the constraints of information cause a perfect
convergence of preferences around the current product mix,
then any welfare criteria which mistakenly relied upon the
exogeneity of preferences and was somehow able to assess
those preferences would always pronounce the current state
of the world to be the best of all possible worlds since any
other conceivable outcome would not correspond to or match
up as well with 'revealed' preferences. A less extreme view
of the extent of endogeneity is one which admits information
sources external to the current product environment into the
process of product preference formation (i.e., new learning
in the sciences, technology, the arts, and so on). Such a
view introduces the possibility that alternatives other than
the current might be perceived as 'better'. But the question of how this perception comes about, of how the judgement is made, cannot be determined independently or unambiguously so long as preferences are a function of the
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collectively generated information network. Put as simply
as possible, the relationship between human happiness or the
human condition and any given economic outcome is likely to
be very uncertain to the extent that product preferences are
an endogenous function of the cultural and material environment. Consequently, to the extent that unambiguous rankings
of alternative outcomes ~9DD~~ be made, the theory suggests
there is no efficiency/equity trade-off as such; there is
simply an equity problem.
What is suggested by this theory as a more relevant
welfare question, given the uncertainty of comparing alternative outcomes, is basically the collective problem of the
consequences of economic growth. One is lead to the suspicion, if the competitive processes outlined here are accepted, that the traditional welfare theory (and societal) emphasis on the importance of growth confuses the competitive
requirements of individual firms (for whom continuous growth
increases the probability of survival) with the collective
welfare. Put differently, one is led to the strong suspicion that a very real welfare problem may be present in the
possibly conflicting private and social interests generated
by competitive growth processes. This is a possibility
which is clearly raised in an environment of strictly limited, non-renewable resources; but our theory would seem to
suggest that the problem is not simly limited to this kind
of situation. There are costs to economic growth.
The
problem of the costs of growth has generally been looked
upon as a problem of unaccounted for costs arising from
deficiencies in the market mechanism. Implicit in this view
(depending upon the proponent) is the proposition that
'internalization' or full and appropriate accounting of
these costs through the extension or simulation of a
property rights regime will resolve the problem. Market
processes will then accurately reflect desired social
outcomes. The suggestion put forward here is, in a sense,
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more fundamental since it questions whether the competitive
requirements for growth coupled with endogenous preferences
so constrain society's perceived set of feasible alternatives that we could perpetually chase an illusory goal of
'more is better.'
In the context of a resource limited world the theory
suggests that there is a possibility that a 'fully endogenized' market economy could go highballing along a particular
high risk, resource intensive path without price or other
informational mechanisms signaling other equally preferable,
but less risky alternatives. If the answer to this proposition is yes, or possibly yes, then the operational welfare
question would once again seem to be directed towards the
design and functioning of institutional-informational mechanisms, in this case those that are, strictly speaking, outside the market but still relevant to its functioning-namely institutions whose information networks are not constrained by the process of converging preferences. There is
no doubt that such institutions/information networks exist.
The question is: what is their relevance and impact on economic processes?
The emphasis on growth may also be confused with the
fact that growth makes the resolution of equity issues much
easier than they might otherwise be. In short, many of the
distributional problems in a resource scarce situation
(i.e., all situations) can be avoided through the creation
of a bigger pie. There is no doubt that continued growth
has had the effect of reducing or eliminating serious social
conflict, at least domestically. But if there is the
potential that other aspects of growth are becoming more
costly, then the relevant question once again appears to be
an institutional/informational one--in this instance
relating to the mechanisms for the resolution of conflict
and their possible application to the equity problems we
have tended to avoid through growth. Undoubtedly these
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problems cannot be addressed without simultaneous reference
to the accessibility of extra-market information (i.e., how
do we avoid the pitfalls of 'endogeneity'?) and without some
reference to the competitive structure itself which, through
its requirement for growth, may exacerbate so much of what
we call the equity or distributional problem.
The question of appropriate criteria for the judgement
of equity has always been a painful matter for economic
theory. The implication of the theory offered here is
simply that equity criteria, or the design of such criteria,
is not a matter for theory. For example, the Pareto criteria and its, variants are explicitly formulated· on the basis
of exogenous individual preference functions and the assumed
omniscience required to aggregate individual preferences.
This is necessary if one is to make abstract judgements
about the social preferability of one state of affairs relative to another. But this or any other possible universal
criterion is clearly not appropriate to the kind of environment discussed here simply because such criteria do not take
into account the effects of the information constraint. It
is the information constraint which gives rise to the endogeneity of preferences and the inability to make unambiguous
comparisons between one state of the economy and another.
Hence the information constraint also indicates the probable
inappropriateness of an aggregate welfare function.
What seems to be more appropriate in the consideration
of equity is the informational/institutional constrained
processes which tend to provide the particularistic, context
relevant criterion upon which equity judgements are based
(e.g., Wilson 1980). One might expect to find criteria of
equity highly variable depending on the informational context and also relative to the market or cluster in question.
In other words, one would expect, in the presence of choice,
a kind of selection mechanism favorable to firms or individuals who traded under conditions perceived to be 'fair',
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however inarticulate the sense of fairness might be. This
selection mechanism should give substantive particularistic
form--in terms of more and less acceptable ways of doing
business--to the incoherent sense of equity contained in the
community. Hence, to the extent that the institutional/informational state and other characteristics of the market or
cluster provide the basis for reasonably informed choice of
trading partners, more favorable economic circumstances
ought to evolve for the firms and individuals who conform to
the more acceptable trading practices. Nevertheless, at no
time in this evolutionary process are the equity criteria
themselves likely to be articulated; rather they will
probably remain embedded in the process in the form of
relatively particularistic laws or informal rules. From the
research and policy pOint of view the interesting questions
ought to revolve around the economic 'adequacy' of laws and
informal rules especially given the constraints of their
evolution and operation. Alternatively, the conditions
under which such choices can realistically take place ought
to be a matter of concern.
Another interesting welfare problem which is brought up
by the whole question of imperfect information is the problem of lying deception. If exchange and competition were
characterized by universal intents to be truthful, the uncertainties of economic interactions, although certainly not
eliminated, would be reduced considerably and one would expect the organization and outcome of economic activity to be
considerably different from what is observed. What appears
to be a very interesting question in this regard is the
characteristics of institutional structures which give rise
to circumstances in which the intent to be truthful is reinforced or not. In other words, the problem with lying and
deception is that it increases uncertainty and leads to more
inefficient and inequitable outcomes. In effect, individual
gains from opportunistic behavior are clearly not in the in-
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terest of society; undoubtedly ,there. are institutional
arrangements which tend to reduce or minimize these prob,
lems. Hierarchial structures would seem, for example, to
encourage the intent to be truthful and this may, in fact,
be one of the sources of the relative economic advantage of
such structures. But if this is so then the structure of
markets with regard to their propensity to encourage credibility of statements is very important when considering the
question of the extent to which economic activity requires
that people subject themselves to hierchical control. In
effect, the entire question of the impersonalization of
economic activity because of the growth of government and
business hierarchies may be related, to a surprising degree,
to the potential for opportunistic behavior in many market
situations (for example see Williamson 1978) •
The externalities problem as stated by neoclassical
theory is also difficult to rationalize in terms of our
theory, also because of the assumption of endogenous preferences and our differing conclusion with regard to the nature
of competitive efficiency.
Without doing too much violence
to neoclassical theory, it seems fair to state that pecuniary externalities operating on the behavior of the individual firm through price signals are viewed as a desirable
and, fortunately, normal state of affairs; but technological
externalities operating outside the price mechanism are
viewed as undesirable and, fortunately, exceptional. To
give this a somewhat broader normative interpretation, we
might say that neoclassical theory finds any interactions
which are arrived at through mutual agreement of the
relevant parties as desirable and finds interactions
initiated and completed through unilateral action as the
source of many economic and social problems. This broader
interpretation is a reasonable normative statement which
does not present problems for our theory. On the other hand
the first, more technically specific statement with regard
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to pecuniary and technological externalities is one which
attempts the marriage of a normative statement (i.e., the
immediately preceedin9) with a statement on the nature of
competitive behavior (that unilateral action must be extramarket, i.e., circumvent the market; and that it is an
exceptional occurence) in a way that is incompatible with
the assumptions and conclusions of our theory.
Basically, the argument here is that in a world such as
we have outlined, adaptive competition involves strategies
and responses to unilaterally initiated actions which may
not be consistent with greater social efficiency. For example, there is the frequently made assertion that advertising can produce strategic situations analagous to the
prisoner's dilemma in which the firm is "damned if it does
and damned if it doesn't" respond to a competitor's initiative. In other words, in information poor environments
there is an invitation to pursue strategic behavior from
which there is always a possibility that all relevant parties may be worse off. From the normative point of view
there is little or no reason to disagree with the broadly
defined neoclassical position on the undesirability of unilateral action. From a positive point of view, however,
there is strong reason to suspect that a complex, information poor environment will be rife with these kinds of
problems. Perhaps the only thing which might constrain or
limit this kind of competitive behavior is the existence of
informal prohibitory agreements or rules, that is,
institutions, within markets and competitive clusters.
In
other words, the theory leads to the hypothesis that there
are indeed a great many possible and socially undesirable
interactions among competitors which, if carried out, would
seriously erode the performance of the market and possibly
the interests of each competitor, unless the experience accumulated within the relevant institutional/informational
network served to create behaviorally constraining rules.
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Situations of common property exploitation--fishing,
hunting, grazing--provide some interesting historical
examples of the effects of these kinds of rules, on what is
assumed to be the classical, or archtypical, technological
externality (Acheson 1975a, Hardin 1976, Wilson 1977).
Similarly, ordinary competitive situations abound with
informal competitive rules (business ethics) and formal
rules (commercial codes).
The importance of the institutional/informational
factors in the so-called externalities problems is perhaps
underlined by the fact that the most glaring of these problems, for example, pollution, occur across the boundaries of
the informational networks created by markets and competitive clusters. In these instances, there is an absence of
informal institutional structures necessary for the
formulation of limiting rules, that is, there are no
competitive clusters nor any relevant markets. Consequently, the lack of direct competitive interactions and the inability to withdraw from (non-existent) exchange or exert
other forms of strategic leverage increases the probability
that unilateral strategic behavior will be perceived as, and
will actually be, unilaterally beneficial. Put somewhat
differently, since the unilateral action is directed across
cluster boundaries there is little likelih60d of a competitive response which could escalate into a mutually degenerative situation. Furthermore, since the unilateral action
is not related to an on-going series of transactions there
is little likelihood that potential trading partners will
withdraw from exchange which is beneficial to the party
initiating the unilateral action.
The neoclassical school tends to divide into two points
of view on this matter of across cluster unilateral action.
First, there is the Pigovian view which adheres rather
strongly to the notion that appropriate changes in relative
prices can be devised and applied in such a way as to
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produce socially desirable behavior.

Second, we have the

property rights view which argues that the full extension of
property rights to all valuable resources will transform all
interactions into voluntary market interactions and thereby
solve the problem. Both these lines of thought share the
same basic premise with regard to the costliness of
information--basically that it is not costly, a premise
which is strongly at variance with our theory. The Pigovian
view tends to attribute almost omniscient powers to the
government which can ostensibly set the appropriate taxes,
subsidies and what have you required to alter relative
prices appropriately, dynamically and in a manner which will
actually improve allocative efficiency. The property rights
school tends to attribute a similar omniscience to individual actors in the market while at the same time denying
the potential opportunity for strategic unilateral actions
within a market context. One is tempted to see the differences in the assumptions of the two views as reflecting not
so much a perception of the reality of the information
constraint, but rather an ideological predilection for ot
against government action. It seems strange to attribute
imperfect knowledge to one, but not another, sector of the
economy.
From the policy point of view, then, our theory tends
towards a somewhat eclectic view on the appropriate basis
for ameliorative action. On the one hand, there is a strong
presumption that the informational cost burden necessary to
simulate the appropriate price mechanism for across cluster
strategic actions (for example, concerning pollution) would
be excessive given the particularistic and changing aspects
of the relevant technology and markets. The results of such
Pigovian policies might just as easily decrease allocative
efficiency and equity as improve them. On the other hand,
there is a strong presumption that property rights alone are
not likely to improve either the efficiency or equity of the
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market. They may be inappropriate to the circumstances
and/or they may involve such high social costs with regard
to their definition and enforcement that they represent a
net deterioration, rather than improvement of the situation.
Collective, institutional action (beyond the minimal
one of maintaining order) is necessary for the proper
functioning of any market. But there is an informational
cost associated with collective action also. What is
suggested and what is the source of the eclectic view of our
theory is that from a policy perspective problems arising
from across cluster unilateral actions should be subject to
a wide range of ameliorative sets of differing rights and
obligations. In other words, solutions to these problems
are not necessarily limited to either "no rights and
obligations" or "property rights" (or the simulatiori of
their effects). There may be, in fact, many potential
solutions falling short of the creation of property rights
but still more constraining than the ones currently
prevailing. Each of these alternative sets can be expected
to alter behavior and give rise to costs of defining,
defending and enforcing rights and obligations. Depending
upon the particularistic circumstances, the social benefits
of the induced behavioral change and the social costs of any
given institutional structure will vary. However, the
policy problem is not simply to choose the institutional
variant with the most favorable benefit/cost ratio. It
would also appear to require an institutional variant
capable of generating a collective sense of what constitutes
social benefits and costs--in other words, the choice of
institution is probably best made in terms of the process it
creates.
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FISHERIES

CHAPTER 1
THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT OF FISHING

Facts do not speak for themselves.
only within the context of a theory.

They make sense

Indeed, what the facts

are depends on the theoretical point of view involved.

That

is, no scientist reports all of the phenomena under study.
What data are selected and the way they are organized depends
on the set of theoretical glasses worn at the time.

In short,

any statement of facts and any description has embedded in it
a model (Hospers 1946:69-79; Beattie 1959:118-123).
The adaptive model described in the last section is
particularly useful when applied to the fishing industry of
New England.

Not only does it allow us to account for a

very high percentage of the phenomena observed; but it has
allowed us to see certain facts about the industry which
have not been reported previously.

The result is, we believe,

a unique and more comprehensive picture of the fishing industry and fishing behavior.
First, the environment within which fishing takes place
is very similar to the one assumed in this model.
Chapter 4,

Part II.)

(See

At first glance, it might appear

that fishing is a relatively simple, traditional, and uncomplicated industry where change comes slowly if at all and
where physical strength is at a premium rather than skill
and knowledge.

To those not familiar with the industry, it

appears that there is only one product--namely fish--which
are caught with boats equipped with a technology (i.e. nets)
which has remained essentially the same for decades.
In reality, fishing is a highly heterogeneous industry
operating in a very complex and changing biological and economic environment.

There are a number of different species

caught in New England, each of which is associated with dif-
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ferent technologies, marketing arrangements, processing
techniques, annual rounds, and legal requirements.

In fact,

one could easily make the case that fishing is several different industries.
innovating.

Fishermen are constantly changing and

In all cases, business success is strongly in-

fluenced by skill and knowledge.

Indeed, fishing is such a

competitive, changing industry, demanding such diverse sets
of skills, that a stupid, inflexible person can succeed, if
at all, only with enormous effort.
In New England the boats in use range all the way from
12 foot outboard-powered skiffs costing only a few hundred
dollars, to 150 foot vessels equipped with the most sophisticated electronic gear involving investments in excess of
two million dollars.

The smaller boats carry a single man

and go day tripping only a few miles from shore; the largest
vessels have crews of more than a dozen men and operate all
over the Gulf of Maine and Georges Bank for days and weeks
on end.

There are at least 19 major types of fishing gear

in common use, which involve different levels of skill and
capital investment, and which are used for different species
(Acheson 1980b).

For example, a lobster trap costs only $35

and is used to catch only lobsters and crabs; a 60 foot (a
common size) bottom trawl net costs about $8000 (including
the doors and cable), and commonly catches six to ten species
per tow.

A clam rake can be used effectively with only a

few days practice, assuming one knows where to find the clams;
a purse seine requires at least five years experience to use
effectively.
The boats, gear and skill are matched to the species
sought.

The habits of these various species and their life

cycles differ widely and have a marked impact on the behavior
and decisions of fishermen.

For example, all species caught

show different migration patterns.

Lobsters remain generally

in the same area throughout the year, but migrate inshore in
the spring and out in the deep water in the fall.
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Thus, in

the summer, fishermen place their traps close toshorei in
the,winter, they are fishing as much as 20 miles from their
home harbors.

Herring have markedly different patterns.

Marketable-sized herring come ashore to spawn in the warm
months of the year--between April and October--in the central and eastern part of Maine where they can be caught in
the bays and estuaries in stop seines and weirs.

In the late

fall, the larger herring migrate southward and are caught in
mid-winter by purse seiners and pair trawlers in the deep
waters of Massachusetts Bay or south of Cape Cod.
show still other patterns.

Scallops

They migrate or travel only in

the larval stage and land on the bottom in dense clusters
depending on tide and currents.

Thus, first one area of the
I

Gulf of Maine has large beds of scallops and then another •.
Besides lobster, herring and scallops there are at least 29
other species commonly caught in commerical quantities in
the Gulf of Maine. 2 The habits and habitats of all these
species are different enough so that each requires something
different of the men who would harvest them.
There are three very distinct marketing arrangements
used in the area.

Every harbor in northern New England has

one or more lobster dealers or a cooperative which sells bait,
gas, and other supplies and which buys lobsters from the fishermen who regularly do business there.

Such dealers or co-

operatives buy lobsters from "their" fishermen daily, and
then resell them to restaurants, pound operators, large lobster shippers in Boston or New York, and so on.

Groundfish-

ermen, in Maine and New Hampshire, however, generally ship
their fish to Boston or New York where they are sold by a

lThe habits and life cycles of various species and the
technology used to capture them have been described in some
detail in another volume.
See Acheson et ale (1980).
2Maine Landings 1979 (Department of Marine Resources)
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broker.
sold.

These fishermen own their own fish until they are
Increasingly, groundfish are sold to local processors

and dealers with whom the fisherman has a long-term arrangement (Wilson 1980).

Herring fishermen are ordinarily obli-

gated to sell their catch to one or another of the herring
processing firms in the central or eastern part of Maine.
Usually these processors loan fishermen money for fishing
gear with the stipulation that their firm has "first refusal"
on the herring caught.
While fishermen and processors have an intimate knowledge of the laws affecting the species they handle, the
legal situation appears very complicated to one not familiar
with the industry.

Not only do the laws vary for each

species within each jurisdiction, but the regulations on a
single species vary considerably from state to state.

Maine,

for example, makes it illegal to take lobsters over 5 inches
on the carapace or under 3 and 3/16 inches.

In New Hampshire,

lobsters must be 3 and 1/8 inches to be legal; in Massachusetts the legal size is 3 and 3/16 inches, and in Rhode
Island 3 and 1/4 inches.

In New Hampshire, Massachusetts and

Rhode Island there is no prohibition on the landing of lobsters over 5 inches long.

Differences of this type can be

seen in the states' laws regarding most other species as well.
Since 1976, when the Fisheries Management and Conservation Act (PL94-265) was passed, the regulatory picture in
New England has become increasingly complex as first one
species and then another has corne under Federal regulation.
In this process, the rules and regulations governing the
exploitation of a single species have changed very rapidly
depending on the scientific information available and the
political pressures engendered (Acheson 1980c).
New England exhibits a good deal of geographical variation as well.

The southern part of the region (i.e. from

Portland, Maine south) is heavily urbanized and industrialized.
Wages are high and unemployment is relatively low.
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Groundfish

are the primary species available.
these fish are caught by large boats

A high percentage of
opera~ing

far offshore.

As one moves further east along the Maine coast, population
density decreases and the area becomes increasingly rural.
In the central part of Maine, groundfishing is far less
important than either lobstering or herring fishing.

The

eastern part of Maine is very rural, isolated and impoverished.

In this area, inshore herring, lobster and scallops

are the fisheries of paramount importance.
groundfishing is done.

Very little

Wages are low, job opportunities

are very poor, and the area has had an unemployment rate not
exceeded by most other places in the eastern United States
since the depression of the 1930's (Acheson et al. 1980:246).
Some fishermen in New England fish for one type of
species throughout the year with one type of gear.

This is

particularly true in the southern region, where a good many
large boats do nothing but fish for groundfish or scallops
in the offshore regions of the Gulf of Maine (for example,
Georges Bank, the Great South Channel).

As one moves further

north and east, an increasing number of fishermen fish for
multiple species over the annual round (Acheson et al. 1980:
253-255).

In eastern Maine, for example, it is common for

fishermen to seek lobsters in the summer and fall and go
scalloping in the winter and spring.

In this same area, a

large percentage of the stop seiners and weir fishermen are
also lobstermen.

In the central part of the Maine coast, many

fishermen tend to combine lobster fishing with gillnetting
for groundfish. Moreover, in this area the boats which fish
for herring with purse seines and gillnets often go bottom
(otter) trawling for groundfish during part of the season.
Not only are there regular, patterned changes over the
annual round as first one species and then another becomes
more plentiful; fishermen are also making a good many permanent changes in fishing gear.

In New England as a whole,

the boats in use are unquestionably becoming larger and the
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gear in use is becoming more versatile.

Thus, in the region

an increasing proportion of the fleet can fish in a larger
number of locations for a larger number of species (Acheson
1980c) .
The enormous technical, biological and geographic variation in the New England coastal area introduces a good deal
of uncertainty into the decision-making process of fishermen.
After all, a strategy which may work well for a fisherman
with one type of boat, fishing for one species in a given
season and area may spell financial disaster for a man with
different equipment fishing in a different area.

Even two

men fishing from the same harbor at the same time with the
same gear may have very different incomes if the range of
their boats or other factors differ.
There are four additional factors which introduce a good
deal of uncertainty into fishing.
fluctuates seasonally.

First, the price of fish

The price of lobster, for example,

normally reaches its annual high sometime

in February or

March when catches are very poor, and is at its lowest point
early in the fall when catches are at their highest.

In

~979

the low point was $l.lO/pound in late July, while the highest
price paid was $3.65 late in March.

While this general pat-

tern has prevailed in the past few years, no one can predict
how high or low the price will go, nor what the price is apt
to be on any given day.

Moreover, within any given season,

the price paid to fishermen can jump very suddenly with little
or no warning.

For example, the price of lobster at the New

Harbor, Maine Cooperative was $3.25 on April 30, 1980; $2.50
on May 1; $2.25 on May 2, and $2.00 on May 3.
finfish are even more volatile.

Prices paid for

There are so many fishermen

in New England that there is nothing anyone fisherman can
do to affect the price paid for a given species at any single
time.

Prices are influenced by such factors as demand national-

ly and internationally, the volume of Canadian imports, and so
on.
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While the general patterns of fish movements are well
known, there are such a large number of factors influencing
fish behavior that it is very difficult to predict exactly
where concentrations of fish of different species will be
at any given time.

It is not enough to know that herring

generally move toward shore in the spring and out to sea in
the fall; a purse seiner has to locate schools of herring
within a hundred yards.

The lobster fisherman needs to know

when lobsters can be caught off a particular shoal.

The

groundfisherman when he leaves shore in the morning will do
much better if he knows that incoming cod can be caught in
30 fathoms of water r.ather than 50 fathom water five miles
away.

The fact that no two seasons are exactly alike makes

it very difficult to accumulate information on fish locations.
Sometimes concentrations of fish show up in very different
places from year to year.

In 1978, for example, great schools

of herring were found in the easternmost area of Maine; the
year before, large schools were caught in the Penobscot Bay
area--lOO miles to the west.

While such year to year dif-

ferences in fish concentrations are unusually pronounced in
the case of herring, the same phenomena can be seen with
other species to a lesser degree.
Another factor influencing the economic success of
fishing vessels is the psychological make-up of individual
crew mernbers--particularly the way that the captain and mate
complement each other regarding their willingness to take
risks (Roberts and Acheson n.d.).

While a captain may know

what to expect from his crew after they have been together
for a while, the composition of fishing crews typically
changes frequently.

This clearly introduces an element of

uncertainty, and one that has a significant effect on the
performance of the boat as a whole.
Last, the catch of any boat depends on the behavior of
other captains and boats.

The catches a lobster fisherman

will obtain from traps placed in a given location will vary
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significantly depending on whether he is the only fisherman
who has placed traps there or whether other fishermen are
competing for a limited number of lobsters.

Much the same

, situation is true in herring fishing and groundfishing.
The first boat to drag a particular piece of bottom on a
given day or put a net around a given school of fish has a
definite advantage.

Latecomers are faced with bottom which

has been partially swept clean of fish, or schools which are
dispersed.
In summary, the environment within which fishermen
operate is very complicated, heterogenous, and introduces a
high degree of uncertainty into the fishing business.

This

uncertainty is increased by the fact that many factors on
which fishing success depends vary considerably from one
time to another.

This is particularly true of the stocks

of fish, their locations, and the prices paid for them.
In the face of all this uncertainty, the fisherman makes
two fundamental sets of decisions:
duce, and (2) how to catch them.

(1) what species to proIn the short run, he may

have very little choice in even these matters, given the
boat and gear he currently possesses.

A man who has only a

small boat and a few hundred lobster traps cannot possibly
go swordfishing in the Gulf Stream without making a large
investment in a new boat and equipment.

Even if a man has

a versatile boat and set of fishing gear, it may be difficult
to change to a different species.

It takes two months to

repair and prepare the number of lobster traps required to
make a living in lobstering on a minimal level.

Once a man

has committed his time and has a gang of traps in the water,
it is very difficult for him to go groundfishing without a
major financial sacrifice.

In a similar vein, once a boat is

equipped to go offshore scalloping, it generally remains in
the scallop fishery for a long time since expensive and permanent modifications of the hull have to be made for a boat
to enter the scallop fishery.

In the long run, fishermen can
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and do make major changes in gear, boats and species sought.
This is not to suggest that fishermen have no flexibility in
the short run.

Fishermen are constantly making changes in

fishing strategies, that is, in locations, species mix, and
market.

The changes that fishermen can make in the long and

short run will be analyzed in great detail in our discussions
of clusters and niches below.

At this point, it is crucial

to realize that fishermen do not make decisions concerning
either the quantity of fish to be caught or the price charged.
Fishermen will catch all of the fish of a given species they
are able to catch, given the time and equipment available.
How much fishermen should catch from a given set of lobster
traps or purse seine sets is not the issue.
the fish or lobsters caught.
control over price.
1980).1

They keep all of

Moreover, the fisherman has no

They are generally price takers (Wilson

Sometimes they do not even know what the price will

be until they have landed.

Maine groundfishermen may not

know for ten days or two weeks.

When a fisherman feels the

price is too low, his only recourse is to stop fishing temporarily, or switch to some other species.
To say that fishermen concentrate on only two types of
decisions (i.e. what to fish for and how to catch those fish)
is not to indicate that fishing is a simple, uncomplicated
industry in which few decisions need to be made.
contrary:

Quite the

the environment in which the fishermen operates

is so complex and heterogenous and marked by so much uncertainty that a good deal of skill and knowledge is required.
The skills and knowledge involved in fishing are not
ordinarily learned in school; moreover, formal education does
not facilitate learning fishing skills.

A stepwise multiple

lThe single exception to this rule may be the large
offshore fin fishing boats operating out of the large ports
in Massachusetts. When three or four of these boats land
in close sequence, the price of fish can be reduced (Wilson
1980).
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linear regression run on data collected in a sample of 190
groundfishermen and herring fishermen showed no si.gnificant
correlation between years of formal education and level of
fishing success (Acheson 1980ii Acheson and Reidman 1980a).
An earlier study on lobster fishermen also demonstrated that
number of years of education plays little role in influencing catch or income in this fishery (Acheson 1977a:114).
Fishermen are very aware that formal education is no guarantee of success, although some very successful fishermen have
college educations.

These data suggest that there is more

than a grain of truth in the apocriphal stories fishermen
tell about "the educated fool," "the college boy who couldn't
catch fish to save his soul," and so on.
However, it is very clear that skill and knowledge are
strongly linked to fishing success--even though those skills
are not learned in school.
of sources.

The evidence comes from a variety

Fishermen themselves are fully aware that tech-

nical skills are of critical importance, and are constantly
comparing the skills and strategies of various men.

Differ-

ences in skill have shown up in several studies carried out
by one of the authors.

A study of fishing effectiveness in

the Maine lobster industry turned up the fact that the skill
of the individual fisherman was one of the most significant
variables affecting catch.

A regression analysis ori these

variables (i.e., fishing area, head type, type of bait used,
depth, type of bottom, and so on) indicated that there were
only two variables that had more influence on catches than
skill--namely the season of the year and length of the trap
(Acheson 1980e).

Still another study of the Maine lobster

industry pointed out that skilled fishermen caught more
pounds of lobster per trap, and had higher gross incomes than
unskilled men (Acheson 1977a:130).
Skill can also produce wide disparities in the income of
lobster fishermen.

One of the authors knows two men who go

lobster fishing out of the same harbor.
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The younger, who had

only five years experience in 1973, used 900 traps and a
thirty six foot boat.

The older man, with some thirty-six

years experience in the business, used only 300 traps, which
he fished from a boat twenty-eight feet long.

In spite of

these differences in equipment, the older man had a net income of $21,000 from lobstering in 1973, while the younger
man netted only $12,800.
Skill and knowledge are important in other fisheries as
well.

A regression analysis on a large sample of groundfish-

ermen revealed a significant relationship between level of
fishing skill and indicators of fishing success (Acheson and
Reidman 1980a).
While it is obvious that skill and knowledge are important for fishing success, it is less clear what these skills
are and what knowledge fishermen have to have to be successful.

Direct, formal interviewing techniques are not effec-

tive in studying skills.

Questions designed to elicit data

on skills were often only successful in eliciting instances
of fisherman's humor or open resistance.

Much of the secrecy

surrounding the subject of skills stems from the fact that
this information is so critical for success.

As one fisher-

men phrased it when he was asked about skills, "You are asking
the secret of how I earn my living."

He clearly was not

interested in talking about the subject.

Under these condi-

tions, more indirect methods, including participant observation and intensive but open-ended interviewing, proved far
more successful in obtaining information on these topics.
The study that produced the most detailed information
on fishing skills and knowledge used a very indirect approach.
In this study, some 18 highline lobster fishermen and four
biologists were shown a set of eleven tables on lobster
catches in their area and asked to interpret the results.
(These tables contained information on such matters as pounds
of lobsters caught per trap in different locations, in different seasons at different depths, on different bottom types,
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and so on.)
results.

The Rohrschach-like technique produced excellent

The average interview lasted some three and a half

hours, and revealed a whole world view of fishermen concerning the life cycle of the lobster, physical features of the
ocean bottom and technology--especially as these factors influenced lobster catches.

Interestingly enough, there was

no difference in the perceptions of the biologists and fishermen on virtually all issues (Acheson 1980d).

Unfortunately,

similar studies have not been done in other fisheries.

Thus,

our information on knowledge and skills in the herring industry, groundfishery, and so on are far more impressionistic.
After several years of contact with the fishing industry,
we have been able to come to several major conclusions concerning fishing skills and knowledge.

First, there are sev-

eral different kinds of skills involved in fishing; the kinds
of skills and knowledge with which novice fishermen are most
concerned are different from those that are of concern to
experienced fishermen.

Men with under five years experience

are most concerned with learning to navigate and to maintain
their boats and equipment, and with how to operate their gear
without undue financial losses due to accident and breakdown.
They are more interested in avoiding disaster rather than
maximizing profits (Acheson 1977a:121).

These are, of course,

skills and knowledge that are of concern to any fisherman,
and which anyone going into the business would have to learn.
The more experienced fishermen, by way of contrast, are most
concerned with learning "the bottom."

When fishermen talk

about "bottom" they are speaking very literally.

The tourist

or amateur fishermen looking at the ocean sees waves and
water; the experienced fisherman sees humps, ridges, edge,
mud-covered channels, rocky shoals, steep dropoffs and a
hundred other specific features that can only be memorized
after years of experience.

The knowledge experienced fisher-

men have of "the bottom" are legendary.
locate specific very small features
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Not only can they

(for example, a wreck, a

rocky outcropping, a small hole) miles from shore; they also
can navigate from one location to another in a thick fog
simply by looking at the changes in the contours of the
bottom on electronic sounding machines.

There are two basic

reasons fishermen pay such attention to the details of the
ocean bottom.

First, it helps them to find fish, since con-

centrations of fish are located at different times of year
on bottom with different characteristics (Acheson et
1980:Chapter 2).

ale

Thus, when fishermen speak of knowing the

"bottom" they are talking not only about the physical features
of the ocean floor, but about a whole theory of fish movements
and behavior as well.

Second, a knowledge of the bottom is

necessary if one is to operate fishing gear successfully and
without damage.

This is particularly true of dredges and

bottom trawls that can be completely destroyed if dragged
over rocky bottom.
Second, there are very SUbstantial differences in the
specific kinds of knowledge about the "bottom" and fish that
are required by each industry.

In the lobster industry, the

most critical skills involve trap placement.

The overall

pattern of such placement is relatively simple.
traps with three factors in mind:

Men place

concentrations of lobsters,

avoiding the destruction of traps from storms, and competition
from other fishermen in any given area (Acheson 1977a).

This

means that traps generally are moved into deeper water in the
winter and back in shallower water in the warmer months of
the year to follow lobster migrations, always with an eye to
the depth of water to avoid storm losses.

The SUbtleties of

trap placement are very complicated indeed, and take a good
deal of time to acquire.

Some men never do learn them.

They

simply memorize a set of "moves" and mechanically change the
position of the traps seasonally without understanding any
of the factors involved.

Highline fishermen, however, have

a large body of knowledge about the microecology of the ocean
bottom and the way that affects the behavior of the lobster.
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They try to place traps with pinpoint precision to "hit" the
specific types of bottom which they know have characteristics
which will be productive of lobsters.

The specific skills

and knowledge of lobster fishermen have been described in
some detail in two articles (Acheson 1977ai1980d).
In the groundfishery, the critical set of skills involves
a knowledge of the "tows" or flat areas where bottom trawls
may be used without becoming entangled.

One also has to

know the "snags," the piles of rock, the sunken boats, and
other obstacles which can destroy a set worth several
thousand dollars in a matter of seconds, and put one out of
business for a matter of hours or days.
not

Groundfishermen must

.only be able to read electronic devices giving informa-

tion concerning position and characteristics of the bottom,
but must also have some system of recording and recalling a
very large number of details about the bottom over wide areas.
Some fishermen record details in books.

The "tow and snag

books" of experienced, successful fishermen are reputedly
sold for many thousands of dollars on retirement.
Herring fishing requires still a different set of skills
and knowledge.

The most important skill in weir fishing con-

cerns the spot to build the weir in the first place.

This

involves primarily a knowledge of the places which herring
schools have frequented over the course of many years.

Stop

seiners not only have to know how to pick seining locations
(i.e. "berths") but also have to master techniques to know
when

fish have entered a particular cove which can be shut

off.

For herring fishermen exploiting schools in open ocean

(purse seiners and pair trawlers) the primary problem is to
locate concentrations of fish.

This not only involves a

knowledge of fish movements and habits, but also the ability
to use the most advanced electronic gear.
Third, the degree of technical knowledge and skill
required varies enormously from fishery to fishery.

Operating

and maintaining a clam hoe takes very little skill.

More
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skill and knowledge is required for success in lobster fishing,
although again the degree of technical knowledge is relatively
low.

It takes relatively little skill to pull lobster traps

with a hydraulic hauler, and boat maintenance
minimal as well.

skills are

Bottom trawling for groundfish requires far

more technical knowledge.

Learning to put gear overboard and

retrieve it takes only a few weeks to learn, but learning to
rig and mend a net is another matter entirely.

A poorly

rigged net (for example, doors improperly 'attached, head rope
too long)

simply will not fish right.

more difficult.

Purse seining is even

It takes, we estimate, some five years to

learn to be proficient in this technique.

Very large offshore

draggers and pair trawlers clearly take the most technical
knowledge to operate.

Not only are the maintenance

and

operation of the equipment so specialized that such boats
have an engineer aboard, but a high degree of skill is required to operate the fishing gear on such vessels.
One of the important things that fishermen have to know
is what other fishermen know.

Since knowledge and skill are

so closely linked to fishing success, the knowledge of the
men with whom one is competing is one of the factors influencing fishing strategy.

Novice lobster fishermen, for example,

will often put traps where older, more experienced fishermen
do.

Naturally, this is greatly resented by the more exper-

ienced fishermen because the traps of the novice will not
only become entangled with his own but will also reduce the
catch of all other traps in the area.

Often the novice

fisherman does not know what factors have influenced the
trap placement strategy of the more experienced fisherman.
All he knows is that the more experienced man knows where to
place traps.

In other instances, what other fishermen know

influences fishing strategy in more subtle ways.

In the

groundfishery, for example, fishermen are often attracted to
or dissuaded from fishing in particular locations depending
on the success of fishermen of different levels of skill.

194

Skilled fishermen sometimes will deliberately stay away from
areas where other skilled men have fished on the ground that
if there were any fish there, the competition has caught them.
In a similar vein, one older fishermen was overheard to say,
"I know that kid has

been fishing on the Kettle (a piece of

bottom) and caught nothing; but I'm going to fish there anyway.

If Roger (a highline fisherman) had been there for three

days and come up empty, I'd know the cod hadn't moved that
far north yet.

But that kid going broke don't mean a thing."

Statements of this kind indicate that fishermen use their
understanding of what each other know about fishing to aid
in their own search.

We will return to this point later.

It also means--and this we would like to stress--that differential fishing knowledge is another element increasing
the complexity of the fishing scene and one strongly influencing the fishing strategies of individual fishermen.
Timing plays such an important role in fishing success
that knowing when to do something is as important as knowing
how to do it.

Concentrations of all species of fish are not

found in the same location permanently.

Thus, if one wants

to succeed as a fisherman, one must be in the right spot at
the right time.

Some species migrate over the annual round

(for example, lobster, adult herring, swordfish) and there
are general rules concerning where they will be at any given
time of year.

But being exactly where the fish are at any

given time takes a lot of knowledge and some luck.
species have cycles which are many years long.

Other

Scallop lar-

vae tend to settle in huge concentrations first in one location and then in another.

Several years after such a concen-

tration has landed in an area, there will be good scallop
fishing (if the bed is found)
out.

until the scallops are fished

Then fishermen have to locate other beds in other areas.
Large numbers of fishermen exploit more than one species

over the annual round depending on the availability of the
species, ex-vessel prices paid, and the equipment at their
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disposal.

Knowing when to switch from one species to another

involves some very complicated rules, and a good deal of
judgement.

Sometimes, fishermen will switch gear in great

haste to be the first boat to exploit a particular species.
Some large boats, for example, fish for groundfish with
otter trawls part of the year and go purse seining for herring part of the year.

When they are dragging (otter trawling)

and spot a school of herring, they head back to port and
spend a frantic day taking off their dragging gear and putting
the purse seine gear on board.

They do not want to be the

second boat to reach that school.
berately seek to be second.

At times, men will deli-

Several excellent fishermen in

the eastern part of Maine will continue scalloping until they
are absolutely certain groundfish are in the area in numbers
sufficient

to warrent changing to

gillnetting.

It takes

a week to rig a boat for gillnetting, and often the first
boats to make this switch find nothing to catch for several
weeks.
Timing is also very important if one is to be successful in marketing one's fish.

This is especially true in the

offshore finfishery of southern New England.

These boats

carry such large loads of fish, that sometimes when several
boats land in close sequence, the warehouses and processing
plants can be so packed with fish that the price drops very
low (Wilson 1980).

It does not pay to land fish on a day

when so many other boats have landed that the warehouses are
full.

By way of contrast, it can pay very handsomely to be

the first boat to go to sea after a long storm.

At that

time, warehouses are apt to be empty, and the first boat to
leave port is apt to be the first boat back and be able to
sell its fish at a high price.
For most species, there is also a weekly market cycle.
Demand is apt to be strongest on Wednesday and Thursday because the fish-on-Friday habit has not died out by any means.
This means that one should try to land fish if at all possible
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so they reach the Boston and New York markets at the end of
the week, and arrange one's days in port accordingly.
In summary, the fishing industry in New England certainly does not operate under the conditions assumed by the textbook model of fisheries in economics.

The environment within

which fishermen work is very complicated.

Fish are not a

single homogenous product; each species or set of species is
a different product which is associated with a distinct marketing structure, technology, and annual round.

Fishermen

do not have perfect knowledge; great uncertainty is the rule.
The critical decisions fishermen make do not involve price
and quantity as much as what to produce and how to catch it.
Decisions of fishermen are not made solely with information
about their own firm in mind.

Information about competing

firms is critical since the costs and benefits to one's own
boat are strongly influenced by what competing firms do.

In

an ever-changing environment, where ocean resources are not
private property, success depends primarily on knowledge and
timing.
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CHAPTER 2
FISHING CLUSTERS AND NICHES

A.

Introduction
As has been pointed out in Part II, firms operating

under conditions of uncertainty are faced essentially with
an information problem.

We have hypothesized that much if

not all of the essential information they need is obtained
from other firms producing similar goods or operating in
similar markets.

In contrast to the text-book model of

economic behavior which assumes that firms make decisions
independently of competitors, our model assumes that some
of the critical decisions are made on the basis of information obtained from other firms producing similar goods,
and that ties between such firms are critical ,for success.
Such units we have termed "clusters"
5 ).

(see Part II, Chapter

Moreover, if our model is correct, a great deal of

the behavior of firms depends on the characteristics of the
cluster to which the firm belongs.
The key issue then is:
New England fishing industry?

Do such "clusters" exist in the
Are the decisions of the firm

influenced by "cluster behavior" in ways that would be
predicted on the basis of this model?

Our observations of

the fishing industry strongly indicate that "clusters" do
indeed exist, and that the type of cluster has a strong
impact on the decisions fishermen make.

In this chapter we

describe a variety of fishing clusters, stressing differences
in social ties, and information flow among and between them.
In Chapter 3, we describe the way different clusters
influence the behavior of fishermen--especially the way
fishermen search for fish, and their innovative behavior.
Next, we present two different patterns of transactions we
observe within and between various fishing clusters.
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In

Chapter 4, we focus on several different kinds of institutional arrangements associated with various clusters, the
way they lower uncertainty for fishermen, and the manner in
which they influence exploitation rates.
B.

General Characteristics of Niches and Clusters
How do fishermen operate in the heterogenous and

uncertain world in which they find themselves?

The answer

to this question, we believe, lies in the fact tilat fishermen
do not operate as isolated units.
uncertainty by forming "clusters.

They have adapted to this
II

While the concept of

"clusters" requires extensive elaboration as it is applied
to the fisheries of New England, it should be noted that
fishing clusters have social, economic and technical aspects.
However, fishing clusters have very different characteristics and involve different kinds of transactions and
institutions.
Sociologists have long noted that the critical social
units and social ties in the lives of many Americans are not
confined to a geographical location or physical community,
but rather involve ties to those who do the same kind of
job.

Salaman, among others, has identified three character-

istics of these so-called "occupational communities"
18-29).

(1974:

Members of these communities identify with their

occupation and have a shared occupational label.

They share

with people in the same occupation a set of values, norms,
and ideals which define goals and proper behavior.

The

norms and goals of those occupational reference groups
extend beyond tile place of work.

Last, members tend to

interact with and form social bonds with people in the same
occupational groups far more than with people in unrelated
occupations.
All of this is certainly true of the kinds of groupings
formed by fishermen (Miller and Van Maanen 1979; 1980).
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However, fishermen's occupational units have other traits
which are not approached in the literature on occupational
community.

Fishermen are organized into firms.

A large

number of the most important decisions they make are
economic in nature.

More important, there is a technical

and biological dimension

to

the groups formed by fishermen.

The relevant social unit for most fishermen is not fishermen
as a

who~e,

but the men fishing the same species with the

same gear in the same area.

To a very large extent, what

they share is a common set of knowledge and skills
concerning the ways to effectively exploit certain species
and market them.

When fishermen meet, much of the conver-

sation revolves around such things.
The linkage between the type of fishing gear men use
and the crucial social units they belong to shows in any
number of ways--particularly in some of the quantitative
information we obtained through interviews during 1977 and
1978.

One of the questions we asked 153 New England

fishermen was:
about fishing?"

"What other captain do you talk with most
The answers received indicate a strong

relationship between the primary type of fishing gear used
by the men involved.
in Table 1.

These results are summarized

In a significant number of cases, the primary

gear of our informants was the same as that of the men they
spoke to most often about fiShing.

For example, of the 61

lobster fishermen interviewed, 49 said they talked most with
another lobster fisherman; of the 33 men who have bottom
(otter) trawls as their primary gear, 26 talked to other
men operating otter trawls the most, while five spoke to
gillnetters, who are also groundfishermen.
with virtually every other kind of gear.

The same is true
A log-likelihood

ratio run on these data demonstrate these results are highly
significant statistically.

There is, in fact, under one

chance in 1000 that the strong relationship between the gear
type of our informants and the gear type of men they talked
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with most often could have occurred by chance alone.
Moreover, men tend to identify with other men using the
same gear type and to compare themselves with them.

This

came out in many aspects of our data--perhaps most clearly
in the results obtained on the question:

"Who is the best

fisherman in your section of the fishing industry?"

The

results are summarized in Table 2.
Here again, there is a very strong relationship
between the primary gear type of the informant and the
primary gear type of the men identified as the "best
fisherman."

For example, of the 61 men whose primary gear

is lobster traps, 49 identified a man who also used lobster
traps as the "best fisherman."

In the case of other gear

types also, the men who were identified as "best fisherman"
used the same type of gear as the informant in a significant
number of cases.

Two aspects of these data should be noted.

First, men had no difficulty identifying their "section of
the industry."

The term "section" caused some confusion

because this term is not used by the fishermen themselves.
Most, however, were very quick to interpret the question in
ways which made it clear that the fishing industry is not an
undifferentiated whole.

No one said "the fishing industry

has no section," or "We are all fishermen."

Second, these

responses indicate that fishermen compare themselves and
identify, in the main, with other men using the same kind of
fishing gear.

A man is a good fishermen or a bad fishermen

only in comparison with other men in the same part of the
industry.

To these men it is almost inconceivable that one

could compare the captain of an offshore scalloper with a
lobster fisherman.

They are simply playing two very

different games with different standards.

For the men in

the New England fishing industry, meaningful sets of social
units are defined by the technology in use.
The geographic range of social contacts fishermen have
varies widely, depending on the kind of gear in use.
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shows very clearly in the information we gathered on radio
contact between captains who use different types of gear.
When we asked captains what three boats they contacted most
on their radios, and then obtained the mean distance between
the homes of the men involved, i t became apparent that men
using certain kinds of gear had a very restricted range of
social contacts, while those using other kinds of gear are
part of much more dispersed networks and social groups.
As can be seen in Table 3, the lobster fishermen
interviewed contacted other fishermen who live within 1.4
miles of each other's homes.
same town.

Most of these men lived in the

From this it is obvious that the contacts of

lobster fishermen are very local.

By way of contrast, those

men using otter trawls, purse seines, and pair trawls most
often contacted captains whose homes were much further away.
The men using these types of gear have direct network ties
which spread over a much wider area, as does their range of
operation.
From these data, i t is apparent that the relevant social
unit for these men is not the fishing industry as a whole or
all men involved in fishing, but the men fishing with the
same type of gear.

In addition, the size of these social

units varies considerably depending on the type of gear
being used.
The literature on occupational communities contains a
very inadequate set of analytical tools for describing the
relevant units in the fishing industry since it orients one
toward thinking in terms of an industry as a whole, and
contains no hint that the technical base (in this case gear
type)

is connected in some important way with critical

social units among fishermen.
Moreover, the concept of "cluster" is far more
inclusive than "community," since it emphasizes that
relationships between fishermen have not only a social
component, but an important economic and technical aspect
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TABLE 3
Mean Distance Between Homes of
Captains Contacting Each Other by Radio
N

Primary Gear Used
Lobster'

(boats contacted)

Mean Distance
Between Homes of captains

155

1.4 miles

6

24.1 miles

6

95 miles

Gillnet

55

7.6 miles

*

Otter Trawl

75

17.4 miles

*

33

6.5 miles

*

18

32 miles

*

Scallop
Longline

Weir

&

**

Stop Seine

Pair Trawl/
Purse Seine

*

* A series of t-tests was run on these results to ascertain
if the differences in these mean mileages were statistically significant or not.
The differences in mean mileage
were significant at at least the .05 level for all those
means marked by the asterisk. This is true for virtually
all combinations tested. Thus, there is, for example,
a significant difference between the mean distance
between captain of lobster boats and the mean distances
of the homes of captains of gillnetters, otter trawlers,
weirs and stop seiners, and purse seiners and pair
trawlers. There is one exception; there is no significant difference in the mean distance between homes
of captains of gillnetters and those of weirs and stop
seiners.

** These long line boats were engaged in swordfishing and
follow schools of fish along the entire Atlantic coast
of the U.S.
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as well.

As we shall see, in the fishing industry of

northern New England, men with similar sets of technical
and economic options not only interact, but influence each
other regarding choice of technology, fishing strategies,
marketing choices, and other decisions.
The various clusters operating in the fishing industry
need to be examined in some detail.

Before this can be

done, however, some information is needed on the concepts
of "niche" and "cluster" as those terms apply to the fishing
industry.
In the fishing industry, it is almost inconceivable
that two boats would occupy the same niche.

A "niche," has

we have defined the term, refers to a feasible set of
options defined by a single point in characteristics space
(See Part II, Chapter 5).

It is almost impossible for two

fishing firms to have the exact same set of options.

If

the boats, gear inventory, crew size, market, species sought,
annual round, wharfing capability, and so on are exactly the
same, the owners of the businesses will differ in age,
experience or some other characteristic.

The historical

record of each firm is likely to be unique as well.

Since

knowledge and skill are so critical in fishing, differences
in the traits of the men themselves may well open opportunities for one fishing firm which are closed to the other.
1bis is true even when the technology is the same.

In one

harbor, for example there are two 42 foot Bruno-Stillman
boats which are used for dragging groundfish in the spring
and for lobstering in the summer and fall.
however, scarcely the same.

The firms are,

The owner of one of these boats

grosses at least $5000 per year more than the other man.
While he is slightly younger, he also has more lobster traps,
more experience in dragging some of the offshore fishing
grounds, and has far more experience with the complicated
electronic gear.

These, and perhaps other advantages, result

in a significant difference in gross income.
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While fishing firms are virtually never identical,
large numbers of boats do have approximately the same or
overlapping feasible sets of opportunities so that they are
in what we have called the same "cluster" of firms.

In some

fisheries, firms have such closely identical sets of feasible
options that they meet the requirements of a "closely packed"
cluster (See Part II, Chapter 5).

Such fishing firms use

virtually the same boats and techniques to catch the same
species, in the same area, at ti1e same time for the same
market.

Other clusters, where opportunities are not so

nearly identical, are "loosely packed."

Where fisheries are

concerned, it is important to stress that the packing of a
cluster refers the degree to which feasible sets overlap in
characteristics space.

The concept of "packing" as applied

to the fisheries does not refer to the number of boats
fishing in an area, the degree of competition for a given
species, or the saturation of a market.
to similarity of options.

It refers merely

For all practical purposes, the

best index of cluster packing in the fishing industry is the
ability to use the same fishing gear or sets of gear witl1in
the same geographical area at the same time.

If boats

operating in the same area can make the same gear switches
and thus make the same decisions concerning what they are
going to produce and how they will produce it, they are
likely to be in a tightly packed cluster.

If they cannot

make simultaneous gear changes, they are in a less tightly
packed cluster.

·If they do not use any of the same gears

over the course of the year, they are obviously in a
different cluster altogether.

The ability to make simul-

taneous gear changes is a good index of the degree of
cluster packing because so many other traits are usually
associated with it.

Two firms using the same gear in the

same area are ordinarily exploiting the same species or set
of species, have crews which share similar sets of knowledge,
and usually have boats approximately the same size with much
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the same equipment.
The boundaries of a firm's feasible set are influenced
by such a large number of factors that it is difficult to
label clusters.

An accurate description of a firm or

cluster of firms would take literally many pages if we
wanted to include all of the features influencing the feasible set of options.

Clearly some kind of shorthand way of

labelling clusters is necessary.

The fishermen themselves

sometimes speak of the various kinds of subunits of their
industry in terms of the primary species they fish (for
example, "lobsterman")

I

but more usually by the primary

gear they use ("gillnetter," "stop seiner," "purse seiner") .
They are fully aware that the target species is closely
correlated with annual round, boat size, fishing gear,
electronic gear, crew size, and to a large extent, knowledge.
Thus, when a fisherman talks about a "stop seiner" or
"lobsterman" he is making a summary statement about a whole
constellation of traits.

He is also fully aware that some

fishermen have many more options than others in that they
can fish for multiple species over the annual round, but
there is no accepted set of terms in his lexicon to describe
these firms with multiple options.

When he is describing

firms which can exploit multiple species, the lack of termi-'
nology forces a fisherman to use whole sentences.

He says

something like "some of the boys go for lobster most of the
year, but some of them are starting to switch off on scallops
in the winter."
In general, we will use the terminology of the fishermen
in describing various niches and clusters.

That is, we will

normally use primary species and pricipal gear as a means of
labelling these units.

There are two caveats, however:

(l) In some cases, firms or clusters exploit two or more
species.

In such cases, we will use multiple species names

as a label for example, "lobster-stop seine" or "pair
trawl-dragger."

(2) The boats of some clusters range the
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length of the coast; others are highly localized.

In the

latter cases, the range of options is influenced by the
place the firm is located.

In these cases, some kind of

location indicator will be used in describing the cluster.
Thus, we will speak of units such as "lobster fishermen of
Port Clyde" or the "Portland redfish fleet" or the
"Passamaquoddy Bay weir fishermen."

Such a system is

awkward and perhaps incomplete, but preferable to the
other options (such as a number system) .
Fishing clusters have five characteristics, which have
been touched on briefly.

First, fishing firms in the same

cluster use the same technology and have boats that are
approximately the same size.

Boats which are markedly

different in size are not generally considered to be in the
same cluster since the feasible set of options is normally
quite different.
larger than others

For example, boats that are appreciably
can sometimes be equipped with larger

scale equipment (for example, bigger nets), can have more
versatile gear, have a wider range, can stay out in rougher
weather, can carry a larger load of fish, and may have a
larger crew.

In addition, boats in a cluster normally

carry the same fishing equipment, and have much the same
type of electronic gear.

Again, boats that have a larger

set of fishing gear have a different set of options, and
those with appreciably more invested in electronic gear
have an edge in searching for fish.
Second, boats in a cluster exploit the same geographical range.

In some cases (for example, the lobster

industry) that range is very small; in others, like the
purse seiners, the area exploited includes the whole inshore
area of the Gulf of Maine.

But whether the range is large

or small, the important point is that firms which fish very
different areas do not have the same options.
Third, markets are an important defining feature of
clusters, since they strongly influence opportunities.
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In

some fisheries, catches are bought immediately when they are
landed, so that the buyer incurs the costs of transportation
and all marketing risks.

In other cases, the fish are the

property of the fisherman until they are sold in distant
markets.

In these cases, it is the fisherman who incurs

the costs and risks.

In some instances fisherman can obtain

sizeable loans from the people to whom they sell fish;
other cases no such credit is available.

in

As we shall see,

marketing ties vary enormously in other respects as
well--particularly in the way they can be used to convey
information to fishermen and the way they affect uncertainty.
Fourth, men in the same cluster form a reference group.
These.are the men one compares one's self with.

They are the

yardstick by which one judges one's own behavior.

It is the

cluster--operating as a reference group--that imposes a
degree of social control on members of that cluster.

A

swordfishermen does not judge his own success or failure by
comparing himself with lobster fishermen, but rather by his
relative standing among other swordfishermen.

The standard

of conduct for a gillnetter derives from that of other
gillnetters in his immediate area.

The captain of a scallop

dragger might earn much more income, but that is irrelevant
as far as a gillnetter is concerned.

He is competing with

other gillnetters; and it is the gillnetting game which is
the focal point of his attention, at least in the short
period.
Fifth, firms in the same cluster are an important
source of information for each other.

However, the flow of

information through the cluster is complicated by the fact
that if the men who are fishing for the same species, in the
same areawith the same techniques have information which
would be helpful to each other, they are also competitors.
At times fishermen openly exchange information in face to
face encounters.

In other instances, they withhold infor-

mation from each other and deliberately mislead each other.

no

In many circumstances, they obtain information from each
other primarily by observation.

The extent to which infor-

mation is exchanged and the mechanism used to transmit it
varies from cluster to cluster.

Some clusters contain

long-established groups whose members have interacted over
a long period of time and who have definite, established
rules concerning competition and proper ways to fish.

The

firms of other clusters are linked by only the loosest
network ties.

In some clusters, fishermen find it advan-

tageous to exchange information with each other; in others
they do their best to obtain information about the activities of other fishermen while deceiving them about their
own.

In many clusters one can observe open exchange and

deception in the same conversation.
It should be noted that a change in anyone of the
factors defining a cluster, that is, technology, geographical areas exploited, markets, sources of information and
reference group) influences the feasible set of options for
a firm.

Thus, these factors affect the degree of cluster

packing and membership ina cluster.
In the following sections, we will describe all of the
kinds of clusters in Maine and New Hampshire, stressing those
in the lobster industry, groundfish industry and herring
fishery, since these are the largest and most important in
1
the area.
The clusters in the southern part of New England
will not be described since the authors do not have extensive
first hand experience with them.

Some information on

fisheries in those areas will be used in the next chapter
to buttress certain aspects of the arguement.

Isome of the information in this section is drawn
from Acheson et ale
(1980:
Chapter 2).
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C.l

Lobster Fishing Clusters
Technology
The American lobster (Homarus Americanus) is found in

the waters off the Atlantic coast of North America from
Newfoundland to Virginia.

However, Maine consistently

produces far more lobsters than any other state, and the
lobster industry is the biggest fishery in Maine and
New Hampshire in both numbers of men employed and in gross
revenue produced.
The technology employed by lobstermen along the entire
length of the coast of northern New England is relatively
uniform.

Lobsters are caught in traps or "pots" three to

four feet long, made either of oak frames covered with
hardwood lathes or of wire.

The lathes and wire allow

free circulation of sea water while retaining the larger,
legal-sized lobsters. l
The open end of the trap is fitted
with a funnel-shaped nylon net, or "head" which lets
lobsters climb in easily but makes it difficult for them to
escape.

The traps are attached to a small styrofoam buoy

via a "warp" (rope made of hemp or polyethylene).

The buoys

belonging to a lobsterman are marked with distinctive sets
of colors, registered with the state.

These traps are

baited with fish remnants obtained from nearby processing
plants.

The traps are usually placed in the water in

"strings," or long rows, so that a man can see from one
buoy to another in a fog or bad weather.

In most of the

region, fishermen have about 350 to 500 traps.

In some

ITO be legal in Maine a lobster must be between 3 3/16
inches and 5 inches measured on the carapace. In New
Hampshire the legal minimum size is 3 1/8 inches; there is
no maximum size.
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areas 6 to 10 traps are tied on a long "warp" so that all are
placed and pulled together.

In these areas, larger groups

of traps are the rule.
Two different kinds of boats are used in the lobster
fishery.

Outboard powered skiffs, between 14 and 18 feet,

are used to fish very near shore in the summer.

Most of the

so-called "skiff-fishermen" are part-timers who have very
small numbers of traps which they pull by hand.
Virtually all of the full-time fishermen fish alone
from gasoline or diesel-powered boats 30 to 36 feet long,
equipped with a depth sounder, hydraul ic "trap-hauler,"
ship-to-shore radio and compass.

In the island areas, boats

may be somewhat larger, more often diesel-powered, and also
equipped with radar to cope with the more violent offshore
seas and the fog.

In the Casco Bay region of Maine, where

men pull larger gangs of traps, large, diesel-powered boats
and two-man crews are the rule.
In addition, virtually all lobster fishermen have a
pick-up truck to transport traps and equipment and a workshop where they store fishing gear and build traps.

A large

number of fishermen, but not all, own their own small docks.
There is very little variation in the basic equipment
used in lobstering.

All full-time fishermen use hydraulic

haulers, save for a tiny handful of older fishermen who
still use winches.

All lobster boats have the same

configuration, with the engine mounted forward and housed
in the cabin, while the fisherman works behind a house with
a glass windscreen and a roof, open on both sides and the
back.

Almost all lobster boats are made of wood or

fiberglass.
Virtually all lobster boats owned by full-time
fishermen are between 25 and 40 feet long.

Boats under

28 feet are too small to be used from November to March,
a season when there are many storms and high winds, and
they cannot carry enough traps.
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Boats over 38 feet have

higher costs per unit of output than smaller boats.

After

all, there is a maximum number of traps that can be pulled
by a fisherman in a day; and increasing boat size will not
increase that number.

Moreover, larger boats cost a good

deal more than smaller boats, have larger maintenance costs
and use more fuel--increasingly an important consideration.
In the past year (1979-80) two of our key informants have
sold boats in the 38 to 40 foot range to buy craft 35 feet
long, which they both regard as ideal for lobster fishing.
From the point of view of the available and known technology,
all lobstering clusters are very tightly packed, with
approximately the same set of fea?ible options open to all
full-time fishermen.

Financial, skill and other factors,

however, tend to differentiate the feasible sets to a
certain degree.
C.2

Geographical Range
When fishing inshore, lobstermen rarely go more than

a few miles from their home harbors due to the territorial
system in the industry.

From the legal view, anyone who

has a state license can go lobster fishing anywhere.
reality, far more is required.

In

To go lobster fishing at

all, one needs to be accepted by the men fishing out of
one harbor, and once one has gained admission to a "harbor
gang," one is ordinarily allowed to go fishing only in the
traditional territory of that harbor.

Interlopers are

strongly sanctioned, sometimes verbally, but more often by
the surreptitious destruction of lobstering gear.

This

territorial system is entirely the result of political
competition between groups of lobstermen.

It contains no

"legal" elements.
Violation of territorial boundaries meets with no set
response.

An older, well-established man from a large

family might infringe upon the territorial rights of others

214

almost indefinitely, whereas a new man or a "part-timer"
would quickly lose a lot of fishing gear.

Ordinarily

trap cutting involves only one or two men from competing
areas.

However, perhaps once a decade, a series of small

incidents will escalate into a full-fledged "lobster war"
involving dozens of men and resulting in widespread
destruction of lobster gear.

However, all conflicts are

kept very quiet, since trap cutting is illegal, and silence
reduces the chances for a victim to retaliate.

As a result,

the public knows very little about the territorial system,
or the political mechanisms that maintain it.
There are some very important local differences in the
territorial system which have been described in detail in an
earlier paper.

However, in all cases, lobstermen are

restricted to fishing no more than 15 miles from their home
harbor, and most of the time they are far closer than that.
As a result, lobster fishing is highly localized.

Fishermen

spend their whole lives literally crossing and recrossing
one very small piece of water.

This geographical limitation

limits social contact as well.

Thus, lobster fishing

clusters are very small, and involve usually only the men
fishing from one harbor or two or three adjacent harbors.
It is important to note that territoriality exists only
in inshore fishing areas where the vast majority of boats
fish.

A few boats are fishing for lobster offshore where

no territoriality exists.
C.3

Marketing
Any sizeable harbor has at least one lobster dealer or

a cooperative which buys directly from local lobstermen and
sells to tourists or to one or more of the large wholesale
firms distributing lobsters in Maine and the nation.
Typically, fishermen sell their catch to dealers every
day or every few days so all of the costs and risks
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associated with storing and transporting lobsters are
assumed by the dealer or wholesaler--not the fisherman.
While the prices lobstermen receive do fluctuate seasonally,
there is little price competition in the Maine lobster
industry.

On any given day, all the dealers and coopera-

tives are paying approximately the same exvessel price for
lobsters.

Dealers compete for a supply of lobsters by

attempting to attach as many lobstermen to themselves as
possible.

They supply "their fishermen" with gas, oil,

and bait at low margins of profit, allow them to use their
wharfs ,free of charge, and supply them with large amounts
of credit.

A few fishermen sell to two or more dealers or

cooperatives, and periodically a man will change from one
dealer or cooperative to another in rapid succession.

But

typically a lobster fisherman maintains a longstanding
relationship with only one dealer and sells his catch
exclusively to that dealer.
The location of dealerships is not connected to lobster
fishing areas.

A lobsterman usually sells to a dealer in

his own horne harbor, but he may sell to any dealer--regardless of location.
C.4

Reference Groups and Information
The men who fish out of one harbor share far more

common

"ownership" of a lobster fishing terri tory.

are informal groups of great importance.
harbor gang interact a great deal.

~~an

They

The men of a

They meet on the docks

and typically talk and joke with each other before they
leave for their day's fishing.

On days when the weather is

bad, groups of fisherman can be seen hanging around the
dealer's dock or cooperative for several hours on end.
Once or twice a day, lobster fishermen will stop their boats
to talk to their friends in between pulling strings of traps.
Virtually all full-time lobstermen have CB radios on board.
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Most of these conversations take place between men in the
same harbor gang.

In fact, it is customary for the men

from each harbor to use one or two channels.

(Men from

other harbors tend to use other channels.)
Even ashore, interaction between lobster fishermen in
the same harbor gang is very intense.

In one community

studied extensively, a large sample of fishermen were asked
to name their best friends.

Of the 113 lobster fishermen

interviewed, 87 named another fisherman in the same "harbor
gang" or "gang" fishing from a harbor no more than 10 miles
away.

In this community, there are an estimated 750 adult

men and only 113 skippers of fishing boats so that there is
only a small probability that these data on the tendency
of fishermen to select other lobstermen as friends could
1
have occurred by chance.
Lobster fishermen in the same harbor gang ordinarily
have long-term, multistranded ties with each other.

They

usually live in the community where the harbor is located.
Only rarely are fishermen who live in one town admitted to
"harbor gangs" located in other towns

(Acheson 1975a:187).

Most of the men admitted to harbor gangs are members of
long established families who have a history
in the fishing industry.

0=

involvement

The men of a harbor gang share a

good many kinship ties as well.

The fishermen in the same

generation have literally grown up together, and members of
their families have known each other and intermarried for
genera tions.
Membership in a harbor gang strongly influences many
aspects of a lobster fisherman's career.

It is the men from

lA Chi Square test run of these results was significant
at the .05 level, indicating that there is only one chance
in twenty that these results could have occurred by chance.
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one's harbor gang that one can count on in an emergency.
Members of a gang will often get together to perform
certain tasks, such as building traps or painting boats.
They generally share a common set of traits, attitudes
and techniques that mark them off as slightly different
from the men of other harbors.
Perhaps most important, harbor gangs are reference
groups.

They provide a yardstick for a man to use in

measuring his success and skill.

They are the primary

people with whom a lobsterman competes; they are the
people whose opinion counts.
themselves.

Such gangs look inward on

They are the most important unit in a lobster

fisherman's life beyond his family and the community in
which he lives (Lazarowitz and Acheson 1980) .
In some of the smaller harbors, the degree of
interaction has been of such intensity that one can
consider the entire "gang" as a group, with all that
indicates about common norms, sentiments and activities.
In the larger harbor gangs, there may be many cliques and
several different groups of fishermen.

If lobstermen

typically interact a good deal with the fishermen operating
out of their own harbor, they have little contact with
lobster fishermen in other harbors--even harbors only a
few miles away.

It is quite common to meet fishermen who

have not visited harbors within 10 miles of thei.r home port
for years.

To some extent, the geography of the coastal

region of Maine, with its long peninsulas, does not facilitate contact.

Moreover, the members of other harbor gangs

are "enemies" in the competition for lobs ter fishing territory.

Virtually every member of a harbor gang has had some

conflict with members of adjacent gangs concerning placement
or destruction of fishing gear.

If he has not, he knows a

lot of friends and relatives who have.
The lack of interaction and the slight enmity between
members of different harbor gangs has a significant influence
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on the transmiss.ion of information.

In one set of towns

studied intensively, it is rare for a lobster fisherman to
be able to name more than ten men who fish from another town
on the same peninsula only nine miles away.
fishermen are the exception to this rule.

Highline
Most of them know

the four or five most successful fishermen in most harbors
within a 20 mile radius.

At times, such men will exchange

information, and even form friendship ties.

When new

techniques and innovations are transmitted between harbor
gangs, usually the network ties between ','highliners" are
involved.
Despi te the network ties between "highliners," information and innovations are transmitted very slowly between
harbor gangs.

For example, there is clear evidence that

lobster traps made from aluminum and vinyl wire catch significantly more lobsters than the old style oak traps.

In 1974,

such metal traps were well established in Bremen, Maine.

It

was only in 1977 that fishermen in New Harbor (a few miles
away) even began experimenting with such traps.

In 1978, a

good many men in New Harbor had begun to build these traps,
but no one in Round Pond, two miles away, was even interested (Acheson 1980a:

429-440).

This means that most of

the information lobster fishermen obtain comes from other
members of their own harbor gang, and even within gangs men
do not gladly share information.

As we shall see, the

reason that information in the lobster industry travels so
glacially relates both to the territorial system and to
the duration of the economic value of the knowledge
involved.
Clusters in the lobster industry are numerous, small,
and tightly packed.

Given the fact that lobster fishermen

are restricted to fishing in small harbor territories and
that interaction among lobster fishermen is largely
restricted to the men who jointly own those territories
(i.e. a harbor gang), virtually every single harbor in

219

Maine and New Hampshire can be considered as an independent
cluster.

Men from two harbors have slightly different sets

of feasible options, since they must exploit different
areas, which are differentially productive of lobsters.
However, virtually all lobster fishing clusters are
tightly packed from the technical point of view.

There

I

is very little variation in the boats, traps, gear, and so
on used in
D.

~~e

industry throughout the entire region.

The Groundfishery
In fishing circles it is common to speak of the

groundfishery, since haddock, cod, hake, flatfish, pollock,
cusk, and other species inhabit the same general ecozones,
are caught in the same gear, and are marketed in a similar
fashion.

However, fishermen also distinguish between

various segments of the groundfishing fleet in terms of·
the gear they use and the areas they fish.

The two most

common techniques used to take groundfish are gillnetting
and bottom (otter) trawling; fishermen speak of "gillnetters"
and "draggers" or "trawlers."

A further distinction is

made between the small inshore boats, sometimes called
"day-trippers," and the large boats exploiting the offshore
fishing grounds of the Gulf of Maine (i.e. the offshore
fleet).

These verbal distinctions underline the fact that

although there are similarities among all the boats and
people exploiting groundfish, there are some very important
differences as well.

For our purposes, it is useful to

distinguish between five different kinds of groundfishing
clusters, based on both the kind of gear used and the areas
exploited:

gillnetters, inshore draggers or trawlers,

offshore draggers, handliners, and tub trawlers.

The

fea~

ible sets people in these categories have are very different
despite the fact they catch the same species of fish and
market them in roughly similar ways.
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D.l
D.l.l

Technology
Gillnetting is a small boat, inshore fishery.

Virtually all the boats in this fleet are between 36 and
,

62 feet and venture no more than 30 miles from shore.
Gillnets are a type of fixed gear, consisting of very long,
narrow nets with weights on the bottom, and floats on the
top which float up vertically from the bottom of the water.
Fish are caught by the gills when they try to force their
heads through the mesh.

Individual gillnets are often

linked together to stretch a quarter of a mile or more
across the bottom.

Gillnets are usually left in the water

no more than two days to minimize predation on fish that
have been caught and to maintain some semblance of quality.
The nets are retrieved by pulling one end of a string of
gillnets into the boat by winding in the rope attached to
the buoy that marks the location of the net.

Power is

generally provided by a gillnet hauler--essentially a
hydraulically-powered drum.

As the net is hauled in, the

fish are disentangled from the net (" picked out") by a crew
of two to five men.

When the net is empty, it is played

over the side again.
D.l.2

Trawling or dragging.

There is tremendous variation

in the size and capacity of the boats engaged in trawling,
which is currently the most important technique used to
catch groundfish.

The smallest boats are about 38 feet

long; the largest are 120 feet, and still larger boats are
being added to the fleet.

The small boats fish

inshore waters exclusively, while the large boats range the
entire Gulf of Maine, concentrating on Georges Bank.

Regard-

less of boat size, all trawlers catch fish by towing a
cone-shaped net through the water.

The sides of the net

are held open by doors attached to the sides of the net.
The nets are towed by long wire cables attached to a winch
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used to retrieve the net.
Trawling may be done from the side of the vessel, called
an eastern rig, or from the stern, called western rig.
types have advantages and disadvantages.

Both

(See' Acheson

et al.
-

1980:

20. )

D.l.3

Handlines and longlines (tub trawls).

Longlining

and handlining are relatively old and primitive techniques.
Handlining refers to fishing with two or three lines over
the side of a boat on which one or more baited hooks are
attached.

A longline, or line trawl, is a horizontal line

with a series of shorter lines with hooks hanging from it.
The use of these techniques to catch groundfish is concentrated mainly in a few harbors in eastern Maine.

In the

main, longlining and handlining are done from very small
boats (under 25 feet), although a few lobstermen, who have
larger boats do a little tub trawling (i.e. longlining) in
the spring when lobsters are scarce.

Given the size of the

boats involved, it is not surprising that "hook fishing" is
done mainly in the summer by part-time fishermen.
D.2

Geographic Range
Unlike the lobster industry, there is no territoriality

in any section of the groundfishery.

Owners of boats are

free to go anywhere they can find fish and still avoid
conflicting with other fishermen.
the range of the boats.

They are limited only by

The large vessels generally take

trips of from four to ten days and exploit fishing grounds
far out in the Gulf of Maine--particularly Georges Bank, the
Northeast Channel, the Great South Channel, and in the past
Browns Bank and Le Haves Bank.

Moreover, there is little

tendency for boats fishing these offshore areas to come
from specific ports.

In recent years, the northeast peak

of Georges Bank was fished by boats from Maine, Massachusetts
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and Nova Scotia.

The inshore fishing areas, such as

Jeffreys Bank, the Kettle Bottom, Jeffrey's Ledges, and
Fipennies Ledge, are fished by both small and large boats.
Since the range of small boats is restricted, these inshore
grounds are exploited generally by boats from relatively
nearby harbors.

Cashes Ledge, for example, is fished mainly

by boats from southern Maine and New Hampshire.

These small

draggers and gillnetters concentrate on nearby fishing
grounds because it is dangerous and expensive for them to
go too far offshore--not because they have any kind of
exclusive rights to these grounds.
In Maine, the majority of the boats that have groundfish as their major fishery are located in only 18 of the
state's 82 harbors.

In addition, most of these boats are

concentrated in the southern part of the region.
Acheson et ale

1~80:

Table 2.)

(See

There are two factors

clearly involved in influencing the concentration of these
groundfishing boats:
fish.

marketing outlets and availability of

It is simply much more convenient to moor one's boat

in a harbor with an established groundfish dealer rather
than going to the trouble of arranging to transrort and
market catches oneself. The role of species availability
is equally obvious. More groundfishing boats are located in
the southern part of this two state region since there are
more groundfish available over a longer period of the
seasonal cycle there.
To some extent, the choice of fishing gear is related
to the seasonal cycle of groundfish and the type of bottom
that predominates in various areas.

Handlining predominates

in the easternmost parts of Maine (for example, Lubec and
Eastport) because groundfish are available in quantity only
a few months a year.

In addition, the very high tides

characteristic of the region set up such fast currents that
use of fixed gear (gillnets) is difficult, and the rocky bottom means that there is little opportunity to use otter trawls.
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D.3

Marketing
All groundfish landed in Maine and New Hampshire ports

is marketed through the same kinds of channels.

Most

commonly, fish are shipped to either Boston or New York
where it is sold through a broker.

A truck picks up the

fisherman's catch, and transports it to the broker who sells
i t on consignment and then sends the fisherman a check.
Thus, the fish is owned by the fisherman until it is sold
on the market, and all the risks and costs of transportation
are borne by him.

There are obviously a good many oppor-

tunities for inequities and misunderstanding in a system
where the fisherman does not even know what he has been
paid for a given load of fish until many days after he has
shipped i t (Wilson 1980:11 f.f.).

In some harbors (for

example, Prospect Harbor, Rockland, and Portland) some
groundfish are bought by processing firms which pay the
fisherman for his catch immediately upon landing.

In ti1e

future, local outlets for Maine and New Hampshire fish will
probably increase.

Some fishermen have long-term

established relationships with local dealers to whom
they sell their fish.

This is the more common method in

southern New England and has been described in detail in
another volume

(Wilson 1980).

For the present, most

of the fish is sold through the trucker-broker system.
D.4

Reference Groups and Information
Groundfishermen have a great deal of contact with each

other.

At sea, the captains of both inshore and offshore

draggers spend an enormous amount of time talking with each
other on the radio.

For example, on one day tripper which

made three three-hour tows, the captain was on the radio a
total of six hours and five minutes.
unusual.

This is far from

The frequency of radio contact with other boats
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depends on the type of gear being used.

Captains of

gillnetting boats use the radio far less frequently than
captain's of draggers since they spend a great deal of their
time helping the crew "pick fish" out of the net.

In part

this use of the radio helps to pass long and boring hours.
But far more than entertainment is involved, because
grouhdfishermen only talk to otller groundfishermen.

They

rarely talk on the radio to lobster fishermen from their
home harbors, even though they might be fishing within sight
of each other.

They never talk to men who fish exclusively

for herring or dig clams either.

Most important, most radio

communication takes place between captains of boats who have
information of use to each other.

The vast majority of the

messages sent and received are between boats that are
directly competing with each other.

Captains of offshore

fishing boats tend to talk to captains of other boats
fishing offshore waters.

The captains of inshore boats

talk to skippers of vessels who are fishing or usually fish
in the same area.
Periodically, fishermen will talk about women, liquor,
parties, sports, or gossip directly about each other, but
such conversations are in a distinct minority.
communication concerns fishing.

Most radio

Markets and fish prices are

a favorite topic, along with discussions on catches and
locations where fish are found.

Most of the information

transmitted is surprisingly frank and honest, given the fact
that the captains involved are competitors.

When a fisherman

asks how large a catch another man got on his last tow, he
will very likely be told with reasonable accuracy.

It is

very rare that fishermen will tell each other lies of such
proportions that they will be damaging.

It is considered

extremely bad form, for example, to tell another man a
certain place is safe to fish, and avoid mentioning dangerous
snags.

However, fishermen characteristically will try to

minimize the amount of information they give out about their
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own boat and its operation while trying to gain as much
information as possible about other boats.

It is also

common for fishermen to exaggerate or underestimate fish
catches to lure a competing boat into changing fishing
grounds so that it will lose valuable fishing time.

For

these reasons, fishermen carefully assess the information
they receive.

Often the information sought can best be

obtained by direct observation or by listening in on the
conversations of others.
Interest in catches and prices received by other boats
is also stimulated by the fact that it is these competing
boats, crews and captains which are the reference group for
groundfisherman.

One's success and standing are measured

in terms of the catches and income one has relative to these
boats.

It is, however, far more difficult to identify the

boundaries of the reference groups in the groundfishery than
it is in lobstering.

Fishermen on large offshore vessels

assess themselves against the record of those on other large
offshore vessels.

Those on inshore vessels compare

themselves with each other.
factors playa role as well.

But geographical and technical
At times gillnetters and small

draggermen constitute a single reference group.

In other

cases, gillnetters and draggermen measure success relative to
other men using the same kind of gear.

In addition the ref-

erence group for groundfishermen almost always extends beyond
the home port, but the relevant audience is not the entire groundfishing fleet either.

Men compare themselves and obtain

information from others who own similar groundfishing boats
in their own harbor and a few adjacent harbors.

As one moves

up the coast, the composition of reference groups changes
depending on the contacts of the individual fishermen
involved.

The kind of sliding scale used by fishermen in

forming reference groups could be seen in the responses of
a sample of fishermen to questions such as:

"Who are the

best inshore groundfishermen?" and "What three boats do you
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calIon the radio most often?"

In the answers to these

questions, i t became apparent that the boundaries of the
reference group used by the men in any harbor were not
exactly the same as those used by the men in adjacent
harbors, even though they might overlap considerably.

For

example, in an area of where five harbors are located,
called A,B,C,D, and E groundfishermen in Harbor B might
communicate and compare themselves with men in their
own harbor and.harbors A and Ci men in harbor C would have
a reference group composed of fishermen in harbors B, C,
and D but not those in A.
It is much more difficult to delineate clusters in
groundfishing than in lobstering.
reference group

The shifting nature of

boundaries is one complicating factor.

Geographical factors also have to be taken into account
since the species mix that is available in anyone area at
any given time differs from that in other areas, and the
costs of transporting fish to market increase as one moves
eastward along the coast.

In the groundfishery, the

technology in use is very different, so that men using
different kinds of gear (i.e. longlines, handlines, gillnets
or otter trawls) and different-sized boats obviously occupy
different niches.

All these factors make it difficult to

decide whether particular groundfishing vessels are part
of the same loosely packed cluster
completely.

or a different cluster

The difficulties become most apparent when

specific situations are considered.

The groundfishermen

from South Bristol and New Harbor, for example, use boats
that are approximately the same size.

They fish the same

grounds for the most part, and communicate with each other
a good deal.

Many fishermen from these two harbors know

each other quite well.

However fish from South Bristol is

sold to a private dealer in MarYland, while fish from
New Harbor boats is sold via the usual trucker-broker
arrangement.

In addition, all the New Harbor groundfishermen
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use otter trawls, while many South Bristol men use gillnets.
Are groundfishermen from ,these two harbors from one cluster
or two?
In the case of the groundfishery, it is impossible to
distinguish between all clusters--particularly in the inshore
fishery--without being very arbitrary.

It is possible

however, to delineate some of the more important and obvious
clusters.

In these cases, differences in feasible sets of

options are so obvious that the clusters involved stand out.
These clusters are listed below:
(1)

The 11 large vessels of the red fish fleet which

fish far out in the Gulf of Maine are a single cluster.

This

is true despite the fact that they belong to two vertically
integrated firms, one in Rockland, the other in Portland.

(2)

The small boats that are used for handlining in

Passamaquoddy Bay, s-tationed at Eastport and Lubec.

(3)

The gillnetters and draggers of Jonesport, Maine

have a s"ingle marketing outlet and fish the same grounds.
Theyare so isolated geographically and socially that they
constitute a single reference group.

(4)

The gillnetters of Stonington have approximately

the same size boats, use the same marketing outlets, and
constitute a closely-knit social group which interacts
frequently at sea and ashore.

They also have the same

annual round, combining gillnetting with fall lobstering
and winter scalloping.

(5)

Vinalhaven Island reportedly has two distinct

groundfishing clusters, although we know little about
them.
(6)

The small dragger captains of Tenants Harbor and

Port Clyde are a cluster.

These men have similar size boats,

use the same marketing outlets, fish the same grounds, and
clearly form a distinct reference group.
(7)

The fin-fishermen of Boothbay and Boothbay Harbor

constitute a cluster.

While their boats vary from 42 to 65

228

feet, they use the same type of gear, fish in many of the
same places, and all sell to the Boothbay Fish and Cold
storage Corporation of which they are all members.

They

also interact a good deal with each other and constitute a
reference group.
(8)

The dragger fishermen of Cundy's Harbor, Bailey's

Island, and South Harpswell are a cluster.

Although there

is some variation in the size of the boats used, these men
sell through the same two or three marketing outlets,
interact a good deal with each other, and use the same gear
in many of the same locations.
(9)

Portland has at least two groundfish clusters:

the redfish boats already mentioned, and the inshore dragger/
gillnet fleet.
(10)

The gillnetters of Kennebunkport.

These men sell

through the same marketing outlet, and fish many of the same
grounds with similar gear and similar sized boats.

They

also constitute a clear reference group.
E.

The Herring Industry

E.l

Technology
Herring are caught by four very different types of

fishing gear: weirs, stop seines, purse seines and pair
trawls. Weirs and stop seines are types of fixed gear;
purse seines and pair trawls are mobile and used on large
boats.

These four different techniques involve different

levels of investment and skill.
All weirs are made from a series of long stakes or poles
driven into the bottom of a bay or inlet; and all have a
round pound or enclosure to hold the captured fish and a
single or double leader extending outward from the "pound"
to guide the schools of herring into it.

The walls of tile

weir are composed of brush or netting hung between the poles.
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Stop seining, like weir fishing, involves trapping
juvenile herring when they enter a bay.

The fish are caught

by hauling a long net across the mouth of the cove after the
school of fish have entered.
In purse seining a very long net (up to 1000 feet)

is

set in a circle around a school of herring. When the circle
is complete, a rope or "purse line" is drawn to close or
purse up the bottom of the net.

The top of the net is then

pulled in to compress the school of fish to the point where
they can be "brailed" into the boat or sucked up with a
fish pump.
Pair trawlers catch herring by towing a very large net
between them.

This is a more advanced technique than purse

seining, since such boats can catch long narrow schools
strung out over a mile or more, and can take fish anywhere
in the water column.

Purse seiners, by way of contrast, can

only approach schools where fish are on the surface and
concentrated into a compact mass.
The primary skill in weir fishing and stop seining
involves a knowledge of where to place the gear (that is,
where to build the weir and which coves to reserve for stop
seining).

Again this involves a knowledge of where fish

have been historically.

Much more is involved in pair

trawling and purse seining.

Men using these techniques

must know how to locate schools of herring in the open
ocean, and must coordinate a large crew (four to ten men)
to operate very large nets and fishing gear.

Extensive

electronic gear and sometimes spotter planes are used to
locate schools of herring.
Weirs and stop seine operations are relatively uniform
although some weirs are larger than others, and some stop
seine operations involve longer nets to stop off bigger
coves.

In addition, some weir and stop seine operators have

inboard-powered boats equipped with hydraulic net haulers to
tend their herring gear, while other men simply use small
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skiffs.
There is, however, a tremendous difference among various
purse seiners and pair trawlers.

The boats that do purse

seining vary in size from 42 feet with a tilree man crew to
90 feet with a seven man crew.

There are variations as well

in the type of electronic gear used, marketing deals with
processing firms, and the amount of involvement in other
fisheries. The pair trawlers are more uniform, although
they range in length from 70 feet to 90 feet.
E.2

Geographical Range
There is great variation in the mobility of herring

fishermen using different types of gear.

Physical and

social factors make owners of stop seines and weirs highly
immobile.

Weirs are obviously permanent fixtures in the

localities where they are built.

~hey

even if the owner wanted to move them.

could not be moved
It is physically

possible to move seine dories from one cove to another, but
few stop seiners move their operations much.

Most of these

men have one or two coves or "berths" which they fish
exclusively.

A few stop seiners move their operations

several times over the course of the season, but they are

in a distinct minority. The relative lack of mobility in
stop seining can be explained in part by the fact that
there are a limited number of places where herring can be
caught by stop seines, and most of these have already been
taken. Moreover, there is a strong sense of territoriality
in the fixed gear herring fishery~ Men who place their
seine dories in a cove have exclusive rights to fish that
cove as long as they are tending the gear.
In many
instances, these rights have been claimed by family members

in the past and have been handed down from one generation
to another.

This sense of territoriality also operates in

the weir fishery.

It has long been considered unfair for a
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fisherman to set up a weir or seine near another man's weir.
This norm has been formalized into a law which makes it
illegal for a person to go herring fishing within 1000 feet
of another's weir.
By way of contrast, the purse seiners and pair trawlers
are among the most mobile fishing boats operating in
New England.

Between May and November, they congregate in

the inshore waters of Maine to fish for juvenile herring;
in the middle of the winter, they travel to Massachusetts
Bay and the waters south of Cape Cod to fish for adult fish.
At times these mobile boats are highly dispersed over wide
areas of the Gulf of Maine.

However, since herring tend to

concentrate in very large schools, the boats following them
tend to concentrate as well.
E.3

Marketing
All of the herring caught in New England waters are

processed in one of the 15 plants owned by the herring
processing companies.

These companies pack the juvenile

sardines into cans, which are sold primarily in the
united States.

The adult herring are

fi~leted,

frozen

and shipped to European markets.
These herring packing firms are vertically integrated.
They not only own the packing plants themselves, but also
very large warehouses where boxes of fish are stored before
being shipped to wholesalers.

In addition, these firms own

the herring "smacks," which transport fish from seines,
weirs, and boats to the plant.

They also own and operate

two of the six pair trawlers as well as some of the purse
seiners.

However, most of the herring are caught by

fishermen who operate their own boats, weirs and seines.
The owners of these plants loan large amounts of money to
these operators with the understanding that their plant will
have first refusal on the fish caught.
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Thus, these

fishermen are closely tied to herring processors although
they are not employees.

In many respects, this system of

financing is comparable to sharecropping, especially since
the company takes a share of the fisherman's catch rather
than a flat amount of money.
E.4

Reference Groups and Information
Given the relatively small size of the herring industry

in New England and the fact that all herring is sold to a
'small number of processing plants, anyone in the herring
business is tied into a network that covers the entire
industry and a large geographic area.

The stop seiners

and weir operaters have some information on purse seiners
and pair trawlers and vice versa.

When large schools of

herring are located and large catches are made, everyone
in the industry knows about it, although the amount of
specific information they have might be relatively small
if they are not personally involved in exploiting those
schools.

The flow of information within the industry is

facilitated by the herring carriers which range the length
of the coast, picking up fish and gossip from fixed gear
operations and boats alike.

However, the information net-

works and reference groups in the herring industry vary
with the gear being used.

The weir operates and stop

seiners have detailed information on herring operations
only in their local area--usually within a 20 mile radius.
For example, the men operating weirs and stop seines in
Passamaquoddy Bay know a good deal about each other's
catches, but they have only the vaguest idea about the
relative success of fixed gear operations in the Jonesport
area or in the Milbridge-Stuben area.

The men operating

stop seines in the bays along Penobscot Bay have a lot of
information about each other, but little indication of
catches in the Mount Desert Island area to the east or
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Boothbay to the west.
However, i t is difficult to argue that the fixed gear
operators in any given area really constitute a reference
group in any meaningful sense.

Virtually all of the men

using this gear are part-time herring fishermen.
their income comes either from some other kind
from another job ashore, or from a pension.

Most of
of fishery,

with the

exception of three men who own more than one weir or stop
seine operation, everyone in the industry can be considered
a part-time fisherman.

In addition, the information these

men exchange appears to be more ephemeral than that
exchanged between other kinds of fishermen.

Once a man has

built a weir or has taken over the family stop seine berth,
the amount of fish he catches depends largely on the vagueries o,f herring movements and his own willingness to tend
his gear rather than on strategic information from or about
other fishermen.

As

a result, the owners of fixed gear

herring operations can be considered a reference group--if
at all--only in the herring season and only within a
restricted local area.
The men manning the six pair trawlers and twenty purse
seiners from Maine ports, by way of contrast, maintain a very
dense communications network, despite their mobility.

Boats

like "'Rodine," "Candy B II," "Dutchess II" and "Western
Wave" are well known the length of the coast among men who
fish for herring.

Very often a high percentage of these

boats are concentrated in one place fishing on the same
schools--regardless of where their horne ports might be.
Their crews interact a great deal with each other.

Every

night there are a good many radio conversations between
herring boat crews fishing in the same area.

They tend to

tie up their boats at the same docks between trips.

In

addition, the men of this mobile herring fleet constantly
monitor and watch each other's movements.

Information on

the location of herring schools is obtained not only from
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watching one's own electronic gear and spotter plane (if
any), but also from observations of the movements of other
boats.

Even when these boats are fishing in different

places, news of the activities of other boats is' obtained
via VHF Eadio or through contacts with the plants and their'
carriers.

Given the small size of the fleet, and the den-

sity of the communications network, it is possible for a
skipper in this fleet to have an idea about the general area
where every other herring boat is fishing at any given time.
All the boats in this mobile herring fleet can be said
to form a single cluster.

All fish for herring throughout

their migratory range, and although there are differences in
the sizes of these boats, they are all able to fish in the
same locations under the same conditions.

The men in this

fleet are a single reference group and maintain a dense set
of network ties over which a great deal of information flows
constantly.

All of the skippers know each other and know

each other's reputation for skill and fishing effectiveness.
In addition, all of the boats in this fleet sell their
'catches to the same small number of processing firms under
similar agreements.
The techniques used by purse seiners and pair trawlers
differ, however.

Purse seiners have a slight advantage very

near shore, since they can "set on" schools of herring in
small bays and in shallow water.

The pair trawlers, however

can take long ribbon-like schools of herring on the surface
or deep in the water column.

They also carry two nets--one

on each boat--so that they may begin another tow as soon as
the first net is back on board which gives them a distinct
advantage if there are a lot of fish.

Given the differences

in technology employed, one might want to argue that there
are two clusters in the mobile herring fleet:
trawlers and the purse seiners.

the pair

It would, however, be very

difficult to claim that there were any more than two.
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F.
F.l

Summary
Boundaries
Four important points need to be made concerning

clusters in the fisheries of northern New England.

Clusters

are groups of firms with the same set of feasible options.
While all clusters in the fishing industry of northern
New England have social, geographical, economic, and
technical aspects, some of these aspects are more important
than others in defining the limits of clusters in the
various fisheries.

The boundaries of lobstering clusters

are determined socially.

The range of the species and the

technology play little role in influencing the formation of
clusters.

Lobsters are found all the way from Newfoundland

to Virginia, and lobster fishermen have very similar fishing
boats which are capable of travelling fairly long distances.
No inshore lobsterman travels long distances, however.

In

fact, they confine their fishing activities to very small
territories and interact almost exclusively with men in
their own harbor gangs or men in very nearby harbors.

It

is this system of territoriality and the associated involution of social contacts that makes every lobster fishing
harbor a separate cluster.

Technological and biological

differences have no bearing in cluster boundaries.
In the groundfishery, the boundaries of clusters are
determined by a combination of the technology in use and the
geographic area fished.

These clusters are defined first by

the type of gear (that is, gillnets, otter trawl, handline,
longline) and second by the area in which that gear is used.
Thus, all the men using a certain type of groundfishing gear
on the same fishing grounds are generally in the same cluster.
They know each other and constitute a reference group.
However, in the groundfishery the boundaries of clusters
are very difficult to delineate because the reference groups
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of groundfishermen and their sets of contacts differ from
harbor to harbor.
In the herring industry, ti1e clusters are most strongly
inf luenced by technological factorl?

There is a sharp

distinction between the fixed gear herring fishermen and
the mobile gear fishermen.

The owners of weirs and stop

seines constitute clusters only in restricted local areas.
The skippers of purse seiners and pair trawlers fish
together throughout the entire range of the species,
clearly have dense network ties, and constitute a reference
group.

Despite the technological superority of the pair

trawlers, i t is best to regard this mobile fleet as a single
cluster.
F.2

Cluster Packing
The degree of cluster packing varies considerably from

one fishery to another.

In the lobster industry, the

feasible sets of options open to lobster boats in the same
cluster are nearly identical.

The men in a cluster are

fishing from the same harbor, exploiting the same commonly
owned territory with boats and fishing equipment that are
very similar technically, and selling their catch to the
same one or two outlets.

There is some variation in·the

sizes of the boats full-time lobster fishermen use, the age
of those boats, the numbers of lobster traps fished, the
electronic gear employed and the ,skill of the fishermen.
These differences mean that some fishermen from a given
harbor have slightly different options than others.
Nevertheless, such differences have such small effects on
feasible options that one can regard all lobstering clusters
as being relatively closely packed.
There is far more variation in the degree of cluster
packing in the groundfishery.

Gillnetting boats in any

given area range from 35 to 65 feet.
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The smaller size

boats are restricted to day-tripping near shore.

The larger

boats can fish up to a hundred mile radius of their home
harbors; make trips several days in length; and commonly
land their fish in several different harbors.
same is true for the inshore draggers.

Much the

Some of the smaller

draggers are restricted to day-tripping in local waters,
while some of the boats fifty feet long and larger take
trips of several days duration along the coast.

In both

the gillnetting fleet and the inshore dragging fleet, there
are also considerably differences in the kinds of electronic
equipment in use.

Some boats have little more than a com-

pass, radio, and recorder.

Others have this equipment in

addition to Loran, radar, scanners, fish scopes, Loran C.
plotters and in many instances more than one of these kinds
of gear.

There are even greater distinctions in the options

open to boats in the offshore fleet.
70 to 150 feet long.
the stern.

These boats range from

Some haul over the side; others over

Again, there is considerable variation in the

amount of electronic gear employed, as well as in the
refrigeration equipment.
The boats in the herring industry exhibit the same kind
of variation.

Some of the smallest purse seiners are 45

feet long; others are over 90.

There are variations in

auxiliary boats, men in the crews, electronic equipment,
and so on.
In summary, then, all three kinds of clusters of firms
exploiting groundfish must be considered relatively loosely
packed in comparison with lobstering clusters. The mobile
herring fleet forms a loosely packed cluster as well.
F.3

Reference Groups and Clusters
In all fisheries,

the size of reference groups appears

to be a constant and has some bearing on the size of clusters.
Men do not compare themselves with one or two other boats but

238

with seven to twenty.

Thus, the fewer boats there are in

one's own home harbor similar to one's own in size and gear
type, the larger and more heterogenous the reference group
will be.

If there are no other gillnetters in one's own

harbor, one may seek ties, contacts, and comparison with
small draggers in the immediate area and gillnetters in
harbors in the next county.

On the' other hand, if one

comes from a harbor where there are at least six or seven
other gilL"1etters in the same size range, the reference group
will likely consist largely of gillnet fishermen in one's
own harbor.

The same principle is applicable to the

offshore fleet.

However, there are so few large offshore

vessels in northern New England that a reference group is
apt to encompass a large geographic area.

The Maine redfish

fleet is composed of boats between 90 and 110 feet long
which fish far out in the Gulf of Maine.

The men on these

boats know a good many details about each other despite the
fact that six of these boats come from Rockland, and the
other five from Portland, over two hours away by car.
The
cluster in this case includes the entire Maine fleet.
Lobstering clusters, by way of contrast, are very
restricted

geographically~-usually

one harbor.

to the men fishing from

The number of boats in the small harbors is

generally between seven and twenty.

In harbors where there

are very large numbers of boats (for example, Vinalhaven,
Friendship, Jonesport-Beals, Stonington), lobstermen are
divided into smaller units, which even have their own
sub-territories.
F.4

Clusters and Fishery Switching
So far we have talked about clusters as if all fishermen

use only one kind of gear and fish for one species over the
annual round.

Most fishermen in Maine and New Hampshire in

fact do exactly this.

HO\.;rever, a fairly large number of
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fishermen are involved in multiple fisheries over the annual
round and use two or more different kinds of gear.

The

number of fiqhermen who. are using multiple types of gear
is clearly increasing (Acheson 19BOb).

In 1978, of the

579 Maine and New Hampshire fishermen who pursued
groundfish as their major fishery, 80, or 13.8 percent
went after other species over some part of the annual round
(Acheson et ale

1980:

Tables 8 and 10).

The largest

number of these men went purse seining for herring, using
the same boats they used for groundfishing.

In the same

year, there were 2205 men who were full time lobster
fishermen in Maine, of whom 541 or 24.5 percent fished
for other species over the year.

Of these 541 lobster

fishermen, 277 or 51.2 percent fished for scallops; 156 or
28.8 percent did some groundfishing; while 79 or 12.9
percent fished for herring (Acheson et ale 1980:

Table 12).

Virtually all of these men use their lobster boats while
engaging in these other fisheries.

It should be noted that

most of the lobster fishermen who go scalloping and stop
seining for herring are from the eastern part of Maine.
Most of the lobster fishermen who go groundfishing are from
the central part of the Maine coast.

Very few lobster

fishermen in the southern part of Maine fish for other
species, and none of the lobster fishermen in New Hampshire
did anything other than lobstering over the annual round.
In 1978 a total of 484 men fished for herring.

Thr.ee

hundred seventeen of these men were full-time fishermen
while 167 were part-time fishermen.

Of the 317 full-time

fishermen, about 210 had herring as. their major fishery
(Acheson et ale 1980:

262).

Virtually all of the stop

seine and weir operators are among the part-time fishermen
or are full-time fishermen who have another species as
their primary one.

Virtually no fishermen make most of

their incomes from stop seines or weirs.

However, the vast

majority of the men whose major fishery is herring do not
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switch onto any other species.

Of the 210 men in this

category, only 45 or 21.4 percent

~ent

after other species,

over half (57.8 percent) for groundfish.

Almost all of these

men were on pair trawlers or purse seiners.
The phenomenon of fishery switching causes problems in
delineating clusters and analyzing the degree of cluster
packing.

When a fishermen switches species, he becomes,

'temporarily at least, part of another industry.

The

marketing outlets change, along with the gear used, the
men with whom one competes, and the norms one is expected
to obey.

A fisherman who fishes for lobster and stop

seines for herring must obey the rules concerning territoriality in his area and sell to a lobster dealer when he
fishes for lobster.

When he switches to herring fishing,

he does far more than cut down on the number of lobster
traps he fishes and put out his seine boat.

He is now part

of the herring industry and is expected to operate as a
herring fisherman.

He must have a berth for his seine dory;

he normally has a deal with a herring processing firm, and
gets large amounts of credit in .exchange for rights to the
fish caught.

It should be made clear that there is no

conflict between these two industries.

Men can pull

lobster traps in the morning and tend their stop seine in
the evening.

In the morning ,they are operating as full-

fledged lobster fishermen; in the evening as herring
fishermen.

The same is true in other fisheries.

The

skipper of a large boat can make a tow with an otter trawl
and be operating completely as a groundfishermen.

In the

afternoon, he can spot a school of herring; go home and
change his dragging gear for a purse seine;
herring fisherman by nightfall.
of two industries at once.

and be a

Such men are really members

Their set of feasible options

is such that they lie somewhere between clusters composed
of fishermen who fish only one species.

They may be

primarily a member of one cluster, but they have wider sets
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of contacts and different skills than men who fish for
only one species.
The men who are engaged in more than one fishery
obviously have different sets of options than men catching
one species exclusively.

Since clusters reflect the sets

of options available to firms, fishery switching must be
taken into account in delineating clusters.

There are

two ways men who fish for multiple species can be assigned
membership in clusters.

First, we might regard all the men

in a given area who combine fisheries as being members of
a different cluster than the men from that area who fish a
single species.

That is, we might say that the lobstermen

fishing from a harbor were one cluster; the stop seiners in
the area were another cluster; and the men who combined
lobster fishing with stop seining a third.

In the short

run, at least, each of these three sets of men produce
different products.

Second, we could classify fishermen

into clusters based on their majority fishery.

On the

whole, the second approach appears to be most applicable
to most situations.

In the long run, these men have much

the same opportunity set.

Moreover, clusters are reference

groups, and involve network ties between fishermen.

Simply

because a fisherman fishes for two species over the annual
round does not mean that he has a vastly different reference
group from the men who fish only one.

A man who goes for

lobster most of the year is still a member of the harbor
gang operating out of his lobstering harbor; and he does
not give up these contacts during the few months he goes
stop seining.

For this reason, it is best to regard the

men who switch fisheries as in the cluster of their major
fishery, even though they have a larger set of feasible
options than most other fishermen in that cluster.

Clusters

that have many such men are not as tightly packed as those
in which men fish only one species.

The amount of fishery

switching and the effect it has on cluster packing is an
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empirical matter that differs from place to place,

For

example, virtually all of the lobster fishermen in
New Harbor, Round Pond and Pemaquid are engaged in lobstering
all year:

few do anything else.

On Swans Island, by way

of contrast, a very high percentage of the lobster fishermen
engage in inshore scalloping during the winter months.

In

tbis! case the New Harbor lobstering cluster is more tightly
packed than that of Swans Island.

However, there are few

generalizations that can be made concerning cluster packing
as it relates to changing fishing gears.

In discussing

the effect of gear switching on cluster packing in other
chapters, each case must be decided on its own merits.
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CHAPTER 3

FISHING CLUSTERS:
A.

THE SHORT RUN INFORMATION PROBLEM

Introduction
Clusters in the fishing industry exist primarily to

solve the problem of obtaining information in a very uncertain environment.

As we have seen, fishing is a highly

heterogenous industry, in which the location of the species
sought, the market, the acti vi ties of other fishermen and what
they know, and, increasingly, the government are all in constant flux so that fishermen are constantly faced with situations of uncertainty.

A strategy which may work in one week

or in one season may doom one to failure if tried the next.
The response of fishermen to this situation is literally to
imitate each other.

Those who are imitated most are men who

have adapted successfully to changing circumstances.

This

imitative behavior, we argue, takes place in both the long
and short run.

In the short run, men imitate the strategies

of more successful fishermen in their search for fish.

In

the long run, this imitation takes the form of adoption of
innovations.
Our adaptive model suggests that the full value of property rights over innovations lasts only as long as other firms
are denied access to the relevant knowledge of innovations
(See Part II, Chapter 7).

This suggests that the secret of

success for innovators is to maintain exclusive control over
the knowledge and skill involved in innovations.

Conversely,

other firms should be willing to expend great effort in obtaining that information about those innovations.

In addition,

the model indicates that the innovations firms accept will be
influenced by the nature of the compe.tition they face-specifically the degree of cluster packing.

Indeed, this is

exactly what we find in the fishing industry in northern New
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England.

Success, as we have seen, is achieved largely by

skill and knowledge.

Successful fishermen go to great lengths

to maintain exclusive control over the innovations they make,
and the knowledge congruent with them.

Moreover, cluster

packing does influence the adoption of innovations.

In this

chapter, we discuss short run imitation and the way it influences the behavior of fishermen on a daily basis.

In

Chapter 4, we discuss long run innovative behavior and the
way the characteristics of clusters and innovative behavior
are systematically interconnected over the course of time.
B.

Searching for Fish
There are two sets of decisions every fishermen has to

make concerning every fishing trip.

The first is whether he

is going to go fishing at all on a particular day or week.
This decision is influenced largely by the weather, the price
of fish, the activities of other fishermen, maintenance problems he may be having with his boat, and problems he may be
having with his crew, if any.

In any fishery, the most common

reason to stay home is the weather.

But one might also decide

not to go fishing if essential gear needs to be repaired' or
if one is having trbuble getting essential crew members.

In

the groundfishery and scallop fishery, one might postpone a
fishing trip if the price falls too low, or if going fishing
would result in one reaching port at a time when a large number of other boats landed so that the price would be depressed.
Once having decided to go fishing, the most essential
question that a fishermen asks is where to fish.

This ques-

tion is far more cri·tical for our purposes since fishermen
have to make such decisions every day and sometimes several
times a day.

This question:

"Where to go fishing?" or "Am

I fishing in the right place?" is a constant preoccupation
of the captains of fishing boats, and the answers they give
to them strongly influence their behavior and ultimately
their economic success.
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There are two sources of information fishermen have concerning locations where concentrations of fish might be located.
First, they can draw on their own experience and the information they can gather themselves from their own electronic
equipment and their own catches.

As we have seen, some men

have the knowledge and skill to be able to find fish concentrations with much greater success than others.

This unques-

tionably involves'detailed information on the habits of the
species involved and the microecology of the ocean floor
(Acheson 1977ai 1980).

Second, fishermen can obtain infor-

mation from other fishermen and
experience.

gain the benefit of their

It is important to note that the amount of in-

formation that can be obtained from other fishermen, and the
means by which it is obtained, differs dramatically depending
on the type of cluster.

This, in turn, depends on the habits

of the species being sought.

Specifically, there is a great

difference in the way information is gained depending on
whether a migratory or a sedentary species is sought.
In the case of lobsters, clams and other sedentary species,
the knowledge one might obtain about fish concentrations lasts
a long time.

If one locates a good bed of clams, one might be

able to come back and dig them with great success for a period
of weeks or even months, if they are not all dug by other
diggers.

The same is true for lobster fishermen, since lob-

sters remain in the same locations for a period of days or
even weeks at certain times of the year.

Given the value of

such knowledge, men fishing such species are very secretive
about their fishing activities.

Periodically, clammers and

lobster fishermen will discuss catches and the locations of
fishing grounds with other fishermen.

But they are usually

careful to discuss such matters only after the fish concentrations have all been caught or only with other close family
members who they want to help, or with men who might have
equivalent valuable information to exchange.
cumstances do they broadcast their successes.
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Under no cirQuite the con-

trary, they are very apt to play down their catches and even
deliberately

understa~e

them.

In fact, the secretiveness of

lobstermen and clammers is legend all along the coast.
one coastal resident phrased it:

"They are the dogdamdest

bunch of liars you have ever seen.
about something.

As

They are always crying

The price of bait is always driving them

out of business, their boats always have worms, their traps-what few have survived the last storm--never hardly catch
anything.

They never admit when they are into the lobsters.

They're making lot more than you or I, but to hear them talk
you would think they were all eligible for food stamps."
The same pattern is observable in the clamming industry.
There is a state law in Maine that all clam dealers have to
record the number of men from whom they purchase clams every
day and the location where those clams were dug.
confided:

One dealer

"I just put down any old thing for the location.

No clammer is going to tell where he dug clams--especially if
the digging is good."

State officials are fully aware that

the information on places where clammers are digging is notoriously inaccurate.

As a result of this secrecy, the most

important way that men in clusters exploiting sedentary species
obtain information about fishing locations is by direct observation.

They watch each other very carefully.

Since there is

so much to be learned by observing where other men are clamming or lobstering and correlating this data with catches,
many men are very wary of anyone

ha~ging

around a dealer's

establishment, keeping close tab on catches.

One man, who

was notorious for loitering around a dealer's establishment
picking up catch details, stirred up such hostility that he
was known as the "CIA clammer."

There is no logic in the

name, but the spirit of the emotions .he stirred up is evident.
Most experienced fishermen are far more cimcumspect in observing each other's fishing behavior.
While all men in such fisheries learn a good deal by
observing each other, and by their own direct experience (i.e.
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electronic instruments, fishing success, and so on), the
degree of dependence on these sources of information differs
markedly with experience and knowledge.

Many very exper-

ienced fishermen rely primarily on their own experience and
detailed knowledge of the bottom and habits of the fish.
Some of the "highline" fishermen state that they almost
ignore what others are doing.

One very successful lobster

fisherman', with perverse pleasure I put it in the following
terms:

"There's no sense fishing with all those dubsj the

only thing they are good at is getting the gear all tangled
to hell up."
reversed.

For the novice fisherman the ratio is almost

He has little experience to draw on and only the

vaguest idea about the bottom and fish movements.

Many of

them have little choice between simply trying to learn where
fish are through their own experimentation (not usually very
successful) or to follow around an older, more knowledgeable
fishermen.

Inexperienced clammers will sometimes dig within

a few feet of experienced men.

In the lobster fishery, in-

experienced fishermen often put their traps in the same place
experienced men have theirs.

Naturally, the experienced

fishermen greatly resent this kind of behavior.

Sometimes

they will rid themselves of the pests by violent means.

One

of the authors has seen one older clammer threaten a man who
was going to dig in the exact same location with a clam rake.
On another occasion, we witnessed an incident in which an
older fisherman flattened the tires on the pick-up truck of
a man who was following him.

In the lobster fishery, exper-

ienced fishermen will sometimes simply "cut off" or destroy
the traps of the men who have "dumped (their traps) on top of
him. "
Ordinarily, however, more subtle means are used by experienced fishermen to discourage their shadows.

Deceptive

tactics are relatively easy for those involved in the clam
fishery.

Inexperienced fishermen locate more experienced men

by seeing them on particular clam flats, asking them or trusted
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acquaintences where they are digging , noting where their pickup truck or automobiles are parked, or literally following
them as they leave their houses to dig clams.

As a result,

experienced clammers who are having too much unwelcome company on the flats are very reticent to tell anyone where they
are currently digging, take pains to park their trucks and
cars in out of the way places, and go in the dark to places
they feel will be especially productive.

They are also very

careful not to visit places they are planning to dig until
they are ready to harvest the clams there.

One of the authors

spent a day with a very experienced clammer, who had been
plagued by what he called "admirers."

'Atleast three hours
I

of the day was taken up with ploys that could have come from
a spy thriller.

Throughout the day, we went through a whole

series of diversionary tactics designed to confuse and confound the competition.

The truck was pulled off to the side

of the road to see if we were being followed; the truck was
carefully hidden while we were actually digging clams; the
best clamming spots were actually dug before daylight and
after dark when we could not be observed easily.

At the end

of the day we sold our clams to this f;i..sherman's "regular
dealer" who he said he trusted.

He told the dealer's assis-

tant a bald faced lie when the topic of digging location was
broached, misrepresenting our actual location by a good sixty
miles.
told

On the way home, I was sworn to secrecy and pointedly
I would never have been brought along if I had not had

the reputation of keeping my mouth shut.
Nor was this highline clammer being unduly suspicious
and secretive.

On two occasions, one of the authors has

heard young local boys with an obvious penchant for trouble
describe how they waited in their car outside the home of a
very good clammer and followed him everywhere he went for the
entire day.

Apparently, this resulted in several shouting

matches, with the parties almost coming to blows at one point.
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In the lobster fishery, other ploys are used to mislead
novices and others.

There are well-verified stories of

experienced men anchoring buoys on pieces of concrete blocks
to simulate a string of traps.

Often men will put actual

traps in places they know are not productive of lobsters as
a disguise.

One knows where a fisherman has placed his traps

from the location of the buoys, but there is no way one can
tell which of these traps are producing.

By deliberately

putting a few traps in "poor spots," highline fishermen hope
to confuse the issue even further.

On several occasions, we

have heard of "highline" lobster fishermen putting strings
of traps dangerously close to shore when a storm was brewing,
and moving them into deeper water at the last minute.

Any

novices lured into the shallow water by these tactics are
almost certain to lose a few traps.
only victims.

Nor are raw novices the

On one offshore island, one moderately good

lobster fisherman who was being accompanied by one of the
authors lost a string of 17 traps by "dumping on ll a highline
fisherman just before a gale.

Still, the rewards of follow-

ing a highline fisherman are high enough so that most novices
and even more experienced fishermen are guilty of the practice
at one time or another.
Some of the other elaborate ploys lobster fishermen use
to confuse other fishermen need to be mentioned.

One Casco

Bay fishermen both authors know well discovered that there
were still good catches of lobsters to be had on mud bottom,
in deep water, some 10 to 15 miles offshore in the summer.
All of the other fishermen in the region concentrated their
traps close inshore since it is widely known in the entire
industry that lobsters migrate toward shore in the summer.
This fishermen knew there were no great numbers of lobsters
offshore, but there were enough still there to make fishing
very profitable if there were no competition for them.

In

order to keep his find secret, he bought an extra colored
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sail for his lobster boat.

l

In the morning, he would hoist

his ordinary white sail on his boat, and fish strings of
traps placed inshore, talking constantly on the radio to
call attention to himself and the location he was fishing.
In the afternoon, he would separate himself from any boats
in the immediate area, raise the colored sail, and go fishing far outside in deep water all afternoon.

Late in the

afternoon, he would come back inshore, raise his wite sail
and come into the dock to sell his large catch, pretending
he had been fishing inshore waters all day long.

2

The secret

of this location was also maintained by deceptive banter at
"the buyer's dock.

At last report, his ploy still had not

been discovered, and he was enjoying the best summer and fall
fishing he had ever had.

This fisherman gleefully told one

of the authors that other fishermen used to watch him very
carefully and even pull some of his inshore traps, to see if
the secret of his inshore traps could not be accounted for
in terms of a different kind of bait or different heads, or
some change in trap construction.
All of this is not to indicate that fishermen exploiting
sedentary species never exchange information verbally.

Older

fishermen will openly instruct their sons and younger k1nsmen
in fishing techniques, and fishermen when they meet together

IOn lobster boats a small sail is usually raised on a
small mast mounted on the stern of the vessel to steady
the boat in a wind.
It is usually obvious at a distance to
a couple of miles or even more.
2To those unfamiliar with the sea, it might seem difficult for a boat to slip away from others and remain hidden
on the open ocean.
Lobster boats, however, are so small
that they are usually difficult to spot with the naked eye
from sea level when they are more than two miles away. Even
on a good day in summer there is usually enough haze to make
them difficult to see as little as a mile and a half away.
Sometimes in rough weather, fog, or rain these small boats
can be difficult to locate a few hundred yards away.
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talk about only one thing:

fishing.

But fishermen will ex-

change information about catches, income, and currently productive locations only with a selected few people, and then
only in a very guarded manner, usually holding back some of
the critical details.

Despite the fact that many lobstermen,

wormers and clammers are friendly, deception and secrecy mark
relationships between men in such clusters.

Men exploiting

sedentary species gain a great deal of information on their
own or by direct observation of others.
In the herring fishery and swordfishery, by way of contrast, the duration of knowledge is very short.

Since its

value is much less, a great deal of information is openly
exchanged.

Schools of fish which are in one place in the

early morning may be completely dispersed and in other locations by noon.

In a day's time, such fish can often be

dozens of miles away from the place they were originally
spotted.

The problem is to locate schools, and once located

to stay with them.

In such fisheries, much of the time at

sea is spent searching for fish.

There is little sense

keeping the existence of such schools secret, because they
will not be in the same place long.

In these pelagic fisher-

ies, there are no fishing locations or "sweet spots," but
merely places where fish happened
them.

to be when one caught

As a result, boats in such fleets actively aid each

other in their search for fish.

They tend to fan out over

a wide area and when fish are found, inform at least some
other members of the fleet.

They might not call other boats

until they have a full load of fish or are sure they have
located more fish than they can possibly exploit themselves,
but they would certainly tell other boats in a matter of a
few hours.

Moreover, such fishermen would never remain com-

pletely mum about the places they caught fish, or the fact
that they caught them.

Anyone who has spent a couple of

nights with the herring fleet is certain to observe at least
one or two instances when boats help each other in search
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operations.

Most often, communication concerning search

behavior involves laconic comments on places where
have been found.

~

fish

Of course, such information is very valu-

able in that it makes it unnecessary for other boats to
search in the same place.

When fish are found, boats will

go out of their way to inform other vessels about the location of schools.

Most inform other vessels about fish loca-

tions in the hope that they will reciprocate some time in
the future.

Herring fishermen often help each other to keep

track of schools.

Manville Davis of New Harbor, Maine recalls

one day when four seiners kept track of a huge school of herring by such cooperation.

In his own words:

"When those

Gloucestermen were coming in with a load of herring, they
would come on over and meet us and point to where the school
was and shout the distance; when we were coming in with a
load, and they were coming back out again, we would do the
same for them.

That school zigzagged a good hundred miles,

but between the bunch of us we managed to keep on them for
three days.
out.

After that, they (the fish)

just

s~emed

to peter

They (the fishermen on the other boats) was all Portogees

you know, but they was nice fellows."
Purse seiners have also been known to give each other
part of their catch when they caught more than they could
handle.

In purse seining, one does not know exactly how many

tons of fish have been caught until one pulls in the seine and
"dries up" the fish.

"Dried up" fish have to be pumped or

brailed into the boat or carrier quickly because they quickly
die for lack of oxygen when they are packed together in the
water.

Eventually they sink, taking the net to the bottom

with them.

Thus, when a purse seiner has caught more fish

than it can handle, it will usually give another nearby boat
the excess fish.

In fact, in the herring industry it is con-

sidered very bad form not to give excess catches to other
vessels.

Not only

a~e

such fish wasted, but herring men say

that if the bottom is littered with tons of dead fish, other
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schools of herring will stay away from the area permanently.
It is also considered an unfriendly and selfish act, and
even evidence of hostility.

Of course, altruism and friend-

liness are not the only reasons to give away such excess
fish.

The men who do so obviously hope the beneficaries of

their largness will reciprocate in the future.
There can be little question that the cooperation
between herring fishing boats contributes to the total success
of the boats in this fleet.

Certainly

they are able to

search a far wider area than would be possible alone.

In

addition, they are able to exert far more exploitive effort
on schools of herring by operating in this manner.
that cooperating boats can seach is enormous.

The area

In February

1978, one of the authors accompanied four pair trawlers for
a day.

These boats left Gloucester in the afternoon.

One

pair of boats went south and systematically searched around
Marblehead and Boston Harbor.

Late at night they had covered

Massachusetts Bay down as far as Plymouth, and by the middle
of the night had searched the entire shore as far south as
the Cape Cod canal.

The other pair of trawlers went first to

Provincetown, and through the afternoon and night worked their
way down the inside shore of Cape Cod.

The search areas of

these two sets of boats was sometimes no more than two or
three miles apart, as they zigzagged out from shore to search
in the middle of the Bay.

Between the four boats, they made

an effective search of the whole Massachusetts Bay.

During

this entire period, they only communicated by radio three or
four times. Nevertheless, each set of boats kept careful
tabs on the activities of the other, primarily by watching
the boat lights.

Around midnight our electronic gear indicated

a school of herring, and we made an eleven minute tow, catching
12,000 pounds of fish.

Within 25 minutes of taking the fish

aboard, the other set of pair trawlers arrived on the scene
from the other side of the Bay to see what we had found.

They

made a tow on the same school and caught a few thousand pounds
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of fish which they never would have obtained had they not
been able to observe us towing from a distance of several
miles.
It should be noted that these two sets of pair trawlers
were competitors.

One pair was owned by one of the Maine

herring prqcessing companies, the other privately by a father
and son team.

If one of these sets of boats located a school,

it was going to fish it first, with very little thought about
the welfare of the other.

Some vessels are far more success-

ful in this overall competition.

From the limited data at

our disposal on catches, it is clear that some pair trawlers
and purse seiners catch 500 percent more than other comparable
boats in a season.

Wadel has .observed even greater dispari-

ties in the North Sea herring fishery.

Here a "single purse

seiner may catch as much as five or ten others put together"
(Wadel 1972:107).

Thus, the kind of cooperation observed

between such herring vessels does not necessarily operate to
distribute the catch evenly.

However, there is enough com-

munication that such boats are able to search very wide areas
and focus fishing effort on the herring schools when
found.

t~ey

are

Thus, this kind of competitive cooperation increases

the total effectiveness of the
success of every boat in it.

fle~t,

if not the short term

In the herring fishery, adding

boats to the fleet fishing in a given area may be an economy
for boats which have been fishing there for some time.

Al-

though we do not have solid quantative data on the matter, we
suspect that removing boats from the fleet fishing particular
areas would often result in a more than proportional decrease
in the total number of fish caught.
Captains of fishing boats contribute to each other's
success--and the success of the total fleet--primarily in the
area of search behavior.

The phenomenon of boats sharing

excess fish with less fortunate boats is far rarer, but such
events occur often enough to cause no great stir among herring
fishermen.

In the herring fishery, it should be noted that
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there is a good deal of open communication among fishermen
not only when they are searching for fish at sea, but also
when they are ashore.

As a result, information about catches

and relative economic success are widely known among the men
of the herring fleet.

Even ashore, the men chasing the highly

mobile herring have few secrets from each other.
While no member of our research team spent any time on
swordfishing boats, information·from key informants indicates
that this fishery is similar to the herring industry.
fish are, of course, highly mobile.
found in the waters off Florida.

In the

w~nter,

Sword-

they are

In the early summer they

appear in the Gulf Stream, off southern New England, and by
early fall, they have migrated north to Newfoundland.

Late

in the fall, as the water cools, they migrate further south
again.

Many New England boats rig up for swordfishing only

in the summer months; others follow concentrations of swordfish throughout their range.

In either case, the problem is

again to locate schools of fish.

Most of the hours spent on

swordfishing boats are spent in dull search for fish, punctuated by a few minutes or hours of intense activity when
fish are harpooned.

As in the herring industry, swordfisher-

men communicate a great deal about locations of schools of
fish.

Here again, there is very little to be gained by keep-

ing fish locations secret and a great deal to be gained by
sharing information.

Information concerning fish locations

may have value for only a few hours at the most; by sharing
information, the search net of the entire fleet is greatly
increased.
Boats of the swordfishing fleet do not ordinarily communicate fish sightings when they occur.

They may, in fact,

keep their good fortune to themselves as long as they are
killing fish.
range)

However, the men of this fleet (in a given

are constantly in touch with each other and much infor-

mation about fish locations is passed via radio.

More impor-

tant, groups of these vessels meet every evening; tie their
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boats together; and engage in what has been variousuly described as an "offshore convention ll or "party" complete with
singing, drinking, storytelling, and a constant exchange of
serious information about the job at hand.

Much of the talk

is, of course, about catches, places where fish were harpooned and speculation about places where they will be found
on the morrow.
Despite the fact that groundfish are a migratory species,
found offshore in the deep waters of the Gulf of Maine in the
winter and inshore in the northern part of the Gulf in the
summer, groundfishermen are relatively secretive.

They learn

about fish locations primarily from their own experience and
from observation rather than from open verbal communication
with others.

In this sense, the groundfishery is more like

the lobster industry than the herring or swordfishery.

This

pattern of secrecy stems from the fact that while the fish
are migratory, the tows and places one can safely fish without destroying one's dragging gear are fixed.

Since the

duration of this essential knowledge is so long, information
about such fishing locations is a jealously guarded secret.
However, groundfishermen are not as secretive and uncommunicative as lobster fishermen and clammers.

While such

fishing boats are at sea, their captains are constantly on
the radio to each other, and some accurate information about
catches and fishing locations are'communicated.

However,

such fishermen rarely actively help each other either, and
as Andersen and Stiles have noted (Andersen 1972:121-128;
Stiles 1972:40-48), a good many radio messages are artfully
designed to deceive the listener about one's degree of fishing
success.
Several variations in the pattern of secrecy and communication should be noted in the groundfishery.

There is more

verbal communication of information of catches and fishing
locations in the inshore fishery, primarily because tows are
relatively well known and because information on catches is
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relatively ea3ily checked.

A man who lies about catches over

the radio may very well find the man he attempted to deceive
on the dock in a few hours watching him unload.

In such

fisheries, men often do not keep elaborate records on tows
and snags.

Some even have small pencilled maps of the tows

they commonly exploit drawn on the walls of the pilot house
where any crewman or visitor can see them.
Ordinarily, the boats fishing inshore go day-tripping
within 25 miles of their horne harbors.

Since there are only

a few tows in any given inshore area, many of the draggers
from the harbors in an entire section of the coast have each
other in view during much of the day.
Unquestionably the information skippers of inshore
groundfishing boats gain from talking to other skippers in
their cluster or observing them has a strong influence not
only on decisions concerning where to fish, but what to fish
for.

In Stonington, Maine, for example, the groundfishing

vessels fish in different locations for different kinds of
groundfish during the spring, summer and fall.
ter several shift to dragging scallops.

In the win-

These men take their

cues concerning switching species and fishing gears from two
or three highline fishermen, who are always the first to seek
out information on species arriving in the area, and the first
to change gears.

These two or three men will switch gear and

fishing grounds ahead of everyone else, and once the majority
of fishermen is convinced they have found concentrations of
a new species, they will shift onto that species as well.
This pattern shows up clearly in the catch records of the
l
local fishing cooperative.
During a period when one species
is plentiful, all boats will be exploiting this species exclusively.

The first sign of change occurs when the two or

IThe figures themselves have not been made available to
our research team. A skilled observer of the industry, who
has access to the figures, has described this pattern to us.
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three "experimenters" show no landings for a period of several days.

It is in this period that they are switching

gears and/or searching new locations for new species.

Then,

one can see a period when the "experimenters" are landing a
new species, while the majority of fishermen are still landing the "older" one.

Gradually the landings of the new

species increase while the older species landings decrease.
In this period, the majority of the groundfishermen in the
harbor are switching to the new species.

The exact same

pattern is apparent several different times a year--every
time there are marked changes in target species, to be
exact.
At times, the "experimenters" gain substantially by
being the first to switch species.

Other times they do not.

If the "experimenters" can find concentrations of a new
species quickly, and the price is good, their willingness to
invest their time in searching out a new species pays handsomely.

Sometimes the men who deliberately wait before making

a switch are the winners.

They are letting the "experimenters"

pick up all the costs of finding new species.

Those search

costs can be very substantial if it takes two or three weeks
to locate concentrations of newly arrived species while the
older species are still plentiful.
In the offshore groundfisheries, where boats range hundreds of miles, knowledge of fishing grounds is far more differential and fishermen more secretive.

Here, the areas ex-

ploited are so vast that fishermen ordinarily do not know the
details of the bottom in all offshore areas, but rather tend
to have a thorough knowledge of some, and be completely ignorant of others.

Here, knowledge of the bottom depends primarily

on the amount of experimenting and exploiting that one has been
able to do, so that older, more experienced men are apt to have
a wider knowledge of more fishing grounds than younger ones.
It should be noted that a detailed knowledge of these offshore
grounds is very costly to obtain and that there are social
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barriers to obtaining it.

Since economic success depends

primarily on a knowledge of the bottom (that is, places one
can tow safely and which are productive of fish), experienced
fishermen will rarely divulge such knowledge.

They will talk

in generalities about fishing grounds, but critical details
about snags and productive locations are rarely fully revealed.

Knowledge of fishing grounds is something learned

only through direct experience, and it is difficult to obtain
this experience with strange fishing grounds.
Many of the offshore groundfish vessels are owned by
large, vertically integrated companies whose owners expect
their captains to be able to produce fish on a reasonably
steady schedule.
fleet.

This is especially true of the redfish

Moreover, the crews of such boats want to make as

much money as possible in as few days at sea as possible.
Thus, both owners and crews judge captains by their ability
to catch a load of fish in a minimum amount of time.

Captains

of these vessels are very often on the horns of a dilemma.
If they spend too much time experimenting and learning about
new fishing grounds, their catches are sure to suffer in the
short run, and they may loose valuable crewmen and perhaps
even their jobs.

On the other hand, a captain's ability to

produce good catches consistently in reasonable time periods
depends largely on his knowledge of a large number of fishing
grounds.

Thus, an offshore captain, if he is to become a

highliner, somehow has to increase his repertoire of possible
fishing grounds despite the obstacles to gaining that experience.

The usual ploy captains use is to fish in locations

they know most of the time, and then make a few experimental
tows in strange areas, all the while pretending they are fully
knowledgeable for the benefit of the crew.

In the case of

company-owned boats, the home office is ordinarily kept fully
ignorant of such forays.
There is a marked difference in the way owners of groundfishing boats learn about the bottom as they move from one
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part of New England to another.

Some boats from the eastern

and central ports of Maine move temporarily to ports in
southern Maine, New Hampshire and northern Massachusetts in
the late winter and early spring when groundfishing is very
bad near their home harbors.

Conversely, some inshore ground-

fishing vessels move to the eastward in the summer and unload
much of their fish in ports in eastern Maine.

When these

boats are fishing in central and eastern Maine, the areas
they can fish are very circumscribed since there is a great
deal of rocky, uneven bottom in the area.

The primary pro-

blem here is to locate the holes or tows where one can safely
fish.

In the southern part of Maine, New Hampshire, and off

Massachusetts, there is a great deal more sandy and gravel
bottom.

Here, the problem is largely one of locating con-

centrations of fish--locations of tows are far less of a
problem.

This situation markedly affects the way fishermen

obtain information about fishing locales.

In the eastern

part of Maine, where critical knowledge about tows has long
duration, men are much more secretive so that a good deal of
data about fishing locales is obtained through observation.
In the southern part of this region, where the problem is
to locate fish concentrations on wide expanses of useable
bottom, the duration of knowledge is relatively short since
the fish are constantly moving.

Here, there is a great deal

of verbal contact between skippers of boats, and an active
exchange of information concerning fishing locations.

So

marked is the difference in attitudes and cooperation that
two owners of inshore draggers, who live in different ports
in central Maine, have said they were seriously thinking of
moving to southern Maine because fishermen there were so much
friendlier.
Others

h~ve

remarked on the situational aspects of this

difference in willingness to communicate accurate information
about groundfish locations.

The exact same men, they say,

are much more open and friendly when they are fishing out of
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ports in the southern part of the Gulf of Maine than they are
when fishing in the more central and northern areas.

Some

men have not only noted the phenomenon, but have also pinpointed the cause.

"When we fish out of Portsmouth and York

(southern region), we all swap information.

Sometimes Cashes

will outfish Jeffreys' and at times you can do as well at
Boone Island and other inshore grounds as anywhere else.

Up

here (New Harbor) everyone has his favorite fishing hole and
he wants to keep it secret.

The same man who will tell you

anything when we are down south, won't give you the time of
day up here."
In summary, then, in all fisheries in northern New
England, fishermen learn a great deal about fish locations
from other fishermen.

It is the men with whom one is com-

peting for the same species in the same area who are the best
source of information on the locations of concentrations of
fish.

The men in the same cluster use each other in much the

same way they do electronic gear--as extensions of their own
senses in searching for fish.

Moreover, in all fisheries,

captains obtain information from other fishermen concerning
fishing locations both by direct verbal contact and by observation.

The proportion of information they obtain from each

source differs according to the duration of knowledge, which
ultimately is related to the mobility of the species being
hunted.

Among men fishing for lobsters, clams and marine

worms, which are highly sedentary, knowledge of the locations
of concentrations lasts a long while so that it is in the
best interests of a fisherman to be very secretive.

The fish

he does not talk about today, he can come back to fish tomorrow.

Much the same pattern is true in the groundfishery--

especially in the offshore areas of the Gulf of Maine and the
more eastern areas of Maine where a knowledge of fixed tows
is crucial.

In the herring industry and swordfishery, more

information is exchanged verbally about concentrations of
fish.

Here the problem is to find the moving fish.
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Once con-

centrations are found, there is little sense keeping locations secret since the fish are not likely to be in the same
place again.

As a result, men in these fisheries are more

prone to exchange information about fish concentrations in
the hope others will reciprocate.
Whether fishermen obtain information about fish concentrations actively or passively (observation, eavesdropping
on radio conversations) information from other skippers
greatly enhances one's ability to find fish.

A man cut off

from contact with other vessels has far less chance of finding fish than if he were part of a widespread search net.

It

is the utility of the information from other vessels fishing
for the same species that makes it highly desirable to form
the kinds of networks, friendship ties, and reference groups
that characterize all clusters.
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CHAPTER 4

INNOVATIVE BEHAVIOR IN FISHING CLUSTERS
A.

Introduction
Fishermen imitate the behavior of other men in ways

which have long-term implications for the formation and
characteristics of clusters.

The most important long run

imitative behavior relates to the adoption of innovations.
We argue that in the face of tremendous heterogeneity and
uncertainty, fishermen adopt innovations which they have
seen other men use with obvious success.

If the external

environment is stable for a long period, this tendency to
adopt successful innovations results in a relatively
uniform technology being used by all of the men fishing a
particular species.

Conversely, we argue that the charac-

teristics of the innovations adopted will vary considerably
with the traits of the cluster involved.

In short,

clusters and technology are actually mutually interelated,
with cluster characteristics influenced by the technology
adopted; and the responsiveness to innovations influenced
by the cluster characteristics, especially the degree of
cluster packing.

In this section, we will first examine

the role of cluster membership in the adoption of innovations.

Second, we will discuss the effect of cluster

packing on the adoption of innovations.
In the past 40 years an enormous body of literature
has been published concerning the social, economic and
cultural factors influencing the diffusion of innovations.
It is, in fact, one of the few topics that has been studiedby people trained in every social science.
different
struck

b~

In all these

disciplines, students of innovation have been
the fact that in any culture, the adoption of

innovations is highly differential, with some people
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adopting them ahead of others
l76ff).

(Rogers and Shoemaker 1971:

Correspondingly, certain kinds of innovations

are adopted relatively speedily in comparison with others.
Until very recently, the social scientists interested in
innovation have asked two key questions:

(1)

What kinds

of innovations are apt to be adopted faster than others?
(2) What kinds of people are more likely to adopt innovations?

Several studies have demonstrated that inno-

vations which are "advantageous," "uncomplicated,"
"triable," or "observable" will be adopted at a faster rate
than those which do not have these characteristics (Rogers
and Burdge 1972:353-354).

Others have pointed out that

rate of diffusion is related to profitability (Mansfield
1961).

The people who are said to be more likley to adopt

innovations--regardless of type--were younger, better
educated, more cosmopolitan than those who were slower to
adopt innovations

(Rogers and Shoemaker 1971:176-191).

In the past few years, however, this approach to the
study of innovation has seemed more like a blind alley than
an avenue to the truth.

Certainly social scientists taking

this approach have produced very contradictory results, and
few generalizations which are universally verifiable.

The

problem, it is increasingly recognized, lies in the fact
that this approach to the study of innovation treats innovator and innovation as separate phenomena, and considers
adoption of innovations out of any cultural context.
Recently, a number of researchers have come to the conclusion that a far more fruitful approach to the study
of innovation is to consider the "match" between the
innovation and the needs of the individual adopting it.
That is, innovations are adopted most quickly when they
solve some problem for the individual considering their
adoption.

This adaptive approach to the study of inno-

vation appears as if it will be very fruitful (Downs, and
Mohr 1976:700-714).

Certainly many fishing innovations
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are adopted because they are matched to the needs of
individual fishermen.

Indeed, much of the data we have

collected concerning technical change in the New England
fishing industry makes very little sense in any other
context (Acheson and Reidman 1980a).
However, all students of innovation have noted that
the diffusion of innovations is a very complicated phenomenon in which a large number of social and economic variables
must be considered.

Those students who want to investigate

the match between an innovation and its adopters have been
forced to consider an even larger number of variables.
Recently, several studies have appeared in which dozens of
variables of all kinds have been treated by advanced
statistical techniques in an attempt to account for the
adoption of innovation..

In such studies personal variables

on the adopter such as age, education, experience, marital
status, and so on are included, along with information on
the innovation and data on the firms doing the adopting
(that is, firm size, total assets, and so on).
However, in the entire literature on innovation little
attention has been given to two sets of variables which are
critical for understanding the adoption of fishing gear in
northern New England.

First, very little has been said

concerning the kind of industrial groupings that owners of
firms belong to--especially the kind of competition firms
are facing in their decision to adopt innovations, and the
kind of information they obtain from those competing firms.
In many studies it is assumed that information about innovations comes primarily from change agents

(for example,

extension agents), or from the mass media (Rogers and
Shoemaker 1971). But to the best of our knowledge,
there has been no study of industrial social units such
as the ones we call "cl us ters" and their effect on the
adoption process.

Our model suggests that the competition

a firm faces from firms producing similar products
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influences the innovation adopted.

The data on the fishing

industry of northern New England support this contention.
Second, little attention has been paid to the kinds of
knowledge needed for successful adoption of innovations.
Many studies mention concepts such as "contact" with an
innovation or the "early knowers" or "late knowers" as if
simple awareness alone is the key to adoption (Rogers and
Shoemaker 1971:l07f£).

Certainly some students of inno-

vation have recognized that there are different kinds of
knowledge that are involved in the adoption process.
and Schoemaker

Rogers

make a distinction between three

different kinds of knowledge:

"awareness," "how- to

knowledge," and "principles knowledge"

(1971: 106-197).

This distinction is also made by Arrow (1962).

"How-to

knowledge" is defined as the information necessary to use
an innovation properly; while "principles knowledge"
involves an understanding of the axioms underlying the
innovation.

However, Rogers and Shoemaker do very little

by way of linking this classification to the adoption of
different kinds of innovations.

As we shall see, ti1e type

of knowledge involved and the factors influencing access to
this knowledge playa critical role in influencing decisions
concerning the adoption or non-adoption of innovations.
B.

The Influences of Cluster Membership on the Adoption of
Fishing Innovations
During the course of the past two years, we have

gathered and analyzed data on some 20 technical innovations
currently being adopted by members of the fishing industry
in New England.

We deliberately picked innovations

requiring different amounts of capital to ascertain the
effect of investment requirements on investment behavior.
Specifically, we studied the factors influencing the
adoption of metal lobster traps--a type of technology which
is inexpensive enough that anyone wanting to experiment with
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this gear is able to do so.

We also studied 18 moderately

expensive innovations, such as Loran C, gillnets, radar,
scanning sonar, otter trawls, and VHF radio, which generally
cost several thousand dollars.

We also studied, at the

other extreme, the adoption of pair trawlers, which cost
more than $500,000 each.

Both quantitative and qualitative

information were gathered on the factors influencing the
adoption of all of these types of innovations.

We framed

a series of hypotheses concerning the adoption of these
innovations, and used standard statistical techniques to
analyze them.

In all cases, our sample was large enough

so that the results were highly significant statistically.
The single exception was the pair trawlers.

Since only 16

of these large vessels have been adopted in all parts of
New England we. did not have a large enough sample to even
attempt a statistical analysis.

The specific results of

our findings are contained in two articles (see Acheson
and Reidman 1980ai Acheson 1978) .
The factors explaining the adoption of all of these
innovations are complicated indeed.

Several are associated

with the adoption of each innovation studied.

In fact, no

two innovations in the entire study could be explained by
the exact same set of variables.

This strongly reinforces

the point made in some of the newest studies of innovation-namely, that different innovations are accepted by different
people to solve different problems (Acheson and Reidrnan
1980ai Duchesneau, Cohn and Dutton 1980).

However, there

are some factors that are connected to the adoption of
most of the innovations studied.

Some variables point up

the importance of clusters on the decision to adopt new
technology.

In order to demonstrate the importance of

cluster behavior in the mix of facets influencing adoption
decisions, we will discuss several innovations, beginning
with lobster traps, the most inexpensive, and ending with
the most costly and complicated.
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B.l

Metal Lobster Traps
In 1977 and 1978, there was little question that

lobster traps made of aluminized wire and vinyl-coated
wire were superior to the old style oak lobster traps.
Even though the metal traps cost more to buy, and last
a shorter length of time, they increase physical productivity sufficiently to be a sound investment (Acheson
1978:24).

Nevertheless, only certain men in certain

harbors adopted large numbers of these traps at a rapid
rate.

A detailed study of the diffusion of metal traps

revealed that two factors were of overriding importance
in their adoption:

career cycle of fishermen, and the

cluster from which they came.

In the area where this

study was carried out, there are substantial differences
in the personal characteristics of early vs. late adopters
of metal traps.

The men who adopted metal traps early are

more committed to the industry, and certainly have more
invested.

Their average age is 41.3 years--in the height

of their career.
not a hobby.

Lobstering for them is an occupation,

They are constantly experimenting with tech-

niques to increase production.
There is a bimodal distribution of the age frequencies
of the late adopters; many are young men in the early years
of their career, while others are relatively old.

The

reasons these classes of men have little interest in the
adoption of metal traps differ substantially.

The older

men are in the process of retracting their fishing operations and retiring.

They want to depreciate their gear

and get out of business.

The young men are more interested

in purchasing wooden traps, both because they consider them
less risky and because they can get more of the cheaper
wooden traps.

Since they have limited capital, and want

to build up their operations as quickly as possible,
wooden traps seem the better buy (Acheson 1978:32).
However, it should be noted that the adoption of metal
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traps was very spotty, with the men from some harbors taking
on this gear long before others.

The concepts of "early

adopter" and "late adopter" have meaning only within the
context of a given harbor.

Specifically, the adoption of

metal gear was studied in five harbors in the Muscongus
Bay area of Maine:

Friendship, Bremen, New Harbor, Round

Pond and Pemaquid.

In this area, metal traps were first

used in Bremen in 1974, and by 1976, some lobster
fishermen in that town had converted completely to metal
traps, and all fishermen had some of them.

However, the

diffusion of these traps to fishermen in other nearby
towns was very slow.

By January 1977, only two men from

New Harbor had any metal traps and they had only a few.
None of the men in Round Pond or Pemaquid--only a few miles
from B.remen--were even experimenting' wi th such traps.

By

this time, however, a number of men in Friendship (across
Muscongus Bay from the Pemaquid Peninsula) had adopted
large numbers.

By 1978, when our study was completed,

at least half of the men in New Harbor had some metal
traps, and four men from Pemaquid were experimenting with
them.

None of the men in Round Pond was interested, despite

the fact that Round Pond is only four miles from New Harbor
in one direction and six miles from Bremen in the other.
In short, the social units involved (that is, harbors, which
are clusters in the case of the lobster industry) played an
important role in the diffusion of metal traps.

Once traps

were established in a particular harbor, they diffused
throughout the "harbor gang" rela ti vely quickly.

However,

diffusion of such traps between clusters or harbor gangs
occurred very slowly.
This diffusion pattern is related to the network ties
and sources of knowledge available to lobster fishermen.
The reason metal traps and other innovations diffuse slowly
between harbors is because of the lack of communication and
hostility between members of different harbor gangs.
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Within

a harbor gang these are dense network ties so that knowledge
of innovations spreads rapidly.

Successful lobster fisher-

men do not give others information about fishing locations,
or much of anything else for that matter.

However, once an

innovation has been adopted by some members of the gang, it
can be observed and its relative efficiency can be more
easily judged.

Once metal traps had been introduced into

particular harbors, it became apparent that they were
relatively more efficient, and they spread very quickly.
The question remains, given the relative lack of
interaction

and the distrust existing between members of

different harbor gangs, how does information about innovations cross boundaries of these clusters?

The data we

have gathered on the diffusion of metal traps indicates
that certain highline fishermen who have wide-ranging
social ties

play an essential role in the transmission

of information about innovations.

The vast majority of

the fishermen in Pemaquid, New Harbor, and Round Pond
said they obtained information about metal traps from men
in their own harbors.

Several highline fishermen, by way

of contrast, said they heard about such traps and were
convinced to buy them by talking with friends from
Bremen--the town where metal traps were first adopted.
Despite this evidence that ideas and awareness of innovations can be transmitted between "clusters" there are
clearly impediments to the transmission of information
from one cluster to another.

This means that cluster

membership is a key factor in the diffusion of innovations
in the lobster industry.

Whether one hears about an

innovation or not, and one's ability to observe it in
operation, depends on whether one comes from a cluster
where the innovation is established.
B.2

Innovations in the Fin-Fishery
Cluster membership is also important in the adoption of
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the intermediate cost innovations, although the importance
of clusters in the adoption process varies considerably
depending on the particular innovation.
factors influencing the adoption of 18

Information on the
intermediate cost

innovations was collected by a team of interviewers in the
summer of 1978

from captains of 190 fin-fishing boats in
l
every major harbor in Maine and New Hampshire.
These
vessels represent approximately 65 percent of all yearround fin-fishing boats in this area.

Information was

collected by personal interviews on the boats and docks
where the boat, equipment and crew could be observed.
Two kinds of informations were recorded on the
interview form:

(1) information on the individual and

his personal history in fishing (education, marital status,
experience in fishing, and soon), and (2) information on
fishing operations and equipment.

The average interview

took about an hour and a half; a few lasted far longer.
Thus, this study provided a great deal of information on
the kinds of changes occurring in the fishing industry
and the traits of the men making them.

Special attention

was paid to changes in boats, electronic gear, and fishing
gear.
Specifically, we studied the adoption of boats that
were significantly larger than the boat the fisherman
previously owned; a larger boat is an innovation, since

-

its adoption requires quantum increases in skill levels.
There were four kinds of fishing gear studied:

gillnets,

otter trawls, pair trawls and longlining gear.

Last, we

' 1 Our stud y 0 f t h
ese"lnnovatlons was comp 1 ete 1 y
separate from the study of the factors influencing the
diffusion of metal lobster traps. The trap study was done
in the summer and fall of 1977 and the winter of 1978; it
involved only lobstermen from four adjacent harbors in
central Maine.
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studied the adoption of the following kinds of electronic
gear:

depth finders, depth recorders, scanning sonar,

radar, automatic pilot, CB radio, VHF radio (very High
Frequency), Loran A, Loran C, and Loran C plotter.
These electronic devices fall into three functional
categories.

The CB radio and VHF radio are obviously used

for communication.
aids to navigation.

Radar and auto pilot are essentially
Depth finders, depth recorders, and

scanning sonar are used fundamentally to locate fish.
These fish finding devices operate by projecting a sound
wave outward from the boat.

The bottom of the ocean or

schools of fish register as flashes of light on cathode
ray tubes, in the case of depth finders and scanning
sonar, and as graphs drawn on paper in the case of depth
recorders.

Loran A and Loran C allow the fisherman to

locate the position of his boat with extreme accuracy.l
They are used not only as navigational devices, but
also in finding fishing locations and in locating fixed
gear.

The Loran C plotter which graphically indicates on

a chart where the vessel has been has many uses in the
search for fish

(for example, helping draggers avoid going

over the bottom twice, aiding pair trawlers in finding
schools of herring) .
The data from this study were coded by the interviewers
who collected the information, keypunched, and compiled at
the University of Maine computer center.

These data were

lThe location is determined by the intersection of
radio beams emanating from fixed stations. The fisherman
notes the number of microseconds it takes for the beam to
reach a station, and finds his position on specially
prepared maps.
*At present, the older Loran A system is being replaced
by Loran C.
The Loran A stations are scheduled to be closed
completely in the next few years.

273

then analyzed by a linear probability model to examine relationships between socio-economic variables and the adoption
of various innovations.

In this

analysi~,

we attempted to

account for 18 dependent variables, which measured innovation,
by regressing each definition of innovation on a subset of 39
independent variables.

Three different kinds of dependent

variables were used in this study:

(1)

those representing

the adoption or non-adoption of a single gear type (for example, Loran C, otter trawl),

(2) more compley definitions

of innovation involving the adoption or non-adoption of any
innovation out of a group of innovations (for example, making
any major changes in primary fishing gear), and. (3) the number of types of major changes in gear or technique the fishermen made.

It should be noted that 14 of the 18 dependent

variables involve a simple definition of innovation--namely
the adoption of a single type of equipment.
Some of the independent variables investigated are relatively standard in studies of innovation; others were selected to test hypotheses concerning unique features of the
fishing industry.

The dependent variables used in this

study are listed in Table 4; the independent variables in
Table 5.

The regression statistics for these innovations

are summarized in Table 6.
Table 6 contains only information on the regression coefficients for each independent variable in all 18 regression
equations.

We have not put in this table the value of the

regression coefficient or the level of statistical significance.

This table contains only the signs of the coefficients

if they were significant at least at the .10 level.

Results

above the .10 level were ignored as statistically insignificant.

We have simplified our regression results in this way to
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TABLE 4
Definitions of Dependent Variables Used in
Regression Analysis of Innovation in
the Fin-Fish~ry of Maine and New Hampshire
Simple Variables
1.

Adoption/Nonadoption of Depth Finder

2.

Adoption/Nonadoption of Depth Recorder

3.

Adoption/Nonadbption of Scanning Sonar

4.

Adoption/Nonadoption of Radar

5.

Adoption/Nonadoption of CB Radio

6.

Adoption/Nonadoption of VHF Radio

7.

Adoption/Nonadoption of Auto pilot

8.

Adoption/Nonadoption of Loran A

9.
10.

Adoption/Nonadoption of Loran C

11.

Adoption/Nonadoption of Gillnets

12.

Adoption of Bottom Trawl after having lobster traps

13.

Adoption of Gillnets after having lobster traps

14.

Adopting a new boat which is a least seven feet larger
than past boat

Adoption/Nonadoption of Bottom Trawl

Complex Variables
15.

Adoption of a new Primary Gear Type (e.g.,
bottom trawl to gillnets)

16.

Making a major change in Primary Fishing Gear (e.g.,
change to midwater trawl, pair trawl or scottish seine
from any other gear type)

17.

Adopting any major piece of electronic gear (i.e.,
Loran A, Loran C, Fish Scope, Scanning Sonar)

18.

Number of major types of innovations adopted.
(The
value of this variable could range between 0 and 3
depending on whether the person adopted a larger boat,
a major piece of electronic gear, or made a major change
in primary fishinq gear) .

Source:

Acheson and Reidman (1980a:Table 2)
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changing from

TABLE 5
Definitions of Independent Variables Used in
Regression Analysis of Innovation in the
Fin-Fishery of Maine and New Hampshire
Type of Independent
Variable
Age
Education

1
2
3
4

Size of Firm*

5
6
7
8

Fishing Success

9
10
11

Wife's Income

12

Information and
Cluster Variables

13
14
15
16
17
18

Expectations and
Opportuni ti es

19
20

Fishing Status

Definition of
Variables

Number

21

Fishermen's age
Fishermen's age squared
Number of years of formal
education
Special formal education in
fishing*
Over 1 million dollars in assets*
$150,000 to $1,000,000 in assets*
$30,000 to $150,000 in assets*
Over $30,000 in assets*
(Note: Variables 5 to 8
compare size of firm to firms
under $30,000 in assets.)
"Highliner"-Highly successful
fisherman*
Average *
Highliner or Average" *
(Note: variables 9 to 11
compare fishing success with
novice fishermen.)
Wife of fishermen had steady,
secure, well paying job*
Number of ports visited in past
year
Member of fishermen's cooperative*
Member of fisherman's political
organization*
Attended major fishing exposition in past year*
Total number of kinsmen fishing
Total number of kinsmen fishing
in horne port
II

Optimistic about opportunities
now *
Optimistic about fishing opportunities five years in future*
Full-time or part-time fisherman*
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TABLE 5 (CONTINUED)
Type of Independent
Variable
Fishing Experience

Primary Species
(sub industry)

Definition of
Variables

Number
22
23
24
25

Number of years in fishing
Fishing 0 to 5 years*
Fishing 6 to 15 years*
Fishing 16 to 25 years*

26

(Note: Variables 23 to 25
compare years fishing to men
fishing over 25 years.)
Other industry (non-lobster,
non-herring, non-groundfish)*
Groundfish*
Herring*

27
28

Geographic Region

29
30

Market Access

31

Possession of
Superior Gear Types

32

(Note: Variables 26 to 28 are
all being compared with the
lobster industry.)
West of Penobscot Bay*
East of Penobscot Bay*
(Note: Variables 29 and 30
are compared with the large
urban ports of Portland and
Rockland. )
Groundfish dealer, processor
or broker in home port*
Fishermen and depth recorder
on past or present boat*
Fishermen does not have any
groundfish or herring gear*
Has VHF on past boat*
Has VHF on present boat*
Does not have boat capable of
fishing offshore*
Has Loran C or Loran C
plotter on past boat*
Has Loran C or Loran C
plotter on present boat*
Has stop seine or weir*

33
34
35
36
37
38
39
*Indicates a binary variable.
Source:

Acheson and Reidman (1980a:Table 3)
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TABLE 6
Summary of Significant Independent Variables on 18 Innovation
Definitions in the Maine/New Hampshire Fin-Fishing Industry
Indep.
Var.
(See
Table
5 for
Labels)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
·16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39

Dependent Variable (See Table 5 for labels)
1
0
0
0
0

0

0

+
0
0

0
0
0

0
0
+
0

2
+
0
0
0

3
0
0
0

4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18

0
0 +
0 0
+
0 0 + 0 +
0 0 + 0 0 0
+ 0 0
+
0
+ 0 +
+
+
+ 0 +
+
0
0
- 0 +
- - 0
0
0
0 +
0 0 + + 0 0 +
0 0 0 0 - 0 0
0 0
- 0 o + + 0 + - 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 - - - - 0 0 + + 0 + 0 +
o- 0 - 0 0
0 + - + 0 0 +
0 0
0 0 0 0

0 0
0 0
0 0 - 0
0 + 0
0

0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 o - 0
+ 0 - 0
+ - - 0 0 0 + ,0 - +
0 o - o
+ 0 + 0

-

0
0

0

0
0
0

-

0
0
0
0
+
+

0
+ 0
+ 0

+
+

0

-

+
+ 0
0 +
0 0
+ 0
- 0
- 0
0 0
0 0

0

0
0

0

-

0
0

-

0
0

0
0

+

+
0

0

0

0

0
0
0

0

0
0

0
0

0

-

+
+
0
0

+

-

0

-

0

+ 0 +
0 + 0
+ 0 +
o- +
+ - 0
0 0 0 0
- - 0
o- 0

0
0

-

+
0

+
+

-

0

-

-

0
0

0
0

+
0

0
0
0

+
+
+
+

0
+
0
0

-

-

0

-

0

0

-

-

0

+

0

0

0

0
0
0
0

0
0

0
0
0
0
0

+
0

+
0
0
0

0
0

-

0

+

0
0
0
0
0

0

+

0
0
+

0

0

+
+

0

0

0
0

+
0

0

0

-

0

0

0

0

.0
0
0

0

+
0
0
0
0
0
0

0

0
0

o0 0

0

0

0
0
0
0

0

-

0
0
0
+

0
0

0

+
If a regression coefficient is significant at the .10 level,
then its sign (+ or -) is entered in the table. Those independent variables having insignificant regression coefficients
are designated by zeros. Variables not included in an equation
are indicated by blank spaces in the appropriate ,column.

Source:

Acheson and Reidman (1980a:Tab1e 5)
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allow us to compare the variables associated with the
adoption or non-adoption of these innovations, unencumbered
by a welter of statistical details.
It took many months to collect, code, and analyze the
data summarized in Table 6.

It would take a good many

pages to explain fully all of these data and the enthnography of the fishing industry which they illuminate.
is not necessary for our purposes.

This

It is, however, critical

to notice two aspects of this information.
First, the information in Table 6 demonstrates that the
social and economic variables explaining the adoption of one
innovation are very different from those associated with the
adoption of others.

For example, the adoption of gillnets

is positively associated with moderate-sized firms and
having a groundfish dealer in the home port, negatively
associated with having groundfish as a major target species,
and the area of the coast west of Penobscot Bay.

To pick

another example, adoption of scanning sonar is positively
linked to a high level of fishing success, membership in
a fisherman's political organization, number of kinsmen in
one's home port, optimism about the future of fishing,
groundfish as a primary target species, the area west of
Penobscot Bay, and having a groundfish dealer in one's
home port.

It is negatively associated with the total

number of kinsmen fishing, optimism about fishing, present
fishing conditions, under five years experience in fishing,
and a lack of groundfish and herring gear.

Very different

sets of variables are linked to still other innovations
'listed in Table 6.

This indicates that these different

innovations are a.dopted by men with different characteristics to solve distinct sets of problems.
reasons that these innovations were adopted

The different
and the

theoretical implications of this behavior have been
discussed in detail in another paper (Acheson and Reidman
19 BOa) •
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Second, although different sets of variables are
associated with the adoption of different innovations, there
are certain variables which show consistent patterns for
large numbers of the innovations studied.

Some of these

patterns can be explained by reference to the general social
science literature, but most require consideration of conditions specific in the fishing industry--particularly the
types of clusters involved.
In the literature on innovation, age and education are
often thought to be important determinations of innovation
(Mansfield 1971:198-199; Rogers and Shoemaker 1971:186).
Neither of these variables is significant in explaining
the adoption of most of the innovations we studied in the
fin-fishery of Maine and New Hampshire.

The data in

Table 6 indicate that education played a role in the
adoption of only Loran A and VHF Radio, and had a negative
correlation with the adoption of depth recorders and a
significantly larger boat.

However, years of formal

education had no significant impact, either positive or
negative, on the response to the oti1er 14 innovations
studied.

Fishermen themselves often state that formal

education bears little relationship to fishing success and
the ability to expand one's fishing business.

These statis-

tics indicate that such stories have a solid basis in fact.
While age was a critical element in the adoption of
metal lobster traps, it played very little role in the
decision to adopt these other innovations.

In the entire

set of equations represented in Table 6, the variables on
age and age squared were significant in only three cases.
In almost all economic studies of innovation, firm
size is identified as a critical variable (for example,
Mansfield 1968a:l07-108).

In 11 of the 18 equations, the

variable on the size of the firm was positively associated
with the adoption of innovations of all kinds, indicating
that larger firms had a stronger tendency to adopt
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innovations in comparison with the smallest firms
than $30,000 in assets).

(less

The intermediate sized firms

($30,000 to $1,000,000) were the most likely to adopt
innovations.

There is little surprising in this pattern.

The smallest firms in the sample were owned by men who
fished for lobster most of the time, or who had small
stop seine operations.

Many do not have either the

financial resources to purchase a lot of equipment or
the need, since lobster fishing requires only a moderatesize boat and very little electronic gear.

The largest

sized firms are also less likely to take on larger boats
or additional fishing gear, doubtless because they already
have some of the biggest,. most well equipped boats in the
fleet.
In the literature on innovation, there is strong
evidence that an entrepreneur's perceptions concerning
future earnings play a very important role in influencing
adoption of innovations--especially innovations requiring
substantial investment (Mansfield 1963:290-311; 1968b:4-S).
However, in our data, variables on perception of present
and future fishing opportunities were positively associated
with the adoption of only six

of the innovations studied.

In essence, these psychological variables were relatively
unimportant in explaining the total set of innovations.
Two of the most interesting variables are membership
in a fishermen's political association and number of
kinsmen in the local area in fishing.

Both of these

variables were positively associated with the adoption
of a large number of innovations studied, and both are
indicative of the important role which clusters play in
the adoption of such innovations.
Those who were the adopters of Sonar, Radar, VFH
Radio and Loran A had a large number of kinsmen who were
fishermen operating from their own home ports, and a
lower than average number of kinsmen in fishing in other
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ports.

Clearly, in these cases, local kinship ties were

used as a means of obtaining accurate information and
experience necessary to adopt these innovations successfully.
In this regard, it should be noted that all of these innovations are relatively expensive, and all require skill
and "hands on" experience to use effectively.

The U.S.

Navy and Coast Guard require radar and sonar operators
to go to school for a period of several months before they
are allowed to stand a shipboard watch, and even then they
are under the command of a petty officer with several years
experience.

While the radar and sonar type equipment used

on fishing boats to navigate and find fish are not as
complicated as the equipment used by the military, it
takes some experience to be able to interpret the lines
and blips appearing on these scopes and graphs.

Naturally,

before one invests thousands of dollars in one type of
electronic equipment as opposed to another, one wants to
be able to see it in operation and preferably to use a
boat equipped with the kind of electronic gear one is
thinking of buying.

A good many fishermen report that

only their kinsmen or close friends can be counted on to
give them accurate information consistently and let them
experiment using their own boats.

Fishing, after all, is

a highly competitive business, and one in which training
and informing the competition is seldom advantageous.

As

one fisherman put it, "There is only one person who is
going to let you experiment with his boat, nets and fishing
gear--your father."

Thus, people who have ready contacts

with a large looal network of kin who are in fishing are
more likely than others to have had a chance to learn
about and try these sophisticated pieces of electronic
gear.
The question needs to be asked, "Why can I t fishermen
obtain the same kind of information on these kinds of
electronic devices from more geographically distant
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kinsmen?"

Distance itself is part ef the answer, since it

tends to. inhibit the flew ef infermatien and limit the
eppertunities to. ebserve gear in eperatien.

Hewever,

anether set ef facters is also. impertant here.
is substantial evidence that

b~e

There

eperating kinship unit

is the kinsmen living in the same tewn er within abeut ten
miles ef each ether.

Kinsmen who. meve away frem the lecal

area rarely interact, and within a generatien are quickly
fergetten (Achesen and Lazarewitz 1980).

Having a large

number ef kinsmen eutside the area ef ene's heme tewn
has no. bearing en the adeptien ef innevatiens.
practical purpeses these peeple de net exist.

Fer all
The

infermatien en these kinship variables net enly peints
up that family ties are used as a means ef ebtaining
infermatien abeut innevatiens, but also. peints to. the
impertance ef clusters.

After all, it is kinsmen in the

same area who. are using the same kind ef gear ene wants to.
purchase who. are valuable.

Mest ef the relatives who. have

such gear are fishing fer the same species in the same
area.

They are members ef the same cluster.
The variable en membership in pelitical erganizatien

also. indicates the impertance ef cluster behavier.

This

variable played a significant rele in the adeptien of a
large number ef innevatiens studied--including depth
recerder, scanning senar, CB radio., bettem trawl, gillnets,
larger beats and the number ef majer innevatiens adepted.
A few ef the men who. said they were members ef fishermen's
pelitical erganizatiens were members ef the Maine
Lebstermen's Asseciatien, but mest were members ef the
Maine Fishermen's Ceeperative Asseciati'en, which is based
in Pertland and eperates as a lebbying greup to. influence
state and federal fisheries legislatien.

An intensive

study of this group indicates that most of the members of
this asseciation live within 25 miles ef Pertland and are
successful draggermen and gillnetters in the prime years
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of their careers (Acheson and Lello 1980).

These men are

doing well in fishing and want to stay in the industry.

They

are willing to donate their time to this organization to
foster a political and legal environment which will ensure
their continued success.

In short, this organization is

composed of the committed highline
the Portland and Harpswell areas.

groundfishermen from
Most of its members are

the best and most influential fishermen in the unit we
have identified as the Portland groundfishing cluster.
Given our intensive study of this cluster, there is no
doubt that a good deal of technical information is obtained
through this organization.

At some meetings, more time is

taken up with discussions of fishing locations, catches,
boats, and equipment than with matters concerning
fisheries legislation.
The regression analysis of factors influencing the
adoption of innovations in the fin-fishing industry in
Maine and New Hampshire contains still additional evidence
that clusters play an important role in the adoption of
innovations.

The region variables

(independent variables

29 and 30) demonstrate that men in Portland and Rockland,
tile fourth and fifth largest ports in New England, are
more likely to adopt large numbers of innovations than
l
fishermen in other areas.
Specifically, men from these
two ports were more likely to adopt depth finders, CB
radios, gillnets, and new boats than fishermen in harbors
west of Penobscot Bay.

And they were more likely to

adopt depth recorders, CB radios, Auto Pilots, Loran C
and new boats than the men in harbors east of Penobscot Bay.

lIn actuality, most of these innovative fishermen are
from Portland. Rockland has very few groundfishermen, save
for those involved in the redfish fleet.
It was an error
to have aggregated together the data on Portland and
Rockland in this regression analysis.
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The reasons that men in these two ports are prone to adopt
so many innovations can undoubtedly be explained in terms
of the information available to them.

Portland has the

largest number of fin-fishermen in the state.

Moreover,

Portland and Rockland also have a lot of firms involved
in marketing and processing fish, shipyards, and firms
selling marine hardware, supplies, electronic gear, nets,
and so on.

These two ports have the largest repositories

of fishing expertise and infrastructure in the region.
Virtually all fishermen in Maine go either to Portland or
Rockland regularly to buy various supplies, have their gear
repaired, or market their fish.

Fishermen operating out of

those two towns are part of clusters whose members have an
unusual advantage in observing and obtaining information on
the entire fishing scene.

It is not just that these men

are passively exposed to more gossip and data about fishing;
they also have a clear advantage in obtaining jobs on
vessels of various types, and in observing a large number
of different kinds of vessels and equipment in action.

In

short, fishermen from Portland (and, secondarily, from
Rockland) have an opportunity to get more "hands on 11
experience with more gear than men from smaller, more
isolated harbors.
In the case of innovations studied in the fin-fishery,
it is critical to note that the opportunity to observe the
innovation, or better still, to experiment with it on a
working boat, is much more important than merely being
aware of the innovation.
vation

If merely being aware of an inno-

were an important prerequisite to adopting it, we

would expect that fishermen who had attended a major
fishing exposition would have adopted more innovations.
This is not true in general.

In fact, attendance at an

exposition is positively related only to the adoption of
a larger boat (see independent variable 16).

Exposition

attendance actually "retards" the adoption of Loran A,
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gillnets and a new primary gear, for reasons discussed in
another article (Acheson and Reidman:1980a).

Certainly men

who are adopting these innovations have obtained information
on them, but that information is obtained from men in their
own local cluster--not at a major exposition in a large
urban cluster.
The strongest evidence concerning the link between
clusters and the adoption of innovation is provided by
information fishermen gave concerning the source of
information about innovations they adopted, and the people
who influenced these adoption decisions.

In all of our

studies of the diffusion of innovations in the fishing
industry (i.e. metal lobster traps, pair trawlers and the
18 types of electronic devices and fishing gear in the
fin-fishery) we attempted to obtain information on the
source of the information.

Very often, fishermen were

unable to identify the factors or people who influenced
their decision or were unwilling to admit they had been
influenced.

Our questions on this topic often resulted

in indeterminate answers such as:

"I just heard about

it somewhere" or "Some of the boys were talking about it."
However, if we aggregate the information we do have on the
source of information about innovations, a very distinct
pattern emerges.

In our study of 20 innovations of all

types combined, only a handful of men said they were
primarily convinced to acquire an innovation from
newspapers, advertisements or other written sources.
Moreover, change agents

(Le. marine extension agents)

were instrumental only in diffusing one of the innovations studied--namely pair trawlers (Bort 1980).

Change

agents were not mentioned by the adopters of any other
innovations.

Most of the information concerning inno-

vations came from other fishermen.
The quantitative data we have gathered strongly
demonstrate that the men who influenced others to adopt
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the innovations studied were in the same cluster.

In this

regard, it should be noted that a very high percentage of
the men who adopted one or more of these 20 innovations
were influenced, directly or indirectly, by men who use
the same type of fishing gear.

This can be seen in Table 7

which contains data on the primary gear of adopters of these
innovations and the men influencing them.

There were 14

instances of innovations adopted by men who fished with
purse seines and pair trawls in which we had information
on the gear type of both the adopter and the men who
influenced them.

In 12 or 86 percent of these cases both

the adopter and the fishermen who was his source of information used the same gear type.

Another 80 innovations

were adopted by men using otter trawls as their primary
gear.

In 56 or 70 percent of these cases men were

influenced by other men using otter trawls.

Seventy

nine percent of the men using lobster traps as a primary
gear were influenced in their decision to adopt innovations
by other lobster fishermen.

The same strong pattern can be

seen in the case of men using gillnets.

A log likelihood

ratio demonstrates that these results are highly significant statistically.
The distance between the home of the men who adopted
innovations and those of the men who influenced them varies
enormously depending on the primary gear type used.

As can

be seen in Table 8, the vast majority of lobster fishermen
were influenced in their decision to acquire innovations by
men who lived very nearby.

Of the 142 cases of innovations

adopted by lobstermen on which we have data, in 106
instances (75 percent), the adopter of those innovations
lived within three miles of the men who influenced him.
In the case of groundfishermen, the men who adopted innovations and those who influenced them lived further apart.
had information on 63 cases of innovations adopted by
gillnetters, and in only 24 instances (or 38 percent of

287

We

TABLE 7
Primary Gear Type of Men Adopting Innovations and
Those Giving Information on Those Innovations
Primary Gear of Adopters of Innovation
Purse
Seine/
Pair
Trawls

Otter
Trawls

Gi11nets

Lobster
Traps

Total # of
Innovations

Purse
Seine/
Pair
Trawls

12

2

Otter
Trawls

4

56

23

2

85

Gi11net

2

18

36

11

67

Lobster
Traps

6

4

18

108

136

24

80

77

121

302

Total
of Primary
Types
of
Adopters

14

Log likelihood ratio results:
G
DF

= 59.8

=

9
p < .001
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the cases) did the adopter and the men who influenced the
adoption decision live within three miles apart.

In the

vast majority of cases, men who used otter trawls as a
primary gear live over three miles away from the men who
influenced them to buy the innovation.

Furthermore,

most of the men using purse seines and pair trawls \"ere
influenced in their decisions concerning innovations by
men who lived very far away.

There were 36 cases of in-

novations adopted by these herring fishermen on which we
have data.

In 31 cases (86 percent) the adopter of the

innovations and the men who influenced their decisions
lived over 15 miles apart.
The results presented in Table 8 are also highly
significant statistically.
TABLE 8
Distance Between the Homes of Adopters
of Innovations and Those Giving Information
on Innovations, by Primary Gear Type
Primary Gear Type of Adopter of Innovation
Purse Seine
Lobster
Otter
and Pair
Traw 1 G'll
~
ne t s T raps T o t a.,-'
Traw 1
106
153
1
22
24

Under
3 miles
3-15
miles
over 15
miles
Total

4

51

29

26

110

31

45

10

10

96

36

118

63

142

359

Log likelihood ratio results:
G

DF

=
=

59.1
9

p < .001

289

The data in Tables 7 and 8 indicate that men using the
same gear in the same geographic range imitate each other
and influence the kinds of innovations each other adopt.
Lobster fishermen tend to have been influenced by men
living very near by; groundfishermen by men living further
away; and owners of pair trawlers and purse seiners by
men living outside their own local area.

This pattern is

to be expected, given the range of social contacts men
using these different kinds of gear have.

From this it

is clear that fishermen are influenced in their innovation
decisions by men in their own clusters.
all, are technical and social units.

Clusters, after

They are composed

of a network of fishermen using the same gear in the same
geographic range.
The reasons for this kind of imitative behavior are
not difficult to discern.

The fisherman, faced with great

heterogeneity and uncertainty, attempts to solve his problems

and increase his fishing effectiveness simply by

copying the strategies of other fishermen which he
perceives to be effective.

There is strong evidence

from the social psychological literature that people seeking
information do not search very far.

From this point of

view, it is not surprising that when fishermen seek information, they seek no further then men in the same fishery
operating in the same geographical range.
C.

Cluster Packing and Its Effect ~ Innovation
This pattern of imitation of innovations in turn has

enormous long-run implications for the formation and
evolution of clusters.

The fact that men in the same

cluster influence each other to adopt similar innovations
means that over the course of time, the technology used by
the men of a given cluster becomes increasingly uniform.
This assumes, of course, that the external environment
(i.e. the laws, availability of species, markets, and so on)
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do not change greatly.

If there are great alterations in

the environment, different fishermen will attempt to cope
by trying a variety of different strategies and adopting
different kinds of innovations.

Thus, a rapidly changing

environment will result in great diversity in the
technology and strategies used by the fishermen of a
cluster.

If this occurs, loosely packed clusters result.

By way of contrast, a slowly changing environment, will
result in more and more uniformity in the technology
employed and in the development of "tightly packed"
clusters.
The degree of cluster packing then is the result
of both time and changes in the environment.

This means

that the degree of cluster packing can differ substantially not only from cluster to cluster, but even within
the same cluster over the course of time.
Conversely, the degree of cluster packing has a
strong influence on the type of innovations adopted by
fishermen.

This means not only that the degree of cluster

packing is the result of the number of common innovations
that a cluster of fishermen have adopted over the course
of time but also that the type of innovations they adopt
is, in great part, a function of the degree of packing.
In short, there is feedback in the system.
Our adaptive model suggests many hypothesis concerning
the adoption of innovations and the degree of cluster
packing.

Where the fisheries are concerned, the two

most important are:
(1) Fishermen in tightly packed fishing clusters will
be more likely to adopt small, incremental innovations.
Large radical innovations are not likely to be adopted
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in such fishing clusters.

l

(2) Fishermen in loosely packed clusters are more
likely to adopt more radical innovations.
There are two reasons for this pattern.

First, tightly

packed clusters are the result of men innovating and
imitating each other over a long period of time in a
relatively stable environment.

These men have had time

to experiment to achieve an optimal solution to the problems
they face.

All of the more radical innovations which are

advantageous have been adopted long ago.

Given the stable

environment in which these clusters operate, the only
innovations left to adopt are those which will make small,
marginal improvements.

The men of less tightly packed

clusters operate in a more heterogenous, changing environment.

They have not had time to explore the full range of

optimal solutions.

It is a type of environment in which

the possibility for more radical·solutions still exists.
Second, and more important, in tightly packed clusters,
the feasible set of opportunities is similar for everyone,
by definition.

In this situation, any innovation made by

one member of a cluster can easily be copied by another
member.

Why then should a fisherman make a radical

innovation?

He takes enormous risk, and if he succeeds,

he will be unable to capture the benefits for very long.
His competitors (i.e. the men in the same cluster) are in
posi tion to be able to copy any innovation he adopts and
will do so the moment he proves to be successful.

Any

advantage accruing to an adopter of a radical innovation

I"Radical innovation" is a misnowner. As we pointed
out in Part II, Chapter 4, all innovative change is cumulative. Major change is produced by the adoption of
several cumulative incremental innovations. The term
"radical innovation" is used because it is less awkward
than "cumulative incremental" innovation.
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is not likely to be his alone for very long.

Thus, where

the feasible set of options is similar for everyone in the
cluster (i.e. tightly packed clusters) the innovations
adopt€d are apt to be small and incremental in nature.
Conversely, in loosely packed clusters fishermen may have
options open to them that others cannot imitate easily.
In these circumstances, the benefits of innovating will
acrue to those who can make the innovation.

Under these

conditions, a radical innovation is apt to pay.
These hypotheses explain several patterns of innovations
that can be observed in various segments of the fishing
industry in New England--particularly when we compare the
pattern of innovation in the lobster industry with that in
the mobile herring fleet.
Lobster fishing clusters, as we have seen, are very
tightly packed.

The geographical distance boats from a

particular harbor can exploit is limited by the territorial
system.

The technology is very uniform.

The vast majority

of boats are between 28 and 37 feet, and are equipped with
an inboard gasoline or diesel engine.

There is very little

variation in the electronic gear used on these boats.

Only

C.B. radios and either depth recorders or depth sounders are
standard equipment on these boats, and very few lobster
fishing boats have any other kind of electronic equipment.
All boats are now equipped wi th hydraulic trap haulers made
by the same company.
traps.

In addi ti-on, lobsters are caught in

While there is some variation in the trap

construction material (i.e. metal vs wood) and the ty.pe
of heads (netting to stop the lobsters from escaping)
used, these factors have relatively little effect on
productivity in comparison with variables such as season
of the year.

There is some variation from one geographic

area to another.

In the Casco Bay area, men tend to fish

larger gangs of traps, with relatively big boats (i.e. 38 to
40 feet), and usually have a sternman to help them.
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In

other parts of Maine and New Hampshire, men fish alone much
of the year and use smaller gangs of traps and smaller
boats.

But wi thin any given clus ter, the equipment and

practices of lobster fishermen are remarkably similar.
This uniformity in technology and fishing practices
is due to a long period of stability in the lobster fishing
industry, which has given fishermen ample time to assess
various different kinds of fishing techniques and strategies and adopt the ones

that have proven satisfactory.

The lobster catch, for example, in Maine has varied between
16.6 million and 22.1 million pounds for the past 20 years
(Thomas 1980).

The

territorial system has been in effect

and has changed little in the past several decades.
Lobsters have been caught with standard lobster traps,
which have varied very little, for well over 100 years.
And lobster boats have been powered by gas or diesel engines
since the 1920's.
Despi te the passage of the Fisheries Management and
Conservation Act of 1976, no Federal regulations have been
promulgated to date which affect the lobster industry.
Moreover, there have been no great changes in the state
laws either.

The most important laws are those aimed

at protecting the breeding stock.

The law prohibiting

catching females with eggs was enacted in the 1930s.

The

rule prohibiting taking lobsters over 5 inches (measured
3 8
on the carapace), and under 3 /
inches were passed
decades ago.

The marketing system has remained relatively

stable as well.

Lobster fishermen have long sold their

catches to local dealers with whom they have close ties,
who then sell the lobsters to wholesale dealers or lobster
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.
1
poun d operatlons.
As a result of this relative stability and the closely
packed clusters which resulted, very few innovations have
been adopted by lobster fishermen in the past 25 years, and
those can scarcely be called radical ones by any means.
The early 1960s saw the adoption of the hydraulic trap
hauler, and a little later electronic depth finders came
into general use.

In the late 1940's, fishermen began to

knit lobster pot heats out of nylon string rather than knit
them from sisal.

In the late 1960s and early 1970's

polyurethane lobster trap warp was introduced and the use
of C.B. radios became widespread.

In the mid 1970's metal

traps came into use in a few areas.

All of these inno-

vations made only the most marginal improvements, since
they all had close antecedents.

Fishermen had been hauling

traps with the aid of winches since the 1930's; some boats
were equipped with single side band radios as far back as
the early 1940's.
woven heads for

Traps had been equipped with warps and
many many decades.

The use of synthetic

rope and twine merely lengthened the useful life-span of
these trap parts.

Of course, the use of metal wire on the

outside of a trap simply is a substitute for wood lathes.
The only really new innovation was the introduction of
electronic depth finders.

Before the advent of these

machines fishermen could only learn what was on the bottom
by using a lead line.

IThere have been some recent changes in the lobster
fishing industry. One notable change has been the spread
of cooperatives. The fist one was started in 1947 and
there are fifteen at this writing.
In the past four
years (since 1976) the price of lobsters has not risen
as rapidly as costs--especially the costs of fuel, bait,
and boat replacement costs. As a result, increasing
numbers of lobster fishermen have begun to fish for
groundfish at certain seasons for the year or have moved
entirely into other kinds of fishing.
(Acheson 1980b).
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It is important to note that none of these innovations
is particularly difficult to learn to use, nor were lobster
fishermen barred from adopting these innovations by
unusually high capital requirements.

Nylon rope and

twine cost more than hemp, but then again, they last
longer too.

Any lobster fishermen can afford to experiment

with metal lobster traps.

Several firms are making them

and they only cost $35.00 each (Acheson 1980a).

C.B.

radios can be purchased in any moderately large city
and modeis run as low as $60.00.
and depth recorders

(and flashers)

Hydraulic trap haulers
cost far more, but even

these kinds of equipment can be purchased for under
$1000.00.

It should be noted that depth recorders and

depth finders are an exception to the rule that most
innovations in the lobster industry are easy to learn
to use.

It is relatively easy to read the depth by

using these machines.

However, learning how to use

information about depth to increase catches takes a good
deal of experience and knowledge.

For a man who has

already acquired an understanding of the movements of
lobsters and a knowledge of the bottom, the use of a depth
finder can speed up his fishing operation.

A depth finder

in the hands of an amateur will do little by way of
increasing output, since he has only the most general
idea what depth means.

Thus, the time it takes to learn

to use a depth finder or depth recorder effectively depends
very much on one's prior state of knowledge.
Since all of these innovations are relatively inexpensive and easy to learn to use, they diffused throughout
the entire lobster industry relatively rapidly.

It is true

that the men of some clusters adopted these innovations
before others.

Certainly there has been some secrecy

concerning the effectiveness of these innovations so that
much information about them was transmitted via direct
observation.

Nevertheless, from the time each of these
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innovations were adopted by the earliest adopters until the
time they became generally used throughout all clusters in
the industry was less than 10 years.

The earliest hydraulic

trap haulers were introduced about 1958; and it was a rare
full-time lobster fisherman who did not have one by 1968.
Electronic depth finders were first used on lobster boats
about 1959.
equipment.

By 1967 or 1968, they had become standard
Nylon twine to make heads started to be used

about 1945, and by 1955 it was general throughout the
industry.
During this entire time period, there were no radical
innovations introduced into the lobster industry, much less
experimentation with any radically new lobster fishing
system.

Given the stable legal, biological, social and

economic environment in which the lobster industry has
operated, only incremental innovations were made and are
currently being made.
In the herring industry, the opposite situation
prevails.

As we have seen the mobile herring fleet is a

single cluster, and one that is very loosely packed.

These

boats range in size from 42 feet to over 90 feet, and a
boat 150 feet long will soon join the Maine fleet.

Most of

these vessels fish within a few miles of shore most of the
time; the larger boats have the capacity to fish the
offshore herring grounds, but the smallest purse seiners
do not.

There is a notable difference in electronic

equipment in use too.

The largest vessels in this fleet

are equipped with radar, depth recorders, fish scopes,
Loran C, Loran C plotter, scanning sonar, VHF radios, and
scrambler phones.

The vast majority of these vessels go

dragging for groundfish part of the year, and six of the
largest boats are now equipped to go pair trawling for
herring.

Some of these vessels, in recent years, have

done pair trawling for such long periods of time that
their primary gear has probably ceased to be purse seines
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and is now pair trawls.

In any case, vessels equipped with

both pair trawls and purse seines have a larger set of
feasible options than those with only purse seines.
While the lobster catch has been relatively stable,
herring are notoriously unpredictable.

In some years,

schools will concentrate in the bays and estuaries of one
part of e1e coast; in other years they will be in other
areas dozens of miles away.

From year to year, herring

catches have fluctuated wildly.

In 1951, for example, the

Maine catch was 22 million pounds; the next year it was
57 million.

In 1974, it was 2 million pounds; in 1957 6

million pounds; in 1976, it had increased to 20 million
pounds.

In the late 1970's, herring fishermen have done

well, but this has not always been the case.
fishing is always a high risk option.

Herring

Moreover, catches

for various types of herring fishing gear have varied
considerably as well.

In general when the mobile herring

fleet (purse seiners and pair trawlers) has done well, the
fixed gear fishermen (weir operators and stop seiners) have
done poorly,

and vice-versa.

For example, in 1969 the

purse seiners caught 59.11 percent of the sardines packed
in Maine, while the fixed gear operators only got 40.89
percent.

In 1977, however, the fixed gear operators caught

77.69 percent of the sardines while the mobile fleet caught
only 22.31 percent.

The same pattern can be seen in the

statistics for a period of decades (Maine Sardine Council
1979) .
Since the early 1970's, the marketing and processing
of herring has altered considerably as well.

Prior to

that time, all herring were canned and sold here in the
United States.

In the past 10 years, the Baltic and North

Sea herring catches have fallen drastically, creating a
huge market for filleted adult herring.

As of late in

1978, six plants in Maine were equipped with automated
filleting equipment manufactured in Europe, and were
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shipping large quantities of frozen herring fillets to the
European market.
The legal environment has changed too.

In 1978, Maine,

in coordination with the Federal government put into effect
a new herring regulatory plan called for closed seasons,
quotas, and restrictions on the size of the herring that
could be caught. It is the first fisheries management plan
that has been put into effect in New England under the new
Federal Fisheries Conservation and Management Act of 1976
and one that constitutes a radical departure from the
regulatory environment that existed before.
Finally, the feasible set of options among vessels in
this fleet differs due to the relation they have with the
processing companies.

Some boats in this fleet are owned

by the processing firms; many others are privately owned
by men who have various different kinds of agreements with
herring processing firms.

As a result of the rapid changes the herring industry
is currently undergoing, in combination with the differences in feasible options open to different fishermen, a
variety of incremental and radical innovations are
being adopted at the present.

Men in the herring fleet are

purchasing larger boats; they are equ:L'pping those boats with
vastly more expensive and complicated electronic gear; and
the gear they are using on those vessels is becoming more
versatile (Acheson 1980c).
Specifically, between 1973 and 1978, our innovation
survey in Maine and New Hampshire showed that of the 13
purse seine captains in our sample, all but two had
purchased a boat over six feet longer than their previous
boat.

Three owners of herring boats had purchased boats

that were over 20 feet longer than the one they had
previously owned.
the adoption of

Such increases in vessel size constitute
a

radical innovation, since a much larger

boat automatically means a difference in crew size
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and an

increase in the range that can be fished;

it necessitates

a good deal more knowledge concerning maintenance, ship
handling, fishing locations, and so on.
In our sample of 13 herring boats, nine had adopted
scanning sonar.

This is not only an expensive piece of

equipment, costing in the range of $9000, but one which
allows the fishermen

to do something he could never do

before--namely get information on schools of herring far
ahead and on the sides of his boat.
adopted Loran C

Another six have

plotters which allow a herring fisherman

to find and map out the location of very large and dispersed
herring schools.

Another four boats have adopted scrambler

phones, and more will certainly do so in the future.

Six

additional boats during these years have adopted pair
trawling--a radically different innovation involving two
vessels working in tandem (Bort 1980).

Futhermore, the

new boats in the herring fleet are western rigged vessels,
which involve a radically different configuration of engine,
wheel house, and hold, which strongly affects the comfort
of the vessel, the net towing characteristics, and the
entire procedure for hauling back the net (Acheson et al.
1980).

None of these innovations is inexpensive.

Scrambler phones cost $15,000 per set, while scanning
sonar and Loran C plotter sets cost about $5,600 and
$10,000 respectively.

The most expensive and radical

innovations are, of course, the adoption of the western
rigged vessel and pair trawls.

These innovations are

associated with whole different systems of fishing.
None of these innovations mentioned can be considered
minor.

Loran C and scanning sonar allow fishermen to

obtain information they could not get before by any means.
Scrambler phones allow them to exchange information without
informing the fleet.

In an industry where a good deal of

information about fishing locations is obtained directly or
by observing other vessels, the use of phones has important
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implications.
There are two reasons for the number of radical innovations being adopted in the mobile herring fleet at
present.

First, the expansion of the market, and Federal

fisheries conservation efforts, in combination with the
advent of a good many different kinds of new types of
equipment, have increased the economic opportunities
available to the industry (Acheson 1980c).
Second, it is very difficult to imitate such innovations and thus the men who have successfully adopted
these new types of equipment and techniques will gain the
benefi t of them.
regard.

Several things should be noted in this

The fact that the mobile herring fleet constitutes

a loosely packed cluster means that most men have dissimilar
sets of feasible options.

What may be possible for the

owner of a large 90 foot vessel may be out of the question
for a

~an

with a 45 foot boat.

In addition, much of the

capital to finance new boats and equipment is obtained
through loans from the processing companies.

The amount

of money these companies will lend is strictly limited.
They will not finance superfluous weirs and boats.

Last,

and most important, the kind of knowledge one needs to
operate this sophisticated electronic and fishing gear can
only be obtained by personal experience.

Since the herring

fleet is so heterogenous, there are very few boats on which
one might gain that "hands on" experience, and even fewer
boats one can observe which are directly comparable to the
boat any given captain owns or is comtemplating buying.
There are several different factors stimulating
investment in the herring industry at present.
is very old and due for replacement.

The fleet

Catches and prices

for herring have been very high (Acheson 1980b and 1980c).
The uncertainty generated by the quickly changing
Federal regulatory system has clearly stimulated men to
purchase new kinds of fishing gear so they can fish for
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mul tiple species in case one fishery or another is

I'

closed."

However, this situation does not explain why these
fishermen are willing to purchase such radically different
kinds of boats and equipment--especially since they entail
such high learning costs.

Why don't these men simply buy

the same kind of boat and fishing gear when their old boat
and equipment needs to be replaced?
for new, complicated innovations?

Why the headlong rush
These men are not late

adopters who need to adopt these innovations to remain
competitive.

They are the early adopters.

The willingness

of these men to adopt radical innovations, we believe, can
be traced to the fact that these innovations cannot be
easily imitated.

The time, effort, and money they invest

in purchasing such gear and learning how to use it will
ultimately benefit them, and give them an edge over their
competitors.

They will not be experimenting with fishing

gear only to educate their competitors.
are very aware of this situation.

Some fishermen

When one of the owners

of a large pair trawler was asked what made him decide to
invest over a million dollars in a new technology he would
have to learn how to use by experimentation, he answered:
"We were willing to take the risk.

We knew we would

lose money until we fooled around and learned to catch
fish with this rig, but after that the whole lake (i.e.
part of the ocean) would be ours."

He made it clear that

he expected very few others to enter pair trawling to
compete with him.

302

CHAPTER 5
INSTITUTIONS AND TRANSACTIONS

A.

Introduction
So far we have concentrated on clusters--the loose net-

works between men using essentially the same technology in
the same area to exploit the same species.

These amorphous

social units composed of people who are essentially competitors playa critical role in solving the information problem
faced by fishermen in both the short run and the long run.
Clusters, in short, are the primary social mechanism fishermen use in coping with uncertainty.
anism, however.

There is another mech-

Under certain circumstances, fishermen form

institutions, which allow them to cope with uncertainty in a
different way.
In forming institutions, fishermen enter into special
agreements with each other to obtain some end that neither
could obtain alone.

These agreements, which are governed by

formal or informal rules, structure the relationships between
individuals in a fishing industry.

Some of these agreements,

or institutions as we call them, operate to reduce financial
costs to the fishermen involved, others to increase revenues
from the sale of fish, and still others function to limit
competition and conflict.

Only a few, for reasons that need

to be discussed in detail, reduce exploitation rates on
resources.

The latter are of particular interest since they

are an indigenous--if informal--kind of fisheries management.
In this chapter, we will first describe institutions we
have noted among fishermen in various parts of New England.
Second, we will make certain generalizations about the exchanges and transactions involved in many of these institutions.

Third, we will discuss the degree to which these

institutions can be explained in terms of the model presented
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in Part II.

Last, we will consider the conditions under

which such institutions come into being.

In the last part

of the volume (Part IV) special emphasis will be placed on
developing a tentative hypothesis concerning the factors
generating those institutions which conserve resources.
While little of a general nature can be said about
institutions and the transactions underlying them until some
of them are described, two things need to be pointed out
immediately.
First, clusters and institutions are not mutually exclusive kinds of organizations or behavior.

The vast major-

ity of the institutions recorded are formed by men in the
same cluster.

Clusters are loose networks of men with the

same opportunity set, which serve as reference groups for
the members and as sources of information.

Under certain

conditions, men in certain clusters will enter into one kind
of agreement or another, concerning some kind of fishing practice or practices.
Second, both clusters and institutions are responses to
the information problem continually facing fishermen.

Men

in the same clusters find each other the best source of information on both fishing locations and the efficacy of
various kinds of technical innovations.

Institutions are, in

effect, substitutes for accurate information.

The future is

impossible to predict, but one can reduce uncertainty by having agreements specifying what actions will be undertaken and
who will bear the costs if misfortune strikes.

In essence,

clusters provide (1) an information network which reduces
each individual's costs of information, and (2) the basis for
institutional formation and evolution.

Institutions reduce

uncertainty by assigning risk and thus providing a kind of
insurance.
We have gathered information on ten instances where
fishermen have formed "institutions."

Two of these (Le.

lobster fishing territories and cooperatives) have been
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studied extensively and a small literature has been written
on them.

While the other eight cases have not been studied

in great detail and little or nothing has been written about
them, we have been able to gather sufficient data through
interviewing to come to several important conclusions concerning them.

We will describe the features of these insti-

tutions critical for our purpose, beginning with those on
which we have the most data and progressing to those where
very little data is available.
B.

Lobster Fishing Territories
Earlier in this section, it was mentioned that lobster

fishermen are allowed to place traps only in the area jointly
owned by the "harbor gang" of which they are a member.

Ter-

ritories are defended against the incursions of men who are
not members of the "gang" by the surreptitious destruction
of 10bstering gear (Acheson 1972).
Several additional facts need to be mentioned about this
territorial system.

First, there are two different kinds of

boundaries that can be observed, which are linked in important ways with the ease of entry into harbor gangs and the
informal agreements to limit fishing effort.

In most areas,

a nucleated territorality is the rule (Acheson 1975a).

That

is, the area close to the harbor mouth is reserved for the
exclusive use of members of the harbor gang, and incursions
into this area are swiftly sanctioned.

Further from the

harbor mouth, feelings of ownership decrease markedly.

Far

from the mouth of such harbors, "mixed fishing" is allowed.
That is, in the middle of large bays or in areas several
miles from the mouths of harbors, men from three to five harbors can often be found fishing together.

Perimeter defended

areas are characteristic of certain islands--particularly in
the Penobscot Bay region--which have been the private property
of certain established families for generations.

The bound-

aries of these fishing territories are known to the yard and
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are strongly defended.

In these areas, little mixed fishing

is allowed; the entire area out to the periphery is exploited
exclusively by members of these harbor gangs (Acheson 1975ai
1980g) .
It is relatively easy to gain entry into harbor gangs
with nucleated territoriality.

In such harbors, a young man

who begins fishing at an early age has no difficulty gaining
acceptance.

This is particularly true if he is a member of

an established family whose members have long been involved
in the fishing industry.

Perimeter defended areas are re-

served exclusively for members of the family owning the
island, or members of a few families they have allowed to go
fishing in their waters.

Thus, without the proper kinship

ties, it is impossible to go fishing in these areas.
reason for this pattern is fairly clear.

The

Perimeter defended

areas exist to guarantee that the entire lobster catch from
a given body of water will be shared by only a few select
men.

There is no sense spending great effort defending the

boundaries of these fishing areas if one is going to let a
large number of people join one's own harbor gang (Acheson
1975a).
Most important for our perspective here, differences in
the system of territoriality affect fishing effort, which, in
turn affects not only the size of the lobsters caught, but also
the breeding stock.

In the perimeter defended areas, there is

less fishing effort on the lobster not only because there are
fewer fishermen per square mile of ocean area, but also because the men in those areas have been able to agree to and
enforce certain conservation rules.

For example, the men

fishing the areas around two such islands have agreed to fish
a limited number of lobster traps.

While this does not limit

the lobster catch over the annual cycle, it does reduce the
cost of trap maintenance and bait.

It also reduces mortality

on the lobster by minimizing the number of "ghost traps"l in
lLost traps which continue to fish.
306

the water.

In addition, the fishermen on Monhegan Island

have agreed to go fishing only from January to June and have
persuaded the State Legislature to pass a law forbidding
fishing in their waters the other six months of the year.
Thus, these fishermen are catching only the more valuable
hardshell lobster and selling their catch at the time of the
year when the price is at its annual high.

In the summer,

when they are working in the local tourist industry, the
state fishery wardens are protecting their exclusive fishing
grounds.

As a result of these practices, the fishermen in

perimeter defended areas not only have higher incomes, but
catch lobsters that are slightly larger (and hence more
valuable).

Moreover, the size of the breeding stock is

clearly larger because the reduction in fishing effort has
resulted in a higher percentage of lobsters which have been
allowed to attain the size where they can bear eggs : (Acheson
1975a).

Thus, the system of territoriality--especially in

the perimeter defended areas--has not only resulted in increased income for fishermen, but has had favorable biological benefits as well.

c.

Cooperatives
While the anthropological literature on fishermen's

cooperatives in the world as a whole has recorded far more
instances of failure than success, a number of very successful fishermen's cooperatives have been formed in various
parts of New England in the past two or three decades.

The

largest and most successful cooperative in New England is the
one at Point Judith, Rhode Island.

Fifteen smaller coopera-

tives have been formed in various Maine ports, and four more
have been formed in other ports of Massachusetts and New
Hampshire.
The first of these cooperatives were formed in the years
immediately following World War II by veterans who were determined to end the exploitation they had experienced at the hands
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of fish buyers, and obtain fuel, bait and supplies at reasonable prices.

The Point Judith, Rhode Island cooperative was

formed at this time with these ends in mind (Poggie 1980:22),
along with the cooperatives at Pemaquid Harbor, Maine and
Boothbay Harbor, Maine.

In the early 1970's another set of

cooperatives was formed in Maine.

Again one of the primary

reasons to form cooperatives was a desire to escape the real
or perceived abuses of fish dealers.

Both in the 1940's and

the 1970's the formation of cooperatives involved direct and
bitter confrontations between private dealers and fishermen.
In the typical cooperative, members are required to purchase stock at the time they join.

Basic management decisions

are made by a board of directors and officers who are elected
by the cooperative membership at large; the day to day operations of the cooperative are in the hands of a hired manager.
The services cooperatives provide for their members vary somewhat.

Usually, however, cooperatives market fish and/or

lobsters for their members and sell fuel, ice, bait, and so
on to them at reduced costs.

In most cases, the profits of

the cooperative are divided among the members and paid to
them once a year in the form of a "dividend."

The Point

Judith, Rhode Island, cooperative provides its members with
ice, group insurance, and cold storage facilities.

The

smallest and newest cooperatives have none of these services.
In all cases, however, men who decide to join a cooperative gain a secure market for their fish at fair prices, and
can buy services and supplies at godd prices.

They are ex-

pected to obey the cooperative's rules, sell their fish to
the cooperative, and must get along with the manager and
other members--sometimes a difficult, frustrating and time
consuming job.

They forfeit the flexibility of being able

to deal with several buyers, some independence and a good
deal of time.
In the eyes of many fishermen, the primary advantages
of cooperatives are the fact that they will buy the fish of
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their members at fair prices.

The fact that they provide

an alternative to private dealers is far more important
than the services and annual bonus.
D.

Dragger Information Exchange
The captains of four draggers from Maine have agreed to

exchange accurate information on catches and fishing locations.

This is not the kind of periodic casual kind of ex-

change all fishermen indulge in from time to time, but a
conscious agreement to exchange accurate information consistently throughout the year and record that pooled information for future reference.

Some of the information on

fishing locations is exchanged at sea via radio in a combination of straight English and private code.

Such guarded

conversations are typical among fin-fishermen (Orbach 1977:
104-131; Anderson 1972:104-139).

More detailed information--

especially on catches--is obtained over the phone or in person when the crews are ashore.

The existence of this "ring"

as it is known to its members is a carefully kept secret.
As one member

explained it, "if all the dubs knew what we

were doing, they might be able to get a good deal from some
of our conversations with a little practice.

They just think

we are just passing the time like everyone else."

The ring

/

members have toyed with the idea of using scrambler phones
to communicate vital information, but so far have not purchased them because the

me~eexistence

of such phones would

indicate they "were passing information to someone that we
didn't want public."
Ring members stress that there are two different kinds
of information obtained.

It gives each of them a data base

on concentrations of fish over a wide area.
broadens their total search pattern.
on long term aggregate behavior.

In short, it

It is also information

As one man phrased it,

"When your own catch goes up in a certain area, you always
wonder if it is a fluke.

If you see all four boats doing the
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same thing, you know it isn't an accident."
The ring is the result of several fortuitous long term
associations.

Two of the members are close kinsmen.

of the ring members have worked on the same boat.

Three

And two

of these men served as captain and mate on a single boat for
a period of years.
high school.
ring.

Two other members were best friends in

No crisis or conflict helped to generate the

One senior member of the ring helped his kinsmen get

started in fishing.

He also used to talk very openly to the

man who served as his mate.

When the mate got his own boat,

they continued to exchange information.

The fourth man was

a friend and associate of the other two men (i.e. the mate
and kinsman) .
It is important to note that all of these men are excellent fishermen operating comparable boats in the same general
area.

The information they exchange is essentially equivalent

in value.
E.

The Northeast-Southwest Trawl Rule in Casco Bay
The lobster fishermen of Casco Bay (Maine) have long used

"trawls ll composed of 5 to 20 lobster traps attached to a single
long line, marked with a buoy at either end.

This system

allows these fishermen to fish a very large number of traps,
and yet minimize the number of buoys congesting the surface.
In the late 1950s and early 1960s, the number of lobster traps
in the area escalated rapidly as first one lobster fisherman
sought to improve his competitive position by increasing the
number of traps he fished, and others quickly built more traps
to remain in a competitive position.

As the numbers of traps

increased, the number of gear tangles went up rapidly.

Ten-

sions due to trap congestion were already high when one man
began to fish "squares."

That is, he placed some 15 to 18

long trawls with over 15 traps each in several parallel rows
in an attempt to reserve a large area of prime fishing ground
for himself.

Additional men took up the practice of "fishing
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squares" with the result that the remaining fishermen were
forced off a large percentage of available summer fishing
ground.

Several others who refused to be pushed out of areas

they had always fished, placed trawls in the area where
"squares" had been placed.

As a result, massive numbers of

traps quickly became entangled with each other; men began
to cut off each other's fishing gear; and tempers flared.
For a period of several months in 1965 and 1966, there was
a great deal of open conflict, with hundreds of traps destroyed, several fist fights and even a few shooting incidents.

Most of the conflict involved men from different

harbors, but there were also numerous incidents of conflict
between men from the same harbor gang.

After a period of

several months, a nucleus of men, who had remained relatively
uninvolved in the fray, proposed a solution--namely, that
everyone in the area would refrain from fishing squares and
would place their "trawls" in a northeast to southwest direction.

This would allow all men to fish large areas and pre-

vent the development of "private fishing grounds," and yet
prevent the severe gear tangles that resulted when men placed
their gear in any direction they chose.

These men began to

fish their own gear in a northeast to southwest direction and
were able to persuade many other of the more active combatants
to join them.

Complete tranquility was a long time in coming,

however, as several militant men continued to insist on their
right to "fish squares."

By the mid 1970s, however, everyone

in the area was fishing according to the northeast-southwest
rule as increasing numbers of fishermen were convinced of the
wisdom of this rule and grew tired of conflict and trap losses.
F.

Lobster Trap Limit and Limited Entry Legislation
In the early 1970's, the lobster fishermen of Great

Chebeague Island and Cliff Island in Casco Bay agreed to limit
the number of traps they fished and limit entry into lobster
fishing.

Thus, they organized themselves in much the same way
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as the fishermen in the perimeter defended areas discussed
above.

In 1973, one of the authors was approached by a group

of those fishermen who wanted to formalize this system by
having the legislature pass laws to:

define a boundary

around their islands, limit entry into this fishery, and
limit the number of traps.

The Southern Maine Lobstermen's

Association, towhich many of these island fishermen belonged,
became interested in promoting this management plan for the
lobster fiShery in the state of Maine as a whole.
1973

a~d

Between

1975 the Association lobbied to limit the number of

entrants into the lobster fishery by controlling the number
of licenses.

The licenses, according to the proposed plan,

could have been sold on the open market so that men could
enter the industry only as older men left or retired.

It

also prohibited fishermen from using more than 600 traps.
This proposed legislation gained the approval of many members
of the Maine Legislature's Committee on Marine Resources.

It

was finally defeated in the Maine House of Representatives
after fishermen from Vinalhaven hired an effective lobbyist,
who argued that aspects of the bill were unconstitutional.
What is of primary interest to us is not the ultimate
fate of the proposed legislation, but that dozens of top
lobster fishermen from some eleven harbors could form an
association, agree on legislation to limit their own fishing
effort, and support that legislation for the two years it took
to get a formal vote in the legislature.
this effort stand out.

Several facts about

First, a great deal of trap congestion

was being experienced in southern Maine.

This was especially

true in the Casco Bay region, due to the escalation in the
number of traps individual fishermen purchased as well as to
a large number of entrants into the fishing industry, many of
whom were part-time fishermen.

There was general agreement

that there were too many traps in the water and too many fishermen.
Second, it is important to note that a limit of 600 traps
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will not cut individual chatches or total catches.

There are

a fixed number of lobsters of legal size in a given area and
virtually all of them are being caught within a year after they
molt into legal size.

Fishermen will catch the same number of

lobsters--all other factors being equal--if they all have 1000
traps or 600 traps.

It may simply take them a little longer.

It would take an enormous reduction in the total number of
traps fished to reduce the catch.

Of course, if one fisher-

man has more traps than others, he will catch more lobsters.
Thus, it is important to restrict all fishermen to the same
number of traps or trap escalation will occur as fishermen
try to improve their competitive position by fishing more
traps.

A trap limit, then, reduces costs for individual

fishermen by reducing the number of traps that have to be
built, maintained, baited, and tended.

It is thus an econo-

mic measure, not a conservation measure.
Third, the limited entry rules were written in such a
way that no established fisherman would be removed from the
industry.

Most of the men prohibited from fishing would have

been part-time fishermen, who are generally disliked by fulltime fishermen (Acheson 1975b).

In time, however, this pro-

vision of the bill would have resulted in a reduction in
fishing effort.
Fourth, it was generally conceded that the licenses,
which would be the

pr~vate

property of the fishermen, would

quickly gain a great deal of value as their price was bid up
by would-be entrants.

Thus, the legislation would have trans-

ferred property rights to the established fishermen worth
several thousand dollars (Acheson 1975b).
In short, the legislation was written in such a way
that it would have clearly benefitted the existing fishermen
by reducing their operating costs, reducing the competition
they faced from new entrants into the industry, and by ,giving
them a license of great value.

Thus, the critical question

is not why the men of the Southern Maine Lobstermen's Associa-
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tion favored such legislation, but why men from other regions,
such as Vinalhaven, opposed it so violently.

The

reactions

of fishermen to limited entry legislation are very complicated
and have been analyzed in two articles (Acheson 1975b and
1980f) .
with the defeat of this bill in 1975, the Southern Maine
Lobstermen's Association has not attempted to establish any
kind of limited entry or trap limit rules on either a formal
or informal basis.

While the membership of the Association,

which includes some of the very best lobster fishermen in
this part of state, is still overwhelmingly in favor of such
legislation, they recognize that only the state can limit the
number of licenses and only the state wardends could enforce
a trap limit.

Informal agreements, they believe, are not

likely to work in a wide area since they can not be enforced.
G.

Herring Stop Seine Berths and Weir Regulations
Fixed gear herring fishermen have long had a system of

established ownership rights over the coves where their gear
is located.

It is not just that a man who "has a weir" or

a stop seine berth has a right to operate that gear without
physical interference from others; he also has "rights" over
an entire stretch of water, and by implication, rights to
catch any fish that may enter the cove or harbor.
Ownership rights are signalled and maintained primarily
by locating one1s fishing gear in a cove.

In the case of a

weir operation, ownership rights are established by building
a weir in the cove; in the case of a stop seine operation,
by anchoring a seine dory containing

~·seine

net in the cove.

These ownership rights are usufructory rights in every
sense.

A man has the fishing rights to a cove only as long

as he is actively maintaining his gear and tending it properly.
When the weir falls apart or is otherwise obviously not tended,
or the seine dory is removed, then others are free to "take over
the berth."

In the past, other herring fishermen would not
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move into a cove if someone merely had his fishing gear
there.

Increasingly, active attention to the gear is nec-

essary to maintain full fishing rights.

In recent years,

there are cases where men have stopped off coves when herring
entered, even though others had seine dories stationed there,
because the cove was not being properly tended.

In one

instance, the man who had the berth had taken a vacation;
in another, he was engaged in other fishing activities.

In

still another case, a fisherman takes over the cove after the
"berth owner," an older fisherman, goes home for the night.
The duration of these ownership rights varies enormously.
There are instances where men have maintained weirs in coves
for 15 to 20 years.

In other cases, men have built weirs in

poor locations and abandoned them after a season or two.
Some stop seine operations have been fished for generations
by members of the same family.

The stop seine berth at

Tenants Harbor, Maine is currently "owned" by a man who inherited it from his father and grandfather.

On the other

hand, certain stop seiners move their gear from one cove to
another--sometimes several times in a single season.

In

these cases, their ownership rights last no longer than the
amount of time they have a seine dory anchored in the harbor.
Two factors clearly play a role in establishing long term
fishing rights in a cove.

First, being the first to establish

one's fishing gear in the cove is of cirtical importance.

As

one man phrased it, "If no one else is in a cove and you are
the first to put a dory there, you have won ninety-nine percent of the battle."

Second, legal ownership of the land

surrounding the cove gives some herring fishing rights in that
cove.

Legally, the oceans are the property of the state and

federal government, and ownership of land does not convey any
rights to any adjacent waterways.

But in the informal nor-

mative system, a man who owns property on a cove has a far
better claim to the local fishing rights than someone who does
not.

Should a conflict arise, there is no question that owner-
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ship of land helps one

to maintain a claim to fishing rights.

The more critical questions is:

What motivates fishermen

to want such a system of usufructory rights over herring fishing sites?

Part of the answer lies in the fact that herring

are a very skittish fish and easily frightened.

In cases

where there are too many boats and too much activity in a
small area, the chances of catching herring are greatly reduced.
If two fixed gear operations are located in the same
location, only one is apt to catch any herring.
any gear conflict, neither may catch any-thing.

If there is
At best,

placing two sets of gear in a single cove is a zero sum
strategy.

It is very likely to be a negative game.

Feelings of ownership of stop seine berths and weir
sites are strong enough so that a man who places his gear in
areas where others are fishing is very apt to have it molested
or destroyed or be forced to guard its continuously.

Guarding

gear is very difficult, since virtually all fixed gear herring
fishermen have other jobs or businesses.

Of course, one can

retaliate if one's fishing gear is destroyed, but this situation, in the words of one fisherman, "means two fishermen put
each other out of business."
Last, virtually all herring fishermen receive large loans
from processing companies to help buy their weirs or stop
seine gear.

The processors make these loans to men in scat-

tered locations to ensure a steady supply of herring.

If a

man from one harbor does not catch fish, one from another
harbor will.

A man who deliberately places his gear in the

exact same location other fishermen have staked out is operating to defeat the general strategy of the processors.

Such

a person is also likely to come into conflict with other
herring fishermen, in which case the processing companies'
investments would be jeopardized.

Thus, it is very unlikely

that a herring fisherman who made a practice of trying to
fish in areas others had reserved would continue to obtain
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loans for very long.
There are, in short, a number of factors inherent in the
nature of herring fishing and in the kind of marketing ties
involved that strongly buttress the system of "ownership"
rights characteristic of fixed gear herring operations.
These factors make it logical or rational for those involved
in the industry to promote such a system of ownership.

The

system has lasted as long as anyone in the industry can recall.

The men in this section of the industry are so well

socialized to the norms concerning "ownership" of weir sites
and stop seine berths that there are very few instances of
conflict and violation in any given season.

In fact, these

norms are so strong that the weir fishermen successfully
petitioned the legislature to pass a law prohibiting herring
fishing within 1000 feet of a weir.

This law merely forma-

lizes a long-existing norm.
H~

The New Bedford Scallop Agreement
Price instability has been one of the problems in the

scallop industry in New England.

In this industry, ex-vessel

prices have risen and fallen so drastically and suddenly that
fishermen are never certain when they leave the dock whether
they will make or lose money on the trip.

Many scallop fish-

ermen are convinced that this price instability is the result
of price fixing by scallop buyers.

The basic cause of this

phenomenon is traceable to the fact that the demand for
scallops is price inelastic, while supply fluctuates greatly
depending on fishing conditions.

Over 80 percent of the

scallops landed are purchased by institutions and restaurants,
which order approximately the same amounts of scallops with
little regard for the price charged.

As one restaurant

owner phrased it, "I can't afford to print new menus every
week when the price of meat and fish change.

When scallops

cost a lot, I make a little less; when scallops cost a little
less, I make a little more.

I always order about 40 pounds

317

per week."
wildly.

The scallop catch, by way of contrast, varies

When the weather is bad, boats stay ashore.

When

it improves, large numbers of them put to sea together.
The result is either scarcity or oversupply.

The scallop buyers

react to this situation by bidding the price up when scallops
are scarce and refusing to buy when storage facilities are
full.

They do not refuse to buy openly, but rather lower

the price offered drastically.

Thus, despite the suspicions

of fishermen, collusion among

buyers is probably not the

cause of the great price fluctuations observed in the scallop
market.

Fishermen, however, are correct in believing that

this situation in the market is hurting them more than it is
buyers, truckers, or consumers, and that all of the risk is
being passed on to them.
Several times in the past, there have been confrontations
between buyers and fishermen, who have demanded higher prics
for the scallops landed.

On many occasions when the price

was very low, fishermen have refused to go fishing until
prices improved.

These work stoppages have had little last-

ing effect because they were not organized.

However, in the

summer of 1980, a set of events occurred in New Bedford

which

might alter the scallop market permanently.
Early in 1980, prices for scallops had averaged about
$. SO/pound.

In May and June, prices had fallen to $.15 to

$.20/pound.

In June, there were several acrimonious meetings

between groups of buyers and scallop fishermen.

When the

buyers refused the demands of fishermen for a $.30/pound minimum ex-vessel price, scallop fishermen refused to go fishing.
By July, the entire New Bedford scallop fleet was "tied up."
During the three week "tie up," the scallop fishermen as a
whole formed an "ad-hoc fishermen's committee" and agreed
that boats will spend a maximum of nine days at sea with a
four day layover, and. that only 11 boats, out of the 135 vessels in the fleet, will be permitted to leave port in a day,
on a schedule set up by the "Committee."
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This, they hoped,

would even out the supply of scallops and prevent the kind of glutted market which has resulted in abnormably low prices.
Whether this fishermen's committee and set of rules will
last for long is uncertain at this writing.

At present, fish-

ermen in New Bedford are determined to continue the rules for
at least two or three months to see whether scallop prices
will rise sufficiently.

If the plan appears to be working,

an effort will be made to continue.

If prices remain low,

undoubtedly they will be dropped or altered in some way.
The plan may very well have favorable results if the rules
can be enforced, since it seeks to remedy what is most
likely the basic cause of price instability--namely fluctuations in supply.

Moreover, New Bedford is the largest scal-

lop port in New England by a very large margin.

A very high

proportion of all the scallops caught in the entire region
are marketed through this city.

Any scheme which can affect

the New Bedford market will certainly affect scallop prices
in the entire region.
I.

Rhode Island Offshore Lobstering Lanes
In recent years the offshore lobster fishermen from

ports in Rhode Island and southern Massachusetts have lost a
great deal of their fishing gear, first to the foreign fleet
before 1967 and then to local scallopers and draggers in the
past few years.

In 1977, the Atlantic Offshore Lobstermen's

Association with headquarters in Westport, Massachusetts,
proposed to solve this gear conflict problem by establishing
a series of "lanes," 100 microseconds apart on Loran C, each
of which would be used alternately by lobster fishermen and
then by mobile gear fishermen.

with this system, all fish-

ermen would be allowed to fish the entire bottom, but at different times to avoid gear conflicts.

One of these lanes

running east and west and marked by a series of large bell
buoys has worked out reasonably well; according to informants.
But, on the whole, the system has failed.
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Local dragger fish-

ermen have tried to avoid lobster fishermen's gear, but they
have entered "forbidden lanes" when they knew there were concentrations of finfish moving through the area.

The worst

offenders have apparently been the scallopers--especially
scallop boats from other parts of the Atlantic coast--who
have not only ignored the whole lane system, but have deliberately destroyed lobster gear.

Sometimes they have run

their boats through areas where concentrations of traps were
placed; at other times they have sunk the marking buoys with
gunfire.
At present, most of the lobster fishermen are attempting
to protect their gear by making sure it is well marked and
by spacing it far enough apart so that draggers can work in
between the lobster pots if the skippers of those boats
really want to avoid entanglements.

At this writing, the

"lane system" is still in effect, but it is clearly not
working well and may be abandoned soon.

J.

Relationships Between Fishermen and Dealers
So far we have considered only relationships involving

fishermen and the kinds of institutions that sometimes evolve
from transactions between fishermen.

Fishermen, of course,

have some very important ties with people who supply ancillary
services for the fishing industry (i.e. boat builders, marine
supply houses, shipyards, and fish dealers).

The relationship

between fishermen and the dealers they sell to is particularly
important, because a man's economic success depends in large
measure on his ability to form and manipulate such ties.
These relationships are particularly important to understand
since they exhibit some very different characteristics than
the ties between sets of fishermen and shed some light on the
nature of the transactions and institutions in the fishing
industry as a whole.
Some fishermen characteristically sell to a number of
dealers, or change dealers within a short period of time.
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The

vast majority of fishermen, however, sell their fish to one
dealer with whom
ment.

they have a long-standing bilateral arrange-

The relationship between fishermen and dealers charac-

teristically involves far more than an exchange of money for
fish.

Dealers will supply fishermen with whom they are ac-

quainted with large loans; financial backing for repairs or
new equipment; preferential prices for fish; supplies, bait,
and paint at wholesale prices; free use of wharves and docks;
and so on.

Most important, the fisherman usually obtains a

great deal of information about the market from the dealer
and can count on the dealer to treat him fairly in evaluating
the worth of his catch.

The fisherman, for his part, is

ordinarily expected to sell all of his catch to the dealer,
or at least give him first refusal on the catch.

The value

of such arrangements to the fisherman is obvious, but the
dealer gains something of critical importance too--namely the
steady, secure supply of fish he needs if he is to keep his
fish processing plant operating and/or keep his own customers.
The terms of these agreements are rarely written down
or legally enforceable.

Under such conditions, it is not

surprising that midunderstandings are relatively frequent,
and periodically the relationship between a buyer and a fisherman will break down completely.

However, such bilateral

arrangements are so advantageous for both parties that men
are reluctant to break a long-standing relationship if at all
possible.
The ties between fishermen and dealers is an institution
since there are a set of informal rules structuring the relationships between the parties involved.

However, there is

tremendous variation in the expectations between fishermen
and the men to whom they sell their catches.
variations can be observed.

Two kinds of

First, a dealer has a unique and

individually negotiated relationship with every fisherman with
whom he does business, depending on the length of the relationship, the amount of fish the fisherman can deliver, the amount
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of time the fisherman can afford to invest in the relationship, and the degree of trust the two men have built up over
time.
A successful sale of fish lays the groundwork for future
transactions involving more complicated exchanges; and a history of successful exchanges can lead to a relationship
involving loans, information, and preferential treatment.
On the other hand, the suspicion that one has been cheated
or is giving more than he is receiving can lead to a loss of
trust, fewer exchanges, and, ultimately, disintegration of
the relationship.

In this sense, the relationship between

fisherman and dealer resembles Foster's dyadic pairs rather
than an institution in which all the rights and obligations
are the same for all people occupying similar statuses
(Wilson 1980) .
Second, the content of a relationship between a fisherman and his dealer depends on the relative leverage the two
can bring to bear during the negotiating process.
or processor has two

assets~

The dealer

superior knowledge of the mar-

kets, and the ability to give loans, supplies at wholesale
costs, free wharfage, and so on.

The fisherman, for his part,

can withhold his supply of fish.

Fishing risk, size of catch,

and ability to store fish all playa role.
On the whole, men who bring in large catches are in a
better negotiating position.

Such men can do far more to

threaten a dealer's supply of fish than a small fisherman.
Fishermen in high risk areas of the industry and men who hold
other non-fishing jobs are in a similarly favorable position
vis-~ -vis the dealers.

After all, if they go out of business

the dealer's supply of fish is cut off.

The ability to store

the catch is of critical importance; a fisherman who has a
hold full of two week old fish is in little position to bargain
In the major fishing industries in New England, these
factors combine in different ways to effect:
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the negotiating

process, the transactions between fishermen, and the dealers
to whom they sell their catches.

At one extreme is the her-

ring industry in which it is standard for dealers (i.e. fish
processors) and fishermen to have very close, long-term
arrangements in which fishermen receive very large, interestfree loans from dealers for boats and equipment which will be
paid out of the catch.

In this industry, the fisherman has

a guaranteed market for his fish at the going rate.

In addi-

tion, these processors go out of their way to treat fishermen fairly, inform them of pending changes in the price of
herring, and will even make loans to tide fishermen over in
poor years.

Such loans and agreements make the processor a

virtual partner in the herring fisherman's business.
At the other extreme are the Maine and New Hampshire
groundfishermen who have very few close ties with their
dealers and are constantly being taken advantage of by
dealers.

The majority of these men sell their fish on con-

signment so they do not even know what they will be paid
until their check arrives in the mail.

They get little or

no financial support from the dealers they do business with,
very little accurate information about fish prices, and no
services (i.e. wharfage, low priced bait, gas, ice, or whatever).

Thus, the groundfisherman in northern New England is

on his own and must sell his fish to a distant dealer who
often acts more like an enemy than a source of support.
The lobster industry presents still another marketing
pattern.

In this industry, dealers attempt to ensure a large

and steady supply of lobsters by attaching as many fishermen
to themselves as possible.

Usually a dealer attempts to "keep

his fishermen" by giving them free wharf space, bait, gas and
paint at low prices.

In addition, he provides a secure and

steady market for "his fishermen."

Dealers in this industry

buy all the lobsters caught by their fishermen at the end of
the day and pay them immediately.

Lobster dealers do make

some loans to fishermen, but these are characteristically for
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small amounts.

It is important to note that in many Maine

harbors, lobster dealers have failed In their attempts to
"keep their fishermen," as the rapid formation of cooperatives attests.
In summary, in these three different fishing industries,
there are three very distinct sets of relationships between
fishermen and the dealers to whom they sell their fish.

At

first glance, it might appear that fishermen and dealers in
these industries are operating within three distinct institutional frames.

This is not true.

The basic social struc-

tural principles in all three markets are the same.

The

observed differences in these industries are due to relative
leverage of dealers and fishermen in negotiating long-term
agreements with each other.
The position of the Maine and New Hampshire groundfishermen is relatively weak.

They have a perishable product

that cannot be stored for more than a few days.

Moreover,

Maine fishermen cannot possibly keep track of the market
situation

personal~y.

There are some 72 species of market-

able groundfish and these fishermen live several hours away
from the markets.

Last, Maine fishermen have small boats

and small catches.
of the dealers.

All of these factors strengthen the hand

A Boston broker trading with a Maine ground-

fisherman knows he is dealing with a man who cannot withhold
his catch, has little knowledge of the various groundfish
markets, and cannot supervise the sale of his own fish personally.

Under these circumstances, the temptation to cheat

must be overwhelming.

Even if the fisherman gets angry and

takes his business elsewhere, he has such small catches that
he has not hurt the original dealer's business much.

More-

over, there is no guarantee that he can find any other dealer
who will treat him any better.

Under these conditions, it is

scarcely surprising that over the course of time the transactions between these fishermen and distant dealers have resulted
in a situation in which the fishermen is on his own and is pro-
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vided with very little in the way of loans or services.
The lobster fishermen is in a far better position.

He

catches one species which can easily be stored live in lobster "cars" for months at a time.

He sells his catch every

afternoon personally and receives his money immediately.
While any single lobsterman's catch is never more than a
few hundred pounds at the most (a 500 pound daily catch is
very large), groups of fishermen, often kinsmen" can pool
their catches which they sell to a single dealer.
every small harbor has at least one lobster dealer.

Moreover,
Thus,

the position of lobster dealers is much weaker than that of
groundfish dealers since they are doing business with men
who can easily keep track of the market and who personally
supervise the sale of their catch.

If they are displeased,

it is relatively easy to sell to another dealer or to hold
their catch off the market altogether.
The relative bargaining position of herring fishermen
is very strong for a different set of reasons.

Herring fish-

ermen catch one species of fish so that it is easy to keep
track of the market.
large.

Sometimes their catches can be very

It is not uncommon for seiners to stop off 10,000

bushels in a night.

But the most important factor increas-

ing the negotiating position of herring fishermen is the
risky--boom or bust--nature of herring fishing itself, which
makes it difficult for processing firms to ensure a steady
supply.

As a result, the herring processing firms extend

loans and financial aid to fishermen in harbors up and down
the coast.

If one of the fishermen to whom they have made

loans does not have herring, another one will.

These firms

are really assuming part of the risk of the individual fishermen in an effort to ensure a steady supply of fish.

Failure

to financially buttress herring fishermen would almost certainly result in vastly increased variations in supply of
herring for the processors.

Herring fishing is such a risky

operation that none of the stop seine operators and weir
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operators can earn a living in herring fishing.
have another job.

All of them

Moreover, virtually all of the purse

seiners fish for other species during one season of the
year.

Were it not for the aid of the processors, a very

large number of these fishermen would abandon herring fishing
completely during dry years, leaving the processors without
fish.

Thus, the success the herring fishermen have had in

negotiating very large loans from processors lies in their
vulnerability in combination with their ability to quickly
switch to some other occupation.
In summary, one of the most important institutions in
the New England fishing industry are the long-term bilateral
relationships between fishermen and dealers.

The content of

the contract between any given dealer and fisherman depends
on the history of the relationship between them, and the
leverage each can bring to bear in the process of negotiations.

The conditions in the lobster industry, herring in-

dustry and groundfish industry are so different that very
different kinds of transactions are typical of each industry.
K.

New England Herring Management Plan Agreement
One of the situations we know least about, and one of

the most interesting, is the circumstances surrounding the
promulgation and acceptance of the New England Herring Management Plan.

In 1977, after PL 94-265 was passed, it became

apparent to the herring processors that Atlantic herring would
soon come under Federal regulation.
They decided that these
regulations should reflect the long-term biological and economic interests of the herring industry.

Consequently,

spokesmen for the five largest processors of herring in Maine
got together with representatives of the herring industry in
southern New England, the state fisheries management agencies,
the National Marine Fisheries Service, the Maine Sardine
Council, and a few highline herring fishermen.
The representatives of these organizations reached a consensus rather
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quickly, which is reflected in both the Maine State Herring
Plan and the Federal Herring Plan.
into effect.

Both have already gone

Basically, they decided to continue quota regu-

lations on herring, specifying the total amount of herring in
each size category that could be taken.

These herring quota

were phrased in terms of the so called "nine-inch-rule" which
in essence limits the amount of adult herring (i.e. over nine
inches) that can be taken as well as the amount of "juvenile
herring" that can be caught.

In addition, there is a rule

specifying the amount of herring that can be caught above a
line drawn from Cape Elizabeth (Maine) to Georges Bank.

Above

that line, herring can be caught essentially in the summer
months; below that line is the winter herring grounds.
The major bone of contention in the negotiations was
the nine inch herring rule.

Basically, the processors in

Massachusetts and southern New England are currently packing
and freezing frozen herring fillets, which can only be made
from herring eight and a half inches long.

In Maine, there

is much more interest in the small-sized herring since the
sardine plants require such a large number of these small
fish.

The industry and government representatives were able

to agree on the "nine-inch-rule" which defined adult herring
as those which are over nine inches.

This rule basically

allocated the amount of adult as opposed to juvenile herring
that could be caught and thus reflected the needs of both
kinds of producers (filleters vs. sardine canners).

Once the

industry and governmental representatives agreed on the phraseology of the ruling, the New England Regional Fisheries Management Council and the Maine state legislature were able to
go forward with the regulations with little difficulty.
It should be noted that this agreement on herring regulations was not easily reached.

The herring processors in

New England, particularly in Maine, are very competitive and
there is a good deal of animosity between them.

327

L.

Exchanges and Transactions in Clusters and Institutions

L.l

Institutions and Uncertainty
Given the information on fishing clusters which we have

presented in the last chapter, and the data on institutions
among fishermen which have been briefly described in this
section~

certain generalizations can be made on the exchanges

and transactions which occur in both types of relationships
among and between fishermen.
First, in the introduction to this chapter it was asserted
that institutions are essentially surrogates for accurate information.

They are agreements stemming from long-term trans-

actions and exchanges, which assign risks and thus reduce uncertainty.

The kinds of transactions that are involved in

institutions and the way they operate to reduce uncertainty
was left purposely vague.

Moreover, no mention was made of

the fact that these transactional rules have to be enforced
to be effective.

Both of these issues can now be addressed.

Lobster territories essentially involve agreements among
the men fishing from particular harbors to limit the number
of men who can fish for lobsters ln a given area, thus reserving the catch for the group from that harbor.

Harbor gang

members not only keep others out of the area by trap cutting
and

harassment but prevent other men from joining their own

harbor gang.

After all, a new man in the area has the same

effect on their own aggregate catches as the incursion of a
man from another harbor.

If this does not guarantee all of

the men in the harbor a certain catch, it at least reduces
the uncertainty of the catch of available lobsters being taken
by someone else.

The transaction that is involved is basically

one in which men from a harbor agree to defend a jointly owned
area.

The sacrifice is emotional energy and periodically traps

which are destroyed in the fray.
What happens when a fishernan who has derived the benefits
of a harbor gang refuses to defend the gang's territory?
cases happen fairly frequently.
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Such

In many instances other mem-

bers of the gang defend the boundaries of the territory, take
their losses, and do little more than grumble.

Sometimes the

recalcitrant are sanctioned by having a few traps cut off.
In these cases the men who have defended the territory make
sure everyone incurs the same losses they have.

In many

cases those men who want to avoid conflict place their traps
well inside the area owned by their own harbor gang.

If

they do not incur the trap losses associated with defense of
the perimeters of an area, they do not receive the rewards
of being able to fish the whole area either.
Cooperatives involve at least two different kinds of
transactions.

In the lobstering cooperatives of Maine,

fishermen agree to sell their catch to one outlet in exchange
for a better price on fish and the inconvenience of working
through a cooperative.

They are essentially swapping inde-

pendence for extra income.
the cost.

To many, the gain is not worth

Fin-fishing cooperatives in southern New England

involve a second kind of transaction.

In these cases, fish-

ermen are exchanging a steady supply of fish for information,
loans, favorable prices and an assured marketing outlet.
all cases, cooperative membership
the fisherman.

In

reduces uncertainty for

Lobstering cooperatives cannot guarantee a

given fixed price, but they can guarantee that the fisherman
will receive the best price for his catch possible.

Fin-fish

cooperatives help to reduce uncertainty by giving an assurred
market, favorable prices and accurate information.
enforcement is a problem.

Again,

When fishermen who are members

of the cooperative sell part or all of their catch elsewhere,
they are not sanctioned for a time.

Repeated

offenses how-

ever usually result in their being maneuvered out of the cooperative.
In the case of the four dragger captains who have agreed
to secretly pool data on catches, information is basically
being exchanged for information.

These men are exchanging

time and confidential information about their own catches and
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fishing grounds for information about fishing conditions
over a very wide area.

All four men agree that this is a

very favorable exchange since it greatly increases the certainty of finding concentrations of fish.

The terms of

these transactions have not been violated yet by any of the
four fishermen involved, but if a violation were to occur
that person would almost certainly be denied information in
the future.

Violation would almost certainly mean an end of

the institution, since many kinship and friendship ties are
involved.
The rules concerning stop seining berths and weirs are
essentially agreements giving exclusive fishing rights in
certain coves in exchange for agreements to stay out of other
coves and fishing areas.

This institution does not guarantee

a certain catch, but it does guarantee that a man will have
no competition if fish do enter the cove where he has the
"berth."

The institution cannot make the behavior of herring

any more certain; but it can reduce uncertainty concerning
the behavior of other fishermen.

Enforcement of the rules

concerning weir and stop seine berths proved to be very difficult.

The industry solved the problem by petitioning the

Maine legislature to have the informal rules formalized into
law, which transferred problems of enforcement from the members of the industry to officials of the Department of Marine
Resources.
In Casco Bay, the fishermen who agree to place their
trap trawls in a northeast to southwest direction are essentially exchanging the right to place traps anarchically for
more fishing time which would have otherwise been used building new traps and untangling fouled gear.

The rule

reduces

the uncertainty concerning the number of traps one will have
producing on any given day and the amount of time one will
spend at sea.

The northeast-southwest rule proved difficult

to enforce although it appears to be generally workable.
The New Bedford scallopers are essentially exchanging
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freedom of movement to get higher prices.
effort was explicitly

The entire strike

aimed at reducing the uncertainty

associated with rapidly fluctuating prices for scallops.
However, it is very difficult to say what would happen if
one or more of the scallop boats involved in the New Bedford
strike decided to ignore the rules concerning trip length
and staggering of trips.
In summary then, in every case, these institutions
involve exchanges and transactions which operate to reduce
one or another kinds of uncertainty connected with fishing.
In all cases, enforcement is a problem.

In some cases vio-

lation of transactional agreements is characteristically
ignored; in other cases fishermen themselves attempt to enforce them; in still other cases, the enforcement problem is
passed over to state officials through the expedient of passing a law.
L.2

Exchange and

Informatio~

Flow in Institutions and Clusters

Exchanges occur in both institutions and clusters.

How-

ever, institutions and clusters are very different not only
in what is exchanged, but more importantly in the rules surrounding the exchanges.
In institutions there are a set of rules

(i.e. transac-

tions) surrounding the whole process by which the exchange
takes place

which insure that the bilateral agreement is

kept, and usually insure that the parties involved obtain
something of equal value.

As we have seen, enforcement of

these agreements always poses problems, but enforceable rules
are present nevertheless.

Exchanges in clusters are essen-

tially uneven and nontransactional.

In exchanges within

clusters, one person is giving more than he receives.

This

is true regardless of whether information is swapped for information; information for favors;

labor for instructions in

running new electronic gear, or whatever.

In addition, there

are no rules surrounding the exchanges in clusters, and there
are neither implicit nor explicit agreements between the parties
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which can be enforced.

A herring fishermen,

for example,

who catches more fish than he can carry may give the excess
herring to another boat fishing nearby rather than have them
wasted.

But there is no hard and fast obligation on the part

of the captain of the other boat to reciprocate in kind or to
reciprocate at all.
This difference in institutions and clusters has a
strong effect on information flow.

When people involved in

institutions exchange information, something of equal value
is given in return, whether that be information, loans,
material goods, or what have you.

Fishermen obtain a great

deal of information about catches, fishing locations and
equipment from other men in the same cluster.

However, in

clusters there are no enforceable rules surrounding the exchange of this information, so that poor fishermen obtain
more from skilled fishermen than the "highline" fishermen
obtain from them.

As a result, information flows from the

most highly skilled fishermen to the least skilled men in
the cluster.

Under these conditions, it is not surprising

that relations between fishermen are marked by secrecy-especially in those fisheries where the duration of the
value of knowledge is long.
There is a marked difference in the proportion of goods
and services which have an explicit economic value which are
exchanged within clusters (or institutions in that cluster)
as opposed to exchanges between men who are not in the same
cluster.

Within clusters, a very high percentage of the

exchanges involve goods or services with only an implicit
value (i.e. information, favors, instruction, and so on).
Sometimes men who fish for the same species in the same area
with the same gear sell each other fish and gear, but for
the most part they exchange favors and information.

Exchanges

between men in different clusters involve primarily goods and
services which have a more explicit economic valuation.
example, when

For

exchanges between a fisherman and his dealer
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do involve exchanges of favors, information, and so on, the
most important exchanges are money for fish, or loans for an
assured

future supply of fish.

Here, the most important

things exchanged are easily measured in monetary terms.

In

short, the exchanges between men in the same cluster have a
very high ratio of implicit to explicit exchanges; while men
who are not in the same cluster have a high ratio of explicit
to implicit exchanges.
L.3

Types of Fishing Institutionsand Fishing Effort
Theoretically, two different kinds of institutions can

exist in any industry:
institutions.

hierarchical institutions and market

The market institutions we subdivided into

exchange institutions and production
II, Chapter 4).

~nstitutions

(See Part

However, both of these types of institutions

are not represented in the fishing industry of northern New
England by any means.
institutions.

We have discovered no hierarchical

If the industry were dominated by large, ver-

tically integrated firms, some instances of hierarchical institutions would undoubtedly exist.

But fishermen in northern

New England simply do not work for anyone, and thus these institutions, which are typical of relationships within a firm,
do not exist.

(The single exception may be the Maine redfish

fleet, which is dominated by two firms which own all the vessels and which have hired captains and crews.)

Even in the

herring industry, where fishermen typically have close financial ties with one or more processing companies, transactions
are still voluntary.

Thus, even in this industry, it would'

be very difficult to make the case that hierarchical institutions exist, at least where the fishermen are concerned.
All fishermen are involved in at least one exchange
institution--namely with their dealer or broker.

Relation-

ships between dealer and fishermen are open, voluntary and
involve a quid pro quo transaction.

However, there are no

other institutions we have discovered which meet these criteria.
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Virtually all of the institutions we have discovered are
competitive or production institutions.

That is, they are

essentially agreements to minimize conflict, competition, and
reduce costs.

This is true of the cooperatives, the lobster

fishing territories, the northeast-southwest lobster trawl
rule, the lobster trap limit bill, the stop seine and weir
regulations, the Rhode Island offshore lobster lanes, the
New Bedford scallop agreement, and the New England Herring
Management Plan.

The aim of these agreements is to benefit

the fishermen involved--not society as a whole.

There is

nothing fishermen can do to reduce the uncertainty they face
due to natural factors, but they can reduce uncertainty by
controlling other fishermen and themselves through bilateral
agreements.

If there is nothing one can do to ensure fish,

one can enter into agreements to reduce the uncertainty about
the actions of one's competitors.

In Heath's terms, rules

have "the function of introducing predictability and regularity into the relationship"

(1976:64).

Several of the institutions described influence fishing
effort and one increases fishing effectiveness.
reducing fishing effort include:

Institutions

lobster fishing territories,

the northeast-southwest lobster trawl rule in Casco Bay, the
lobster trap limit, the stop seine berth and weir regulation,
the New Bedford scallop agreement, Rhode Island offshore lobstering lanes, and the New England Herring Management Plan.
In all of these cases, fishermen agreed to place restrictions
on the gear they used, the time they spent fishing, or the
location where they fished.

A reduction or increase in fish-

ing effort is not the avowed purpose of these agreements, but
it is certainly their effect.

These agreements are enforced

in different ways and in different degrees.

It is critically

important to note that in most of these instances, there is
no evidence that these institutions actually cut fishing mortality or operated to conserve the fish resources.
In only
one case (i.e. the lobster fishing territories), do we have
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solid evidence that this did, in fact, occur.

It is criti-

cal to note that entry into perimeter defended areas is much
more difficult than in nucleated areas
territories in this chapter).

(see section on lobster

As a result, there are fewer

fishermen per square nautical mile of fishing grounds in perimeter defended areas (Acheson 1975a:196).

This reduction in

fishing effort has three biological and economic benefits.
First, lobsters caught in perimeter defended areas are larger.
This means that the percentage of female lobsters which are
sexually mature and capable of extruding eggs is much larger
in perimeter defended areas than in nucleated areas (Acheson
1975a:200).

Second, the reduction in fishing effort has re-

sulted in higher stock densities in perimeter defended areas.
Third, fishermen in perimeter defended areas catch larger
lobsters and more pounds of lobsters with less effort.

Thus,

the average gross incomes of men fishing in perimeter defended
areas is significantly higher than those of men in adjacent
nucleated territories (Acheson 1975a:203).

Thus, the system

of territoriality found in the Maine lobster fishing industry--a kind of spontaneous limited entry system--clearly has
beneficial effects for both the lobster and the men fishing
for them.

We suspect that other institutions we have described

in the New England fishing industry might have the same kind
of beneficial effects.

At this writing, we have no evidence

of this, however.
Institutions among fishermen can function to increase
fishing effort of fishing efficiency.

Certainly the dragger

information exchange has increased the effectiveness and incomes of the fishermen who participate in it.

If the entire

groundfish fleet were involved in such exchanges, there would
clearly be much more pressure on the resource.

Again if these

institutions between fishermen conserve fish stocks, they do
so only as an accidental aftereffect.
tion is:

The more crucial ques-

Why don't fishermen form institutions whose aim is

the reduction of fishing effort and the conservation of the
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stocks?

Management, after all, presumably benefits everyone--

including fishermen

(Acheson 1980f).

This question is ad-

dressed in the last part of this volume.
L.4

Formation of Institutions

~nd

Fisheries Management

Most of the social behavior of fishermen is essentially
cluster behavior.

That is, when fishermen interact with each

other, the most important ties are within the loose networks
of men who have the same feasible set of opportunities.
Under certain circumstances, however, fishermen form institutions in which there are a set of formal or informal rules
structuring transactions between people.

The formation of

these kinds of institutions is of critical importance for
purposes of fisheries management since some of these structured arrangements involve agreements between fishermen to
limit fishing activities.

If one could pinpoint the factors

associated with the evolution of such institutions, it might
be possible to introduce policies which would encourage the
formation of similar institutions which would limit fishing
pressure.

In addition, it would hopefully give some insights

into the kinds of regulations that fishermen would accept
with relatively little political opposition.

Presumably,

fishermen would have far less objections to the same kinds
of regulations they impose on themselves than to regulations
which are not matched to the existing normative system and
social structure.
Institutions of all kinds are relatively rare among
fishermen, and we do not have good historical evidence on the
evolution of most of them.

Some are so new that they have no

history (e.g. the New Bedford scallop agreement, the Rhode
Island lobstering lanes); others are so old that their origins
have been lost in time (e.g. the lobstering territories, and
arrangements between fishermen and dealers) .
Nevertheless, we have enough information on these cases
to corne to some tentative conclusions about the conditions
under which fishermen form them.
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(A)

The formation of institutions is clearly struc-

tural; they cannot be explained in terms of personality or
friendship.

In many cases, fishermen can be reasonably

friendly with other fishermen in their cluster, but not form
any kind of institution.

In other instances, there can be

a good deal of hostility and suspicion and yet the individuals concerned are still able to agree on a set of rules
structuring their relationships and acheive a set of mutually
desired ends.

There is, for example, no love lost between

several of the herring processors, or between many of the
lobstermen fishing from the same harbor.

Yet the former

were able to cooperate to formulate a herring management
plan agreeable to all; while the latter are able to successfully defend their fishing territories.

Clearly, far more

is involved besides goodwill.
(B)

Gear conflict and market forces operate to produce

an element of cooperation among fishermen.

As the discus-

sions of the formation of cooperatives and the New Bedford
scallop agreement point out, one needs volume to get a market.

Fishermen who can agree to aggregate their catches are

in a better position vis-~ -vis the market than those who
operate alone.

Moreover, in situations of gear conflict all

fishermen are losers

and no one can be said to gain anything.

In these cases, fishermen can obtain something by working together that they could not achieve alone.

Much of the cooper-

ation we see in the fishing industry has as its goal either
avoidance of gear conflict or more favorable marketing situations.

Again, most of the institutions noted are production

institutions.

The role of conflict and "unfair treatment" in

the formation of institutions has been noted by several social
scientists (Blau 1964:231).
(C)

One of the primary traits of market institutions is

that they involve transactions in which the exchanges are
equal or relatively equal. We suspect that institutions do
not evolve unless the parties involved do obtain something of
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equivalent value.

As a corollary, it appears that the in-

stitutions which are the most stable are those in which there
is a quid-pro-quo exchange, and those that are the least
stable involve exchanges that are unequal.

This finding is

in accordance with those of Thibault and Kelley (1959) and
Homans (1961), who stress that rules (i.e. norms) are the
result of bargaining and strategic interaction.

In this

regard, it should be noted that the institution'

which is

most likely to fail is the Rhode Island offshore lobstering
lane agreement.

It may have failed already.

The reason is

simply that the lobster fishermen obtain a great deal from
the arrangement; the groundfishermen

obtain far less.

The

arrangement allows lobster fishermen to save many thousands
of dollars a year in gear that otherwise would have been
destroyed.

Dragger fishermen lose a lot of flexibility by

adhering to the agreement, and do not really loose much gear
because of lobster traps when they do not.

They can, in

fact, usually fish in and around strings of traps so that
they can get the fish from areas where there are lobster
traps, and avoid destroying their own gear at the same time.
The inequality takes another form too.

Lobster fishing traps

are impossible to guard continuously and thus are very vulnerable.

Groundfishing

or scalloping gear is easily guarded

against depredations by other fishermen since it is on the
boat.

Thus, dragger fishermen can easily sanction lobster

fishermen through the surreptitious destruction of their
fishing gear.

The reverse is not true, however.

As a result,

many scallopers and some dragger fishermen fish anywhere they
want in violation of the "lanes agreement."

There is very

little that lobster fishermen can do to sanction the violators.

Under these circumstances, it is scarcely surprising

that the whole institution is in jeopardy.
(D)
Institutions are most easily formed by small groups
of people who are able to communicate with each other relatively
frequently.

Every single institution studied involved under
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fifty people and in some of these cases far fewer people are
party to the agreement.

The New England Herring Management

Plan was essentially put through by eight to ten people, and
the "dragger information exchange" included only four.

In

the vast majority of cases, those involved in these various
institutions live and fish in one harbor, or two or three
adjacent ports.

Lobster fishing territories and cooperatives

are essentially agreements between men fishing from one harbor.

The dragger information exchange, the northeast-

southwest lobster trawl rule, the lobster trap limit, and
the Rhode Island lobstering lanes included men from two or
three harbors in the same general area.

In only one case--

the New England Herring Management Plan--did the participants
live in widely scattered parts of New England.

Most of the

men involved were processors who keep in very close touch
with each other.

This situation is not surprising.

There

is, after all, a massive literature in sociology concerning
small groups, attesting to the fact that small groups are
able to reach decisions and coordinate efforts faster and
more easily than large groups.
stresses that rules

Another body of literature

(norms) are likely to be evolved in situa-

tions in which the participants can interact on a face to face
basis.

This is one of the essential points of Romans' The

Human Group.
(E)

In all of the cases where men have formed institu-

tions the participants to these agreements receive the benefits

in~the

short run.

Lobster fishermen who defend fishing

territories and restrict entry into local harbor gangs receive not only short-term rewards in the form of less competition, but also long-term rewards through increased recruitment.
Herring fishermen who obey local rules concerning stop
seine operations receive benefits in the form of exclusive
fishing rights in one cove or estuary.

It is important to

note that several fishermen mentioned during interviews concerning institutions that the geographic range of the species
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played a critical role in influencing willingness to enter
into transactions which restricted their fishing operation.
That is, they were more willing to restrict their fishing
operations when they could exploit fish throughout the entire range of the species.

Lobster fishermen who enter in-

to territorial agreements know that lobsters are relatively
immobile, so that the lobsters they conserve in one year
will be available to them in another.

Herring processors

are willing to divide the spoils so to speak, since they
know that vessel operators obligated to them can exploit
herring anywhere in the Gulf of Maine.

Thus, these men know

that they will not restrict their own fishing efforts only
to see the benefits of their sacrifice go to some other fisherman.
(F)

Last and most important, fishermen who enter into

institutional agreements in which their own fishing operations are restricted are involved in tightly packed clusters.
Eight of the ten cases of institutions noted involved men in
the lobster industry, the fixed gear herring industry or in
scalloping.

In all of these cases, fishermen have very simi-

lar sets of options, and these are all industries which are
difficult to switch out of. Lobster boats, as we have seen,
are specialized for lobster fishing and cannot be easily
altered for any other fishing.

Offshore scallop boats re-

quire permanent, expensive hull modification if they are to
fish for anything but scallops. There is nothing that owners
of stop seines and weirs can do with their gear except fish
for herring, and moreover the number of locations where they
can use that gear is very limited as well.

The herring pro-

cessors who were so instrumental in producing the New England
Herring Management Plan are not fishermen, but their set of
feasible options is very restriced.

There is only one thing

they can do with a herring processing plant without the expenditure of a large amount of money.
closely packed cluster.

They, too, are in a

None of the institutions we have
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found involve fishermen from loosely packed clusters save
for the men who organized the Point Judith Fishermen's Cooperative.
There are two reasons men from closely packed clusters
are more prone to restrict the use of fishing gear.

First,

men from these clusters have few other feasible options.
It is not easy for them to switch to fishing other species.
Since they are so dependent on one type

o~

gear and one

species, they are apparently more willing to enter into exchanges which minimize the costs of gear conflict and conserve the species.
Second, the costs of violating formal or informal institutional rules are far higher for men from tightly packed
clusters than for fishermen in loosely packed clusters.
Fishermen in all clusters obtain a good deal of valuable information from each other which strongly affects their economic success.

No fisherman can afford to alientate a large

number of other men in his own cluster for fear or reducing
the amount of information to which he has access.

The costs

of alienating other cluster members are much higher for men
in tightly packed clusters, however.

They are not only depen-

dent on one species, but on other men in their own area fishing for that species.

For these men, violation of institu-

tional rules may bring not only physical sanctions (i.e.
destriction of fishing gear), but also an end to many network
ties through which essential information is obtained.
In this part of the volume, we have described the way
fishing clusters and institutions actually operate.

In Part

IV, we explore how a knowledge of these fishing institutions
and clusters, in combination with biological and economic
information, might be used in the formation of fisheries management plans.
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PARI' IV

'IDWARD A BEHAVIORAL THEORY OF THE MANAGEMENT OF COMPLEX FISHERIES

llY

A.

Intrc::duction
With the implementation of the 200-mile fisheries limit

(PL 94-265) in March of 1977, the U. S. embarked on the management of relatively complex fisheries systems.

Unlike the

relatively stable single species systems described in accepted
economic theory, these systems tend to be highly variable,
mUltiple species systems whose dynamics are very imperfectly
understood.

Additionally, these fisheries exist in a social

and political context which not only limits the choice of
management policies, but also, and more importantly, significantly affects the real (enforcement, administrative, and so
on) costs of policy alternatives.

The purpose of this section

is to begin the development of a socio-economic theory of
greater relevance to these complex systems.

The argument put

forth here is predicated to a certain extent upon the imperfections in our biological knowledge of these complex fisheries.
Nevertheless, much more fundamental to the argument is the
notion that the social costs of rule making and enforcement
(i.e., the institutional transaction

costs) are high in a

complex, uncertain, and highly variable environment.

Our

approach to the argument is, first, to define the pertinent
biological and economic attributes of the fishery environment.
We then introduce some propositions about the formation and
operation of institutions under conditions of uncertainty and,
in the light of these propositions, ask the time worn question
of why the market has not given rise to nconserving"
tions in fisheries.

institu-

On the basis of our answer to this ques-

tion, we then turn to an analysis of the North Atlantic
demersal (groundfish) fishery.l

Needless to say, we consider

these arguments as nexploratory.n

,

~We

concentrate on the demersal fishery because it allows us
to bring out many points concerning complex fisheries.
In
addition, management plans for these species are currently
being developed by the New England Regional Fisheries Management Council. Management plans for herring and lobster have
already been formulated or are in the final stages of preparation.
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B.

Biological and Economic Assumptions About the Fishery
The experience of the past four years

(1977-1980), espe-

cially in New England, provides a strong rationale for altering
the basic assumptions of the accepted economic theory of fisheries.

The accepted body of theory makes two fundamental

assumptions about the biological environment:

(1) that bio-

logical processes relevant to the fishery are well known, and
(2) that the characteristics of these processes are such that
it is possible to exercise considerable control over potential
biological outcomes in the fishery.

Both of these assumptions

are built into a typical specification of the biological
production function, found, for example, in Clark (1976) and
Andersen (1977).

On the economic side, accepted theory tends

to rely exclusively upon the standard neoclassical model of
microeconomics which assumes that the decision maker has perfect knowledge about the environment and that the key to economic success is the ability to minimize costs.
The theory we are proposing here alters these basic biological and economic assumptions about the fisheries environment.

The basis for altering the biological assumptions rests

upon what appears to be a consensus emerging among biologists
with regard to the state of our knOWledge regarding the dynamics of fish populations.

These considerations lead to the

following major assumptions about the biological state of the
fisheries environment; those which appear most germane to the
management problem are:
(1)

Each of the many harvested species of fish has dif-

fering population characteristics.
(2)

The relative

abundance of any species over time in

the fishery is generally subject to wide variations which are
most pronounced when viewed in terms of the strengths of successive year classes.
(3)

The state of our knowledge makes it difficult to de-

termine the cause of these variations in year class strengths.
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Put differently, standard theory assumes that man, through control of his own exploitive efforts, can also control future
sizes of exploitable stocks.

However, experience in the North

Atlantic and apparently elsewhere lends little support to this
crucial assumption.

There is little evidence that there is a

relationship between current stock size, fishing effort, and
future population sizes.

However, when stock sizes are driven

to very low levels as a result of fishing pressure there appears to be a reduced probability of good recruitment.
cally,

Specifi-

for each species, we assume that recruitment is a

highly variable stochastic function of spawning stock size.
Below some critical spawning stock size, which is difficult to
specify, the expected value of the distribution of variation
in recruitment as a function of spawning stock size is reduced
sharply.

Above it, we assume that for all practical purposes,

the expected value of the distribution of variation in recruitment is independent of spawning stock size.
In addition to these assumptions about the biological
environment, we have made five other assumptions about the factors influencing economic competition.

All of these assump-

tions are at variance with the standard theory, although they
are reasonable given OUr model and the data presented on competition
(1)

among fishermen

in Part III of this volume.

We assume that demersal fish neither school in the

manner of pelagic fish such as herring and menhaden nor distribute themselves randomly as in theory.

Rather, we assume

that fish move relatively slowly in fairly dense aggregations
and that their movements are influenced by bottom types, currents, water temperatures, and a variety of other physical
factors.
(2)

We assume that the locations where concentrations

of individual species may be found is very difficult to predict
in a way which is meaningful for the immediate competitive
purposes of individual fishermen.
347

(3)

We assume that the primary costs of fishing are re-

lated to the costs of acquiring knowledge about the location
of fish at any particluar point in time.

By primary cost, we

mean simply that the efficient acquisition of knowledge about
the location, density, and movements of fish is the overriding
determinant of competitive success or failure.
(4)

Furthermore, we assume that the individual fisher-

man's costs of acquiring information about fish is a function
of the multivessel competitive information networks developed
as a result of both competitive and cooperative behavior of
ohBer fishermen as well as his own searching behavior.
(5)

Finally, we assume that fishermen are not technolog-

ically bound to the pursuit of a single species, but may easily
and freely alter the species direction of their fishing effort
(within the limits of a relatively large set of demersal
.
) .I
speCles

These economic and biological circumstances cast the collective production problem in a different light than that
assumed by standard theory.

Most important, the biomass of

the system as a whole, as opposed to the individual species
within the system, appears to exhibit marked stability over
time.

If one can speak of recruitment to a biomass it would

appear that biomass size is not a function of factors related
to exploitation rates, but is perhaps more closely related to
overall energy inputs to the system which appears to be relatively stable over time.

(Again, this appears to be true over

wide, but not extreme, ranges.)
Although the biomass of individual species varies considerably from year to year, season to season, and location to
location, the relative stability of the overall biomass is
extremely

important to

the

competitive

strategies

,
·This is not to suggest it is easy to change from one fishery
to another if that means a major change in boats, gear type,
or skill.
(See Acheson 1980b.)
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of individual fishermen.

Although these variations are pre-

dictable to a certain degree, the precision of these predictions in terms of time and location is insufficient to be
relevant to the competitive problem faced by the fisherman.
Consequently, the problem for fishermen is not how to trawl
vast areas of ocean for randomly or predictably distributed
fish; rather, it is to obtain information on changes in the
location and availability of non-randomly distributed fish.
In multispecies fisheries, the rapidly changing external
environment places a premium on the ability to adapt rapidly.
Given the rapid changes in availability of these species, a
social network is critical for success.
This view of the biological situation has implications
that are very different from those stemming from the standard
bio-economic models concerning fisheries.

First and most im-

portant, it suggests that the possibility and feasibility of
controlling fish population size appears to be substantially
reduced and, consequently, that the social benefits of exercising controls (e.g., on fishing effort)

should be much more

modest except for those controls necessary to maintain a safe
minimum population size.

Second, these circumstances imply

that the most beneficial kinds of policies are those designed
to control the timing of the

exploitation of the already-

recruited population in the short run.

The question of how

that control may be economically exercised we address through
our theory of institutions.
C.

A Basic

Institutiona~

Proposition

Accepted economic theory of wild fisheries is based on
the fundamental observation that market processes provide only
a very imperfect collective mechanism for the conservation of
wild resources.
ure.

Fisheries are the classic case of market fail-

There is nothing in

our theoretical view or experience

which would lead us to disagree with this observation.

How-

ever, accepted theory suggests that the reason market forces
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are ineffective in stemming over-exploitation is due solely
to the absence of well defined property rights or a mechanism
for simulating their effects.
not wrong.

This deduction, we believe, is

However, the common property resource argument has

been so compelling that it has closed off consideration of
many other reasonable policy alternatives.
Our theory of adaptive behavior suggests several other
policy alternatives which should be considered.

The model

suggests that the organization of economic activity

for the

exploitation of wild fisheries is a collective problem just
like any other economic activity.

As such, it requires the

establishment of rules for the avoidance of strategic interactions which have the potential of eestroying the possibilities for collective betterment through exchange and/or production.

In non-fisheries markets, for example, the absence

of such rules can lead to situations in which the uncertainty
of another party's potential strategic behavior is so large
that exchange or production is not feasible.

It is the oppor-

tunity cost of this foregone exchange or production which
makes the establishment of rules (or sets of rules, which we
call institutions) economic.

But to be economic, it is clear

that the costs of these rules themselves cannot exceed the
opportunity costs of the potentially foregone exchange or
production.

Furthermore, there is often more than one set of

rules which will produce the desired social benefits.

The

problem lies in choosing the most economical set of rules from
among a larger set of feasible rules. 1
Commons (1923)

looked upon these rules as reciprocal sets

of rights and obligations.

It is the assignment and enforce-

ment of these rights and obligations to particular individuals
or collections of individuals which has the effect of altering

lThe idea that social forms are selected with costs and benefits in mind has been clearly recognized by Barth, among
others (1966:4).
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behavior in the direction desired by policy. 1
feasible

But to be

(i.e., capable of preventing undesirable strategic

behavior) whatever rules are chosen must be tailored to the
context of the social problem.

For example, rules or regula-

tions well suited to sedentary creatures would probably be
very inappropriate for highly migratory species.
In this light then, our dissatisfaction with the standard economic theory of fisheries lies primarily in the fact
that these theorists consider only two institutional alternatives with regard to fisheries policy:

namely, one may either

abolish the root of the problem through the establishment of
resource property rights or one may simulate the market result of resource property rights through the appropriate application of taxes and subsidies.

From our point of view,

these policy suggestions are not "wrong" per se, but have the
effect of ignoring the crucial question and that is the choice
of the most effective and economic sets of rules.

In effect,

standard theory poses the policy problem in terms of a choice
between "no rules" and one of two very limited sets of rules.
It is not surprising, given this artificial choice, that most
economists automatically assume that the theory defined set
of rules--called "limited entry"

in the trade--is

socially

superior to no rules at all.
Actually, standard theory is very unclear as to what it
means by resource property rights and, in particular, provides
little or no guidance for the specification of these rights.
We might suggest that what is implied but never articulated
lIn most situations, rules are not assigned to individuals.
Rather the rules or social forms are generated through a process
in
which individuals change their strategies of interaction
in response to the ploys of other individuals.
The individuals
involved, in other words, construct the rules of the games they
play through repeated transactions over the course of time
(see Barth 1966; Heath 1976: 64).
In this sense, fisheries
regulation involves a different process.
Here, leqislat0rs and
management agencies do play a large role in selecting rules
(i.e. laws) constraining the choices of individuals in the
fishing industry.
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is simply a situation in which individual fishermen are constrained to behave in a way that is consistent with the socially efficient harvest of the resource.

There is nothing

at all wrong with this implied objective.
atical about it is that the vagueness

What is problem-

or lack of definition

of the term "resource property rights" obfuscates the economic
policy problem.

Generally it places economists in the position

of not being able to recognize the very wide range of potential
constraining rules capable of achieving a socially efficient
solution to "overfishing."

The exact rules or regulations

formulated will vary from fishery to fishery.
In summary, accepted theory does not consider what might
be termed "intermediate" systems of rights and obligations
nor does it seriously consider the basic economic question of
the social costs and benefits of any particular system of
rights, duties, and obligations. Given the dichotomous policy
choice presented by the theory, there is an almost universal
presumption among economists that the social benefit/cost ratio
of a property rights system or its simulation through taxes
and subsidies will be relatively favorable.

This appears to

be the correct answer to an irrelevant question.
ful question is:

A more fruit-

which of the potential sets of rules and

regulations will produce the best social benefit/cost ratio?
D.

Restatement of the Fisheries Problem
It should be noted that most current wild fisheries are

not conducted in the absence of institutions which define and
enforce rights and obligations.

Observation of communities

exploiting wild resources turns up many examples of "spontaneous"

(i.e. market,not governmentally imposed) institutions

whose purpose of to govern certain collective aspects of the
activity. We have documented ten such instances in the New
England fishery in the previous part of this volume (Part III,
Chapter 5).

Few, if any, of these institutions, however, are
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explicitly designed for the purpose of conserving the resource.
We are aware of a few instances--hunting and trapping in the
Northern Maine woods, pre-colonial grazing practices in the
Sahel (Hardin 1976), lobstering around certain Maine islands
(Acheson 1975a; Wilson 1976)--in which institutions function
to conserve resources and the people involved recognize this.
Nevertheless, the much more prevalent situation is characterized by the absence of resource conserving institutions; it
is the prevalence of these situations which has given rise to
the perception of an endemic problem.

However, the existence

of institutions for the collective solution of other economic
problems (and, in a few instances, conservation problems)

sug-

gests a refinement of the fundamental question about overfishing:

since fisheries resource conservation is so clearly

a collective problem and since the groups engaged in the
exploitation of these resources have shown the ability to
create institutions for the solution of other collective problems, why is it that there are so few resource conserving
institutions?
Our general model (see Part II) and the data on New England fisheries

(Part III) suggest that several factors are

involved in the formation of resource conserving institutions.
First, we may note that institutions arise when the informational costs or uncertainties in the trading or competitive
environment are too high to make exchange or production feasible.

Second, we suggest that the particular institutional

form chosen or evolved to facilitate exchange or production
is determined by consensus (non-articulated) that arises among
traders or competitors who confront similar types of uncertainty.
Third, we suggest that the function of these institutions is
to remove or reduce the uncertainties of trading or competition
through the creation of behavioral rules which make the outcomes of individual transactions more predictable.

Institu-

tions also must involve a mechanism for the enforcement of
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these behavioral rules.

As we saw in the last chapter, en-

forcement is constantly a problem.
These four factors are suggested by our general model
(Part II).

Our analysis of ten existing fishing institutions

(see Part III, Chapter 5) suggests that institutions will
arise when transactions involve swapping entities of equal
value, and when the people who bear the transaction costs reap
the benefits.

In addition, the span of the crucially neces-

sary information network must encomapss, at the least, all
the individuals affected by or affecting the collective problem.
These notions about the necessary evolutionary conditions
for the formation of institutions suggest several explanations
why resource conserving institutions have not arisen in fisheries.
First, the span of the relevant information networks
created by trading and competition, especially the latter, is
typically not large enough to encompass the span of users of
the resource itself.
Our second hypothesis is that conserving market institutions have not evolved because the requirement for repeated
encounters with uncertainty under similar conditions is not
easily met, given the complex biological nature of the fishery.
Put differently, we have mentioned previously the great difficulty there is in determining causality in variations in the
relative abundance of any given species of fish.

This dif-

ficulty is encountered by scientists using the best data,
theory and analytical techniques available.

The relatively

few instances of overfishing or dramatic declines in abundance
which have been observed in any given fishery have been insufficient to give rise to a clear sense of causality among fishermen--much less a clear sense of what might be done to remedy
the situation (Acheson 1980f).

In the absence of any consen-

sus about whether any overfishing problem even exists, it is
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senseless to expect fishermen to evolve norms and institutions
to solve such problems.
tures takes time.

The evolution of institutional struc-

The rate of evolution is probably closely

related to the frequency with which very similar situations
are encountered and a fishery does not give rise to frequent
overfishing situations.

It is only recently that we have

become conscious of anything more than isolated instances of
what appears to be overfishing.
Last, fisheries management involves foregoing present
catches in the hope that future catches and
improved.

It involves investment.

inco~es

will be

The problem is that the

rewards of management come, if at all, only years in the future.
Under these circumstances, it is scarcely surprising that fishermen do not support rules to conserve the fisheries.
costs of such rules will be borne by them.
be shared with new entrants.
when current fishermen

The

The benefits will

They may even come at a

ti~e

have left the fishery completely.

Fishermen are acutely aware of these limitations (Acheson
1980f: 784 ).
E.

Market Impairment in Complex Fisheries
Given these hypotheses about institutional evolution,

what can be said about the nature of the market impairment in
the fisheries?

Traditionally, economists have tended to em-

phasize the impairment arising from potential reductions in
stock which result from

intergenerational effects of fish-

ing activity (i.e., the so-called stock/recruitment problem).
In addition to this longer term impairment, the literature also
mentions the impairments that arise from short term competitive
interactions (i.e.,"crowding effects" and age of capture effects).

In each case, what is meant by the impairment is an

opportunity cost imposed upon society as a result of strategic
behavior on the part of fishermen.

The term impairment implies

that there are opportunity costs that need not be borne by
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society, provided better rules for the governance of fisheries
can be found.

In the immediately following section, we dis-

cuss the particular nature of these impairments with special
reference to the Atlantic demersal fishery and the institutional
policies implied by the peculiar nature of the impairments in
the context of the unique circumstances of the fishery.

The

analysis treats these impairments as if they were inseparable, even
though

in an unregulated fishery, all these impairments are

simply different manifestations of the same problem.

However,

from the point of view of ameliorative policy, it is possible
to find rules which can solve one and not the other impairment.
Also it should be noted that the reason for our use of the
term impairment instead of externality, as is more common in
the literature, is that the meaning of the term externality
is derived from the notion that normal competitive behavior
is not characterized by strategizing (i.e. the model of perfect competition).

It should be clear from the preceeding

sections of this book that we consider strategizing, potentially
degenerative competitive behavior, to be normal.

Hence, the

different term.
E.I

Short-Term Competitive Interactions
The impairments arising from short-term strategic behavior

by fishermen can generally be said to occur in two very distinct circumstances.

On the one hand, there are gear conflicts

or other forms of physical interference which arise because
fishermen often find it advantageous to fish in very close
proximity to one another.

These conflicts can be

seen most

clearly, for example, when fixed gear (gillnet, longline, etc.)
is used in the fishing operation.

Often, the close proximity

of one fisherman to another is an attempt by one to take advantage of the presumed greater knowledge of another regarding
the location of fish.

When this kind of imitative strategic

behavior is carried to an extreme, the chances for physical
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entanglement of the gear are high.

This can mean loss of the

gear of both fishermen, or, at the least, loss of time spent
untangling the gear.

It is rare for gear conflicts to arise

except in cases where fixed gear is employed, and even in
those instances the very nature of the problem--the close
proximity of competitors, the clear losses in terms of gear
or time, and the relatively straight-forward solution rules-is such that impairments of this sort can generally be solved
by consensus of the involved parties.

The northeast/southwest

trap placement rule in the Casco Bay lobster fishery, the Rhode
Island lobster lanes, and the weir-stop seine rules cited in
the previous chapter are good examples of this kind of spontaneous institution.

In short, problems of physical inter-

ference generally do not appear to be critical management
problems because the conditions of their occurrence are generally sufficient for the evolution of "spontaneous" solution
rules.
The other short-term competitive impairment ( "crowding"
in the literature) concerns the reduced catch of one fisherman
due to another fisherman's success.

The range or span of this

particular impairment would appear to depend in large part upon
the mobility characteristics of the resource.

For completely

sedentary animals, the span of the problem is apparently relatively localized: a fishermen's activity in one location is
not likely to affect the activity of a fisherman located
elsewhere.

One would expect this localization of the impair-

ment to facilitate the growth of rules whenever it was felt
that the opportunity costs of the impairment exceeded the
cost of potential rules.

This appears to be the case in the

lobster fishery in which the territorial system operates to
reduce entry and thus crowding (Acheson 1972, 1975a, 1980g;
Wilson 1977).
In the case of the more mobile animals, however, one would
expect the range of affected parties to exceed the span of
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information networks created by competitive interactions.

For

example, mackerel fishermen who exploit the same stock of fish
in the Mid-Atlantic Bight and off the Nova Scotia coast are
unaware of each others' effects on the stock.

They also have

no information networks of the kind necessary for the establishment of ameliorating rules.

The less mobile demersal fish

probably present a case intermediate between the sedentary
and highly mobile species.
Another aspect of the crowding impairment which may help
explain the relative absence of spontaneous rules for its
amelioration has to do with the severity of the social opportunity costs.

This may be explained by reference to the dif-

ferences between social and private efficiency caused by this
competitive interaction (where we are using a very narrow
definition of efficiency--catch per unit effort).

For any

particular boat, the most efficient situation is one in which
there are no·

other boats in the fishery.

Densities of fish

would be greatest and catch per unit effort at a maximum in
this circumstance.

Nevertheless, this single boat will find

that its own efficiency is affected by its own actions--the
more it catches, the more it reduces the density of fish in
the ocean and the lower will be its own efficiency.

The ad-

dition of other vessels to the fishery will, of course, reduce
the efficiency of the first and subsequent vessels.

In fact,

for any given rate of total catch, the same reduction in efficiency will take place regardless of the rules or institutions
in place.

The question, then, is where is the impairment?

If this impairment is purely a physical phenomenon, no rule
would appear to be able to ameliorate its effects.
The idea that there is an impairment lies in the presumption that rules can be devised to alter the total catch and
thereby affect the extent to which these efficiency reductions
take place.

Traditional theory, in fact, proposes that the

major difference between free entry and sole ownership is in
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terms of differences in total output.

The reason offered for

this is that the sole owner is assumed able to perceive and
react to the marginal efficiency effects of additional fishing
units.

Given prices in the market, he is then also assumed

capable of equating marginal costs and revenues.
maximizing decision rule

This profit

results in fewer boats and greater

efficiency of each remaining boat.

Whether this decision rule

is capable of generating a net social gain or not depends,
among other factors, upon the nature of the overall supply
function in the fishery.

Traditional theory assumes that at

levels of exploitation at or beyond MSY (Maximum Sustainable
Yield) the industry supply curve is vertical or backward
bending.

In these circumstances, the marginal value of the

product of an additional vessel is not actually zero or negative.

In effect, the opportunity cost to society arises when

the value of the net addition to total catch of a new boat does
not equal or exceed the value placed upon that additional
catch by society (i.e. units of effort greater than that consistent with maximum economic yield) .
In the kind of complex fishery we are concerned with, it
is unlikely that limited entry rules can be developed which
are economic from the point of view of the society as a whole.
There are three reasons for this skepticism:

First, the op-

portunity cost borne by society depends to a large extent upon
the nature of the supply curve.

The traditional presumption

that this function is vertical or backward bending (and hence
that there is a high social opportunity cost) is based upon a
long run concept of equilibrium in which supply becomes a
function of the stock/recruitment relationship in the fishery.
Given the nature of the stock/recruitment relationships that
appear to be found in complex fisheries, there is reason to
doubt the validity of this presumption, at least above safe
minimum population levels. Also, there is the question of
whether it is the short or the long run supply function which
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is pertinent to the determination of social opportunity costs.
In the short run the fishery will always show an upward sloping supply function.

So long as the choice of output in the

short run does not impact upon output in the long run, the
opportunity cost of crowding would be entirely short run and
would not appear excessive.

Hence, there is strong reason to

believe that so long as safe minimum population levels are
maintained or exceeded, there is little or no social cost in
this respect to free entry.
Second, the economic value of the "marginal decision rule"
must be judged not only in terms of its potential for reducing
social opportunity costs, but also in terms of the costs of
the rule itself.

In this respect, those promoting the tradi-

tional argument are guilty of attributing costless omniscience
to either the sole owner or the management authority which
might be attempting to simulate the effects of sole ownership.
Given the tremendous variation in the species composition from
location to location, season to season, and year to year,
highly variable species prices, and long lived capital equipment, the practical informational requirements facing the sole
owner or management authority would appear to be extremely
costly.

Put differently, the ability to discern the marginal

effect of an additional harvesting unit in these circumstances
would be very low or exceedingly costly.

In addition, one

must also take into account the social costs incurred in the
establishment of the institutional structure (e.g. limited
entry) necessary for the implementation of the decision rule.
Limited entry, after all, is not popular with the majority
of fishermen

(Acheson 1980f: 775ff).

Third, each additional vessel increases the efficiency
of other vessels because it reduces the collective search costs.
Knowledge of the locations of fish concentrations cannot be
acquired by an individual acting entirely on his own.
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The

ocean is rather large, the distribution of fish very uneven,
and the width of the search path of any single vessel is very
narrow.

Consequently, fishermen tend to rely upon one another

for information about the results of each others' searches.
As we have pointed out, there are basically two ways that search
information flows through the fleet:

(1) information is gained

by observing fishing locations and catches;
exchanged verbally.

(2) information is

The public reluctance of fishermen to

discuss the success of their fishing operations gives the
impression that involuntary information flows dominate because
of the apparent barriers to the flow of information.
only partially true.

This is

Most fishermen--especially those seeking

mobile species--exchange a good deal of information with each
other.

In these arrangements with family members, close rel-

atives, and good friends, fishermen share fairly detailed information about where the fish are, where the most promising
search areas might be, and so on.

The basis for the voluntary

provision of competitively valuable information is the expectation of reciprocation at some time in the future.

In the

literature, there are numerous examples of such informationsharing agreements (e.g. Acheson 1980a: 442ff; Acheson and
Lello 1980: 374;

Wilson 1980; Orbach 1977: 104-133; Bort 1980;

\ndersen 1972).
From the economic point of view, these arrangements are
significant not only because they offset the inefficiencies
of greater numbers but also because admission to one of these
information-sharing groups constitutes a significant barrier
to successful entry into the fishery.

That is, unless a fish-

erman can gain entry into an information-sharing arrangement,
his chances of competitive success are considerablY diminished.
From the point of view of the magnitude of social opportunity
costs, one is led to conclude that the existence of these
arrangements would lead to fewer but more efficient boats than
tlould otherwise be the case.

In short, these pra~tices of fish-

ermen are entirely in accord with the policy direction implied
by theory.
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In summary, under the circumstances we assume are characteristic of a complex fishery, there does not appear to be a
strong,

~

priori case for the existence of large, net, social

opportunity costs arising from the strategic interactions
among fishermen.

(This stands in contrast with traditional

fisheries theory.)

Three factors lead us to this conclusion.

First,costs to management of discovering and preventing the diseconomic impact of the marginal vessel are apt to be high.
Second, the collective search arrangements among fishermen
create barriers to entry and important economizing effects.
Third, the crowding opportunity costs are likely to be limited to the short run, assuming that the current stock size does
not fall below the safe minimum level.
In effect, complex fisheries do not appear, on their face,
to present an instance of a highly impaired market.

It is not

at all clear that establishing property rights or its bureaucratic simulation would give rise to greater net social benefits than the current system of institutions.

The practical

management problem would appear to be whether the benefitcost ratio of these rules devised by fishermen can be improved
upon by the imposition of sole ownership or its bureaucratic
simulation.
F.

Age of Capture Impairments
In a sense, the age of capture impairment is a result of

short-term competitive interaction also.

Traditionally, how-

ever, it has been treated quite separately from the so-called
"crowding problem."
The age of capture impairment stems from the fact that
fish grow rapidly when young and slowly when old so that the
biomass of any given year class of a species exhibits the same
general growth patterns modified by the age specific mortality
rate of the class.

Given these differences in biomass growth
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rates over time, it is felt that there should be an economically optimal time of harvest.

A first approximation to the

determination of this optimal time states that harvest should
take place when the costs of waiting are no longer offset by
the more rapid growth of the biomass (Clark 1976).

As a

practical matter, this notion of optimality has to be modified to take into account the imperfect mobility of capital
and labor resources employed in the harvest, the imperfections

in our knowledge of the location of the fish, our imperfect
knowledge of actual growth rates which may vary by location
and so forth, the presence of predators and prey, and finally,
the fact that our technological ability to selectively harvest
fish of only a certain given size is very limited.

All these

factors make it very difficult to identify the optimal period
of harvest, as well as make it difficult to harvest the class
in that period.
In a multiple species context, further complications
enter regarding the actual or expected availability of substitute species.

Put simply, the problem here is that the

market exhibits a strong preference for stability of supply
but tolerates some substitution among species.

If no sub-

stitution were possible, the preference for stability of supply would cause the optimal period of harvest to become
crucially dependent upon expectations regarding the time of
arrival and size of new year classes in the fishery.

Given

the extreme variability in the strength of successive year
classes, which appears to characterize most marine fish
species, and the relatively short prediction horizon which is
possible, an unambiguous analytical determination of the optimal timing of harvest in a single species context becomes
virtually uneconomical not because the analytical technique
is necessarily difficult, but because the cost of analytically
relevant information is likely to be so high.

In a multiple

species fishery, the nature of both the analytical and
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practical problem is changed markedly.

At any given time

there is always a greater expected probability of "good" year
class among a number of species than there would be for a
single species.

This can be taken as simply a normal statis-

tical phenomenon or, alternatively, as a result of the relative
stability of the total system biomass noted earlier.

What-

ever the case may be, the result from the practical point of
view is that the timing of the exploitation of a year class
of any given species is less dependent upon expectations
regarding the arrival of a new year class.
What species may happen to have good year classes and
the relative prices of those species is another question, however.

This aspect of a multiple fishery causes the analytical

problem of the optimal economic timing of harvest to become
exceedingly complex.

On the other hand, given substitution

in the market, the social opportunity costs of not achieving
that optimum are minimal.
In spite of these problems with the determination of the
optimal timing of harvests, one may logically argue that a
formal set of rules cannot lead to timing the harvest for any
defined optimum.

This argument is very simple:

in the absence

of any rules, each fisherman has the incentive to catch fish
before the other.

This leads to harvesting the fish as early

in their life as possible consistent with what is saleable in
the market, with unfortunate results for the stocks and society
as a whole.

Consequently, the social opportunity cost of the

"age of capture" impairment is the difference between the
value of fish harvested under the "as early as possible"
strategy and the value which could be obtained if formal rules
were instituted to force fishermen to harvest the fish at some
more

optimal age.

In sum, the management question is whether

or not there exist economical rules for the reduction of this
opportunity cost.

364

As mentioned, the feasible set of rules will depend upon
the particular biological, technological, social, and economic
context of the fishery.

In a net fishery, such as the New

England groundfishery, biological and technological factors
severely limit the feasible techniques (and hence possible
rules) which might be used to selectively harvest fish by
size or age.

Fish cannot be caught indiscriminately and then

sorted by sizes after they are brought on board the vessel
without creating extremely high mortality rates among the
smaller fish.
Consequently, the size selection needs to take place while
the fish are still in the water.

There are basically only

two imperfect ways in which this can be accomplished.

First,

the mesh size of nets (or hook size on a longline) can be
chosen so that smaller fish stand a lower probability of capture.

This is a far from foolproof technique.

The greatest

problem is that no small fish are released from otter trawls
when the mesh of the net is already plugged by larger fish.
In a multiple species fishery in which the optimal size of
each species differs, it also requires a compromise mesh size
based, for example, on the relative value of allowing each
species to grow to a given size.

Needless to say, the tech-

nological limitations of this method of size selection in a
mUltiple species fishery considerably magnify the analytical
problem of determining the optimal period of harvest.

In a

sense, mesh size is a relatively crude tool for influencing
the timing of harvests.

Consequently, not only is the cost

of the analytical problem increased, but the practical ability
to approximate the solution to the analytical problem is reduced by the technological attributes of the mesh size technique.
From the point of view of management policy, these limitations
reduce the potential benefits of using mesh size to regulate
the timing of harvest.

Whether the technique is capable of

yielding a net gain from the fishery is likely to depend entirely upon how the particularistic aspects of the fishery
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influence the benefits and costs of a mesh size rule.
The second way to size select fish ii through the avoidance of congregations of small fish.

In a multiple species

fishery, this may be a very difficult procedure to follow
because of the intermingling of small and large fish of the
same and different species.

With intermingling, an avoid-

ance strategy--closing a geographical portion of the fishery-always carries with it a difficult problem:

namely, when

does the cost of foregoing the availability of large fish outweigh the bene1it of avoiding small fish?
is not a difficult problem.

Analytically, this

Given the relative price of the

fish, expected growth and mortality rates, interest rates and
catch per unit effort, a breakeven ratio
fish can be calculated.

of small and large

The real problem is the informational

one--what is the extent of intermingling?

How does it vary

as one moves across the bottom of the ocean?
wixing vary by species?

How does the

Here again, feasible solution rules

are likely to be totally dominated by the idiosyncratic characteristics of the resource.

If, for some reason, small fish

tend to congregate more or less separately from large fish
and in relatively stable locations, the information problem
is minimized and avoidance is clearly a viable means for
size selections.

To the extent that such clear size separa-

tions do not occur, the usefulness of area prohibitions for
size selection is diminished.

As with mesh size, the very

particular attributes of the resource and the harvesting methods dominate the choice of appropriate rules for putting into
effect an avoidance strategy (i.e., when, where, and for how
long is avoidance appropriate?).
No matter what the institutional structure--sole ownership or governrrent rnanagerrent--attempts to solve the age of capture problem
will depend upon the implementation and enforcement of rulesof-thumb, based on compromise and imperfect information.
relevant policy problem lies in devising an appropriate
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The

institutional structure which is capable of assimilating the
idiosyncratic information about the fishery and reaching or
deciding upon the relevant compromise rules-of-thumb.
An interesting question that occurs here is whether or
not the appropriate rules need to be directed at the act of
~election

itself--i.e., specifying a particular mesh size or

closed area--or whether rules can be devised which encourage
individual fishermen to adopt the selection techniques most
appropriate to the idiosyncratic conditions they happen to
encounter in the process of harvesting.

For example, what

would be the effect of a simple "minimum size of landing"
rule for each species?

Is it possible that fishermen can

devise their own selection techniques which at the same time
do not confound the intent of the size rule?

Would fishermen

operating under this kind of regulation tend to fish indiscrimately, discarding under-sized (and dead) fish?

Might

they, for example, find that a large mesh size caught more
larger fish and fewer smaller fish than a small mesh?

This

kind of "indirect" rule appears to have the advantage of
simplicity and also maintains the fisherman's ability to
adapt to resource idiosyncracies more than would a direct
rule which specified a certain mesh size or closed area.
Whatever rule approach is eventually taken, the process
of developing regulations is not likely to be analytically
elegant but must be steeped in the very particularistic aspects of the fishery.

This is absolutely crucial if anything

near an optimum rule is to be implemented.

In any case, it

requires solid scientific work, especially on the more behavioral
aspects of fish stocks, the fishermen, and the knowledge of
fishermen regarding the stocks.

In effect, the complexity

of the fishery and the limitations in the feasible set of
rules would appear to require an equally complex and diverse
collective information and decision network.
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G.

The Recruitment Impairment
The recruitment impairment arises from the possibility

that fishing activity will lead to declines in the size of
future generations (or year classes) of exploitable fish.
This possibility is most easily illustrated in terms of the
models that posit a continuous relationship between fishing
effort and fish population size.

The implied view of these

models is that changes in current population size caused by
fishing effort give rise to changes in egg production, and,
depending upon food or some other limiting factor, an increase or decrease in the rate of recruitment or future
population sizes.

In the view of these models, a potentially

large opportunity cost to society arises when current fishing
effort is large enough to cause a decline in recruitment.
The source of this opportunity cost, of course, is levels of
fishing effort great than that necessary to maintain the
population at a level consistent with maximum economic sustained yield from the fishery.

In short, the models conclude

that careful regulation of fishing effort is necessary to
maintain populations at the level consistent with maximum
economic yields.
In the kind of complex fishery we are dealing with, there
is little, if any, evidence to demonstrate the existence of
biological processes similar to those assumed by standard
economic theory.
1977.)

(See, for example, Hennemuth 1979; Cushing

Biologists are beginning to suspect that there is

almost no causal relationship (at least for practical purposes)
between current fishing effort and future stock sizes except
perhaps when fishing proceeds to the point where the current
spawning population is driven to very low levels.
threshhold level is currently not known.

This

Above this mimimum

safe population level, the probability of spawning leading to
a 'good' year class appears more or less independent of
s~awning

population size; below, it appears that there is a

reduced probability of a good year class.
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The management

implications of this kind of biological production function
are important, especially when compared with the traditionally
held view.
In terms of the potential social opportunity cost which
might be borne in a completely unregulated fishery, this nontraditional view of the effort/recruitment relationship suggests that there is essentially no opportunity cost so long
as current spawning populations are not fished to a point
below the (uncertain) safe minimum level.

In other words,

above the safe minimum level we may still observe highly
variable recruitment, but this variation is probably not due
to factors related to the current size of the population.
There is, in effect, no ability to exercise control over
this variability (at least not through controls on fishing
effort) and, hence, there is no rule which can be devised to
achieve a better result.

Below the safe minimum population

size, however, there is clearly an opportunity cost related
to the level of fishing effort; and an impairment exists.
A set of rules to prevent this situation from arising could
theoretically be developed.

The biological production

function assumed by most biologists suggests that the appropriate rules need to be directed at spawning as opposed to
total stock size.

Given the relationship between size of

individual fish and maturity, the attainment of minimum safe
spawning populations at the least requires size selectivity
l
in harvest.
The relevant management question here, as in all other
cases, is whether or not an economical rule or set of rules
from the social standpoint can be developed.

The answer to

this question depends upon the particular bioeconomic

con-

text of the fishery and the existing normative structure.

lIn this case, however, the objective of size selectivity is not some economically optimal timing of harvest,
but rather the preservation of minimum spawning stock
size.
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H.

Application to the Atlantic Demersal Fishery
In this section, we outline the bioeconomic context

relevant to the Atlantic demersal (i.e. groundfish)

fishery

and then discuss the set of formal and informal rules regulating relationships between fishermen and influencing their
fishing effort.
From the viewpoint of management, the spawning stock/
recruitment relationships cause a good deal of uncertainty-most importantly in the magnitude of the safe minimum population size.

Because of this uncertainty, one of the first

questions that needs to be asked is whether or not there are
any existing mechanisms or rules that tend to divert effort
away from or towards populations where spawning size is
declining toward the safe minimum.

The answer to this ques-

tion is that few such rules exist in this fishery in contrast
to the herring and lobster industries.

In this regard, two

separate points need to be made.
(1)

The structure of the market itself could operate

to limit effort on over-exploited species.
so, however.

It does not do

The traditional economic argument is that below

some 'unspecified' population size, effort targeted at a
given species becomes uneconomic (except for a continuing
by-catch).

There is no

~

priori basis for determining

whether this economic minimum population exceeds or is exceeded by the safe minimum spawning population size.

Never-

theless, it is of some interest to consider those factors
which might affect the level of the economic minimum.
In a multiple species context, the most important factor
would appear to be the substitutability (i.e., price elasticity) of each species in the market.

The importance of sub-

stitutability for management is illustrated most easily by
reference to an extreme condition.

Suppose, for example,

that all species in the fishery were perfectly sUbstitutable
for one another in the market.

Under these circumstances the

species targeting of fishing effort would be purely according
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to availability, which, presumably, would be strongly correlated with species abundance.

In the best of all

possi~le

markets one would find that market forces effectively constrain fishing activity to maintain population above the
safe minimum level.

Unfortunately, the actual market for

the fishery hardly behaves in this way.

Price elasticities

appear to be fairly high for some traditional white meat
species, at least on an annual or longer term basis.
However, there is only a very limited market for large numbers of species composing a significant proportion of the
biomass (e.g. squid, whiting, etc.).
These problems appear to derive from the market structure (see Wilson 1980) which tends to restrict the geographical range of final consumption.

This has the effect of

closing off demand for many species regularly consumed outside this restricted geographical district.

Needless to

say, this lowers species substitutability at the ex-vessel
level, which, in turn, exacerbates
problem.

the long-term management

These same structural aspects of the market also

tend to give rise to a relatively rigid (in terms of individual species) supply contract structure.

The result is a

relatively marked price inelasticity and highly volatile
prices for almost all species in the short run.

This con-

tractual phenomenon presumably has the effect of retarding
the fishery's response to the declining abundance of a given
species, and, consequently, increasing the probability that
any given species might be driven below safe minimum population levels.
Since these structural aspects of the market are

them-

selves the result of significant impairments (Wilson 1980),
the strong implication is that fisheries management problems
may derive significantly not from behavioral impairments in
the fishery itself, but from impairments in its associated
markets.

In other words, policy directed towards the removal

of market impairments may have the effect of reducing the
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opportunity costs of reduced recruitment.
(2)

Size selectivity regulations and the competitive

impediments to a free flow of search information could aid
in maintaining safe minimum stock sizes.

The size selectivity

rules can increase the probability that each year class has
a chance to spawn at least once.

On the other hand, such

rules would appear to be of reduced benefit if they do not
also contribute to a higher probability of survival for fish
above the mean age of selectivity.

In other words, if the

throw of the dice is such that the fishery experiences several successive poor year classes, recruitment becomes heavily
dependent upon spawners from relatively old year classes.
These fish have been vulnerable to fishing mortality over a
long period of time.

And it is reasonable to expect that in

the absence of an intentional or unintentional mechanism for
reserving a part of this population, it could become dangerously small.

This outcome is likely to occur regardless of

whether traditional regulatory mechanisms (i.e. quotas, mesh
sizes, etc.) are in place or not.
This potential outcome suggests the need for a new rule
or set of rules which would operate in such a way as to selectively maintain a small but significant population of older
fish, more or less as a spawning stock reserve in the eventuality of successive poor or disastrous year classes.

Other

than the market induced tendencies to avoid the targeting of
effort on small populations, there would appear to be few or
no traditional rules appropriate to this particular problem.
Two kinds of possible regulations which might achieve this
end are permenent sanctuaries, and rules to protect very
large fish.

(The latter would be analagous to the law pro-

tecting lobsters in Maine over 5 inches on the carapace.)
The institutional structure of the fishery--and this we
stress--is such that no rules to beneficially affect recruitment have had a chance to develop.

The rules governments

have employed or suggested--basically quotas and limitation
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of effort--are the product of theoretical structures (i.e.,
dealing with the biological production function) which appear

to be inconsistent with the statistical record of the

fishery.

The new theoretical structures that are emerging

cast the recruitment problem in a slightly different light.
They suggest that the most economical regulations from the
standpoint of the society are those which can maintain a
small, mature population distributed over several year
classes.
I.

Conclusion
We have attempted in Part IV to outline what we feel is

a relatively simple, socially economic approach to fisheries
management.

Our institutional or behavioral approach differs

from the standard bio-economic approach in several important
aspects.

We do not see the fishing problem as different from

any other problem of socio-economic organization.

In all

cases, human interactions in either exchange or production
are subject to opportunities for individual gain which, in
the absence of prohibitive rules, threaten to destroy the
circumstances which give rise to the collective benefits of
trade and specialization.
tive problem of this sort.

"Overfishing"

is clearly a collec-

We propose that solutions are to

be found in the application of rules which are closely tailored to the particular context of the problem.

Furthermore,

these rules are themselves costly, and in order for any rules
to be socially economic, their cost must not exceed the social
opportunity cost of the problem.

In strong contrast to stand-

ard theory, there is no reason to believe on the basis of this
approach that fisheries resource property rights, or their
bureaucratic simulation, provide a clearly superior and socially
enconomical institutional context for the management of fisheries.
The need to manage fisheries is scarcely new.

The same

problems and the same solutions have been discussed for close
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to three centuries with little to show for it.

In 1759,

Hederstrom wrote:
"I wish to believe that with an increased
knowledge about these matters [the growth rates
of fish] at least some more reflecting husbandmen will be more prepared to spare the young
fish until it has reached its full size. To these
will belong especially those who are the owners of
lakes and thus sole beneficiaries of their good
economy. Also all persons who own shares in the
same lakes and fishing waters ought to agree on
the same economy with the small fish, both for
their own and for society's common and great
advantage in times to corne.
If this had been the
case in the past, we would not now suffer from
such a deficiency of fish and the lakes which
otherwise might be such excellent, rich, and
secure storerooms would not be empty."
(Hederstrom
1759:229.)
If our work does nothing more than orient fisheries
management efforts from focusing solely on property rights
toward an analysis of all of the social and cultural forces
that might be used in an effort to conserve fish stocks, it
will have been of some use.
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